In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Books ReceivedThe Ambitions of Curiosity: Understanding the World in Ancient Greece and China. By G.E.R. Lloyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi + 175. Price not given.The Art of the Han Essay: Wang Fu's Ch'ien-Fu Lun. By Anne Behnke Kinney. Tempe: Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1990. Pp. xi + 154. Paper $10.00.The Autobiography of Jamgön Kongtrul: A Gem of Many Colors. By Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrön (...) Thayé and translated by Richard Barron (Chökyi Nyima). Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2003. Pp. xxii + 549. Price not given.Awesome Nightfall: The Life, Times, and Poetry of Saigyō. By William R. LaFleur. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. xiii + 173. Paper $14.95.Becoming the Compassion Buddha: Tantric Mahamudra for Everyday Life. By Lama Thubten Yeshe, edited by Robina Courtin, and foreword by Geshe Lhundub Sopa. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. xi + 194. Paper $14.95.Between Two Worlds East and West: An Autobiography. By J. N. Mohanty. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 134. Hardcover RS 525.00.The Chinese Face of Jesus Christ. Edited by Roman Malek, S.V.D. Sankt Augustin, Germany: Institut Monumenta Serica and China-Zentrum; and Nettetal, Germany: Steyler Verlag, 2002. Pp. 391. EUR 40.00.Chinese Medicine in Contemporary China: Plurality and Synthesis. By Volker Scheid. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 407. Hardcover $69.95. Paper $23.95.Confucian Feminist: Memoirs of Zeng Baosun (1893-1978). Translated and adapted by Thomas L. Kennedy. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2002. Pp. xxi + 170. Price not given.Consciousness Studies: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. By K. Ramakrishna Rao. Jefferson (North Carolina) and London: McFarland and Company, 2002. Pp. 367. Hardcover $65.00.Constituting Communities: Theravāda Buddhism and the Religious Cultures of South and Southeast Asia. Edited by John Clifford Holt, Jacob N. Kinnard, and Jonathan S. Walters. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. Pp. viii + 224. Hardcover $65.50. Paper $21.95.Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western. By Daya Krishna. Volume X Part 1 of History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, edited by D. P. Chattopadhyaya. New [End Page 110] Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2001. Pp. xxiii + 417. Hardcover RS 1200.East and West: Identità e dialogo interculturale. By Giangiorgio Pasqualotto. Venezia: Marsilo Editori, 2003. Pp. 210. EUR 16.00.Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China. By Edward Slingerland. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xii + 352. Price not given.Encountering Kā lī: In the Margins, at the Center, in the West. Edited by Rachel Fell McDermott and Jeffrey J. Kripal. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. Pp. xviii + 321. Hardcover $55.00, £37.95. Paper $21.95, £15.95.Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Antonio S. Cua. New York and London: Routledge, 2003. Pp. xx + 1020. Hardcover $150.00.Essays on Indian Philosophy. By J. N. Mohanty and edited by Purushottama Bilimoria. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xxxvii + 347. Paper RS 525.00.Faith, Humor, and Paradox. By Ignacio L. Götz. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002. Pp. 136. Hardcover $61.95.Four Illusions: Candrakīrti's Advice for Travelers on the Bodhisattva Path. Translated by Karen C. Lang. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xv + 240. Price not given.The Great Awakening: A Buddhist Social Theory. By David R. Loy. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. 223. Paper $16.95.The Hidden History of The Tibetan Book of the Dead. By Bryan J. Cuevas. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 328. Price not given.Huang Di nei jing su wen: Nature, Knowledge, Imagery in an Ancient Chinese Medical Text. By Paul U. Unschuld. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. Pp. xii + 520. Hardcover $75.00, £52.00.In Dewey's Wake: Unfinished Work of Pragmatic Reconstruction. Edited by William J. Gavin. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. Pp. vi + 249. Hardcover $71.50. Paper $23.95.Knowledge and Freedom in Indian Philosophy. By Tara Chatterjea. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002. Pp. xvi + 159. Hardcover... (shrink)

The research has three objectives: 1) to study the concept of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, 2) to study the concept of reality and knowledge in Buddhist philosophy, and 3) to analyze the concept of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in Buddhist philosophical perspective. This is documentary research. In this research, it was found that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle refers to the experiment of thought while studying physical reality on smaller particles than atoms where at the present no theory of Physics (...) can clearly explain such properties. In this respect, the mentioned principle is utilized to predict the pairs of a certain attribute of physics, position, and momentum, for instance. The accuracy of position, however, cannot be precisely yielded in advance by such a principle. In other words, it is impossible to measure the position and momentum of a quantum particle at the same time. In the study of the ultimate reality on the matter in the Buddhist philosophy, it showed that corporeality in nature is conditioned by cause and effect and thereby falling under the three common characteristics: 1) impermanence, 2) state of suffering, and 3) state of non-substantiality. In the study of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in the Buddhist philosophical perspective, this research was found that the processes in acquiring certain knowledge of Heisenberg and Buddhist philosophy are by one another in the sense that such knowledge is methodologically acquired through experience, rationality, and intuition because both see the Reality in the same manners, that is, the physical reality is viewed by Heisenberg as the thing that goes under changing state of wave-particle all the times, and the matter is seen by Buddhist philosophy as the impermanence and change depending upon its factors involved and thereby is not-self. However, in the different aspect, on the one hand, Buddhist philosophy utilizes the knowledge on the matter to develop the morality and ethics by which the cessation of suffering could be respectively made, but on the other hand, Heisenberg somehow applies the certain knowledge on physical objects into quantum technology to accommodate the physical comfortability in living life. Suggestions in the application of knowledge gained from this research into benefit were that while Buddhist philosophy can make use of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle to provide certain help at the time of explanation of three common characteristics being done through the scientific method, science also can utilize knowledge gained from Buddhist philosophy to expand the framework of scientific knowledge which is aimed at studying only the physical objects to be able to study the mental objects through the integration of three epistemological methods as well. (shrink)

Description: The book Hinduism and Buddhism in Perspective is divided in seven chapters. So far many things with the emphasis on philosophical thought have been discussed and viewed throughout this book. Both Hinduism and Buddhism are primarily concerned with the practical problems of human life. Their direct aim is to offer solutions for the proper guidance of Human conduct. They try to suggest practical ways and means solving the pressing problems of life and to attain the state of (...) Supreme perfection. However, the approach of the Hinduism is mainly para-psychological and it offers solutions mostly on the basis of traditional and metaphysical presuppositions, whereas the approach of Buddhism is thoroughly empirical in which the traditional metaphysical speculations are brushed aside. Surely, Hinduism and Buddhism are fundamentally opposed to each other in the belief of the existence of God (Brahman). The former holds the view that God or Brahman is the guiding principle behind the entire process of evolution and dissolutions. The latter does not recognize the idea of God or Brahman. It rejects idea of God. Concerning the concept of action (karma) both the Hinduism and Buddhism agree that all actions, whether good or bad, produce their proper consequences in the life of the individual who acts, provided they are performed with a desire for the fruits thereof. A man becomes good by performing good actions and bad by bad actions. (shrink)

Is Buddhism’s attitude towards accepted forms of knowledge sceptical? Are Pyrrhonian scepticism and classical Buddhist scholasticism related in their respective applications and expressions of doubt? In what way and to what degree is Critical Buddhism an offshoot of modern scepticism? Questions such as these as well as related issues are explored in the present collection, which brings together examinations of systematic doubt in the traditions of Buddhism from a variety of perspectives. What results from the perceptive observations and profound (...) analytical insights of the seven essays is a rich and multi-faceted picture of two families of philosophical systems—scepticism and Buddhism—that seem both akin and at odds, both related and distant at the same time. (shrink)

This volume of essays offers direct comparisons of historic Western and Buddhist perspectives on ethics and metaphysics, tracing parallels and contrasts all the way from Plato to the Stoics, Spinoza to Hume, and Schopenhauer through to contemporary ethicists such as Arne Naess, Charles Taylor and Derek Parfit. It compares and contrasts each Western philosopher with a particular strand in the Buddhist tradition, in some chapters represented by individual writers such as Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Santideva or Tsong Khapa. It does (...) so in light of both analytic concerns and themes from the existentialist and phenomenological traditions, and often in an ecumenical spirit that bridges both analytic and continentalist approaches. Some of the deepest questions in ethics, dealing with the scope of agency, value-laden notions of personhood and the nature of value in general, are intertwined with questions in metaphysics. One set of questions addresses how varying conceptions of selfhood relate to moral values ; another set of questions addresses how a conception of oneself or one’s selves should or should not affect how one thinks of happiness, or eudaimonia, or – in classical Indian terms – artha, sukha or nirvana. Western philosophy has featured discussion of both, but some would argue that certain traditions of Asian philosophy have offered a more sustained and even treatment of both sets of questions. The Buddhist tradition in particular has not only featured much discussion on both fronts, but has attracted many contemporary philosophers to its distinctive spectrum of approaches, and to what is – from many ‘Western’ points of view – a seemingly subversive analysis of ego, selfhood and personhood, whether in metaphysical, phenomenological or other incarnations. (shrink)

This paper defends the realist representationalist version of the Buddhist-Abhidharma account of consciousness. The account explains the intentionality and the phenomenality of conscious experiences by appealing to the doctrine of self-awareness. Concerns raised by Buddhist Mādhyamika philosophers about the compatibility of reflexive awareness and externality of the objects of perception are addressed. Similarly, the Hindu critiques on the incoherence of the Buddhist doctrine of reflexive awareness with the doctrines of no-self and momentariness are also answered.

The present book is true to its title. A collection of articles that stems from a symposium of the same name at the University of Hamburg in 2017, the authors here bring different perspectives to bear on the philosophical and historical relations between Buddhism and scepticism. Though this is relatively well-trodden ground, the insightful studies here shed new light on the matter. We find historical studies of the possible links between Pyrrhonism and Buddhism ; a defense of Nāgārjuna's (...) class='Hi'>philosophical scepticism as of the Pyrrhonian variety ; considerations of the role of sceptical doubt in less expected places, such as in Dharmakīrti's and Vasubandhu's... (shrink)

Buddhism is essentially a teaching about liberation - from suffering, ignorance, selfishness and continued rebirth. Knowledge of 'the way things really are' is thought by many Buddhists to be vital in bringing about this emancipation. This book is a philosophical study of the notion of liberating knowledge as it occurs in a range of Buddhist sources. Buddhism, Knowledge and Liberation assesses the common Buddhist idea that knowledge of the three characteristics of existence is the key to liberation. (...) It argues that this claim must be seen in the context of the Buddhist path and training as a whole. Detailed attention is also given to anti-realist, sceptical and mystical strands within the Buddhist tradition, all of which make distinctive claims about liberating knowledge and the nature of reality. David Burton seeks to uncover various problematic assumptions which underpin the Buddhist worldview. Sensitive to the wide diversity of philosophical perspectives and interpretations that Buddhism has engendered, this book makes a serious contribution to critical and philosophically aware engagement with Buddhist thought. Written in an accessible style, it will be of value to those interested in Buddhist Studies and broader issues in comparative philosophy and religion. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt at opening parallel but contrastive avenues into the respective Christian and Buddhist outlooks with respect to the metaphysical notion of relativity in contradistinction with the concept of the Absolute. The main thesis is that Christianity and Buddhism present us, in their respective normative intellectual economies, with analogous, yet profoundly different ways of envisioning metaphysics from the vantage point of their sui generis soteriology. In other terms, our argument is that Christian and Buddhist metaphysics (...) are essentially informed by the tenets of their spiritual way, whether redemptive or emancipative. Furthermore, these forms of “soteriological metaphysics” could be encapsulated in the twin nutshells of an “absolutization of the relative” on the one hand, and a “relativization of the absolute” on the other hand. The first formula refers, more specifically, to Christian Trinitarian theology, and the second to the Buddhist ontology of emptiness. These two formulas provide a theoretical framework that suggests both the internal coherence of each tradition and the ways in which this coherence is variously understood within the tradition itself. In the soteriological emphasis of these two traditions lies a possible—but not exclusive—way to open a wider space for a hermeneutics of aspects and vantage points, as well as for warding off any overly rigid conceptual crystallizations through a deeper recognition of the interplay between principled intellectual unity and the manifold of human existence. This essay is the second section of the article, and focuses on the Buddhist tradition. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt at opening parallel but contrastive avenues into the respective Christian and Buddhist outlooks with respect to the metaphysical notion of relativity in contradistinction with the concept of the Absolute. The main thesis is that Christianity and Buddhism present us, in their respective normative intellectual economies, with analogous, yet profoundly different ways of envisioning metaphysics from the vantage point of their sui generis soteriology. In other terms, our argument is that Christian and Buddhist metaphysics (...) are essentially informed by the tenets of their spiritual way, whether redemptive or emancipative. Furthermore, these forms of “soteriological metaphysics” could be encapsulated in the twin nutshells of an “absolutization of the relative” on the one hand, and a “relativization of the absolute” on the other hand. The first formula refers, more specifically, to Christian Trinitarian theology, and the second to the Buddhist ontology of emptiness. These two formulas provide a theoretical framework that suggests both the internal coherence of each tradition and the ways in which this coherence is variously understood within the tradition itself. In the soteriological emphasis of these two traditions lies a possible—but not exclusive—way to open a wider space for a hermeneutics of aspects and vantage points, as well as for warding off any overly rigid conceptual crystallizations through a deeper recognition of the interplay between principled intellectual unity and the manifold of human existence. This essay is the first section of the submission, which is focusing on the Christian tradition. (shrink)

Buddhist philosophers have developed a rich tradition of logic. Buddhist material on logic that forms the Buddhist tradition of logic, however, is hardly discussed or even known. This article presents some of that material in a manner that is accessible to contemporary logicians and philosophers of logic and sets agendas for global philosophy of logic.

A collection of essays, mostly original, on the actual and possible positions on free will available to Buddhist philosophers, by Christopher Gowans, Rick Repetti, Jay Garfield, Owen Flanagan, Charles Goodman, Galen Strawson, Susan Blackmore, Martin T. Adam, Christian Coseru, Marie Friquegnon, Mark Siderits, Ben Abelson, B. Alan Wallace, Peter Harvey, Emily McRae, and Karin Meyers, and a Foreword by Daniel Cozort.

This book is the first to engage Zen Buddhism philosophically on crucial issues from a perspective that is informed by the traditions of western philosophy and religion. It focuses on one renowned Zen master, Huang Po, whose recorded sayings exemplify the spirit of the 'golden age' of Zen in medieval China, and on the transmission of these writings to the West. The author makes a bold attempt to articulate a post-romantic understanding of Zen applicable to contemporary world culture. While (...) deeply sympathetic to the Zen tradition, he raises serious questions about the kinds of claims that can be made on its behalf. (shrink)

Our present actions can have effects on future generations - affecting not only the environment they will inherit, but even perhaps their very existence. This raises a number of important moral issues, many of which have only recently received serious philosophical attention. I begin by discussing some contemporary Western philosophical perspectives on the problem of our obligations to future generations, and then go on to consider how these approaches might relate to the classical Indian philosophical tradition. Although (...) the Indian commitment to pre-existence and rebirth precludes the arising of the Non-Identity Problem, this does not mean that there is not still a problem about justifying our obligations to future generations. The Indian Non-Reductionists about personal identity have difficulties with this that are comparable to the difficulties of their Western counterparts, but the Indian Buddhist Reductionists offer some provocative arguments for impartiality and the rationality of altruism. (shrink)

Some influential interpreters of Dharmakīrti have suggested understanding his thought in terms of a ‘sliding scale of analysis.’ Here it is argued that this emphasis on Dharmakīrti's alternating philosophical perspectives, though helpful in important respects, obscures the close connection between the two views in play. Indeed, with respect to these perspectives as Dharmakīrti develops them, the epistemology is the same either way. Insofar as that is right, John Dunne's characterization of Dharmakīrti's Yogācāra as ‘epistemic idealism ’ may not, after (...) all, distinguish this perspective from Sautrāntika; indeed, epistemic idealism can be understood as just the view these positions share. Thus, what distinguishes the ‘Yogācāra’ section of Dharmakīrti's texts is simply his making explicit that epistemological commitments the Sautrāntika does hold are already compatible with idealism. Sautrāntika and Yogācāra thus differ only when one turns to the metaphysical arguments that additionally show that only such mental things as sense data could be real. (shrink)

Huayan Buddhist philosophers and John Dewey share a perspective on emptiness or dependent origination. This article compares Dewey's local, contextual, and relational metaphysics with Huayan thinkers’ use of the metaphor of Indra's jewel net to extend their relational metaphysics to an infinite extent. Huayan thinkers base their ethics of compassion on the recognition of the infinite relatedness of all things. Dewey prefers constructing social institutions that foster experiences that are reliably aesthetically unified. This dispute is significant because pragmatism (...) and Buddhism both provide promising ethical positions based on the understanding of persons as temporally limited and relational. (shrink)

The modern way of life is highly dependent upon the production of goods by industrial organizations that are in turn dependent upon their workers for their ongoing operations. Even though more than a century has passed since the dawn of the industrial revolution, many dangerous aspects of work, both physical and mental, remain in the workplace today. Using Buddhist philosophical principles, this paper suggests that although many sources of the problem reside within the larger society, the industrial engineer (...) is still a key factor in bettering work and providing a workplace suitable for their fellow workers. Drawing on these insights, we present a number of work design guidelines that industrial engineers who abide by Buddhist principles could practice to help overcome some of the many sufferings produced by modern work. (shrink)

This chapter examines some of the most important perspectives that Mazu 馬祖 and his followers hold, based on author’s reading of reliable Hongzhou 洪州 texts and utilizing contemporary philosophical insights. The first is trans-metaphysical perspective, which is embodied in the Hongzhou deconstruction of the tendency to substantialize Buddha-nature as something independent of the everyday world of human beings. Hongzhou overturns Shenhui 神會’s quasi-metaphysical understanding of the realization of Buddha-nature as intuitive awareness isolated from ordinary cognitive activities, and as (...) the favorable ti, which relies on no conditions, over the yong. The second is liminological perspective, which is manifested in the Hongzhou understanding of the limits of descriptive language, the relativizing of the absolute boundary between speaking and non-speaking or silence, and the use of language to play at the limits of language. The third is ethical perspective, but it demonstrates itself through a twist of the ethical and non-ethical. While the Hongzhou masters often subvert conventional moral distinctions, they advise students to practice morality merely according to shifting conditions. This relational perspective enhances Hongzhou Chan’s profound ethicality. The fourth is counter-institutional perspective, which describes the Hongzhou masters’ middle way towards institutionalization, an attitude of “being with and against” institution by walking two roads at the same time, and avoiding the extreme iconoclasm and conformism. It helps Hongzhou Chan de-stabilize the hierarchical effect of formalization and generalization, emphasize the expedient nature of institutionalized teaching and practice, and make the institution remain open to changing circumstances. These perspectives provide implications for contemporary discourse on metaphysics/ontology, philosophy of language, ethics, and critical theory about institution; however, they originally only serve Hongzhou Chan’s soteriological purpose. (shrink)

Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency? gives voice, for the first time, to exclusively Buddhist perspectives on free will. In bringing together the work of some of the most important thinkers in this relatively new area of Buddhist studies, editor Rick Repetti gives the reader access both to the best theories on Buddhism and free will currently available and to the scholarly debates shaping articulations of and responses to the problem under consideration. Structurally, the book represents (...) a philosophical exchange so that each chapter either foreshadows or responds to those surrounding it. While each chapter offers a unique snapshot image of the relationship between Buddhism and free will, Repetti's... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 149-162 [Access article in PDF] Buddhist-Christian Complementarity in the Perspective of Quantum Physics Lai Pan-chiu Chinese University of Hong Kong Introduction The idea of Buddhist-Christian complementarity is by no means new. 1 But what is meant by "complementarity"? In quantum physics, the concept of "complementarity" has been extensively discussed due to the principle of complementarity introduced by Niels Bohr (1885-1962). This (...) principle is also one of the hotly debated issues in the areas of religion and natural science. Many scholars attempt to show that there are cases in Christian theology comparable to the complementarity in quantum physics. The most discussed case is perhaps the Christological doctrine of two natures in Jesus Christ. 2 Some scholars even attempt to interpret the relationship between theology and science in terms of complementarity. 3 This kind of discussion is not merely fanciful imagination originated by Christian theologians, since even Niels Bohr himself did advise Christian theologians to apply the complementary way of thinking in theology. 4 An interesting question may then be whether the principle of complementarity in quantum physics may cast light on the problem concerning Buddhist-Christian complementarity. This is the issue this essay attempts to address. Complementarity in Quantum Physics Modern physics, especially the theory of relativity and quantum physics, as Werner Heisenberg pointed out, brings forth to us an important philosophical issue—the relationship between language and reality. Some modern physicists find that they have to make use of ordinary language to establish a visual understanding or presentation of some events, which can hitherto only be expressed by a bundle of mathematical formulae. However, the ordinary language, together with its derived concepts, used in classical physics cannot adequately interpret some of the discoveries of modern physics. For example, conventional concepts of time and space can no longer apply directly in the general theory of relativity. The inadequacy of the classical concepts of "wave" and "particle" in quantum physics is another illustrative case. According to Bohr's theory, physicists can make use of these classical concepts in a [End Page 149] loose way, even though these concepts may seem to contradict each other when applied together. 5The principle of complementarity proposed by Niels Bohr refers specifically to the use of the two seemingly contradictory concepts in classical physics—"particle" and "wave"—to explain the behavior of a particular entity, light. Wave and particle are mutually exclusive concepts in classical physics. According to the classical understanding, wave possesses some characteristics that particle does not have, such as reflection, refraction, diffusion and interference. In reverse, particle also possesses some characteristics that wave does not have, such as occupying certain space. However, quantum physicists have discovered that in some experiments, light "behaves" as wave, whereas in others it behaves as particle. The results of experiments seem to suggest that neither "wave" nor "particle" can adequately explain the quantum phenomena. For this reason, some physicists, including Albert Einstein, suggest abandoning the use of the concepts of wave and particle in the subatomic realm. Contrary to this view, Bohr insists that the concepts of "wave" and "particle" remain usable and useful in quantum physics because "however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms." 6 As Bohr puts it, "the fundamental postulate of the indivisibility of the quantum of action is itself, from the classical point of view, an irrational element which inevitably requires us to forego a causal mode of description and which, because of the coupling between phenomena and their observation, forces us to adopt a new mode of description designated as complementary in the sense that any given application of classical concepts precludes the simultaneous use of other classical concepts which in a different connection are equally necessary for the elucidation of the phenomena." 7The principle of complementarity can thus be understood as a method or "mode of description" using two or more mutually exclusive concepts of a specific realm (classical physics) to explain a phenomenon of another realm (quantum physics) that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 147-151 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism. By DaleS.Wright. Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1998. xv +227 pp. In a work brimming with unobtrusive erudition and centered on the figure of Huang Po (d. 850), Dale Wright offers a seasoned account of a topic that is still very much in need (...) of clarification, namely, the roles of language, conceptuality, textuality, interpretation, and historical development in Zen Buddhism. Some recent critics tend to see Zen as incoherent or even hypocritical in that this "special transmission outside the sutras, not dependent on language and texts, pointing directly to mind" (quoted, p. 64) in reality developed complex and varied textual and ritual traditions from [End Page 147] which the supposedly pure enlightenment experience cannot be siphoned out. Wright argues that the critics themselves are often naive, giving an inverted reflection of the naiveté of earlier scholars such as John Blofeld, who saw Zen as centered on an ineffable Supreme Experience, quite independent of the language used to point to it. Nonetheless, Wright himself is in basic agreement with the critics and in radical opposition to Blofeld (and to D. T. Suzuki). But he points out that the early Chinese Zen masters speak in many voices, often anticipating the most sophisticated insights of their critics.Wright's style is very unlike that of Bernard Faure, being slow, serene, reflective, scrupulous, and imbued with the deepest respect for the Zen tradition. Yet his thought rejoins Faure's at many points.The thrust of Wright's argument is to demystify Zen enlightenment by reinserting it in its varied linguistic, social, institutional, and historical contexts. He gives a realistic and holistic account of what Zen experience must have been like for disciples of Huang Po (pp. 187-192). His stress on the linguisticality of all experience certainly illuminates the texture of Huang Po's world. But I am left wondering if there is not another aspect of Zen that is missed here. Modern philosophers have derived much insight from the realization that thought and perception are deeply embedded in language. But I do not know that anyone has proven that there can never be a thinking or perception that is independent of language. Even the supposedly pan-textualist Derrida states somewhere that he does not exclude the possibility of nonlinguistic thought. In most fields of inquiry this abstruse question makes no practical difference, but in the case of Zen it is of crucial import. The presupposition of universal linguisticality, especially if it hardens into a dogma, may block access to the core of Zen experience.Wright argues that though some Zen masters sought prelinguistic immediacy, the majority were deeply aware of the inseparability of experience and the language in which it is grasped. But could it not be that prelinguistic immediacy was so much taken for granted in Zen that the masters scarcely needed to insist on it? Wright says that enlightenment itself is a linguistic event, since it is often occasioned by a verbal statement and given immediate expression in another verbal statement. But to recognize the indispensability of language for conveying experience is not necessarily to imply that the experience itself is dependent on language. Although a certain poem of Huang Po "strives to make its anti-textual point, the master must enter into the textual world to do so, thus abandoning the position of 'no dependence on texts'" (p. 22). Is it really necessary to see a contradiction here, given that, as Wright himself points out, "no unanimity on the meaning of the mandate against 'words and letters' existed" (p. 26)? Let us suppose that the point is nonattachment to texts and a realization of the intrinsic independence of enlightenment from the limited perspectives of textuality, language, and conceptual thought. This is quite compatible with intensive use of texts in practice.Blofeld explains that texts were useful to the learner but cast aside when enlightenment was reached. Wright argues that the enlightened experience must "continue to hold within it, and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Ethics of Death: Religious and Philosophical Perspectives in Dialogue by Lloyd Steffen and Dennis R. CooleySarah MosesThe Ethics of Death: Religious and Philosophical Perspectives in Dialogue Lloyd Steffen and Dennis R. Cooley MINNEAPOLIS: FORTRESS PRESS, 2014. 318 PP. $34.00In The Ethics of Death, religious studies scholar Lloyd Steffen and philosopher Dennis Cooley offer ethical analysis of a variety of topics with an approach they refer (...) to as "dialogic engagement," modeled upon their own interdisciplinary exchange with one another (4). In fact, each of the seven main chapters is explicitly structured as a dialogue: each author laying out his particular approach in two separate sections, which are then followed by a question-and-answer section where the authors pose questions to one another and provide brief responses. Intending to address death as it relates to the moral lives of the living, the chapters cover topics that are of enduring interest to students, scholars, and the general public: abortion, the death penalty, war, suicide, physician-assisted suicide, and euthanasia. To distinguish it from other recent titles that explore the dying experience in contemporary medical contexts, the book might be more accurately described as addressing the ethics of killing. [End Page 218]To set the stage for subsequent topical chapters, the book's first chapter provides a basic introduction to ethics, including outlining prominent ethical theories such as Kantian, utilitarian, virtue, and natural law approaches. Readers will find clear descriptions of key terms such as consequentialism, deontology, and pragmatism. In his section Steffen also addresses the contrast between religious and secular ethics, noting how religious ethical traditions are potentially distinctive (such as divine command theories or use of sacred texts) and potentially overlapping (such as similar practical judgments). In this chapter, the authors also indicate their own preferred normative approach: Steffen identifying with a "natural law hybrid ethic," a natural law approach that "allows the other ethical theories a part but says none has the final say" (22), and Cooley advocating what he calls the "Pragmatic Principle" approach, combining what he considers plausible and helpful from both deontology and consequentialism (32–33). The authors' normative approaches reveal the strengths and limitations of various ethical theories, and the practical usefulness of theoretical hybridity.Each of the topical chapters provides readers with relevant background information, such as the legal and policy history of particular issues. Given the flexible normative approaches taken by the authors, not surprisingly each chapter provides a nonabsolutist position on each form of killing (although Cooley's evaluation of war is strongly negative: "Some may be justified, whereas the vast majority cannot be" [165]). The chapters also provide balanced, thoughtful sections that outline major arguments on opposite sides of ethical debate, sometimes in the form of enumerated "for and against" lists. The chapters thus familiarize readers with important dimensions of contemporary debates, such as just war theory, pacifism, human rights theory, definitions of personhood, and the determination of medical futility. Chapters include useful references to thinkers who have shaped ethical debate such as Don Marquis and Judith Thompson on abortion and Mahatma Gandhi and Douglas Lackey on war and violence. Students of religious ethics will find the sections by Steffen particularly helpful in reviewing various ethical positions from religions such as Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism.The book could certainly be effective in a topical survey course at the undergraduate or graduate level, with a major strength that the book's structure illustrates theoretical connections between philosophy and religious studies regarding ethical inquiry. The dialogue questions that conclude each chapter could be used to frame class discussion or even as prompts for student writing assignments. However, for a course focused on comparative religious ethics, instructors would want to supplement with more in-depth ethical analysis from particular religious ethical traditions. [End Page 219]Sarah MosesUniversity of MississippiCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hooked! Buddhist Writings on Greed, Desire, and the Urge to Consume, and: Subverting Greed: Religious Perspectives on the Global EconomyBrian KarafinHooked! Buddhist Writings on Greed, Desire, and the Urge to Consume. Edited by Stephanie Kaza. Boston: Shambhala, 2005. 271 pp.Subverting Greed: Religious Perspectives on the Global Economy. Edited by Paul F. Knitter and Chandra Muzaffar. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002. 193 pp.The Buddha's second noble truth (...) diagnoses the cause of suffering as desire, understood as a mental state of greed or clinging attachment that in turn leads to grasping. The mind that wants to find lasting satisfaction by grasping at objects of desire, the Buddha said, is doomed to dissatisfaction because the very nature of conditioned existence frustrates permanent pleasure. The monkey-mind keeps clinging desperately to the banana in the cage even as that clinging itself traps the hand that grasps. To let go, to escape suffering through an insight into the structural nature of the cage, the fruit, and the grasping hand, seems beyond the monkey's abilities until, chastened by the seemingly endless lack of satisfaction and wishing to emerge into a state of freedom, the monkey enters the path and trains his mind to recognize the true causes of his frustration.The teachings of the Buddha have been understood, for the past 2,500 years, as a therapy of desire. The analysis of suffering and its causes in the confused and clinging minds of ordinary sentient beings, and the prescription of a path of training to uproot those causes and thereby free the mind from suffering, have been presented as a perennial psychospiritual system of training responding to [End Page 179] the afflicted condition of every sentient being's mind regardless of culture, language, or economic system. But what happens, asks Santikaro, the American meditation teacher and disciple of Achaan Buddhadasa, in his essay in Hooked!, when this psychological inquiry is taking place in a social context marked by the deliberate and systematic exacerbation of desire, as in the contemporary period of consumerist capitalism? This question might be taken as a kind of koan to be read between the lines in all of the essays in this compelling, darkly humorous, and inspiring book: is liberation possible under capitalism? Even the Buddha's teachings can be commodified, Thubten Chodron points out in her essay, with examples ranging from the advertising hype on posters for the highest yoga tantra initiations by visiting Tibetan lamas to the high prices charged at many retreat centers and the commercial mindsets of Buddhist students wanting the biggest bang for their buck when they come to teachings or retreats. Even socially engaged Buddhist activists surf the web looking for bargains between news flashes on the latest imperial wars, as Diana Winston ruefully and comically recounts in her piece, "You Are What You Download." It seems that we are in danger of becoming a population of "hungry ghosts," the mythical beings of Buddhist cosmology whose tiny mouths cannot possibly consume enough food and drink to slake the voracious hungers and thirsts of their enormous bellies.The essays in Hooked! range widely across themes and vary greatly in styles. The text moves from the personal memoir of Winston to the meditation teachings of Pema Chodron, the philosophical inquiries into time of David Loy, descriptions of social change movements in Thailand by Pracha Hutanuwatr and Jane Rasbash, green power in contemporary Japan, essays on generosity in Zen monastic training and gift-based economies, young Buddhists' shopping habits, and much more. But all of the authors seem to agree with the recognition that, under capitalism, the problem of desire, greed, and attachment is exponentially more acute than in traditional societies, dwelling as we do in an environment that is antithetical to the very idea of a therapy for desire's overcoming. The essayists also seem to agree that hope is not vain, that it is in fact still possible to follow the path of the Buddha under capitalism, but that to be effective the practice of the path needs to take seriously and fully acknowledge the effects, intra-psychically as well as socially, of the capitalist economic system. We are... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration by Jay L. GarfieldYilun Zhai (bio)Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration. By Jay L. Garfield. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xiv + 248. Paperback $24.95, ISBN 978-0-19-090764-8.Jay L. Garfield's Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration offers a comprehensive presentation of Buddhist ethics as well as one of the most ingenious metaethical developments in the field. With (...) Western philosophers as its potential readers, the tone and the choice of examples of this book contain a typical philosophical flavor. Most interestingly, it is not only an objective interpretation of the existing Buddhist ethical theories, but also an innovative work that expands the current theoretical boundary. Buddhist Ethics is divided into three parts: in the first part ("Structure") Garfield argues that Buddhist ethics is best characterized by "moral phenomenology," a metaethical theory that emphasizes how we experience over what we do. The second part ("Doctrine") elaborates on how both the Theravāda and Mahāyāna paths are ethical in nature and compatible with a phenomenological interpretation. The third part ("Contemporary Issues") introduces Engaged Buddhism, and claims that Buddhist ethics can function naturalistically without supernatural concepts such as rebirth and the six realms of transmigration.The first part of Buddhist Ethics maps a structural framework of moral phenomenology. Over the past decades, philosophers have endeavored to place Buddhist ethics under the existing Western metaethical categories, for Buddhist ethical thought bears a striking resemblance to all of the major traditions of Western ethics--consequentialism, virtue ethics, and deontology. But Garfield rejects any simple generalization and proposes a particularist reading of Buddhist ethics, which he calls "moral phenomenology." For Garfield, Buddhist ethics cannot be captured by any universal, overarching moral principle; not because Buddhists neglected ethics or failed to create metaethical theory, he argues, but that no universal moral principle is sufficiently sophisticated as a guidance for real life (p. 23). The complexity of dependent origination and the unique goal-oriented paths make the Buddhist definitions of action, agent, free will, pleasure, and pain utterly distinct from their Western counterparts. In particular, while Western philosophers often rely on our natural perceptual capacities and the conceptual mind as sources of information (such as the Cartesian "clear and distinct ideas"), according to Garfield, Buddhist ethicists regard ordinary perception as [End Page 1] fundamentally flawed and the source of all suffering. Thus, they "aim to correct a 'natural' way of experiencing ourselves," characterized by moral phenomenology (p. 22).Although moral phenomenology is the nucleus of Garfield's entire project, a comprehensive, formal definition of the term is lacking throughout the book. To help the reader understand this sophisticated term and its ethical stance, I will briefly summarize it here. Buddhist moral phenomenology centers on the transformation of our mental experiences, which Garfield calls an "input ethics," in contrast to the Western "output ethics" that emphasize explicit rules, external actions and their consequences, and cultivation of virtues (p. 29). The process of ethical cultivation--completed through prescriptive paths--replaces our natural egocentric experiences with a liberated perspective stemming from the interdependence of all things. Such a perceptual transformation in turn replaces one's instinctive reactions with a spontaneous and responsive mode of comportment toward the world (p. 27). The final goal of moral phenomenology is the elimination of suffering for all sentient beings, with the buddhas and bodhisattvas as exemplary models of its perfection. In this sense, it is a combination of an ethical path and a soteriological path.To the best of my knowledge, Garfield is the first person to explicitly identify a moral phenomenological reading of Buddhist ethics: His 2010 article "What Is It Like to Be a Bodhisattva" and 2015 book Engaging Buddhism include pioneering research on this theory. The current book (Buddhist Ethics) further develops the theory, offering a more mature metaethical structure and in-depth explorations of canonical texts from the Indo-Tibetan traditions. By endorsing a moderate form of ethical particularism, Buddhist phenomenology refrains from committing to a single Western metaethical category, and gains notable advantage in synthesizing a myriad of Buddhist moral discourses into a united whole. This theory is undoubtedly Garfield's paramount contribution in the... (shrink)

On the Buddhist doctrine on impermanence; based on Dharmakīrti's Santānāntara-siddhi.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhist Literature as Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy as Literature ed. by Rafael K. StepienVesna A. Wallace (bio)Buddhist Literature as Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy as Literature. Edited by Rafael K. Stepien. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2020. Pp. xi + 381. Paperback $26.95, isbn 978-1-4383-8070-1.The editor of the Buddhist Literature as Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy as Literature should be commended (...) for bringing together an excellent collection of essays and producing the first comprehensive volume that offers a coherent study of the relationship between Buddhist literature and philosophy. This book is an ambitious and praiseworthy project, which covers a wide range of Buddhist literary genres produced in India, Tibet, and East Asia over two millennia. As a whole, the volume invites the reader to reexamine a centuries-long binary division between the categories of literature and philosophy, which have been often approached in academic studies as mutually exclusive. It does so by demonstrating that in the context of Buddhism, philosophy and literature continuously converge, diminishing the overarching binary and broadening their scopes. Most contributions to this volume demonstrate that Buddhist philosophy as presented and enacted in Buddhist literature is not limited to what some would consider a "pure philosophy." The volume is divided into the two, mutually mirroring sections, with each section containing six chapters. Chapters forming the section one, "Buddhist Literature as Philosophy," aim at broadening our perspective about literary forms, such as tales, novels, hymns, and court poetry, which have not been usually explored as the means of articulating Buddhist philosophical views. Chapters grouped in the section "Buddhist Philosophy as Literature" focus on Buddhist literary theories as philosophy of language and introduce the Buddhist biographical and autobiographical genres characterized by practical philosophy to further challenge our preconceptions of what it is that constitutes literature and philosophy. While some contributors endeavor to demonstrate the presence of rational, analytical reasoning in unexpected literary forms, other contributors problematize a strict distinction between literature and philosophy as inapplicable to Buddhism, which is undeniably cross-disciplinary.The first two chapters in section one, authored by Amber Carpenter and Sarah Shaw respectively, draw examples from jātaka stories to show us how Buddhist ethical lessons work in the narrative tales of the Buddha's former births. These two chapters also draw our attention to an accessible and engaging, [End Page 1] narrative manner that presents the Bodhisattva's philosophical exercises to the audience, a manner that stands in contrast to the a priori reasoning characteristic of philosophical treatises. In the first chapter, titled "Transformative Vision: Coming to See the Buddha's Reality," Carpenter analyzes two jātaka stories--"Bodhi the Wandering Ascetic" and "The Man Without an Heir"--taken from Āryaśūra's Jātakamālā. In the first story, a renunciant Bodhi, while repudiating the king's ministers who are intent on disqualifying him as a king's advisor on morality, makes metaphysical claims regarding the nature of reality, causation, and the universe, and provides the reasons and arguments. According to Shaw, by offering an insight into the Buddhist worldview and morality, jātaka tales have a transformative power not only with regard to ethics but also in transforming the reader's vision of reality. In the chapter "Jātakas and the Abhidhamma: Practical Compassion and Kusala Citta," Shaw suggests that a reason why jātaka stories are rarely discussed seriously in the way that they were intended is their literary format based in narrative and mundane situations. Analyzing the concepts of momentariness and kusala citta ("virtuous consciousness") in these stories, Shaw shows that by communicating the technical and insight-based Buddhist doctrinal elements, jātaka tales significantly contribute to Buddhist practical ethics. The Pāli Javanahaṃsa-jātaka, a tale about the friendship between a goose and a king, introduces the reader to some of the most complex Buddhist ideas such as impermanence, momentariness, and mental states, expounded in the Abhidhamma in extraction. Through her analysis of the Kurudhamma-jātaka and Mahosaddha-jātaka, Shaw further shows the integration of narrative literature and Buddhist philosophical tenets, of Buddhist tales and the Abhidhamma, of the relationship between the intention and consciousness... (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility and desirability of artificial intelligence by considering western literature on AI and Buddhist doctrine.Design/methodology/approachThe paper argues that these issues can best be considered examined from a variety of philosophical and religious viewpoints and that resolution of those issues depends on which point of view the questions are addressed from. There are a number of philosophical questions involving AI usually considered by philosophers: what is the definition of AI, (...) what is a status of an AI as compared with human intelligence, is there a legitimate purpose for creating AI; if so, what is that purpose? Buddhism is a religion that is deeply philosophical and, perhaps to the surprise of western readers, has a lot to say about the nature of human mind and human intelligence. Although Buddhism does not talk explicitly about AI, the richness of its philosophical views concerning human nature and the nature of the physical world sheds considerable light on the philosophical questions stated above.FindingsThe paper explains how Buddhist teaching would answer the four questions above.Originality/valueThe paper is the first to clarify the Buddhist position on AI, and perhaps represents the first attempt to explore the relationships between any major religion and the AI agenda. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Who Hears?A Zen Buddhist PerspectiveRobert AitkenWestern psychologists and neurologists have attempted to use their concepts to explain East Asian religions for more than seventy-five years. Carl Jung (1875–1961) wrote a long foreword to Richard Wilhelm's The Secret of the Golden Flower back in 1931, which gave many readers in Europe and the Americas their first glimpse of philosophical Daoism.1 A generation later, Erich Fromm's conversations with D. (...) T. Suzuki were recorded in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis.2 In our own time, the Dalai Lama's collaborative work with neuroscientists and psychologists has received widespread attention,3 while academia has given James H. Austin's Zen and the Brain hearty approval.4The process of mutual understanding between Western scientists and teachers of East Asian religion is still incomplete, however, and in earlier times it had barely begun. I remember my amusement back in the 1970s, watching a video of monks trailing streams of wires attached to biofeedback instruments while they were walking formally and solemnly. Even in those early days it was apparent to me that for all their academic credentials, the scholars had started with an ignorance of the subject of their study. They were successful in measuring something in the brain relating to a samādhi condition, but while the monks may have grounded themselves more or less in a settled practice, who is to measure their appreciation of the mejiro chirping in the camellia bush just outside? Great masters of Zen, Zhaozhou, and Deshan and their successors did not talk about being settled, any more than neuroanataomists discuss the importance of the alphabet.The chirping of the mejiro might have reminded the monks of a case, a case that would lie in a dimension even further from the world of wires and dials. "Who is the master of hearing that sound?"5 This was the gist of a question by Bassui Tokushō Zenji—a question that became a public case, one kōan among many other kōans that have not been studied by science. It is time for such a study.My directory of Chinese kōans holds more than 5,500 neatly framed traditional stories set forth to guide the student.6 The modern Zen teacher is conversant with some 550 of these kōans, a number that is sufficient if... if.... There are several caveats. If the teacher treats kōans as historical artifacts, then the stories are no [End Page 89] longer kōans, and the teaching is perniciously misleading. Sometimes the teacher has gone only part way in kōan study. The great house of conventional wisdom has fallen, but he or she doesn't know it is ruined and holds forth in the old explanatory way. Sometimes the teacher has completed the long course of study, but elects to pontificate from within the wreckage of the old manor. Finally there are those who abandon the ruins completely for practice on the open road. Here is my gāthā pointing to that way:Stepping forth on the open road,I vow with all beingsTo distinguish the voices of birds,And make good use of my time.Bassui Zenji's kōan "Who is the master of hearing that sound?" could be paraphrased here at the Pālolo Zen Center as "Who is hearing that thrush singing on the railing outside?" If, in the days before I retired, a student were to respond, "I hear the thrush," I would not have approved. Bassui would not have approved. Intimacy would be missing, and intimacy is the Dao. Intimacy is the way of all the Buddhas. There is no Zen without intimacy; intimacy with what? Both the self and the thrush. That was Bassui's intention, you can be sure.Fayan met Dizang while on pilgrimage. Dizang asked, "What are you up to these days?"Fayan said, "I'm going around one pilgrimage, wherever my feet will carry me."Dizang asked, "What to you expect from pilgrimage?"Fayan said, "I don't know."Dizang said, "Not knowing is most intimate." Fayan underwent great realization. 7Zen Buddhism stresses intimacy, while in... (shrink)

Taking language as its general theme, this book explores how the tradition of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophical speculation exemplifies the character of scholasticism. Scholasticism, as an abstract and general category, is developed as a valuable theoretical tool for understanding a variety of intellectual movements in the history of philosophy of religion. The book investigates the Buddhist Scholastic theory and use of scripture, the nature of doctrine and its transcendence in experience, Mahayana Buddhist hermeneutics, the theory and practice (...) of exegesis, and questions concerning the authority of sacred texts. It also deals with the Buddhist Scholastic theory of conceptual thought as the mirror of language, the Scholastic defense of logic and rationality as a method, as well as the role of language in the idealist and nominalist ontologies of the Mahayana. Finally, the author treats the question of ineffability and the silence of the Buddha from a new perspective. (shrink)

Traditional scholars of philosophy and religion, both East and West, often place a major emphasis on analyzing the nature of “the self.” In recent decades, there has been a renewed interest in analyzing self, but most scholars have not claimed knowledge of an ahistorical, objective, essential self free from all cultural determinants. The contributors to this volume recognize the need to contextualize specific views of self and to analyze such views in terms of the dynamic, dialectical relations between self and (...) culture.An unusual feature of this book is that all of the chapters not only focus on traditions and individuals, East and West, but include as primary emphases comparative philosophy, religion, and culture, reinforcing individual and cultural creativity. Each chapter brings specific Eastern and Western perspectives into a dynamic, comparative relation. This comparative orientation emphasizes our growing sense of interrelatedness and interdependency. Culture and Self includes many Asian and Western philosophical, religious, and cultural perspectives. Chapters focus on Vedanta, Samkhya-Yoga, and other Hindu approaches, as well as Buddhist, Confucian, Taoist and other Indian, Chinese, and Japanese perspectives. Studies present Cartesian and other dominant Western perspectives, as well as Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, feminism, and other Western challenges to the dominant Western interpretations of culture and self.This volume will appeal to students and readers of philosophy, religious studies, Asian studies, and cultural studies. (shrink)

J.N. Findlay was a South African philosopher who published from the late 1940s into the 1980s. He had a prestigious international academic career, holding many academic posts around the world. This article uses a textual comparative approach and focuses on Findlay’s Gifford Lecture at St Andrews University between 1965 and 1970. The objective of the article is to highlight the extent to which Findlay’s philosophical writings were influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism. Although predominantly a Platonist, Findlay drew influence from Asian (...) philosophy and religion, particularly Mahāyāna Buddhism. In these lectures, he applies the metaphor of the Platonic Cave to investigate Hegelian and Husserlian approaches to knowledge. Though he was a leading Hegel and Husserl scholar, his reading of these two philosophers is strongly influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism, resulting in a unique mystical interpretation of these two philosophers. Revisiting Findlay’s writings is significant for two reasons; firstly, he investigated Buddhism prior to the Asian religions being included in Religious Studies departments’ purview in South African universities, and secondly, his interpretation of two prominent Western philosophers along Buddhist lines provides an early attempt at decolonising the predominance of Western philosophical views of knowledge.Contribution: This contribution forms part of a larger collection of essays investigating philosophical works that have had a significant impact on the study of religion. This contribution investigates the Buddhist influence on J.N. Findlay’s philosophical readings of Husserl and Hegel. (shrink)

Comparing Buddhist and contemporary analytic views about mereological composition reveals significant dissimilarities about the purposes that constrain successful answers to mereological questions, the kinds of considerations taken to be probative in justifying those answers, and the value of mereological inquiry. I develop these dissimilarities by examining three questions relevant to those who deny the existence of composite wholes. The first is a question of justification: What justifies denying the existence of composite wholes as more reasonable than affirming their existence? (...) The second is a question of ontology: Under what conditions are many partless individuals arranged composite-wise? The third is a question of reasonableness: Why, if there are no composites available to experience, do “the folk” find it reasonable to believe there are? I motivate each question, sketch some analytic answers for each, develop in more detail answers from the Theravādin Buddhist scholar Buddhaghosa, and extract comparative lessons. (shrink)

_A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy_ is the most comprehensive single volume on the subject available; it offers the very latest scholarship to create a wide-ranging survey of the most important ideas, problems, and debates in the history of Buddhist philosophy. Encompasses the broadest treatment of Buddhist philosophy available, covering social and political thought, meditation, ecology and contemporary issues and applications Each section contains overviews and cutting-edge scholarship that expands readers understanding of the breadth and diversity of (...) class='Hi'>Buddhist thought Broad coverage of topics allows flexibility to instructors in creating a syllabus Essays provide valuable alternative philosophical perspectives on topics to those available in Western traditions. (shrink)

One of the major aims of this article is to provide the theoretical account of mindfulness provided by the systematic Abhidharma epistemology of conscious states. I do not claim to present the one true version of mindfulness, because there is not one version of it in Buddhism; in addition to the Abhidharma model, there is, for example, the nondual Mahāmudrā tradition. A better understanding of a Buddhist philosophical framework will not only help situate meditation practice in its originating (...) tradition, but it will also clarify a Buddhist perspective on consciousness. In this article, I present the Abhidharma account of mindfulness—as explicated in the Abhidharmakośa, the root text for the Abhidharma tradition—and the theoretical model of the mind that underlies its practice. Abhidharma–Yogācara model of the mind, I believe, contains critical philosophical insights relevant to contemporary concerns while at the same time placing mindfulness meditation in its proper philosophical context. (shrink)

Modern scholarship has often wondered whether Indian Buddhist idealism is primarily epistemic or metaphysical: does this idealism amount to a kind of transcendental scepticism according to which we cannot decide whether objects exist or not outside of consciousness because we can have no epistemic access whatsoever to these objects? Or is it rather ontologically committed, i.e., does it consist in denying the very existence of the external world? One could deem the question anachronistic and suspect that with such an (...) inquiry we project onto Ancient and Medieval India a distinction that remains profoundly alien to it, were it not for a few preserved texts where Indian authors themselves distinguish between two such kinds of idealism within the Buddhist philosophical tradition. As already pointed out by Dan Arnold, this is the case in the commentary by Manorathanandin on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika; but the difference between two varieties of Buddhist idealism is also alluded to in Hindu sources, both Mīmāṃsaka and Śaiva. The present article offers a new analysis of Manorathanandin’s short and somewhat ambiguous distinction, and it examines in this connection some important remarks found in the works of the Śaiva nondualists Utpaladeva (c. 925–975) and Abhinavagupta (c. 975–1025). It shows that according to these authors, in fact the epistemic version of the Buddhist argument in favour of idealism is already metaphysical insofar as it necessarily involves a denial of the existence of the external world, and it attempts to assess the faithfulness of this Śaiva interpretation to its Buddhist sources. (shrink)

Traditionally, Buddhist philosophy has seemingly rejected the autonomous self. In Western philosophy, free will and the philosophy of action are established areas of research. This book presents a comprehensive analytical review of extant scholarship on perspectives on free will. It studies and refutes the most powerful Western and Buddhist philosophical objections to free will and explores the possibility that a form of agency may in fact exist within Buddhism. Providing a detailed explanation of how Buddhist meditation (...) increases self-regulative mind-control abilities, the author argues that the Buddhist path is designed to produce meditation virtuosos exhibiting mind-control abilities far exceeding the free-will advocate's ability to 'do otherwise' or have their choices be 'up to' them. Based on the empirically-supported mind-control cultivated by these meditation virtuosos, the book proposes the principle of, 'Buddhist Soft Compatibilism', a theory of 'freedom of the mind' that entails freedoms of the will, attention, emotion and action, compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. Buddhism, Meditation and Free Will will be of interest to Buddhist and Western philosophers and academics interested in comparative philosophy, free will, philosophy of action, metaphysics, ethics and Religious Studies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 140-144 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Culture and Self: Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, East and West Culture and Self: Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, East and West. Edited by Douglas Allen. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997.xv + 184 pp. Inspired perhaps by both deconstructive and constructive impulses, this important collection of nine essays undertakes to challenge the notion, common in both Western (...) and Eastern philosophical and religious traditions, that there exists such a thing as an objective, ahistorical, universal "self." At the same time, the volume as a whole makes a case for the value of a notion of the self that takes account of its cultural and historical situatedness. Douglas Allen's introduction succinctly frames the central claim of this project: While an increasing number of scholars, both Eastern and Western, appreciate the importance of the dialectical relationship between self and culture, and the vital role culture plays in determining the nature of the self, notions of the self as unconditioned by culture, or of the self as influenced by cultural factors that are merely superficial, subjective, and illusory, continue to dominate the religious and philosophical thought of both West and East. Thus it is the aim of these essays to undermine the dominance of those notions, in particular by means of a comparative, [End Page 140] cross-cultural methodology that highlights the existence of differing views of the self, thereby calling into question the dominant monolithic understanding.The essays are divided into four sections. The first part, "Multiple Asian and Western Perspectives," contains two essays in which a number of different Asian views are considered, resulting in analyses that are broad rather than deep. Obviously this approach has its limitations: the observations about the various cultural understandings discussed in each of these essays tend to be somewhat lacking in complexity. However, both essays do a creditable job of presenting the cross-cultural resources available to critique the notion of an enduring, true, objective self, free of sociohistorical determinants.Douglas Allen's essay clearly articulates the somewhat narrow understanding of the self against which his and many of the other views contained in this collection are implicitly positioned, characterizing it as post-Cartesian: autonomous, rational, individual, skeptical, and foundational. In spite of frequent references to the dominance within Eastern thought of the notion of an ahistorical, culturally unconditioned self, and in spite of the richness of views on the eternally unchanging nature of the self to be found, for example, in various forms of Hinduism, it is clearly and explicitly a modern,Western view of the self against which Allen wants to argue. His basic claim, then, is that this modern Western view is itself historically and culturally determined and that, moreover, there are pressing philosophical and political reasons for challenging it. In contrast to this post-Cartesian self, Allen offers four alternative conceptions--the self of the Bhagavad Gita, determined by karma and social position; the "no-self" of Buddhism; the Marxist self, constituted by the economic conditions of production within which it finds itself; and the relational self of much modern Western feminist theory--suggesting that these understandings provide richer views of the self by virtue of taking account of the self's location in history and culture.The target of Alan Roland's essay is not the largely philosophical notion of selfhood considered by Allen, although clearly it builds on that notion. Rather, Roland takes up the self ofWestern psychoanalytic theory in order to ask whether, given the Western assumptions upon which it is based, psychoanalysis can be universally valid. He suggests, in the context of a critical reading of several major psychoanalytic studies of Asian cultures, that psychoanalysis in Asia can be found in three predominant guises, each limited in some important way: evolutionism, which posits the individualist self as the goal of psychological development, thereby dismissing the more relational selves of Asian cultures as developmentally inferior; universalism, which argues for a self that is essentially the same across cultural differences, imposing a single analytical standard on widely diverging... (shrink)

This captivating new book, a milestone in Buddhist and comparative studies, is a compilation of seventeen essays celebrating the work and thought of Nolan Pliny Jacobson. A profoundly motivated interdisciplinary thinker, Jacobson sought to discover, clarify, and synthesize points of similarity among leading thinkers of different Oriental and Western cultures. For almost half a century, he articulated his vision of an emerging world civilization, one in which all people can feel and express their creative, constructive powers for the benefit (...) of others as well as for themselves. Jacobson believed that philosophy and the works of philosophers should be understood as a vital force enriching all civilizational experience. His own philosophic perspective was rooted in the conviction that novelty is the source of all experience and the center of a creativity that lives beyond words, arguments, and rational paradigms. Throughout his career, Jacobson explored Buddhist texts and personalities, spending much time in the Orient, particularly Myanmar and Japan. He also closely studied the works of numerous Western philosophers, including Whitehead, Dewey, Peirce, James, Hartshorne, and Wieman. Jacobson believed that American philosophy and Buddhism concurred in many ways, with the potential to form a powerful basis for the development of a world civilization. The essays in this volume are organized around Jacobson’s activities, publications, and interests. Authored by an impressive selection of scholars, the essays are grouped into four sections—"Historical Context," "Central Issues," "Practical Implications," and "The Japan Emphasis." Hajime Nakamura, Charles Hartshorne, Kenneth K. Inada, Seizo Oho, and numerous others discuss freedom, creativity, and Buddhism’s self-corrective nature, setting forth their reasons for sharing Jacobson’s ideas and visions. (shrink)

The book investigates distinctions between independent individuality and interactive relationality in physical phenomena. This is a common topic for investigation in modern physics and philosophy of science, and the topic is explored using contemporary research in those disciplines. Additionally, it is common for Buddhism to focus on relationships, and it proposes that independent individual things do not exist. In the context of physical reality, I take this Buddhist view as a hypothesis and examine it critically. We evaluate its arguments (...) and find them generally to be problematic when evaluated against modern standards for logic and physics. However, its fundamental principle—emptiness, or shunyata—is still worthy of being tested. -/- Contrary to many books on Buddhism and science, this one takes a very positive view of science. Yet, this depends on how we define ‘science’. Hence, the book begins with an examination of that topic, informed by philosophy of science and the author’s experience and training as physicist and philosopher. While we discuss, explain and justify many standard views of science, and present the standard elements of science, physics and physics theories, the book argues extensively for one perspective: pluralism in a synthesis of the author’s design. -/- I will show shunyata to be quite consistent with the knowledge framework of Physics Pluralism. When we test Buddhist emptiness against the results of physics—interpreting both within that knowledge framework—we discover the relevance, importance, and some truth in the relationality ideas of shunyata. -/- Robert Alan Paul has studied physics, had a career as a physicist, and both studied and practiced Tibetan Buddhism. He holds a bachelor’s degree in physics, and separate master’s degrees in philosophy; philosophy of science & mathematics; and physics (abd). He holds an interdisciplinary Ph.D. in four disciplines: philosophy of science, Western analytic metaphysics, Buddhist philosophy, and physics. His Ph.D. dissertation was the foundation of this book. (shrink)

The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural (...) correlates of state consciousness or creature consciousness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Dialogue:Moving ForwardThomas Cattoi (bio) and Carol S. Anderson (bio)The San Francisco Bay Area is an interesting location in which to ponder Buddhist-Christian relations. The website UrbanDharma.org lists more than a hundred institutions affiliated with Buddhist organizations—a density higher than in the Beijing metropolitan area. Some of these centers have a clearly ethnic and denominational character, serving a predominantly immigrant population. Some, like many of the (...) Tibetan organizations, function as cultural centers but also attract a considerable Western clientele. Others, like the San Francisco Zen Center or Spirit Rock in Marin County, belong to the first wave of historical Buddhist centers established in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. A few more are trying to establish new forms of enculturated Buddhist practice that are more suited to Western sensitivities and are only loosely affiliated with the cultures of traditional Buddhist societies. At the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, alongside schools training Jesuit priests, Dominican friars, and Protestant ministers of various denominations, the Institute of Buddhist Studies prepares students from different walks of life to work as Buddhist chaplains in hospitals and educational institutions. Buddhism, in its various forms and manifestations, is no longer an exotic import from a little known “elsewhere,” but is part and parcel of the local spiritual landscape.For students and scholars practicing in such a diverse environment, it is perhaps difficult to imagine that for the greatest part of its history, most of Christendom was largely unaware of the very existence of the Buddhist tradition. While Clement of Alexandria and Jerome do mention Buddhism, and references to its practice can be found in the writings of medieval travelers such as Marco Polo, most European Christians lived in a world where the role of the religious “other” was played by Judaism and Islam. It was only in the early modern era, with the beginning of the European colonization of Asia, that non-Abrahamic religious traditions gradually entered the intellectual horizon of Western intellectuals and scholars. Around the year 1740, a French Jesuit named Jean-François Pons (1688–1752), otherwise remembered as a pioneer of Sanskrit studies in the West, came to the startling realization that many of the religious practices that missionaries and travelers had come across in regions as far apart as China, Japan, Nepal, and Mongolia were actually all parts of the same religious tradition. In his correspondence with his fellow Jesuits in France, he coined the [End Page vii] term Bauddhamatham—teaching of the Buddha—to refer to what would eventually be known as Buddhism. In the early years of the nineteenth century, many Sanskrit and Tibetan texts started to be catalogued and translated into the major European languages, bringing about the first encounter between Europe’s intellectual elites and this utterly foreign religious tradition.The nineteenth century also saw the beginning of a more existential engagement with the Buddhism tradition, albeit one that was limited to intellectual elites who were highly critical of institutional Christianity. In his work The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer found in Buddhism many echoes of his own philosophical insights. Many of the members of the Pāli Text Society, established in London in 1871, had rejected Christianity and thought they would find in Buddhism a moral framework in a society where the normativity of the Christian tradition had already started to be questioned. At the same time, we also see the beginning of the first comparative studies, where Buddhism and Christianity are compared from a speculative and doctrinal perspective. In 1880, Ernest de Bunsen claimed that if one made an exception for the crucifixion, many of the fundamental moral teachings of Buddhism and Christianity were virtually identical. This was just the beginning of a slew of similar studies.While the Christian churches were initially uninterested or outright skeptical about engaging in dialogue with non-Christian religious traditions, this attitude started to shift in the decades following the Second World War. The Second Vatican Council, for instance, marked an important shift in the Catholic Church’s attitude toward other religions. Before the 1960s, Catholic theology departments did not offer courses on other religious traditions or on interreligious dialogue... (shrink)

The evolving field of neuroscience provides a fresh perspective for understanding and clarifying the nondualistic epistemology of Buddhist philosophy. Its egalitarian adherence to “wisdom embracing all species” required an epistemological shift beyond both egocentric and anthropocentric assumptions, outlined in such texts as the Lotus Sūtra and the Diamond Sūtra. Parallels can be drawn to the Triple Loop learning process, “an ‘epistemo-existential strategy’ for profound change on various levels.” Inherently hierarchical tendencies in Daoist and Confucian philosophies posed a challenge (...) to the egalitarian stance of Buddhist nondualism. Passages from Daoist, Confucian, and Neo-Confucian texts demonstrate the limits of Chinese nondualism. The hybrid brain cultivated through Buddhist practice was able to maintain the benefits of the task-driven dorsal attentional network, while being grounded in the stimulus-driven ventral attentional network. The Five Ranks of Chan meticulously trace the process of recognizing the nondualism of deluded mind and awakened mind. The final rank, “Unity Attained,” restores the role of allocentric attention, which has been described as “the basic simplicity of the undyed fabric,” as the default. Thus, inspired by the pedagogy of cognitive dissonance woven into Sanskrit texts, Chinese practitioners deployed their own “circuit-breakers” of ventral attention to disrupt the dogmatic “perseveration” of dorsal attention. The resulting epistemological reorientation reveals the nondualism of reality. (shrink)

The basic philosophical question underlying the Asian values debates is whether human rights represent a universal moral concern applicable to humans in every culture or whether they are simply another form of Western imperialism. While most of the philosophical work on this issue has focused on Confucian and Marxist elements, there is a growing interest in tackling the topic from a Buddhist perspective. This paper evaluates Jay Garfield’s attempt to reconcile Buddhist ethics with Western-style human (...) rights. Garfield endeavors to situate rights in a character-based normative theory of ethics grounded in the Buddhist sentiment ofcompassion. After locating Garfield’s account within the general confines of Buddhism, the paper assesses the resulting nature of the rights themselves. Unfortunately, Garfield’s version of rights does not retain the protective character of individual rights, the unique feature which largely explains their ever-increasing employment in the ethical, legal, and political discourse of modern societies. (shrink)