We provide a retrospective of 25 years of the International Conference on AI and Law, which was first held in 1987. Fifty papers have been selected from the thirteen conferences and each of them is described in a short subsection individually written by one of the 24 authors. These subsections attempt to place the paper discussed in the context of the development of AI and Law, while often offering some personal reactions and reflections. As a whole, the subsections build into (...) a history of the last quarter century of the field, and provide some insights into where it has come from, where it is now, and where it might go. (shrink)
Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.
This is a collection of new essays written in honor of the work of Peter D. Klein, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein’s work by engaging directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors.
John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.
Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ . In the (...) Anthropology and the Doctrine of Virtue, apathy is taken in the sense of freedom from affects. In these texts, Kant maintains that we must strive toward a state in which affects are absent. (shrink)
Peirce’s system of sixty-six classes as represented in the Signtree visual model is considered in order to show the strong relation between experience and cognition in semiotics. In this Signtree model we find twenty-four different classes of sinsign, in which we can observe signs of experience, and thirty-six classes of legisign, in which we find general types or laws. Sinsigns and legisigns are predominant in the system of sixty-six classes and they are closely related. Ordinary experiences are used to illustrate (...) the relations and dependencies among these classes and show how a set of experiences may lead to a certain set of cognitions. They also point out one way to use the Signtree to conduct a semiotic analysis. (shrink)
The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper (...) starts the job of mapping what can be said about this feature of Gettier situations. The goal is to stimulate further exploration into this yet uncharted territory. (shrink)
Anti-luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck (...) is of no help to the anti-luck epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti-luck epistemologist's coveted noncircular analysis of knowledge. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to make a brief discussion about three aspects that characterize the Socrates's Dream in the Theaetetus . First, I comment the function of the Dream in the context of the third definition of knowledge. Them I move on the text and examine some questions concerning the notion of logos in 201 d -202 c . In the last section I discuss the problem of perception of the stoicheia . At this point I refuse the (...) thesis, defended by some interpreters, that Plato puts the stoicheia in the same perceptual condition of the sensibles as they are described in the Theaetetus 184-6.  . (shrink)
In this paper, I analyze Kant’s theory of action and if human beings can act morally without being moved by sensible feelings. I will show that the answer of the Critique of Pure Reason, Groundwork and the Critical of Practical Reason is without any doubt “yes”, but Kant is ambiguous in the Metaphysics of Morals and also in the Anthropology. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that there are some sensible conditions to the reception of the concept of duty: (...) moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for one self . I examine moral feeling and love of human beings, trying to figure out whether or not they are necessary sensible pre- conditions to moral actions. (shrink)
Amigos, não é justo que um ou dois conheçam os vaticínios que me fez Circe, a augusta deusa; por isso vou contá-los, para que, cientes dos perigos, ou morramos ou nos protejamos da morte e escapemos ao fado. Ela nos recomenda em primeiro lugar, que nos defendamos do canto das maravilhosas Sereias e de seu florido vergel. Aconselhou que só eu lhes ouvisse a voz; por isso, amarrai-me de pé sobre a carlinga, com rudes laços, para que eu daqui não (...) saia, e pendam fora de meu alcance as pontas das cordas. Se eu insistir convosco para que me solteis, apertai-me, então, em laços ainda mais numerosos. (shrink)
J.W. Goethe concluded in 1795 his novel Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship. Twelve years later, Hegel would publish his Phenomenology of Spirit. His “science of the experience of consciousness” and this new kind of novel appeared in historical conditions leading both literature and philosophy to pay attention to culture and to cultivation of identity by the hero himself. Goethe and Hegel converge in two masterpieces, close to each other in many aspects. This paper aims to present Hegel’s Phenomenology as an example of (...) a stylized apprenticeship novel. Lukács would point out in Goethe’s novel “the problem of the relation between poet and bourgeois world”, in which a romantic Werther had collapsed, for there is a pedagogical significance for socialists in this narrative. Although in our age philosophies of history are suspicious, such “coming-of-age novels” still survive as an appropriate gender in the writings of, e. g., Günter Grass and J. M. Coetzee. (shrink)
De acordo com Jennifer Lackey, deve-se asserir que p somente se é razoável acreditar que p e se alguém asseriu que p, afirmaria que p pelo menos em parte porque é razoável acreditar que p. Como dados para essa norma de asserção, Lackey apela à intuição de que, nos casos de afirmação altruísta, os agentes afirmam com propriedade epistêmica algo que não acreditam. Se essa norma de afirmação fosse verdadeira, então ela explicaria por que as afirmações altruístas são epistemicamente apropriadas. (...) Neste trabalho, oferecemos uma reductio ad absurdum desse ponto de vista. O resultado é que os asserções altruístas não são epistemicamente apropriados. (shrink)
The target article criticises neural-symbolic systems as inadequate for analogical reasoning and proposes a model of analogy as transformation (i.e., learning). We accept the importance of learning, but we argue that, instead of conflicting, integrated reasoning and learning would model analogy much more adequately. In this new perspective, modern neural-symbolic systems become the natural candidates for modelling analogy.
Neste artigo pretendo mostrar que o desenvolvimento temporal da política na história mundial deve ser considerado como uma encenação da dialética hegeliana. Encenação deve ser aqui tomado como uma apresentação na efetividade de um texto pressuposto. Tal texto é a Ciência da Lógica. Minha intenção é mostrar a utilização, não deste texto na sua totalidade, mas de algumas sequências preferenciais da lógica. Tal será mostrado: 1) na figura do senhor/servo; 2) na relação eticidade e moralidade. Neste segundo momento, procurarei mostrar (...) como a política e seu julgamento encenam essas categorias. Por fim, indicarei em que medida a ideia de encenação resolve algumas aporias referentes a necessidade e acaso da filosofia hegeliana. (shrink)
Peirce’s classes of signs are instruments of inquiry, and, as such, they have an effective analytical power. We can find in Peirce’s texts four systems of sign classes that vary from having 3 to 66 classes. The system of 66 classes brings up the idea that to better represent a sign process, it would be necessary to consider an aspect of the sign before considering the relation that involves that aspect. However, if one observes the trichotomies in the system of (...) 10 sign classes, this method, which seems very reasonable, cannot be applied, for before considering the sign-object and the sign-interpretant relation, Peirce only proposes the examination of the sign itself. Considering the development of Peirce’s semiotics, I propose to look back to the system of 10 classes and add to it the trichotomies that will allow the consideration of every aspect of a relation in itself before examining it within the relation. This process brings up a system of 21 classes of signs, which will be suggested as an instrument of inquiry. The aim of this paper is not only to deduce the system of 21 classes, but also to allow the reader to understand how each class represents a step in a semiotic inquiry. With that in mind, I will work on an example of how to proceed with a semiotic analysis using the system of 21 classes. (shrink)
Donald Davidson intenta reconciliar dos posiciones tradicionalmente opuestas: la positivista, naturalista, y la hermenéutica. Sin embargo, aunque sostiene la identidad mente-cerebro y la explicación causal de la acción, en su teoría tienen más relevancia la autonomía e irreductibilidad de lo mental así como la relación de justificación que existe entre razones y causas y que fundamenta las explicaciones de sentido común. Argumentaré que su intento conciliador no ha tenido éxito ya que opta claramente por el proyecto interpretativo frente al explicativo. (...) Ese proyecto se basa en la creencia de que compartimos universalmente ciertos principios de raciona-lidad que hacen posible la interpretación mutua por lo que tiene problemas a la hora de explicar el relativismo y la irracionalidad. Además, considera que las únicas explicaciones válidas de la acción son las de la psicología popular. (shrink)
Wolfgang Sander propõe uma inovação significativa no pensamento pedagógico atual. Em termos conceituais, sua sugestão é renovar o conceito de “Bildung”, do século XIX, por meio da inserção da controvertibilidade e da perspectividade como componentes essenciais do processo de ensino e aprendizagem, bem como do ideal de uma pessoa “instruída”.2 Essa mudança conceitual, defende ele, requer uma alteração paralela nas noções de conhecimento e ciência, as quais ele propõe encarar do ponto de vista “construtivista”. Na prática, a implementação dessa ideia (...) demandaria com certeza uma extensa reforma do sistema educacional, inclusive uma abordagem radicalmente nova do magistério, dos currículos, da participação dos estudantes, do uso e do desenvolvimento de novas tecnologias na escola e até do cenário físico do ambiente da escolarização. O enfoque de Sander está principalmente centrado na fundamentação de sua proposta. Eu vou, naturalmente, acompanhá-lo nesse aspecto, considerando, sobretudo, embora não de modo exclusivo, o conceito de controvertibilidade”. Minhas considerações, todavia, implicam que seria um grave erro ignorar a dimensão prática desse conceito até mesmo para as análises teóricas que dele sejam feitas. (shrink)
In this paper, I shall discuss the relation between practical reason and emotions in Kant. First, I begin by explaining why knowledge of emotions is important for the transcendental project in the moral domain, understood as the claim that reason can determine our actions, in spite of our inclinations. Second, I explain the definition of affects and passions in Kant's philosophy and relate the two to feelings and the faculty of desire. I then question the possibility of controlling emotions, showing (...) that it is, if not an altogether impossible task, at least a difficult one. I show that while affects present a momentary loss of control, they can still coexist with practical reason. Passions, however, may ground principles for actions, and represent a serious danger for rational mastery over inclinations. (shrink)