"This book presents a distinctive version of a contractarian approach to law and justice. The work argues that law and justice are social norms that arise from a process of social evolution, and are binding only if and to the extent that they are mutually beneficial. It explicitly rejects accounts of law and justice that are based on morality, on the basis that morality itself is only legitimately founded on mutual advantage, But it also rejects most existing versions of contractarianism, (...) which are based on ideas of hypothetical agreements by rational contractors, in favour of an approach that is based on actually existing social norms, but advocates critically examining these norms and discarding those that are not truly mutually beneficial. The first half of the book develops the approach, while the second half explores some of its implications for law. It argues for a left-libertarian approach to property, an approach largely based on the common law of tort, contract and criminal law, and a rejection of most statutory law, which is based not on mutual advantage but rather on benefiting some at the expense of others. However, it ultimately recognises that there are those who want a more extensive state than this approach allows, and advocates a strong form of federalism to allow this, provided robust exit rights are provided"--. (shrink)

Integrating concepts of maintenance and of origins is essential to explaining biological diversity. The unified theory of evolution attempts to find a common theme linking production rules inherent in biological systems, explaining the origin of biological order as a manifestation of the flow of energy and the flow of information on various spatial and temporal scales, with the recognition that natural selection is an evolutionarily relevant process. Biological systems persist in space and time by transfor ming energy from one state (...) to another in a manner that generates structures which allows the system to continue to persist. Two classes of energetic transformations allow this; heat-generating transformations, resulting in a net loss of energy from the system, and conservative transformations, changing unusable energy into states that can be stored and used subsequently. All conservative transformations in biological systems are coupled with heat-generating transformations; hence, inherent biological production, or genealogical proesses, is positively entropic. There is a self-organizing phenomenology common to genealogical phenomena, which imparts an arrow of time to biological systems. Natural selection, which by itself is time-reversible, contributes to the organization of the self-organized genealogical trajectories. The interplay of genealogical (diversity-promoting) and selective (diversity-limiting) processes produces biological order to which the primary contribution is genealogical history. Dynamic changes occuring on times scales shorter than speciation rates are microevolutionary; those occuring on time scales longer than speciation rates are macroevolutionary. Macroevolutionary processes are neither redicible to, nor autonomous from, microevolutionary processes. (shrink)

This article discusses various arguments for and against treating equality as a fundamental norm in law and political philosophy, combining prior arguments to the effect that equality is essentially an empty idea with arguments that treat it as a non‐empty but mistaken value that should be rejected. After concluding that most of the arguments for treating equality as a fundamental value fall victim to one or both of these arguments, it considers more closely arguments made by philosophers such as Ronald (...) Dworkin and Thomas Nagel that base a duty of promoting equality on the fact that governments impose a legal order on persons without their consent. It concludes that these arguments are mistaken: if the legal order imposed by government is justified then imposing it is not wrongful and generates no duty of equal treatment, while if that order is not justified no requirement of equality of treatment would cure the lack of justification. It concludes that equality should not be a value in law or political theory, but in some cases other considerations may justify particular rules that are sometimes mistakenly thought to be based on equality. (shrink)

This article explores the implications of the Harm Principle, modified to accommodate recent criticisms by Arthur Ripstein, for theories of distributive justice. It concludes that the resulting Sovereignty Principle leads to a left-libertarian theory of justice that is based not on egalitarianism but rather on considerations internal to the Principle itself. This theory avoids criticisms of incoherence that have been rightly applied to other recent versions of left-libertarianism, and supports a requirement of substantial redistribution without necessarily precluding further redistribution for (...) reasons other than those of justice. (shrink)

Research integrating the perspectives of different disciplines, or interdisciplinary research, has become increasingly common in academia and is considered important for its ability to address complex questions and problems. This mode of research aims to leverage differences among disciplines in generating a more complex understanding of the research landscape. To interact successfully with other disciplines, researchers must appreciate their differences, and this requires recognizing how the research landscape looks from the perspective of other disciplines. One central aspect of these disciplinary (...) perspectives involves values, and more specifically, the roles that values do, may, and should play in research practice. It is reasonable to think that disciplines differ in part because of the different views that their practitioners have on these roles. This paper represents a step in the direction of evaluating this thought. Operating at the level of academic branches, which comprise relevantly similar disciplines (e.g. social and behavioral sciences), this paper uses quantitative techniques to investigate whether academic branches differ in terms of views on the impact of values on research. Somewhat surprisingly, we find very little relation between differences in these views and differences in academic branch. We discuss these findings from a philosophical perspective to conclude the paper. (shrink)

The current work builds a definition of irritability from both academic definitions and lay perspectives. In Study 1, a quantitative content analysis of academic definitions resulted in eight main content categories. In Study 2, a community sample of 39 adults participated in qualitative interviews. A deductive thematic analysis resulted in two main themes. The first main theme dealt with how participants positioned irritability in relation to other negative states. The second dealt with how participants constructed irritability as both a loss (...) of control and as an experience that should be controlled. The discussion integrates the findings of both studies and provides a concise, but comprehensive definition. (shrink)

This volume explores how Catholicism began and continues to open its doors to the wider world and to other confessions in embracing ecumenism, thanks to the vision and legacy of the Second Vatican Council. It explores such themes as the twentieth century context preceding the council; parallels between Vatican II and previous councils; its distinctively pastoral character; the legacy of the council in relation to issues such as church-world dynamics, as well as to ethics, social justice, economic activity. Several chapters (...) discuss the role of women in the church before, during, and since the council. Others discern inculturation in relation to Vatican II. The book also contains a wide and original range of ecumenical considerations of the council, including by and in relation to Free Church, Reformed, Orthodox, and Anglican perspectives. Finally, it considers the Council’s ongoing promise and remaining challenges with regard to ecumenical issues, including a groundbreaking essay on the future of ecumenical dialogue by Cardinal Walter Kasper. (shrink)

Objective: Parental influence during children’s “everyday” pain events is under-explored, compared to clinical or experimental pains. We trialed two digital reporting methods for parents to record the real-world context surrounding their child’s everyday pain events within the family home.Methods: Parents completed a structured e-diary for 14 days, reporting on one pain event experienced by their child each day, and describing child pain responses, parental supervision, parental estimates of pain severity and intensity, and parental catastrophizing, distress, and behavioral responses. During the (...) same 2-week period, a subsample of parent-child pairs completed digital ecological momentary assessments, immediately after any chosen pain event. Children reported their current pain while parents estimated the child’s pain and indicated their own distress.Results: “Everyday” pain events frequently featured minor injuries to the child’s head, hands or knees, and child responses included crying and non-verbal comments. Pain events occurred less frequently when parents had been supervising their child, and supervising parents reported lower levels of worry and anxiety than non-supervising parents. Child sex was significantly associated with parental estimates of pain intensity, with parents of girls giving higher estimates than parents of boys. Child age was significantly associated with both the number of pain events and with parental estimates of pain intensity and child distress: the youngest children experienced the fewest pain events but received higher pain and distress estimates from parents than older children. Hierarchal Linear Modeling revealed that parental estimates of pain severity were significant positive predictors of parental distress and catastrophizing in response to a specific pain event. Furthermore, higher levels of parental catastrophic thinking in response to a specific pain event resulted in increased distress, solicitousness, and coping-promoting behaviors in parents. The EMA data revealed that children reported significantly higher pain intensity than their parents.Conclusion: The electronic pain diary provided a key insight into the nature of “everyday” pain experiences around the family home. Digital daily reporting of how the family copes with “everyday” events represents a viable means to explore a child’s everyday pains without disrupting their home environment. (shrink)

With a few exceptions, critical theorists have been late to provide a comprehensive diagnosis of neoliberalism comparable in scope to their extensive analyses of advanced welfare state capitalism. Instead, the main lines of critical theory have focused on questions of international justice which, while no doubt significant, restrict the scope of critical theory by deemphasizing linkages to larger political and economic conditions. Providing a critique of the Frankfurt School, Brian Caterino and Phillip Hansen move beyond its foundations, and call (...) for a rethinking of the bases of critical theory as a practical, freedom-creating project. Outlining a resurgence of neoliberalism, the authors encourage a fresh, nuanced analysis that elucidates its political and economic structures and demonstrates the threats to freedom and democracy that neoliberalism poses; the reformulation of a radical democratic alternative to neoliberalism, one that critically addresses its limitations while promoting an enhancement of communicative and social freedom. (shrink)

In 1975 E. O. Wilson called for biologists to appropriate ethics.1 Few philosophers worried deeply about this potential usurpation because they felt firmly ensconced on the other side of the Humean wall from the biologists. Science can provide neither guidance nor values. Perhaps nowhere is this more clear than in the crowning question of ethics; namely, what is the meaning of life? Since evolution proposes an ateleological account of the natural world, biologists can dismiss the question to which we all (...) desperately want an answer as a category mistake. If pressed to understand the question metaphorically, biologists begrudgingly reply that the meaning of life is to get as much of your genetic material. (shrink)

Resumo Neste texto, o autor concentra-se em dois artigos históricos: o de Max Black “Why cannot an effect precede its cause”? e o de Michael Dummett “Bringing about the Past”. O autor irá mostrar onde falha o “bilking argument” de Black, contra a possibilidade da causalidade invertida. Por conseguinte, o autor irá concordar com Dummett, na possibilidade de um agente actuar a fim de que algo possa ocorrer no passado, contudo, discordando da argumentação de Dummett face a um desafio céptico, (...) que tenta mostrar a inutilidade de afectar o passado. Palavras-chave : Black, causalidade invertida, Dummett, razões, tempoIn this discussion I focus on two classic articles: Max Black’s ‘Why cannot an effect precede its cause?’ and Michael Dummett’s ‘Bringing about the Past’. I argue that Black’s bilking argument against the possibility of backwards causation fails. I agree with Dummett that the idea of an agent acting in order that something should have happened in the past is not absurd, but I disagree with Dummett’s response to a sceptical challenge which attempts to show that it is pointless to attempt to affect the past. Keywords : backwards causation, Black, Dummett, reasons, time. (shrink)

This paper takes up Richard Kearney's work The God Who May Be, specifically in the context of postmodern debates concerning epistemological claims regarding the other. Kearney's hermeneutics of religion attempts to forge a middle path between ontotheological philosophies of religion and various quasi-religious manifestations of postmodernism; however, my main concern is to address certain points of disagreement between Kearney and proponents of a deconstructive "religion without religion" principally Jacques Derrida and John D. Caputo. The main issue at stake is just (...) how other God is, which is itself a specific case of a broader question concerning otherness per se. Caputo et al. claim that religious assertions about God are fundamentally undecidable, which means that they are "infinitely translatable" and "substitutable," that we can never tell what is a translation of what, but the ultimate point is that it "does not matter" The undecidable nature of religious claims includes the very claim that religion is a discourse about God, which is why deconstructive religion without religion is a messianic hope for "the impossible" devoid of any content. Kearney objects that such radical undecidability leaves us lost in the desert ofkhora with no way to distinguish, even imperfectly and provisionally, between God and Satan, good and evil, the widow and the terrorist. In this paper I claim that Kearney succeeds in finding this via tertia between the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of complete indeterminacy by thinking God in two important ways: as persona-prosopon (which avoids confusing God with khora or monstrosity) and as posse (which keeps us from dogmatism). /// O presente artigo toma em particular consideração a obra de Richard Kearney The God Who May Be, especificamente no contexto dos debates pós-modernos acerca do estatuto epistemológico da alteridade. A abordagem hermeneutica que Kearney faz da religião procura estabelecer um caminho médio entre as filosofias ontoteológicas da religião e várias manifestações quase-religiosas do pós-modernismo. O autor do artigo, contudo, pretende estabelecer alguns pontos de desacordo entre Kearney e os defensores da "religião sem religião" típica do movimento da desconstrução, tendo em vista, sobretudo, as aportações de Jacques Derrida e de John D. Caputo. Em questão está especificamente a alteridade de Deus, ou seja, um caso específico da questão mais alargada acerca da alteridade em si mesma. Caputo, por exemplo, defende que as asserções religiosas sobre Deus são fundamentalmente indecidíveis, o que significa que elas são "infinitamente traduzíveis "e "substituíveis ", enfim, que nós nunca sabemos o que pwpriamente é tradução de quê, sendo que, no fundo, a questão em si mesma "não importa". O carácter indecidível das propostas religiosas inclui a ideia de que a religião constitui um discurso sobre Deus, razão pela qual a desconstrutora "religião sem religião "constitui uma esperança messiânica pelo "impossível" desprovida de qualquer conteúdo. Kearney objecta que uma tal indecidibilidade radical nos deixa perdidos no meio do deserto da Chora sem capacidade de distinguir, ainda que imperfeita e provisoriamente, entre Deus e Satanás, entre o bem e o mal, entre a viúva e o terrorista. Assim, o autor do artigo defende que Richard Kearney é bem sucedido em sua busca de uma via tertia entre a Cila do dogmatismo e a Caríbdis da completa indeterminação graças ao seu modo de pensar Deus por dois caminhos distintos: como pessoa-prosopon (o que impede confundir Deus com Chora ou monstruosidade) e como posse (o que nos resguarda do dogmantismo). (shrink)

If a legal rule tells us to do something, do we thereby have a reason to do it? This remains one of the most basic questions for theoretical and practical reflection on law. It is a foundational question, which many prominent contemporary theorists have discussed, yet the topic remains poorly understood. While many legal positivists have recently sought to “explain normativity”, this is likely a project inconsistent with the basic commitments of legal positivism, and, in any event, thoroughly unnecessary. Following (...) ides of M. B. E. Smith and David Enoch, this article emphasizes that law does not always (or “essentially” or paradigmatically) give reasons for action, and when it does give us reasons for action, it does so in unremarkable ways.Resumen:Si una norma jurídica nos dice que hagamos algo, ¿acaso por ese solo hecho tenemos una razón para hacerlo? Esta sigue siendo una de las preguntas más básicas para la reflexión jurídica, tanto teórica como práctica. Se trata de una cuestión fundamental que muchos teóricos importantes del derecho han discutido; aunque el tópico sigue estando muy pobremente entendido. No obstante que recientemente muchos teóricos positivistas han buscado “explicar la normatividad”, este es probablemente un proyecto inconsistente con los compromisos básicos del positivismo jurídico y, en cualquier caso, totalmente innecesario. Siguiendo las ideas de M. B. E. Smith y David Enoch, este artículo subraya que el derecho no siempre (o no “esencial” o paradigmáticamente) ofrece razones para la acción, y cuando es el caso que ofrece razones para la acción lo hace de una manera irrelevante. (shrink)

In Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco’s thoughtful and important article, “Reasons in Action v Triggering Reasons: A Reply to Enoch on Reason-Giving and Le- gal Normativity,” she explores with great care the nature of reason-giving, in connection with challenging David Enoch’s influential recent work on reason-giving and the law. While Rodriguez-Blanco’s article makes an important contribution to the literature on the best understanding of rea- son-giving and practical reasoning, it is not clear that an approach to rea- sons for action reformed along the (...) lines Rodriguez-Blanco suggests would change or clarify the ultimate question on which she focuses: the way in which legal systems in general or individual legal norms do (or do not) give citizens reasons for action. The question of whether we have a general (presumptive) moral obligation to act (or refrain from acting) as legal norms direct us depends to a significant degree on whether there are good arguments against an individualistic, case by case, approach to responding to such norms.Resumen:Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco explora con minuciosidad en su detallado e importante artículo, “Reasons in Action v Triggering Reasons: A Reply to Enoch on Reason-Giving and Legal Normativity”, la naturaleza del otorgamiento de razones, en aras de cuestionar el influyente trabajo reciente de David Enoch sobre el otorgamiento de razones y el derecho. Si bien el artículo de Rodriguez-Blanco constituye una importante contribución a la literatura en cuanto a la mejor comprensión del otorgamiento de razones y la razón práctica, no está claro si el enfoque hacia las razones para la acción, reformado sobre la línea de lo que sugiere Rodríguez-Blanco, clarificaría la cuestión primordial de la que se ocupa: la manera en que los sistemas jurídicos en general o las normas jurídicas individuales le dan (o no) a los ciudadanos razones para la acción. La cuestión sobre si tenemos una obligación moral (presuntiva) general de actuar (o de abstenerse de actuar) tal como lo disponen las normas depende en gran medida de si hay buenos argumentos en contra de un enfoque individualista y casuístico para responder a tales normas. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical examination of Kierkegaard's account of friendship, and considers whether he accounts sufficiently for the transformative possibilities of friendship. Part I gives a brief discussion of ethical friendship in Either/Or, then turns to Works of Love and its critique of friendship. Kierkegaard does, however, retrieve and affirm friendship insofar as it is transformed by Christian neighbor love. The author then proceeds to consider whether this transformed friendship can also be genuinely transformative. Part II draws on Kierkegaard's (...) analysis of the leveling effects of modern culture, and argues that friendship can play an important role in resisting this threat by helping to initiate and preserve religious actuality. The author of the article contends that Kierkegaard needs to be pushed further on this point, since his writings remain ambivalent regarding such a possibility. Similarly, Part III examines Kierkegaard's openness to a concept of transformative Christian friendship. To this end, the article considers the possibility of friendship with Christ. Then, drawing on John 15, the Christological basis for friendship is taken into consideration. Finally, through Kierkegaard's account of Christ's friendship with Peter, the author of the article concludes that a charitable reading of Kierkegaard points us toward transformative friendship, even though it seems also clear that the Danish thinker does not venture far enough in that direction himself. /// O presente artigo analisa criticamente o pensamento de Kierkegaard sobre a amizade, interrogando-se particularmente até que ponto ele dará ou não suficiente atenção às possibilidades transformativas da mesma. Começando com uma breve discussão da amizade ética na obra Alternativa, o artigo passa depois a uma análise de Obras do Amor e à crítica da amizade que nela se faz. Mostra-se, assim, que Kierkegaard retoma e afirma a amizade na medida em que ela é transformada pelo amor ao próximo. A questão seguinte tem a ver com a possibilidade de esta amizade transformada poder também ela mesma ser genuinamente transformativa. Num segundo momento, o autor do artigo toma em consideração a análise que Kierkegaard faz dos efeitos niveladores da cultura moderna, argumentando que a amizade pode desempenhar um papel importante na resistência a esta ameaça ajudando a iniciar e a preservar a actualidade religiosa da mesma. O autor considera que Kierkegaard precisa de ser confrontado no que se refere a esta questão dado que os seus escritos permanecem ambivalentes a propósito desta possibilidade. De igual modo, num terceiro momento do artigo, o autor analisa a abertura de Kierkegaard ao conceito cristão de uma amizade transformativa. Para este fim, é considerada sobretudo a possibilidade da nossa amizade com Cristo. Neste contexto, o artigo aborda, nomeadamente em referência ao capítulo 15 do Evangelho de S. João, a base Cristo-lógica da amizade. Por fim, o artigo faz referência à amizade de Cristo com Pedro e conclui que uma leitura benevolente de Kierkegaard não pode deixar de nos apontar para uma visão transformativa da amizade, ainda que o pensador dinamarquês não pareça ir suficientemente longe nesta direcção. (shrink)

We start with a nearly arbitrary standard classical first order "language" $C\sb{o},$ which is expanded to $C\sb{M,T}$ = "$C\sb{o}+M+T$", where for any variable x, M and T are unary formulas. We start also with a model ${\cal T}\sb{o},$ which together with $C\sb{o}$ represents a fixed non-problematic interpreted first order language. For each $\mu,\tau\subseteq U\sb{o},$ the universe of discourse for ${\cal T}\sb{o},$ the model ${\cal T}\sb{\mu,\tau}$ over $C\sb{M,T}$ is given so that its reduct to $C\sb{o}$ is just ${\cal T}\sb{o},$ and so (...) that for any $C\sb{M,T}$-variable x, the set-extensions of M and T are $\mu$ and $\tau$ respectively. For each $C\sb{M,T}$-expression e, $\vec e$ is its distinctly chosen representative in $U\sb{o},$ and $\lbrack\!\lbrack e\rbrack\!\rbrack$ is a constant $C\sb{o}$-term which names $\vec e.$ ;The goal is to find $\mu\sb*$ and $\tau\sb*,$ such that $\mu\sb*$ and $\tau\sb*$ plausibly and "self-referentially" approximate meaningfulness and truth respectively for any interpreted language represented by ${\cal T}\sb{\mu\sb*,\tau\sb*},$ by satisfying at least the following conditions. ; $\tau\sb*\subseteq\mu\sb*,$ and for each $C\sb{M,T}$-sentence $\sigma$ such that ${\cal T}\sb{\mu\sb*,\tau\sb*}\models M\lbrack\!\lbrack\sigma\rbrack\!\rbrack,$ $$\eqalign{&\ {\cal T}\sb{\mu\sb*,\tau\sb*} \models\sigma\Longleftrightarrow{\cal T}\sb{\mu\sb*,\tau\sb*}\models T\lbrack\!\lbrack\sigma\rbrack\!\rbrack,\ {\rm and}\cr&\ {\cal T}\sb{\mu\sb*,\tau\sb*}\models T\lbrack\!\lbrack\sigma\\leftrightarrow T\lbrack\!\lbrack\sigma\rbrack\!\rbrack\rbrack\!\rbrack.\cr}$$ ; There is a class of expression representatives $\mu\sp{D}\subseteq\mu\sb*$ containing every $C\sb{o}$-expression representative, such that the set $\tau\sp{D}=\mu\sp{D}\ \cap\ \tau\sb*$ itself satisfies the following properties. ;First, for each $\vec\sigma$ such that $\sigma$ is a $C\sb{M,T}$-sentence, if for all $\mu,\tau\subseteq U\sb{o}$ satisfying $\mu\supseteq\mu\sb*$ and $\tau\supseteq\tau\sp{D},$ it is the case that ${\cal T}\sb{\mu,\tau}\models\sigma,$ then $\vec\sigma\in\tau\sp{D}.$ ;Second, whenever $\vec\sigma\in\tau\sp{D},$ then also $\sp{\vec{\enspace}}\ \in\tau\sp{D}.$ ;Third, $\tau\sp{D}$ is "upwardly closed" with respect to the strong-Kleene rules for the truth-value evaluation of Boolean combinations of formulas. For example, for $C\sb{M,T}$-sentences $e\sb1$ and $e\sb2$: $$\eqalign{&\ \vec e\sb1\in\tau\sp{D}\Longleftrightarrow)\sp{\vec{\enspace}}\ \in\tau\sp{D}.\cr&\ {\rm If}\ \vec e\sb1\in\tau\sp{D}\ {\rm or}\ \vec e\sb2\in\tau\sp{D},\ {\rm then\ so\ is}\ \sp{\vec{\enspace}}\ \in\tau\sp{D}.\cr&\ {\rm If}\ \sp{\vec{\enspace}}\ \in\tau\sp{D}\ {\rm and}\ \sp{\vec{\enspace}}\ \in\tau\sp{D},\ {\rm then}\ )\sp{\vec{\enspace}}\ \in\tau\sp{D}.\cr}$$ ; For each $C\sb{M,T}$-expression e not involving T, ${\cal T}\sb{\mu\sb*,\tau\sb*}\models M\lbrack\!\lbrack e\rbrack\!\rbrack$; in particular, for any $C\sb{M,T}$-expression e whatsoever, ${\cal T}\sb{\mu\sb*,\tau\sb*}\models M\lbrack\!\lbrack\\neg M\lbrack\!\lbrack e\rbrack\!\rbrack\rbrack\!\rbrack.$ ; ;In this dissertation, it is shown for the first time that there are in fact $\mu\sb*$ and $\tau\sb*$ which simultaneously satisfy all three conditions , , and , even when the consequent of the Godel fixed point theorem must hold. (shrink)

The Metaphysical Club, a gathering of intellectuals in the 1870s associated with Harvard, is widely recognized as the crucible where pragmatism, America's distinctively original philosophy, was refined and proclaimed. Louis Menand's bestseller about the group was a dramatic publishing success. However, only three actual members - Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Charles S. Peirce, and William James - appear in this book, alongside other thinkers such as John Dewey who were never in the Club. The Real Metaphysical Club tells the full (...) story of how this influential group shifted the course of philosophy in America. In addition to pioneering pragmatism, the group explored radical empiricism and idealism, and formulated personalism and process philosophy, equally important developments. This volume contains thirty-seven important writings dating from 1870 to 1885 by the real members of the Metaphysical Club. The first section centers on pragmatism and science; the second part collects writings of the lawyers; and the third part covers idealist and personalist philosophers. Many of these writings have never been reprinted before, and nothing like this impressive collection has ever been attempted. A general introduction provides a narrative history, and the editors' three introductions to the volume's sections vividly bring to life the intense meetings, sustained debates, and pioneering thought from the Metaphysical Club. (shrink)

It can happen that a single surface S, viewed in normal conditions, looks pure blue (“true blue”) to observer John but looks blue tinged with green to a second observer, Jane, even though both are normal in the sense that they pass the standard psychophysical tests for color vision. Tye (2006a) finds this situation prima facie puzzling, and then offers two different “solutions” to the puzzle.1 The first is that at least one observer misrepresents S’s color because, though normal in (...) the sense explained, she is not a Normal color observer: her color detection system is not operating in the current condition in the way that Mother Nature intended it to operate. His second solution involves the idea that Mother Nature designed our color detection systems to be reliable with respect to the detection of coarse-grained colors (e.g., blue, green, yellow, orange), but our capacity to represent the fine-grained colors (e.g., true blue, blue tinged with green) is an undesigned spandrel. On this second solution, it is consistent with the variation between John and Jane that both represent the color of S in a way that complies with Mother Nature’s intentions: both represent S as exemplifying the coarse-grained color blue, and since (we may assume) S is in fact blue, both represent it veridically. Of course, they also represent fine-grained colors of S, and, according to Tye, at most one of these representations is veridical (Tye says that only God knows which). But at the level of representation for which Mother Nature designed our color detection systems, both John and Jane (qua Normal observers) are reliable detectors. (shrink)

At the beginning of Sein und Zeit, Martin Heidegger raises the question “What is the meaning of Being?”. In a celebrated review of Heidegger, Gilbert Ryle observes that, though some would quarrel with the assumption “that there is a problem about the Meaning of Being,” he, for the moment, will not. Why not? Because, says Ryle, the “question of the relation between Being qua timeless ‘substance’ and existing qua existing in the world of time and space seems to me a (...) real one.”. (shrink)

This volume focuses on democratic experimentalism, gathering a collection of original and previously unpublished essays focusing upon its major outlines, as well as specific aspects ¿ both promising and troublesome - of this theoretical approach. Together these essays offer conceptions of democracy and democratic governance that emphasize and highlight experimentalist aspects of pragmatic thought, particularly Deweyan pragmatism, and its relationship to instantiation in concrete social and political institutions. Issues of democratic governance, political organization and the relationship of law to democracy (...) are analyzed. (shrink)

New Blackfriars, Volume 103, Issue 1104, Page 165-169, March 2022.

New Blackfriars, Volume 103, Issue 1106, Page 433-435, July 2022.

Joseph D. Anderson & Barbara Fisher Anderson Moving Image Theory: Ecological ConsiderationsCarbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.ISBN 0 8093 2599 3253pp.Pat Brereton Hollywood Utopia: Ecology in Contemporary American CinemaBristol: Intellect.ISBN 1 84150117 4270pp.

Popular images of rights almost always emphasize their protective qualities. But who is really protected? In this paper it is argued that contemporary rights talk, because of faulty underlying assumptions, systematically favors prejudice and big property interests. Further, once the mistaken assumptions are surrendered, and it is realized that all rights are affirmative, a less systematically misleading debate can be created within the realm of rights discourse.

In this chapter Alessandro Capone’s claim as the intimate relationship between legal reasoning and indirect reports is investigated through looking at legal citation practices, use of case law, and statutory and constitutional interpretation. Capone’s thought is informed in the chapter through a reference to the work of Ronald Dworkin and Edward H. Levi. The conclusion of the chapter is that Capone is correct that use of indirect reporting in law is ubiquitous and therefore warrants careful study. Further, and opposite of (...) Dworkin’s hope for a univocal use of indirect reports, Levi’s analysis emphasizes the bottom-up, conversational and polyvocal aspects of legal reasoning as is noted by Capone. This in turn requires eliminating the hope for finding or imposing a determinate and univocal meaning on legal citation, case law, and statutory and constitutional interpretation. Instead, continuing dialogue is required. Indeed, legal process should try to include as many voices in the construction of meaning as possible. (shrink)

Thomas Elsaesser and Warren Buckland _Studying Contemporary American Film: A Guide to Movie Analysis_ Arnold: London 2002 ISBN 0 340 76206 3 (PB) x + 309 pp.

The long-awaited revision of the industry standard on phylogenetics Since the publication of the first edition of this landmark volume more than twenty-five years ago, phylogenetic systematics has taken its place as the dominant paradigm of systematic biology. It has profoundly influenced the way scientists study evolution, and has seen many theoretical and technical advances as the field has continued to grow. It goes almost without saying that the next twenty-five years of phylogenetic research will prove as fascinating as the (...) first, with many exciting developments yet to come. This new edition of Phylogenetics captures the very essence of this rapidly evolving discipline. Written for the practicing systematist and phylogeneticist, it addresses both the philosophical and technical issues of the field, as well as surveys general practices in taxonomy. Major sections of the book deal with the nature of species and higher taxa, homology and characters, trees and tree graphs, and biogeography—the purpose being to develop biologically relevant species, character, tree, and biogeographic concepts that can be applied fruitfully to phylogenetics. The book then turns its focus to phylogenetic trees, including an in-depth guide to tree-building algorithms. Additional coverage includes: Parsimony and parsimony analysis Parametric phylogenetics including maximum likelihood and Bayesian approaches Phylogenetic classification Critiques of evolutionary taxonomy, phenetics, and transformed cladistics Specimen selection, field collecting, and curating Systematic publication and the rules of nomenclature Providing a thorough synthesis of the field, this important update to Phylogenetics is essential for students and researchers in the areas of evolutionary biology, molecular evolution, genetics and evolutionary genetics, paleontology, physical anthropology, and zoology. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that John Dewey developed a philosophy of law that follows directly from his conception of democracy. Indeed, under Dewey’s theory an understanding of law can only follow from an accurate understanding of the social and political context within which it functions. This has important implications for the form law takes within democ- ratic society. The paper will explore these implications through a comparison of Dewey’s claims with those of Richard Posner and Ronald Dworkin; two other (...) theorists that inti- mately link law and democracy. After outlining their theories I will use the recent United States Supreme Court case, Citizens United, to discuss how practitioners of the three theo- ries would decide a case that implicates both the rule of law and democratic procedures. In order to do this judges following each theory, “Dews, Dworks and Poses,” are imagined. Ul- timately this paper will show that drastically different results to Citizens United would fol- low. The (tentative) conclusion of the paper is that Dewey’s conception of the relationship between democracy and law is a superior option to either that of Dworkin or Posner. (shrink)