Evolution - both the fact that it occurred and the theory describing the mechanisms by which it occurred - is an intrinsic and central component in modern biology. Theodosius Dobzhansky captures this well in the much-quoted title of his 1973 paper 'Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution'. The correctness of this assertion is even more obvious today: philosophers of biology and biologists agree that the fact of evolution is undeniable and that the theory of evolution (...) explains that fact. Such a theory has far-reaching implications. In this volume, eleven distinguished scholars address the conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological richness of the theory and its ethical and religious impact, exploring topics including DNA barcoding, three grand challenges of human evolution, functionalism, historicity, design, evolution and development, and religion and secular humanism. The volume will be of great interest to those studying philosophy of biology and evolutionary biology. (shrink)

It’s a familiar fact that there is something it is like to see red, eat chocolate or feel pain. More recently philosophers have insisted that in addition to this objectual phenomenology there is something it is like for me to eat chocolate, and this for-me-ness is no less there than the chocolatishness. Recognizing this subjective feature of consciousness helps shape certain theories of consciousness, introspection and the self. Though it does this heavy philosophical work, and it is supposed to be (...) relatively obvious to anyone who introspects, it is rather difficult to see just what this phenomenal me-ness is supposed to be; indeed, many philosophers deny it exists. In this paper we try to provide a clear sense of what phenomenal me-ness involves, and then then consider some arguments for the existence of phenomenal me-ness experience as well as some accounts of what gives rise to it. In the end, we argue that the plausible senses of me-ness are a good deal thinner than what often seems to be claimed. (shrink)

In 'Doing and Allowing', Samuel Scheffler argues that if a person sees herself as subject to norms of individual moral responsibility, then the content of her first-order substantive norms of individual moral responsibility must attribute greater responsibility to what one does than to what one could, but fails, to prevent. This paper is about how a morally responsible agent could deny the doctrine of doing and allowing, why an environmentalist should, and what this means for environmental ethical theory.

As assisted reproductive technologies become increasingly popular, debate has intensified over the ethical justification for restricting access to ART based on various medical and non-medical factors. In 2010, the Australian state of Victoria enacted world-first legislation that denies access to ART for all patients with certain criminal or child protection histories. Patients and their partners are identified via a compulsory police and child protection check prior to commencing ART and, if found to have a previous relevant conviction or child protection (...) order, are given a “presumption against treatment.” This article reviews the legislation and identifies arguments that may be used to justify restricting access to ART for various reasons. The arguments reviewed include limitations of reproductive rights, inheriting undesirable genetic traits, distributive justice, and the welfare of the future child. We show that none of these arguments justifies restricting access to ART in the context of past criminal history. We show that a “presumption against treatment” is an unjustified infringement on reproductive freedom and that it creates various inconsistencies in current social, medical, and legal policy. We argue that a state-enforced policy of restricting access to ART based on the non-medical factor of past criminal history is an example of unjust discrimination and cannot be ethically justified, with one important exception: in cases where ART treatment may be considered futile on the basis that the parents are not expected to raise the resulting child. (shrink)

John Steinbeck’s 1939 novel can be given a reading that links events and the mentality of characters to mainstream schools of liberal and neo-liberal political theory: libertarianism, egalitarianism, and utilitarianism. Each of these schools is sketched in outline and applied to topics in rural political culture. While it is likely that Steinbeck himself would have identified with an egalitarian or utilitarian view, he resists the temptation to deny his Okie characters an authentic voice that matches none of these schools so (...) well as it articulates an agrarian mentality once associated with Thomas Jefferson and today articulated by Wendell Berry. This reading of The Grapes of Wrath, in turn, can be interpreted as both a rebuke to contemporary social theorists who continue to impose an ill-fitting left-right dichotomy on working class political culture in rural America and as a roadmap suggesting ways that philosophy and rural sociology might engage one another more directly and productively with respect to contemporary rural development and environmental quality issues. (shrink)

In the third episode of season one of True Detective, "The Locked Room", detective Rust Cohle explains the life. This predicament makes him not just a "pessimist" also a "nihilist"‐someone who denies that life has meaning. The idea that life might be a dream is one of humanity's oldest and most enduring philosophical thoughts. The oldest versions of these ideas come from Indian philosophy. In Western philosophy, the thought that life could be a dream is linked not so much to (...) reflections on life, death, and transcendence as it is to the problem of whether it is possible to have certain knowledge. One way to draw together the Eastern and Western philosophical threads is with the following line of thought, taken from Wendy Doniger's classic book on Indian and Western views of dreaming, Dreams, Illusion, and Other Realities. (shrink)

With the world looking to the U.S. for strategic leadership in ethics and power, Americans cannot afford to deny American youth a strong foundation and education in international studies.

It is above all in virtue of the will, or freedom of choice, that I understand myself to bear in some way the image or likeness of God. For ... God's will ... does not seem any greater than mine when considered as will in the essential and strict sense. This is because the will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something; ... or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when something is put forward (...) for our consideration by the intellect, we are moved to affirm or deny it, or pursue or avoid it, in such a way that we feel we are not determined by any external force. For in order for me to be free, there is no need for me to be capable of moving both ways; on the contrary, the more I incline in one direction - either because I understand that reasons of truth and goodness point that way ... the freer is my choice. (Descartes, Fourth Meditation.). (shrink)

E. P. Thompson's poetry and poetics are rarely considered by commentators on his work, but they are central to his thought. Thompson, who for a long time identified as a poet rather than a historian, struggled to find an alternative to both the Bloomsburian modernism he associated with decadent British capitalism and the chilly philistinism of Stalinist socialist realism. Thompson's unique and ingenious poetics emphasizes the political nature of poetry, yet denies that poets ought to subordinate their (...) work to political concerns. By understanding Thompson's poetics, we can understand his critique of the 'positivism and utilitarianism' which he came to believe were inherent in most forms of Marxism. Thompson's poetics also helps us to understand the peculiar forms that some of his most famous political polemics take. (shrink)

Scrutiny (1932-1953) was one of the most important critical reviews of the last century. Its editors and contributors included F. R. Leavis, Q. D. Leavis, Denys Thompson, L. C. Knights, D. W. Harding, W. H. Mellers, H. A. Mason, among others. In recasting Scrutiny’s critique of mass culture by way of Alisdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981), I hope to show that the Scrutiny project not only dramatizes the conflicts internal to what MacIntyre calls emotivist culture, but provides a (...) new way of looking at the group’s relation to the culture industry, its purported elitism, and its deep ties with a communitarian rather than socialist politics. (shrink)

Do we directly perceive physical objects? What is the significance of the qualification ‘directly’ here? Austin famously denied that there was a unique interpretation by which we could make sense of the traditional debate in the philosophy of perception. I look here at Thompson Clarke’s discussion of G. E. Moore and surface perception to answer Austin’s scepticism.

A closely argued book about what the negative tradition in Western theology involves.

The development of the theory of deliberative democracy is connected to the completion of two tasks. The first is to combine broad political participation with the rationality of the political process. The second is to ensure the political unity of modern societies, which are characterized by a pluralism of often incompatible values, norms, and lifestyles. Within the framework of this theory, the key democratic procedure is rational deliberation open to all interested parties. The purpose of this procedure is to reach (...) an agreement, as stated in the theory of Jurgen Habermas. However, experimental studies of deliberative practices show that they may result not in agreement but in the radicalization of positions. Unlike Habermas, John Rawls believes that a consensus on values and norms is unattainable. His theory of political liberalism attempts to answer the question of how political unity is possible in practically insoluble conflict, that is, in a situation of disagreement. He proposes the ideal of a well-ordered society with the assumption that a just society is one in which there is no agreement on comprehensive doctrines, but there is a consensus on the basic principles of justice. However, Rawls’s theory, in turn, faces a number of significant problems. For example, he was forced to admit that the democratic culture of society is a prerequisite for the formation of basic principles of justice in a well-ordered society. Rawls’s idea about the connections among disagreement, political freedom, and democracy influenced the further development of the theory of democracy, stimulating the search for different models of decision-making and the formation of political will without rational agreement. After all, the possibility of democracy lies in the conflict of ideas about justice and good. (shrink)

The revival of Anglo-American political philosophy began in the 1970s with the publication of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls and Wittgenstein and Justice by Hanna Pitkin. This revival was facilitated by the turbulent political processes occurring after the Second World War that required philosophical understanding, but the long-dominant utilitarian approach could not fully meet this task. Traditionally, the main issue in political philosophy has been the question of power, spe- cifically its political organization and legitimacy. Rawls demonstrated that (...) the political organiza- tion of power is derived from how we understand ethical norms and what norms (rules) we follow in social interaction. Thus, the main question of political philosophy is not power but justice. He also demonstrated that political freedom is closely linked to equality. Rawls’s theory had a deci- sive influence on the political philosophy of the twentieth century, the development of which was largely based on criticism or reception of his ideas. Today, we are witnessing the beginning of a break with tradition, which was expressed by Rawls and suggested that the political is based on the possibility of consensus and ethical agree- ment. The current developments in political philosophy are closely connected with the rethink- ing of Rawls’s legacy, and we see this in the development of non-ideal political theories. (shrink)

As you know, the foundations of modern historiography of religion were laid by Hegel. "Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion," which he read at the University of Berlin, represent not only a unique system of philosophy of religion, but, equally important, is also an example of a profound historiosophical study of the religious phenomenon. However, unfortunately, this part of the Hegelian heritage remains largely unexplored in the national philosophic and religious studies literature.

The proposition that the existence of God is demonstrable by rational argument is doubted by nearly all philosophical opinion today and is thought by most Christian theologians to be incompatible with Christian faith. This book argues that, on the contrary, there are reasons of faith why in principle the existence of God should be thought rationally demonstrable and that it is worthwhile revisiting the theology of Thomas Aquinas to see why this is so. The book further suggests that philosophical objections (...) to proofs of God's existence rely upon an attenuated and impoverished conception of reason which theologians of all monotheistic traditions might wish to reject. Denys Turner proposes that on a broader and deeper conception of it, human rationality is open to the 'sacramental shape' of creation as such and in its exercise of rational proof of God it in some way participates in that sacramentality of all things. (shrink)

The study of the Hegelian understanding of religious consciousness has never been carried out in the domestic philosophy, although this topic is extremely important, as the philosopher shows the gradual formation of religious consciousness as a special gestalt of self-knowledge of a spirit that is different from other forms of consciousness, and therefore has its own, inherent only to him, specifics.

Since the 1970s, scholars have begun to pay special attention to the questions of whether democracy guarantees peace, whether freedom should be sacrificed in the name of security during war, how sustainable peace is possible, and what threats war poses to democracy. In the same period, influenced by the legacy of Immanuel Kant and David Hume, the democratic peace hypothesis began to be developed. This article discusses the theoretical debate concerning this hypothesis, as well as the question of whether the (...) type of political regime affects the state's success in war. An examining of the theoretical debates has shown that the proponents of the democratic peace hypothesis have not been able to provide convincing evidence of a direct link between the type of political regime and the willingness to initiate war or maintain peace. At the same time, the debate disproves another common belief, that of the military weakness of democracies. The article notes that the prevalent theoretical approach to studying the issue of war and democracy is based on an eschatological idea of the future democratic world. In contrast to this view, Gunther Anders’ idea of an “apocalypse without a Kingdom” opens up a new perspective for understanding war and democracy, which is that the destruction that war brings is not followed by the construction of a new world. In this case, the main task is not to achieve democracy as a result of war, but to preserve democracy during war. (shrink)

Human suicide presents a fundamental problem for the scientific analysis of behavior. This problem has been neither appreciated nor confronted by research and theory. Almost all other behavior exhibited by humans and nonhumans can be viewed as supporting the behaving organism's biological fitness and advancing the welfare of its genes. Yet suicide acts against these ends, and does so more directly and unequivocally than any other form of maladaptive behavior. Four heuristic models are presented here to account for suicide in (...) an evolutionary and sociobiological framework. The first model attributes suicide to the extraordinary development of learning and cultural evolution in the human species. Learning may make human behavior so independent of biological constraints that it can occasionally assume a form entirely contrary to the principles of biological evolution. The second model attributes suicide to a breakdown of adaptive mechanisms in extremely stressful novel environments. The third model involves kin and group selection, arguing that in limited circumstances suicide may occur because of beneficial effects it has on other, surviving individuals who share the suicidal individual's genes. The last model suggests that suicide should be tolerated by evolution when it has no effect on the gene pool. This model holds particular promise in accounting for aspects of suicide not attributable to culture. The evidence indicates that suicide is most common in individuals who are unlikely to reproduce and unable to engage in productive activity; such individuals are least capable of promoting their genes. A complete explanation of suicide may derive only from an analysis of its biological significance. (shrink)

Does possessing some human virtues make it impossible for a person to possess other human virtues? Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams both answered “yes” to this question, and they argued that to hold otherwise—to accept the harmony of the virtues—required a blinkered and unrealistic view of “what it is to be human.” In this essay, I have two goals: (1) to show how the harmony of the virtues is best interpreted, and what is at stake in affirming or denying it; (...) and (2) to provide a partial defense of the harmony of the virtues. More specifically, I show how the harmony of the virtues can be interpreted and defended within the kind of Aristotelian naturalism developed by philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. I argue that far from being an embarrassing liability for Aristotelianism—based in an “archaic metaphysical biology”—the harmony thesis is an interesting and plausible claim about human excellences, supported by a sophisticated account of the representation of life, and fully compatible with a realistic view of our human situation. (shrink)

Excerpt from Descartes L'homme a souvent exalté avec orgueil la puissance de sa raison; mais plus souvent encore il l'accuse, la renie, et se met à. Douter d'elle. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, (...) an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In their recent paper, Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton evaluate seven volumes of the Oxford University Press series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry,” an international book series begun in 2003 focusing on the emerging interdisciplinary field at the interface of philosophy and psychiatry. According to Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton, the series represents a clear indication that the interdisciplinary field of philosophy of psychiatry has been flourishing lately. Philosophers and psychiatrists face a “new philosophy of psychiatry”. However, the optimism (...) which the “new” philosophy of psychiatry celebrates is precisely the exiling of philosophy from the foundations of psychiatry. The 150 year old belief that psychopathology cannot do without philosophical reflection has virtually disappeared from common psychiatric education and daily clinical practice. Though the discipline of psychiatry is particularly suited to contributions from philosophy, the impact of philosophy on psychiatry nowadays remains limited. With some exceptions, philosophical papers are embedded in a philosophical context inscrutable to ordinary psychiatrists. Much current philosophical work is perceived by psychiatrists as negativistic. I would encourage the field of psychiatry to incorporate once again basic philosophical attitudes which render possible true dialogue with philosophy and enrich both disciplines. The views developed here should not discredit the value and importance of Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton’s paper and the excellent series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry.” As Jaspers said “Everybody inclined to disregard philosophy will be overwhelmed by philosophy in an unperceived way”. (shrink)

Central to Kierkegaard’s account of religious existence is his critique of speculative reason. This critique begins with the distinction between subjective and objective reflection. Its most radical aspects appear in Kierkegaard’s discussions of the paradox. In spite of Kierkegaard’s frequent comments on this notion, it is not readily understood. I want to argue against a common reading of this notion and propose an alternative reading. This alternative reading allows for a conceptually quite plausible account of the manner in which the (...) paradox presents reason with a boundary, in virtue of its relation to objective reflection and to subjective reflection as well. Because of this boundary, reason points beyond its own achievements to a domain of contemplation and appropriation. This is a domain that reason itself identifies in connection with the paradox. It both surpasses rational achievements and integrates them into itself. (shrink)

Fragments of mummy-cartonnage, formerly in the collection of University College, London, now on permanent loan to the Ashmolean. Parts of two columns of a papyrus-text of a Greek Tragedy: head and foot of both columns partly preserved. The lines of col. ii are not quite straight opposite those of col i. There were eighteen or nineteen lines in col. i, nineteen in col. ii, the last line of col. ii being slightly below the level of the last line of col. (...) i. The text was written in the third century B.C, perhaps before 250 B.C. The hand is similar to that of P. Petrie I Plate V. No Lesezeichen of any kind are visible. [Fragment = 6·9×7·1 cm.: =6·7×10·9 cm.: = 4·2×14·2 cm. Height of column of writing =14·7 cm. Existing margins = 2·5 and 2·3 cm. Probable height of roll = 20/21 cm. . Fr. = col. i, 1–6 + col. ii, beginnings of 2–4: fr. = col. i, 9–18 + col. ii, beginnings of 9–14, 16–19: fr. = col. ii, middle of 1–15.]. (shrink)

The British have often denied the very existence of a tradition of English literary theory. George Watson redeems that denial in his latest book, the first study of 20th Century English theory. The book begins with Yeats, Pound and Eliot, who made England their home. In subsequent chapters, based on personal recollection as well as published sources, it assesses the contribution of I.A. Richards, William Empson, F.R. Leavis, C.S. Lewis, Isaiah Berlin and Wittgenstein, as well as Marxists like E.P. (...) class='Hi'>Thompson and Raymond Williams. English literary theory is a tradition that has suffered in reputation, paradoxically, by the sheer fertility of its invention. In this seminal work the author celebrates that fertility from the First World War downto the death of Iris Murdoch in 1999, showing that England pioneered the academic study of theories of literature years in advance of France or the USA. (shrink)

In recent years "British" Idealism has been subject to sweeping re-evaluation and rehabilitation. The essays collected here by Will Sweet compare Bernard Bosanquet's ideas and arguments with those of Idealists and non-Idealists alike, and establish that Bosanquet was far more clear-headed and insightful than denunciations of the "Idealist school" by Moore, Russell, C. D. Broad, Harold Prichard, and A. J. Ayer suggest. Sweet observes in his introduction that Bosanquet has long remained in the shadows of T. H. Green and F. (...) H. Bradley, that Bosanquet was a prolific writer who shaped philosophical debates across the English-speaking world for decades, and that estimations of his social theory and political philosophy, and to a lesser extent his metaphysics, have diverted attention from his contributions to logic and aesthetics.Essays by Sandra M. den Otter, Peter Nicholson, and Kevin Sullivan deal directly with Bosanquet's social philosophy. Bosanquet was engaged from the 1880s in work with the Charity Organisation Society, an association that set the tone of late Victorian and Edwardian debates over British poverty. He and his wife served on the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws , against whose majority statement—cautioning against such direct assistance to the poor as. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Ohio HegeliansDenys P. LeightonSelected and introduced by James A. Good. The Ohio Hegelians. Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005. Volume I: Peter Kaufmann, The Temple of Truth (1858). Volume II: Moncure D. Conway, The Earthward Pilgrimage (1870). Volume III: J. B. Stallo, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (2nd ed., 1884).This collection of facsimile reprints prepared by James A. Good is one of the newest contributions to (...) the series 'History of American Thought' published by Thoemmes Continuum. Good has already made significant contributions to study of the history of American philosophy and 'thought' by editing for the same series a reprint edition of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1867–1893 (22 volumes, 2002) and co-editing, with Michael DeArmey, a selection of writings by the St. Louis Hegelians (3 volumes, 2001). The latter constitutes very nearly a subset of the former. The acknowledged leader of the 'St. Louis Movement' from 1858 until the late 1870s was William Torrey Harris (1835–1909), who edited the Journal of Speculative Philosophy during the entire period of its publication. JSP predated Mind in England by nearly ten years and was the first specialized venue in the [End Page 445] Anglo-American world for serial publication of scholarly writing on philosophical issues. It also featured original writing on arts and literature, education, and theology, as well as some of the first translations into English of works by J. G. Fichte, F. Froebel, F. A. Trendelenburg and K. Rosenkranz. In addition to publishing work by North American and European thinkers who have by now—perhaps predictably—fallen from scholarly view, JSP featured writing by G. Stanley Hall, William James, C. S. Peirce, Josiah Royce, John Watson and John Dewey.There is a general historical rationale for Good's compilation of ostensibly significant writings by men collectively dubbed by Loyd Easton—with genuflection to the better-known St. Louis Idealists—'the Ohio Hegelians'.1 Yet, as I shall elaborate, the criteria of selection of documents for this collection are somewhat puzzling. Easton grouped under the label 'Ohio Hegelians' Peter Kaufmann (1800–1869), August Willich (1810–1878), John Bernhard Stallo (1823–1900) and Moncure Daniel Conway (1832–1907), while nevertheless denying that they formed a distinctive school of Hegelian philosophy. The most obviously Hegelian among them was Willich, a radical democratic journalist and agitator who features prominently in the complex history of 'Left Hegelianism' and early Marxism. However, Good has decided not to include Willich's writings in this collection, reasoning that his journalistic writings and ephemera 'do not lend themselves... readily to a collection of philosophical works' ('Introduction', p. v). Neither were all the items Good selected for the aforementioned collections of a strictly philosophical nature (whatever that might mean), so one wonders why Willich's Hegelian writings were left out here. It is somewhat curious that Good should include here The Earthward Pilgrimage (1870) by Conway, a Virginian by birth, who, after alienating his Unitarian congregation in Washington, DC by his strongly abolitionist sentiments, was appointed in 1856 to a pastorate at the First Congregational Church in Cincinnati. This 'Ohioan' left the state and the country by 1863 and was thereafter more directly associated with English intellectual life. For most of the period 1864–1897 Conway presided over the undenominational South Place Chapel in London (subsequently, the South Place Ethical Society), which literally served as a pulpit for many guest speakers expressing forms of religious and political radicalism (e.g., agnosticism, 'secularism', republicanism, producer and consumer co-operation). There are few direct references in Conway's The Earthward Pilgrimage to his American experiences. Easton's reason for including Conway among these Ohioans was that Conway had interacted closely in Cincinnati with Willich and Stallo after 1856, when all were enthusiastic supporters of the Republican, 'free-soil' candidate for President, John C. Fremont.Of Peter Kaufmann, author of The Temple of Truth (1858), something will be said in due course, but Stallo became the most un-Hegelian of the Ohio Hegelians. In his Preface to the first edition of The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1881)—the second edition is the one included in Good's [End Page 446] compilation... (shrink)

Satisfaits que la connaissance soit un aller vers l'objet, les hommes se détournent au moment d'en déduire le retour. Croyant connaître, ils ne font que désirer leur propre échec. D'où vient qu'ils s'arrogent ainsi la mesure de l'abstrait selon des conditions finies? Comment cesser d'entendre "nature" (et, avec lui, tout son cortège : "être", "matière", "substance", "objet"...) dans "physique"? Le stratagème de la raison s'accompagne ipso facto d'une extase, d'une recherche de conditions qui, pour la raison, se situent précisément hors (...) d'elle. Tenir toutes les mesures dans l'effacement même du principe : ce n'est pas là simple jeu abstrait, mais discipline qui voue à l'inhumain. Reconduire les proportions vers le foyer d'une possibilité qui tranche : ce n'est pas là dessaisissement par la pensée de sa tâche propre, mais reprise terrible de ce qui, en elle, est davantage qu'elle. Qu'avons-nous à craindre? Qu'est-ce qui nous retient? Si les hommes ne peuvent vivre sans "les choses", le physicien doit du moins indiquer ce en quoi les choses s'évanouissent. Si la science est une tekhnè, la physique a, par et en elle-même, renoncé d'emblée à toute quête de salut. Non par désespoir, mais parce que la lucidité seule est joie. Le physicien est généreux car il reconnaît en son interrogation quelque chose de plus précieux que lui-même : voilà qui devrait inexorablement l'éloigner des hommes. Personne ne sera sauvé. S'il faut la vérité, elle se fera au prix de nous. Alexandre Lissner. (shrink)

The concept of digital culture defines a set of values, practices, and expectations regarding the format of human interaction in today’s online society. Predictions of digital culture describe the specifics of the online environment and the general context of social life. The range of interpretations of digital culture varies between two poles: from the recognition of digital technologies as a way of presenting libraries, museums, historical monuments, etc., to the concepts of digital culture as a new socio-anthropological reality, the content (...) of which is not limited to ICT. Culture as a phenomenon means the semantic unity of human activity, the desire to format social life following ideas and values, the movement from existing to obligatory, from actual to potential, and digital culture is an adequate response to the demands and challenges. People worldwide change their placement of everyday activity, and we could admit such huge transformation in the Chinese People’s Republic exactly obvious. (shrink)

In the Fitzwilliam Museum at Cambridge there is a papyrus fragment, hitherto unpublished, of Euripides' Medea. It was written early in the 2nd century A.D., or possibly at the end of the 1st century A.D. The hand is a good round medium upright, similar to that of P. Oxy. 1810, possibly a little older. The stop and apostrophe in Fr. 1 line 1174 were evidently added later. There are several smudges and blots. Elisions only. There were 35 lines to a (...) column. (shrink)

Central to Kierkegaard’s account of religious existence is his critique of speculative reason. This critique begins with the distinction between subjective and objective reflection. Its most radical aspects appear in Kierkegaard’s discussions of the paradox. In spite of Kierkegaard’s frequent comments on this notion, it is not readily understood. I want to argue against a common reading of this notion and propose an alternative reading. This alternative reading allows for a conceptually quite plausible account of the manner in which the (...) paradox presents reason with a boundary, in virtue of its relation to objective reflection and to subjective reflection as well. Because of this boundary, reason points beyond its own achievements to a domain of contemplation and appropriation. This is a domain that reason itself identifies in connection with the paradox. It both surpasses rational achievements and integrates them into itself. (shrink)