Jeremy Bentham entend rompre avec les théories du contrat social et proposer une justification utilitariste de la démocratie. Or, aucune théorie de la démocratie ne peut se dispenser d’une théorie du « demos ». L’utilitarisme benthamien comporte ainsi un renouvellement de la question du peuple dans chacun de ses aspects, ontologique, politique et moral. Bentham développe une véritable théorie du peuple qui, bien que méconnue, constitue un tournant dans l’histoire de la philosophie politique.

La notion de « peuple » n’est pas un vain mot en philosophie politique. Elle fait l’objet d’une réflexion qui a, depuis un point de vue moderne, un double horizon ; d’une part, les deux Révolutions du XVIIIème siècle qui voient l’entrée du peuple sur la scène de l’Histoire ; d’autre part, J.-J. Rousseau et l’idée de « peuple autolégislateur » condition et principe de l’autonomie du peuple. Suivant cette compréhension classique, non seulement le « peuple » renvoie f...

Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed interest for the idea that experience generally includes an experience of the self – a self-experience – whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is also phenomenally aware of (...) the fact that it is presented to her. This supposed phenomenal dimension has been variously called “mineness”, “for-me-ness”, “pre-reflective self-awareness” and “subjective character”, among others. This view, associated with historical figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science, but also intense controversy. This book explores some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the explanation question. The volume also surveys various domains of human experience, both normal and pathological, where a “sense of self” might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness, introspection, memory, emotions and values, and offers insights into the possible relations between the notions of subjective awareness involved. The first part of the book is devoted to more sceptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the second, to more robust ones. (shrink)

In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...) notions in question, under the labels of “for-me-ness”, “me-ness” and “mineness”. Next, I argue that these notions are not equivalent; in particular, there is no conceptual implication from for-me-ness to me-ishness or mineness. Empirical considerations based on clinical cases additionally suggest that the three notions may also correspond to different properties (although the claim of conceptual non-equivalence does not depend on this further point). The aim is clarificatory, cautionary but also critical: I examine four existing arguments from subjective character that are fuelled by an undifferentiated use of the three notions, and find them to be flawed for this reason. (shrink)

Legislation banning gender-affirming medical care (GAMC) for minors is inconsistent with the Consensus Recommendations for Pediatric Decision-Making (Salter et al. 2023). Gender dysphoria is a medical condition, and GAMC promotes adolescents’ health interests. The evidence for GAMC is comparable to the evidence for other types of pediatric medical care. Parents are permitted to consent for similar risks in the treatment of other conditions. Evaluation of the potential benefits, risks, and treatment alternatives is contingent on individual patients’ clinical conditions and adolescents’ (...) and their parents’ values and preferences. Such decisions are within the scope of parental discretion and should be made through shared decision-making with health-care providers. Parents’ declining GAMC does not inherently create a significant risk of serious imminent harm required to justify state intervention. Usurping parental discretion for GAMC is unjust: it treats this medical care differently than other comparable types of medical care without sufficient justification. (shrink)

Comment une oeuvre esthétique peut-elle être en même temps philosophique, et inversement? Question classique à laquelle cet article se propose de répondre par une interprétation de trois albums du shock-rocker Marilyn Manson à la lumière de la notion deleuzienne de personnage conceptuel. Il s'agira ainsi de mettre au jour par l'exemple les conditions d'une rencontre improbable entre pensée artistique et pensée philosophique.

1. Introduction Ce numéro spécial dédié aux corpus d’ancien et moyen français, à leur constitution et à leur exploitation, vient après bien d’autres numéros de revues présentantl’usage des corpus en linguistique depuis une dizaine d’années. Mais celui-ci est spécifiquement consacré aux corpus concernant les périodes les plus anciennes de la langue, c’est-à-dire aux formes et pratiques linguistiques qui sont les plus différentes de ce que connaît et pratique le locuteur moderne, et pour lesque..

El artículo analiza la función de la teología cristiana en la sociedad actual. A tal fin, el autor comienza por sintetizar los elementos más característicos de la sociedad que se está gestando. En segundo lugar, propone la necesidad de una mediación cultural para la comunicación del evangelio. Seguidamente, el autor reclama el necesario diálogo de la teología con la cultura y la universidad. Y el estudio termina por presentar sintéticamente el papel de los centros superiores de enseñanza de la teología, (...) según las recomendaciones de la Veritatis Gaudium del papa Francisco. (shrink)

Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed interest for the idea that experience generally includes an experience of the self—a self-experience—whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is also phenomenally aware of the fact that it (...) is presented to her. This supposed phenomenal dimension has been variously called “mineness,” “for-me-ness,” “pre-reflective self-awareness,” and “subjective character,” among others. This view, associated with historical figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of cognitive science, but also intense controversy. This book explores some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the explanation question. The volume also surveys various domains of human experience, both normal and pathological, where a “sense of self” might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness, introspection, memory, emotions, and values, and offers insights into the possible relations between the notions of subjective awareness involved. The first part of the book is devoted to more skeptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the second, to more robust ones. (shrink)

One broadly recognised characteristic feature of (a core subset of) the self-attributions constitutive of self-knowledge is that they are ‘immune to error through misidentification’ (hereafter IEM). In the last thirty years, Evans’s notion of “identification-freedom” (Evans 1982) has been central to most classical approaches to IEM. In the Evansian picture, it is not clear, however, whether there is room for a description of what may be the strongest and most interesting variant of IEM; namely what Pryor (1999) has first brought (...) to the fore under the name “Which-object IEM”, and which I’ll prefer calling existential IEM. I argue that recent development of relativist frameworks in semantics and pragmatics, particularly in Recanati (2007a-b), (2009), (2010), (2012a), may be precisely of a nature to address this limitation. The relativist theory of IEM, and in particular its suitability to cover existential IEM, may superficially seem to stem from a rejection of the core elements of the classical identification-freedom approach. However, I hope to show that, modulo a clarification and richer un-derstanding of the relevant notions of identification and identification-freedom, the relativist theory of IEM can be seen as both pushing further and complementing Evans’s intuitions, rather than conflicting with them. (shrink)

Prayer and the temple were two of the most prominent themes in the Third Gospel and they have garnered scholarly interest. However, the discussion about prayer vis-à-vis the temple in Luke’s special source (L) has gone unnoticed. Using source criticism and narrative criticism, the research shows a connection between prayer and the temple in L. The relationship between the two reflects the development from a belief in the temple as a place for praying and receiving an answer, to Jesus who (...) intercedes for the people. This article argues that the prayer in Luke’s special source revealed Jesus as the new, personified temple through whom the L communities prayed and received answers to their prayers. Based on this finding, this article then shows the possible reconstruction of the separation between Judaism and Christianity from the perspective of L communities. Contribution: This article contributes to the discussion on Lukan Christology by proposing that Jesus is the new personified temple as understood by the L communities. Such a depiction lends new support to Dunn’s reconstruction of the parting of the ways between Jews and Christians. (shrink)

Corporate governance guidelines are a mechanism that a firm can enact which should reduce agency costs and better align the interests of boards and the suppliers of capital. This study examines stock price reactions primarily attributable to institutional investors occurring when corporations announce the enactment of corporate governance guidelines. A final sample of 77 firms was derived from the first announcement of corporate governance guidelines exclusive to the SEC-EDGAR database. The results indicate that good governance does matter. Firms that announced (...) the enactment of corporate governance guidelines experienced increased stock prices following the announcements. There was an immediate (days 1–4) reaction for firms that provided all or part of the guidelines’ substance; a delayed (days 8–10) reaction occurred for those firms that only referenced the guidelines’ enactment. Additionally, firms with either a potentially greater following or that had a previous history of acrimonious relations with stakeholders were rewarded by the announcement of the enactment of guidelines. (shrink)

SOME MODERN THOMISTS claiming to follow the lead of Thomas Aquinas, hold that the objects of the types of mathematics known in the thirteenth century, such as the arithmetic of whole numbers and Euclidean geometry, are real entities. In scholastic terms they are not beings of reason but real beings. In his once-popular scholastic manual, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, Joseph Gredt maintains that, according to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the object of mathematics is real quantity, either discrete quantity in arithmetic or (...) continuous quantity in geometry. The mathematician considers the essence of quantity in abstraction from its relation to real existence in bodily substance. "When quantity is considered in this way," he writes, "it is not a being of reason but a real being. Nevertheless it is so abstractly considered that it leaves out of account both real and conceptual existence." Recent mathematicians, Gredt continues, extend their speculation to fictitious quantity, which has conceptual but not real being; for example, the fourth dimension, which by its essence positively excludes a relation to real existence. According to Gredt this is a special, transcendental mathematics essentially distinct from "real mathematics," and belonging to it only by reduction. (shrink)

It is generally recognized that the content of a philosophy cannot be adequately understood apart from the form in which it is couched and the style of reasoning with which it is supported. Matter and form go together in a philosophy, as they do in all human creations and everywhere in nature. Thus, Werner Jaeger has shown the importance of form in the development of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Julius Stenzel has stressed the interrelation of dialectical method and content in the (...) philosophy of Plato. In the study of the philosophies of the Middle Ages the common scholastic method has long been the object of attention; but, with the exception of Thomism, their individual and special modes of procedure and styles of reasoning have largely been neglected. All too often they have been studied with an eye simply to their content, as “static systems of conceptions”, with little if any regard for their living form and method. (shrink)

Ouvrages Cathiard Marie-Agnès & Rebière Catherine, Lecture labiale pour l’adulte devenu sourd, 1re éd., Paris, De Boeck Supérieur, 2020, 192 p. Cathiard Marie-Agnès, Vivre avec des prothèses auditives ou des implants cochléaires, éditeur Books On Demand, 2022, 192 p. Directions d’ouvrages collectifs – Ouvrages en collaboration Cathiard Marie-Agnès & Pajon Patrick, Les imaginaires du cerveau, Fernelmont, Intercommunications & Éditions Modulaires Européennes, coll. « Transversales philosophique...

Malgré les déclarations d'intention et les efforts des écologistes, la planète est en danger. Ses ennemis cherchent un profit immédiat à empoisonner l'air, les sols et l'eau, à abattre les arbres et les animaux. Ils trouvent un intérêt à détruire la réalité pour lui substituer un monde virtuel contrôlable. Cet essai invite à établir de nouvelles relations entre la planète et les hommes.

Prayer, the central spirituality in the theological and ethical life of Christ’s disciples, has not yet received significant attention from Johannine scholars. Although some scholars emphasised and discussed prayer in the New Testament, Johannine scholars have failed to recognise the significance of prayer in the Fourth Gospel. Using narrative criticism the article aims to uncover the relationship between prayer and koinonia in the Fourth Gospel. The research on the theme of prayer and koinonia conducted in the Fourth Gospel has yielded (...) the finding that prayer was a manifestation of abiding in Jesus. Koinonia was a form of prayer. Contribution: The article fills the lacuna in Johannine studies, more specifically, in the field of prayer and koinonia. The article, which is in line with the scope of HTS Theological Studies, and offers a new interpretation of prayer and koinonia in the Fourth Gospel. (shrink)

The indexical word “I” has traditionally been assumed to be an overt analogue to the concept of self, and the best model for understanding it. This approach, I argue, overlooks the essential role of cognitive phenomenology in the mastery of the concept of self. I suggest that a better model is to be found in a different kind of representation: phenomenal concepts or more generally phenomenally grounded concepts. I start with what I take to be the defining feature of the (...) concept of self, namely its “super-reflexivity”: to use this concept is not just to think of oneself, but to think of oneself as the thinker of the present thought. I call this familiar observation the “Thinker Intuition”. I review some shortcomings of the indexical model of the concept of self, which is the classical account of the Thinker Intuition. I go on to propose a different account, the “phenomenal model”, according to which the concept of self is a phenomenally grounded concept, anchored in a generic kind of cognitive phenomenolog... (shrink)

It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible appeal (...) to cognitive economy, the relativist theory does not fully account for the epistemic profile that distinguishes de se thinking, as some of its proponents hope to do. A deeper worry concerns the reliance of the theory on a primitive notion of “centre” that hasn’t yet received enough critical attention, and is ambiguous between a thin and a rich reading. I argue that while the rich reading is required if the relativist analysis of the de se is to achieve its most ambitious aims, it also deprives the theory of much of its explanatory power. (shrink)

In their recent paper, “Practical Knowledge without Luminosity,” Bob Beddor and Carlotta Pavese (2022) claim that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions, or “essentialism,” is false. Essentialism states that some actions are essentially intentional, such that, “whenever they are performed, they are performed intentionally” (2022, p. 926). Beddor and Pavese work to reject essentialism, which figures as a key premise in Juan Piñeros Glasscock’s anti-luminosity argument against the knowledge condition for intentional action (Piñeros Glasscock, p. 1240). Historically, essentialism has received (...) little attention from philosophers since its inception in Elizabeth Anscombe’s Intention (2000, §47). However, I believe that essentially intentional actions can play an important role in an ontology of action. In my paper, I develop and argue for a variety of essentialism in the context of naive action theory, which I call naive essentialism. Naive essentialism is a two-fold thesis, which claims that (1) essentially intentional actions exist, and (2) that essentially intentional actions ground accidentally intentional actions. My paper has four parts. In the first part, I distinguish between essentially and accidentally intentional actions, and unpack the relevant principles of naive action theory. Second, I present the grounding thesis that accidentally intentional actions are grounded in essentially intentional actions. Next, I provide an argument for the existence of essentially intentional actions. Lastly, I briefly respond to a possible objection to my argument. The upshot of my arguments is that essentially intentional actions form the metaphysical and explanatory bedrock in a naive ontology of action, and that there are good reasons for accepting a key premise in Piñeros Glasscock’s anti-luminosity argument. (shrink)

Durante la primera mitad del siglo XIII, las obras de Aristóteles sobre filosofía natural, metafísica, psicología y ética se tradujeron al latín, junto con sus comentarios árabes y griegos. En estos escritos, el mundo medieval tuvo que confrontarse con una visión filosófica y científica del universo, cuya naturaleza era altamente superior a cualquiera otra conocida hasta entonces. El efecto de este descubrimiento fue verdaderamente vigorizante y, cuando estas obras se difundieron en las universidades, tuvo lugar una profunda revolución en la (...) mente medieval. Los efectos de esa revolución aún se sienten en nuestro tiempo. (shrink)

We argue that relating to myself as me provides, as such, a reason to care about myself: grasping that an event involves me, instead of another, makes it matter in a special way. Further, this self-concern is not simply a matter of seeing in myself some instrumental value for other ends. We use as our foil a recent skeptical challenge to this view offered in Setiya (2015). We think the case against self-concern is powered by unwarrantedly narrow construals of three (...) key notions. One is the notion of a first-personal way of relating to oneself. A narrow account of the first person in terms of special epistemic relations to oneself makes it easy to overlook a source of non-instrumental reasons of self-concern, located in the special relation a subject has to herself as agent. Two is the notion of what it is to be a reason. And three is the notion of self-concern itself. We show that the skeptical case rests in part on a slide towards neighbouring but distinct notions of egoism and selfishness. We also argue that Setiya’s notion of self-love, offered to capture the pre-theoretical intuition of self-concern, cannot do it justice. (shrink)

We argue that relating to myself as me provides, as such, a reason to care about myself: grasping that an event involves me, instead of another, makes it matter in a special way. Further, this self-concern is not simply a matter of seeing in myself some instrumental value for other ends. We use as our foil a recent skeptical challenge to this view offered in Setiya 2015. We think the case against self-concern is powered by unwarrantedly narrow construals of three (...) key notions. One is the notion of a first-personal way of relating to oneself. A narrow account of the first person in terms of special epistemic relations to oneself makes it easy to overlook a source of non-instrumental reasons of self-concern, located in the special relation a subject has to herself as agent. Two is the notion of what it is to be a reason. And, three, is the notion of self-concern itself. We show that the skeptical case rests in part on a slide towards neighbouring but distinct notions of egoism and selfishness. We also argue that Setiya’s notion of self-love, offered to capture the pre-theoretical intuition of self-concern, cannot do it justice. (shrink)

Health care institutions have paid increasing attention to preventing nosocomial transmission of influenza through vaccination of health care personnel. While multifaceted voluntary interventions have increased vaccination rates, proponents of mandatory programs contend the rates remain unacceptably low. Conventional bioethical analyses of mandatory programs are inadequate; they fail to account for the obligations of nonprofessional personnel or to justify the weights assigned to different ethical principles. Using an ethics framework for public health permits a fuller analysis. The framework's focus on fairness (...) accentuates the potential differences between the risk of transmitting infection and employment status, and the need to equitably evaluate exemptions. The framework's emphasis on balancing benefits and burdens highlights the need to justify a specific goal and questions the need to exclude all nonmedical exemptions. While mandatory vaccination programs are justifiable, greater attention should be paid to their implementation. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 25-27.

Table of contents -- Foreword by klaus schwab -- Author biographies -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction - by armand doucet & jelmer evers -- education in a time of unprecedented change by michael soskil -- education today: a collection of snapshots by elisa guerra -- - overcoming equity gaps in and through education by michael soskil -- Teach me: the learner profile by armand doucet -- the power of learning by nadia lopez -- contextualizing personalization in education by (...) class='Hi'>armand doucet -- Evolution of technology in the classroom by koen timmers -- flip the system: the networked activist teacher by jelmer evers -- Conclusion- by armand doucet & jelmer evers -- Epilogue by andreas schleicher. (shrink)

La Base de français médiéval (BFM) fait partie des corpus de français médiéval (9e-15e s.) les plus anciens et les plus utilisés par les linguistes diachroniciens et plus largement par tous ceux qui s’intéressent à l’histoire du français. Elle est le fruit d’une collaboration entre linguistes-philologues et spécialistes de la méthode textométrique implémentée dans la plateforme TXM. L’article présente un état des lieux du corpus BFM2022 focalisé sur la représentativité et l’interopérabilité des données. Il illustre l’apport des outils numériques pour (...) l’équilibrage des données et présente la stratégie de standardisation multi-niveau (structure textuelle, références, métadonnées, annotations) ayant permis à la Base de s’intégrer à des corpus diachroniques plus étendus pour des recherches en diachronie longue. (shrink)