Figuren des Akrobatischen sind in der Literatur der Moderne omnipräsent. Zwischen 1850 und 1925 werden sie zum Träger poetischer, philosophischer und politischer Visionen der Zeit. Um die lange Jahrhundertwende bricht sich in Europa eine überwältigende Faszination für Zirkus und Varieté Bahn: Das Artistenmilieu wird motivischer Stichwortgeber der Künste, Projektionsfläche antibürgerlicher Imaginationen und gesellschaftsutopischer Gegenerzählungen. Im Kontext dieses Popularitätshochs gerät das akrobatische Vermögen den literarischen Taktgebern der Zeit zum Träger einer vielgestaltigen Semantik der Überschreitung: Flaubert erklärt sich zum Artisten, Kafka zum (...) Kunstreiter, Baudelaire fordert akrobatische Disziplin, Nietzsche seiltänzerische Kühnheit. Als Grenzgänger, der scheinbar mühelos die Schwerkraft überwindet und unter Einsatz des Lebens über dem Abgrund balanciert, gilt der Akrobat noch den Avantgarden als programmatisches Symbol für ein neues Subjektverständnis im Spannungsfeld von spielerischer Leichtigkeit und tödlichem Ernst, von Disziplin und Überwältigung, von Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit. Anna Luhn untersucht die Konzeptualisierungen des Akrobatischen im literarischen Diskursraum der Moderne erstmals in ihren historischen Voraussetzungen, ästhetischen Effekten und utopischen Fluchtpunkten. (shrink)

The Oxford English Dictionary says that a rite is ‘a formal procedure or act in a religious or other solemn observance’. The word comes into English through the French rite from the Latin ritus . Its original meaning escapes etymologists; and this is a mixed blessing, for we neither can nor must attempt a retrieval of its hidden roots. We are told by respectable etymologists that the word is associated from earliest times with Latin religious usage, but that even in (...) the early Latin it was already extended to ‘custom, usage, manner or way’ of a non-religious sort. [Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary .] So, too, in modern languages the terms ‘rite’ and ‘ritual’ have specifically religious meaning, but they are also used in social and cultural settings that we would not call religious. What first strikes us about the terms ’ and ‘ritual’ is an emphasis upon a certain formality, upon a regular and stable way in which an action or set of actions is to be performed. A ritual is more than a formalism, however, since there are formalisms that are not rites, such as the logical rules for making a valid argument. Moreover, the term is frequently associated with the terms ‘myth’, ‘symbol’ and ‘faith’. These, too, are primarily religious, but are also extended to non-religious contexts. Indeed, there seems to be a network of such terms whose usage touches upon some extraordinary quality in things. Like them, the term ‘ritual’ shares both a wide variety of meanings and a certain hint of impropriety. The variety of ritual forms is notorious, ranging from the most sacred religious liturgies to the absurdities of a fraternity initiation; and the impropriety of the term breaks out whenever we brand a certain action ‘ritualistic’, just as we sometimes refer slightingly to an assertion, saying it is ‘mythical’, ‘merely symbolic’ or ‘credulous’. (shrink)

Why do organizations need to learn? This question will be discussed in this article, as well as the definition and characteristics of learning organizations. The reader will get a comprehensive description of a learning organization based on Peter M. Senge “The fifth discipline” to understand how a learning organization differs from traditional organizations. The final chapter will get an outlook that future learning processes within networks will have a stronger role, since it allows a better understanding between intraorganizational and interorganizational (...) learning processes. Purpose of the article: This article will lead you within the topic of learning organizations. It will set a first input to different approaches how a learning organization can be defined and get established.Through this the reader will get an impression that a common vision is very important for these approches. So this article will set a first trigger for the interested reader for learning organisazations. Methodology/methods: Literature study for creation of new knowledge due to scientific work.Scientific aim: The reader will get a comprehensive description of a learning organization based on Peter M. Senge “The fifth discipline” to understand how a learning organization differs from traditional organizations due to literatur study. The article will show that there is still a lot of research potential to create a role model concept for the implementation of a learning organizsation. Findings: Due to the inconsistent research results further multifaceted approaches remain to gather further research results. As more people will be employed in organizations, communication will become a more important component within a learning organization. Furher more a common vision is very important to establish a learning organization. Conclusions : Core issue lies in questioning how learning processes of individuals and within organizations are working. The various concepts for “learning organization” describing organizational learning, to constantly expand the learning ability of organizations and, consequently, the skills to solve problems from individuals and organizations itself. Here the integrative approaches e.g. the fifth discipline try to close the research gap and clarify the phenomenon of organizational learning.. Due to the inconsistent research results further multifaceted approaches remain to gather further research results. As more people will be employed in organizations, communication will become a more important component within a learning organization.. Different approaches showed the importance of communication within learning organizations as a fundamental component of those. Following the results of these concepts, it is important to promote collective learning processes so that organizational learning can occur.. In future learning within networks will get a more and more important role, as it allows to forster the understanding between intraorganisational and interorganizational learning processes.. (shrink)

BackgroundThe theory and practice of ethics consultations (ECs) in health care are still characterized by many controversies, including, for example, the practice of giving recommendations. These controversies are complicated by an astonishing lack of evidence in the whole field. It is not clear how often a recommendation is issued in ethics consultations and when and why this step is taken. Especially in a facilitation model in which giving recommendations is optional, more data would be helpful to evaluate daily practice, ensure (...) that this practice is in line with the overarching goals of this approach and support the development of standards.MethodsWe analyzed all consultations requested from an EC service working under a facilitation approach at a maximum-care university hospital in Germany over a period of more than 10 years. Our aim was to better understand why—and under what circumstances—some consultation requests result in a recommendation, whereas others can be sufficiently addressed solely by facilitated meetings. We especially wanted to know when and why clients felt the need for clear advice from the EC service while in other cases they did not. We compared ethics consultations in terms of the differences between cases with and without recommendations issued by the ethics consultants using χ2 difference tests and Welch’s t-test.ResultsA total of 243 ECs were carried out between September 2008 and December 2019. In approximately half of the cases, a recommendation was given. All recommendations were issued upon the request of clients. When physicians asked for an EC, the consultation was significantly more likely to result in a recommendation than when the EC was requested by any other party. ECs in cases on wards with ethics rounds resulted in comparably fewer recommendations than those in wards without ethics rounds. When interpersonal conflicts were part of the problem or relatives were present in the meeting, clients less frequently asked for a recommendation.ConclusionFrom the client’s point of view, there does not seem to be only one “right” way to provide ethics consultations, but rather several. While facilitated meetings are obviously appreciated by clients, there also seem to be situations in which a recommendation is desired (especially by physicians). Further empirical and theoretical research is needed to validate our single-center results and re-evaluate the role of recommendations in ethics consultations. (shrink)

First of all, this paper aims at a clarification of Wittgenstein's conception of grammatical propositions. Their essential characteristics will be developed and some of the central questions concerning their status will be discussed: Should grammatical propositions be seen as arbitrary conventions? How do they work in practices? And how do they relate to natural facts? Later on, the two propositions "Every rod has a length" and "Sensations are private" will be discussed in more detail, for both fulfil three important features (...) of grammatical propositions: They are not empirical descriptions, they are rules of a practice, and they are not knowledge-claims but express insights. Focussing on the grammar of pain language, it will be shown what kind of interdependency exists between grammar and natural facts. It will also turn out that some grammatical propositions are closely connected to our understanding of living a human form of life. (shrink)

The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928). In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of (...) Philosophy, published in German in a series of volumes between 1964 and 1980. Schmitz’s System is centred on the claim that the contemporary view of the human subject is the result of a consequential historical process: A reductionist and ‘introjectionist’ objectification of lived experience culminating in the ‘invention’ of the mind (or ‘soul’) as a private, inner realm of subjective experience and in a corresponding ‘grinding down’ of the world of lived experienced to a meagre, value-neutral ‘objective reality’. To counter this intellectualist trend, Schmitz puts to use his approach to phenomenology with the aim of regaining a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience—hoping to make up for what was lost during the development of Western intellectual culture. Since both this text and the overall style of Schmitz’s philosophising are in several ways unusual for a contemporary readership, a brief introduction is provided by philosophers Jan Slaby and Rudolf Owen Müllan, the latter of whom translated Schmitz’s text into English. The introduction emphasises aspects of Schmitz’s philosophy that are likely to be of relevance to contemporary scholars of phenomenological philosophy and to its potential applications in science and society. (shrink)

This paper discusses Raimo Tuomela's we-mode account in his recent book "Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents" and develops the idea that mode should be thought of as representational. I argue that in any posture – intentional state or speech act – we do not merely represent a state of affairs as what we believe, or intend etc. – as the received view of 'propositional attitudes' has it –, but our position relative to that state of affairs and thus (...) ourselves. That is, we represent the subject through what I call "subject mode" and its position through what I call "position mode". I argue that the key to understanding collective intentionality is to understand how we represent others as co-subjects of positions rather than as their objects. This is shown on various levels of collective intentionality. On the non-conceptual level of joint attention we experience others as co-subjects who we attend with rather than to and who we are at least also disposed to act jointly with. On the conceptual level of the we-mode we represent others as co-subjects of positions of knowledge, intention, belief and shared values. Organizations and thus group agents in Tuomela's sense I propose to understand in terms of what I call "role mode", that is, in terms of the positions individuals and groups take as occupants of certain roles, for example, as committee members, or as chancellor of Germany. I try to show how this account, while very much in the spirit of Tuomela's, can avoid his fictionalism about group agents and some other problems of his account, while steering between the Scylla of excessive individualism and the Charybdis of extreme collectivism. (shrink)

In this paper I want to introduce and defend what I call the "subject mode account" of collective intentionality. I propose to understand collectives from joint attention dyads over small informal groups of various types to organizations, institutions and political entities such as nation states, in terms of their self-awareness. On the subject mode account, the self-consciousness of such collectives is constitutive for their being. More precisely, their self-representation as subjects of joint theoretical and practical positions towards the world – (...) rather than as objects of such positions – makes them what they are. Members of such collectives represent each other as co-subjects of such positions and thus represent the world from the point of view of the collective. (shrink)

A perceptual realism that is naive in a good way must be naively realistic about world and mind. But contemporary self-described naive realists often have trouble acknowledging that both the good cases of successful perception and the bad cases of illusion and hallucination involve internal experiential states with intentional contents that present the world as being a certain way. They prefer to think about experience solely in relational terms because they worry that otherwise we won’t be able to escape from (...) radical skepticism. I argue that experiential relations to objects require that their subjects be in internal experiential states. But this does not mean that these states are our epistemological starting point which can be known independently of any knowledge of the external world. We do escape the epistemological predicament of radical skepticism because the good cases are primary over the bad ones. But this is not because the good cases alone provide reasons for belief, but because we do not need a reason to think we are in a good case, but do need a reason to think we are not, and such a reason must come from a good case. So bad cases can only be thought of as deviations from good cases. And we can only understand experiences as states with contents distinct from their objects and present in good and bad cases once we understand misrepresentation, that is, bad cases, and therefore only as we ascribe knowledge of the external world to ourselves. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize theory-biased and overly individualist approaches to understanding others and introduce the PAIR account of joint attention as a pragmatic, affectively charged intentional relation. I argue that this relation obtains in virtue of intentional contents in the minds of the co-attenders, and – against the received understanding of intentional states as propositional attitudes – that we should recognize what I call “subject mode” and “position mode” intentional content. Based on findings from developmental psychology, I propose that (...) subject mode content represents the co-attenders as co-subjects, who are like them and who are at least disposed to act jointly with them. I conclude by arguing that in joint attention we experience and understand affective, actional and perceptual relations at a non-conceptual level prior to the differentiation of mind and body. (shrink)

In addition to the Frege point, Frege also argued for the force-content distinction from the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. I argue that this fact more readily supports the view that questions operate on and present assertions and other forceful acts themselves. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled as has recently been proposed. Rather higher level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed (...) assertive or directive acts that are forceful and committal, while suspending commitment to them. The Frege point confounds different varieties of force and the question whether something is merely presented for consideration with the question what is so presented. Force is representational: through assertoric and directive force indicators subjects non-conceptually present positions of theoretical or practical knowledge, while interrogative acts indicate positions of wondering which strive for such knowledge. (shrink)

The contribution deals with knowledge of what to do, and how, where, when and why to do it, as it is found in a multitude of plans, rules, procedures, maxims, and other instructions. It is argued that while this knowledge is conceptual and propositional, it is still irreducible to theoretical knowledge of what is the case and why it is the case. It is knowledge of goals, of ends and means, rather than of facts. It is knowledge-to that is irreducibly (...) practical in having world to mind direction of fit and the essential function of guiding as yet uncompleted action. While practical knowledge is fundamentally different from theoretical knowledge in terms of mind-world relations, the practical and theoretical domains are still parallel in terms of justificatory and inferential relations, they are like mirror images of one another. It is shown that if this view of practical knowledge is accepted, convincing Gettier cases for practical knowledge can be constructed. An extensive analysis of these cases demonstrates the usefulness of the notions of practical deduction, abduction, and induction. (shrink)

How can people function appropriately and respond normatively in social contexts even if they are not aware of rules governing these contexts? John Searle has rightly criticized a popular way out of this problem by simply asserting that they follow them unconsciously. His alternative explanation is based on his notion of a preintentional, nonrepresentational background. In this paper I criticize this explanation and the underlying account of the background and suggest an alternative explanation of the normativity of elementary social practices (...) and of the background itself. I propose to think of the background as being intentional, but nonconceptual, and of the basic normativity or proto-normativity as being instituted through common sensory-motor-emotional schemata established in the joint interactions of groups. The paper concludes with some reflections on what role this level of collective intentionality and the notion of the background can play in a layered account of the social mind and the ontology of the social world. (shrink)

This volume aims at giving the reader an overview over the most recent theoretical and methodological findings in a new and rapidly evolving area of current theory of society: social ontology.

BackgroundEthics consultation is recognized as an opportunity to share responsibility for difficult decisions in prenatal medicine, where moral intuitions are often unable to lead to a settled decision. It remains unclear, however, if the general standards of ethics consultation are applicable to the very particular setting of pregnancy.Main textWe sought to analyze the special nature of disagreements, conflicts and value uncertainties in prenatal medicine as well as the ways in which an ethics consultation service (ECS) could possibly respond to them (...) and illustrated our results with a case example. Ethics facilitation and conflict mediation, currently, have no broadly consented normative framework encompassing prenatal diagnosis and therapy as well as reproductive choice to draw on. Even so, they can still be helpful instruments for ethically challenging decision-making in prenatal medicine provided two additional rules are respected: For the time being, ECSs should (a) refrain from issuing content-heavy recommendations in prenatal medicine and (b) should not initiate conflict mediations that would involve the pregnant woman or couple as a conflict party.ConclusionIt seems to be vital that ethics consultants as well as health care professionals acknowledge the current limitations and pitfalls of ethics consultation in prenatal medicine and together engage in the advancement of standards for this particularly complex setting. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Zulässigkeit genetischer Untersuchungen an Arbeitnehmern wird in Deutschland neu diskutiert, nachdem einer hessischen Lehrerin die Verbeamtung auf Probe zunächst verweigert wurde, weil ihr Vater an der Huntington-Krankheit leidet. Es soll untersucht werden, ob eine gesetzliche Regelung genetischer Untersuchungen in der Arbeitsmedizin wünschenswert ist und welche ethischen Maßstäbe dabei zu berücksichtigen wären. Gendiagnostische Untersuchungsverfahren im engeren Sinn finden noch keine breite Anwendung in der Arbeits- und Betriebsmedizin. Die Nutzung genetischer Informationen gehört aber auch hier zum Standard. Damit sind verschiedene ethische (...) Konflikte verbunden, die insbesondere die Bereiche Autonomie und Diskriminierung betreffen. Gesetzliche Regelungen sollten sich daher nicht an der jeweiligen gendiagnostischen Technologie orientieren, sondern an der prognostisch-prädiktiven Qualität genetischen Wissens. Das Machtungleichgewicht am Arbeitsplatz und die immanenten Interessenkonflikte machen gesetzliche Regelungen erforderlich, die angesichts der zunehmenden Verfügbarkeit prädiktiver medizinischer Informationen Personenrechte schützen und einen fairen Interessenausgleich fördern. (shrink)

In the absence of pre‐established communicative conventions, people create novel communication systems to successfully coordinate their actions toward a joint goal. In this study, we address two types of such novel communication systems: sensorimotor communication, where the kinematics of instrumental actions are systematically modulated, versus symbolic communication. We ask which of the two systems co‐actors preferentially create when aiming to communicate about hidden object properties such as weight. The results of three experiments consistently show that actors who knew the weight (...) of an object transmitted this weight information to their uninformed co‐actors by systematically modulating their instrumental actions, grasping objects of particular weights at particular heights. This preference for sensorimotor communication was reduced in a fourth experiment where co‐actors could communicate with weight‐related symbols. Our findings demonstrate that the use of sensorimotor communication extends beyond the communication of spatial locations to non‐spatial, hidden object properties. (shrink)

For researchers who study technology designs, the application and execution of so-called design-oriented research projects are a common way of funding their research. Against this background, we propose a new methodical approach with which VSD can easily be implemented in such projects and which we call “value declaration”. We share our experience with this method which we gained in two design-oriented research projects.

The Frege point to the effect that e.g. the clauses of conditionals are not asserted and therefore cannot be assertions is often taken to establish a dichotomy between the content of a speech act, which is propositional and belongs to logic and semantics, and its force, which belongs to pragmatics. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks and Francois Recanati, who propose act-theoretic accounts of propositions, argue that we can’t account for propositional unity independently of (...) the forceful acts of speakers, and respond to the Frege point by appealing to a notion of force cancellation. I argue that the notion of force cancellation is faced with a dilemma and offer an alternative response to the Frege point, which extends the act-theoretic account to logical acts such as conditionalizing or disjoining. Such higher-level acts allow us to present forceful acts while suspending commitment to them. In connecting them, a subject rather commits to an affirmation function of such acts. In contrast, the Frege point confuses a lack of commitment to what is put forward with a lack of commitment or force in what is put forward. (shrink)

[This is an old version which is superseded by the published version. I keep it here for the record, as it has been cited.] A strict dichotomy between the force / mode of speech acts and intentional states and their propositional content has been a central feature of analytical philosophy of language and mind since the time of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks (2015, 2016) and Francois Recanati (2016), (...) who argue that we can't account for propositional unity independently of the forceful acts of speakers and propose new ways of responding to the notorious 'Frege point' by appealing to a notion of force cancellation. In my paper I will offer some supplementary criticisms of the traditional view, but also a way of reconceptualizing the force-content distinction which allows us to preserve certain of its features, and an alternative response to the Frege point that rejects the notion of force cancellation in favor of an appeal to intentional acts that create additional forms of unity at higher levels of intentional organization: acts such as questioning a statement or order, or merely putting it forward or entertaining it; pretending to state or order; or conjoining or disjoining statements or orders. This allows us to understand how we can present a forceful act without being committed to it. In contrast, the Frege point confuses a lack of commitment to with a lack of commitment or force in what is put forward. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie in den vergangenen Monaten auf den Weg gebrachten Initiativen zur Änderung des Schwangerschaftskonfliktgesetzes in Deutschland betonen den grundsätzlichen Stellenwert der Schwangerenberatung vor und nach Pränataldiagnostik und damit auch die Bedeutung der Entscheidung der Schwangeren. Vorstellbar und zum Teil auch bereits eingerichtet sind darüber hinaus Beratungsstrukturen für die in einen Abbruch involvierten Ärzte. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen von Beratung für die Schwangere wie auch für die beteiligten Ärzte bei (späten) Schwangerschaftsabbrüchen. Die umfassende Beratung der Schwangeren kann (...) sowohl der Sicherung selbstbestimmter Entscheidungen als auch dem Schutz des ungeborenen Lebens dienen. Die hypothetisch-stellvertretenden Entscheidungen der zur Arztberatung eingerichteten Kommissionen aber lassen nicht nur Zweifel an ihrer Legitimation, sondern ebenso an dem grundsätzlichen Umgang mit der medizinischen Indikation aufkommen. Gesetzesinitiativen in diesem Bereich müssen sich deshalb auch mit der medizinischen Indikation befassen, wenn eine umfassende und konsequente Regelung angestrebt wird. (shrink)

The book presents the first comprehensive survey of limits of the intentional control of action from an interdisciplinary perspective. It brings together leading scholars from philosophy, psychology, and the law to elucidate this theoretically and practically important topic from a variety of theoretical and disciplinary approaches. It provides reflections on conceptual foundations as well as a wealth of empirical data and will be a valuable resource for students and researchers alike. Among the authors: Clancy Blair, Todd S. Braver, Michael W. (...) Cole, Anika Fäsche, Maayan Davidov, Peter Gollwitzer, Kai Robin Grzyb, Tobias Heikamp, Gabriele Oettingen, Rachel McKinnon, Nachschon Meiran, Hans Christian Röhl, Michael Schmitz, John R. Searle, Gottfried Seebaß, Gisela Trommsdorff, Felix Thiede, J. Lukas Thürmer, Frank Wieber. (shrink)

Although training in self-regulated learning is effective in improving performance, human trainers can reach only a few people at a time. We developed a web-based training for potentially unlimited numbers of participants based on the process model of SRL by Schmitz and Wiese. A prior study observed positive effects on self-reported SRL and self-efficacy. In the present randomized controlled trial, we investigated an improved version of the web-based training, augmented by the application of peer feedback groups. Prospective university students (...) in an online mathematics preparation course were assigned randomly to one of four experimental conditions: Group D, group TD, group TDP, and group C. Complete data was obtained for 136 participants. The learning diary was intended to trigger goal setting, planning, and self-motivation in the morning and reflection in the evening. The web-based training consisted of three lessons with videos, presentations, self-tests, and exercises. In the peer feedback condition, participants were randomly assigned to groups of five persons each and used a bulletin board to discuss pre-defined topics related to the content of the web-based training. Outcome measures included a test of declarative SRL knowledge, an SRL questionnaire, a general self-efficacy scale, log file data, and a mathematics test. Results showed positive effects for the web-based training, particularly when combined with peer feedback on both SRL knowledge and SRL questionnaires, self-efficacy, and on objective time-investment, but not on the mathematics test. The learning diary did not exhibit positive effects. We conclude that additional peer-feedback seems to be a useful supplement to web-based trainings with comparably low organizational costs. (shrink)

1 L’oggettivazione psicologistico-riduzonistico-introiettivistica Nella seconda metà del V secolo a. C. si ha in Grecia una radicale conversione del modo in cui l’uomo intende se stesso e il mondo nel quadro della cultura intellettuale europea che da quel momento sarà poi dominante: si tratta dell’oggettivazione psicologistico-riduzionistico-introiettivistica. Il mondo empirico viene smembrato in seguito alla separazione di un mondo interiore psichico ritenuto diverso per ogni possessore di c...