Dentre os problemas tradicionais da Epistemologia, uma das controvérsiasmais persistentes é a questão da inserção versus isenção de valores naciência. Filiando-se a uma longa tradição crítica, o filósofo Hugh Laceydesenvolve um exame contundente acerca dos fundamentos da ciência emsua interação com a sociedade, questionando a noção tradicional deneutralidade científica. Pretendemos nesse trabalho estender a crítica deLacey às ciências sociais, e especificamente à Economia. Argumentamosque a ortodoxia da ciência econômica moderna , atravésda incorporação do paradigma mecanicista da física clássica, bem comode (...) todo instrumental analítico das estratégias materialistas, não representaum tipo de compreensão neutra dos fenômenos econômicos, mas sim umaparticularmente notável manifestação dos valores predominantes nessasociedade , da qual faz parte.Assim, procuramos mostrar que, também no âmbito social, a preeminênciados aspectos nomológicos e quantitativos da realidade na formulação dasteorias econômicas de tradição neoclássica espelha valores sociais altamenteestimados nas sociedades modernas.Among the traditional problems in Epistemology, one of the most persistentcontroversies is the question of value insertion versus value exemption inscience. The philosopher Hugh Lacey, in consonance with a long criticaltradition, advances a sharp examination of the foundations of science andits interaction with society, questioning the traditional notion of scientificneutrality. In this essay we intend to extend Lacey’s criticism to the socialsciences – specifically to Economics. We argue that modern economicsorthodoxy , by the adoption of the mechanicalparadigm of classical physics and all the analytical instruments of thematerialist strategies, does not represent a type of neutral understandingof the economic phenomena, but instead, a particularly considerablemanifestation of the predominant values of the society of which it is a part. So, we intend to showthat also in the social scope, the favoring of the nomological and quantitativeaspects of reality mirrors social values highly regarded in modern societies. (shrink)

In his introductory textbook, Philosophy of natural science, Hempel presents, as an illustration and a starting point for an analysis of the processes of inventing and testing scientific theories, an account of the researches of Semmelweis the Hungarian physician who, in the middle of the xixth century, discovered the cause of puerperal fever and an effective method of prevention. The account does not involve anything that is factually untrue, but it is quite succinct, leaving out many important aspects of the (...) case. Our thesis is that, although those omissions are justified in view of the aims of the account, they are also convenient to Hempel, because they help to propagate an image of science which goes much beyond the processes of invention and test. It is an image which reflects the positivist conception of science, and thus, whatever the intentions of the author, contributes to the dissemination and strengthening of that conception, but which, at least in this case, does not correspond to reality. To demonstrate the thesis, we give an account of the parts of Semmelweis's story omitted by Hempel, and we show how they do not fit in with the positivist image of science. Along the way, we distinguish three types of critique of positivist historiography: the Kuhnian, the post-modern, and the engagé. In the conclusion, we present some considerations concerning the medical research of today. -/- . (shrink)

El pasaje de la Elegía de Gray (PEG) en “On Denoting” es extremadamente obscuro y ha sido objeto de muy diversas interpretaciones. Aparentemente contiene una crítica devastadora contra la teoría de los conceptos denotativos que el propio Russell había postulado en The Principles of Mathematics (PM) (1903). En este artículo exponemos sucintamente dicha teoría semántica, examinamos detalladamente el pasaje en cuestión y exploramos algunas de las interpretaciones que pretenden desentrañar su sentido. Con ello mostramos, en primer lugar, que la crítica (...) se dirige directamente contra la teoría de PM; en segundo lugar, que no es posible hacer unos pocos cambios homogéneos para habilitar una lectura literal del pasaje; finalmente, que, si bien algunos de los argumentos que los intérpretes han aducido para abandonar la teoría de los conceptos denotativos son sólidos, no es obvio que todos ellos se encuentren en PEG. (shrink)

Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...) entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In Section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In Section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In Section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in Section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in the third section. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of some prominent aspects of intellectual history as practiced today in Latin America, especially regarding conceptual history. It delves into the way this methodology arrived to the region not long ago and discusses the way some of its practitioners combine it with the history of political languages, often ignoring the profound differences between both approaches. Therefore, the text stresses some of the most significant contrasts between them. In its last part, the article is critical of (...) the purported “globality” of global intellectual history, an issue that is inextricably linked with the pervasive use of the English language in the field. Throughout, the text poses several of the challenges that lie ahead for intellectual history in Latin America. (shrink)

Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are ‘token-reflexives’, in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able (...) to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analiza la tesis foucaultiana de la reducción de la filosofía a forma de conocimiento en Descartes y el consecuente abandono de la espiritualidad clásica, es decir, de la filosofía concebida como forma de vida basada en el cuidado de sí. A partir de aquí, además de observar que el propio Foucault matizará esta tesis, se demostrará que en Descartes la filosofía sigue esencialmente unida a la espiritualidad.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Se analizará una aporía inherente al giro subjetivo del último Foucault causada por el sostenimiento simultáneo de dos sentidos incompatibles de la irreductibilidad del sujeto y, por lo tanto, de su posible emancipación: en unos casos es posible hacer referencia a procesos de subjetivación externos a las formas de subjetividad generadas por el poder ; pero, en otros, los procesos de emancipación no pueden ser pensados más allá de la resistencia al poder. La hipótesis del trabajo es que la aporía (...) está producida por la gradual marginación del problema del autoconocimiento en la temática del cuidado de sí, que, como resultado, pasa a ser comprendida exclusivamente desde las prácticas cínicas. Pero reducido el autoconocimiento, también es eliminada la problemática del cuidado de sí, que sostenía la noción fuerte de la subjetividad. Se mostrará que en el Barroco literario y neoestoico español se pueden encontrar elementos para recuperarla. (shrink)

Self-injury is a perilous and increasingly common behavior that is particularly prevalent among youth. Nonetheless, there is a deep-rooted public stigma towards people who self-injure. Consequently, people who engage in self-injury are reluctant to seek professional help or disclose their experiences to others. This article aims to combat stigma and promote help-seeking behavior by debunking the common myths surrounding self-injury in the Malaysian context. Specifically, this article aims to serve as an eye-opener for Malaysian counselors and other mental health professionals (...) to improve their multicultural knowledge, skills, and attitudes when working with those who self-injure. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to introduce an approach for understanding social cognition that we call the normative approach to social cognition. Such an approach, which results from a systematization of previous arguments and ideas from authors such as Ryle, Dewey, or Wittgenstein, is an alternative to the classic model and the direct social perception model. In section 2, we evaluate the virtues and flaws of these two models. In section 3, we introduce the normative approach, according to (...) which human, socio-cognitive competences rely on a myriad of social norms and routines that mediate our social interactions in such a way that we can make sense of each other without taking into consideration their mental states. In sections 4 and 5, we find some common premises shared by the two prior models and offer some arguments against them. In section 6, we advance some possible arguments against our approach and offer some responses against them. (shrink)

Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines :259–281, 2015; Zawidzki, Philosophical Explorations 11:193–210, 2008; Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013). This regulative view shares with the classical Dennettian intentional stance its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those similarities, (...) it makes sense to assess the regulative view by considering some of the classical arguments against the normative nature of the intentional stance :76–100, 1985; Stich, Philosophical Topics 12:39–62, 1981; Stich, The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990). The aim of this paper is to argue that the priority that the regulative view lays on the pluralistic and regulative character of folk psychology leaves the theory well-placed to resist these arguments. In this sense, the regulative view possesses better theoretical options to defend the normative character of human social cognition. (shrink)

Análisis estético, sociológico y político de la obra de Goethe Las desventuras del joven Werther, partiendo de las tesis estético-literarias de Georg Lukács, claramente influenciadas por Friedrich Schiller, y de las consideraciones que el mismo Goethe realizó posteriormente acerca de su vida y obra en su inconclusa autobiografía Poesía y verdad . El objetivo es realizar un pequeño estudio de la obra pero, en especial, del tipo de sujeto que ejemplifica su personaje principal: el sujeto del humanismo burgués revolucionario , (...) un sujeto que podemos caracterizar en palabras de Lukács como demoníaco y que, por su estructura constitutiva, está condenado al fracaso de sus expectativas vitales. (shrink)