En littérature comme en peinture, le brouillage des hiérarchies est aussi constant que leur formulation, tant l'acte créateur se confond avec leur transgression et leur déplacement. L'importance théorique des genres paraît disproportionnée au regard de leur influence réelle sur la création littéraire et artistique. En revanche, leur impact se fait bien plus ressentir sur la réception des oeuvres, car ils fournissent des critères de jugement et permettent d'instaurer dans le système des beaux-arts une manière d'ordre politique. La transgression des hiérarchies (...) est bien souvent involontaire, et quand elle est volontaire, elle apparaît comme un geste iconoclaste, mais ce geste lui-même n'est pas loin de devenir institutionnel. S'il est aujourd'hui banal d'étudier la transgression des frontières génériques, le présent volume interroge la fascination que les hiérarchies ont toujours exercée, envers et contre toute réalité, et la séduction paradoxale des genres mineurs"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Ce recueil réunit des articles qui s'interrogent, depuis un ensemble de perspectives philosophiques des plus diverses, sur le rapport entre nature et éthique.

This book explores the ethical and political implications of the debate between Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas on the question of Place. It relates their debate to larger disagreements concerning ontology and ethics, the status of humanism, and the relationship between worldliness and transcendence. Ultimately, in an epoch characterized by tribalism and globalization, the Heidegger-Levinas debate illuminates the need for a contemporary politics of place that enables human beings to dwell and practice hospitality.

La morale d'Aristote a suscité ces dernières années des ouvrages d'envergure: les deux tomes d'Introduction, traduction et commentaire de l'Ethique à Nicomaque par les Pères Gauthier et Jolif, le volume de Pierre Aubenque sur La Prudence chez Aristote, puis cette thèse que M. Vanier présentait à l'Institut Catholique de Paris en 1962 et qu'il publie maintenant dans un texte « revu », « amélioré ». Des ouvrages qui se suivent mais ne se ressemblent pas. II n'est pas question de (...) les confronter; indiquons seulement qu'aux aspects historique et philologique, à l'étude des sources, du milieu et du langage, M. Vanier préfère l'approfondissement des principes qui inspirent la morale du Philosophe, cet approfondissement dût-il conduire à des vérités que le texte même n'explicite pas pourvu que la doctrine les implique dans sa synthèse et sa cohérence. (shrink)

It is all the rage today to speak about the “power" of images. Yet while it seems hardly disputable that images generate fascination or repulsion and that they provoke laughter, tears or delight, it is by no means clear what it entails to grant them an agency of their own. The article sets out to chart the current literature on the topic, and to indicate why it is not the same to ask what it means for images to do things (...) to us and what it means do things with images. While the former question often leads, under a disguise of object-oriented thinking, to reintroduce mentalism, the latter gets caught up in inextricable problems that Austin’s speech act theory already had to struggle with. In the last section, at alternative account is proposed: the performance of image is not an event of causation, it is a process of visualization that lets appear what can only appear in images. (shrink)

La personne comme question est un sujet qui n'a cessé d'alimenter la réflexion de l'auteur, ceci en s'appuyant sur Husserl. De la préhistoire du concept de personne à son épanouissement médiéval puis jusqu'à sa réactivation phénoménologique, la personne est un combat pour le soi. La perspective généalogique adoptée dans ce livre vise à montrer que c'est la genèse du concept biblique de personne qui montre le véritable sens d'être de la personne, alors que le concept juridique en est dérivé. Citant (...) les auteurs clé de ce concept de personne, ce livre en retrace l'histoire. (shrink)

Reason, egoism, and utilitarianism, by H. Sidgwick.--Is egoism reasonable? By G. E. Moore.--Ultimate principles and ethical egoism, by B. Medlin.--In defense of egoism, by J. Kalin.--Virtuous affections and self-love, by F. Hutcheson.--Our obligation to virtue, by D. Hume.--Duty and interest, by H. A. Prichard.--The natural condition of mankind and the laws of nature, by T. Hobbes.--Why should we be moral? By K. Baier.--Morality and advantage, by D. P. Gauthier.--Bibliographical essay (p. 181-184).

In this landmark study, Emmanuel Levinas discusses the aspects and function of intuition in Husserl's thought and its meaning for philosophical self-reflection.

Feminist critics of the stigmatization of prostitution such as Martha Nussbaum and Sybil Schwarzenbach argue that the features of the practice do not, or at least need not, differ essentially from those of other more respected sorts of labor. I argue that even the least degraded forms of the current practice of prostitution remain objectionable on feminist grounds because patrons demand a semblance of sexual self-expression that engages discriminatory beliefs about women's sexuality.

Comment expliquer la persistance d’objets techniques ou scientifiques qui semblent en tout point dépassés? Cet article étudie ce problème, à travers un cas portant sur les modèles d’évaluation du passage de la radioactivité dans l’environnement. Ces modèles apparaissent dans les années 1950 et se fondent alors sur un coefficient unique. De nombreux problèmes conceptuels et pratiques concernant ce paramètre apparaissent et sont alors menés de nombreux travaux de développement d’alternatives à ces modèles qui semblent dépassés. Malgré cela, ceux-ci sont encore (...) aujourd’hui largement majoritaires. Nous expliquons cette situation a priori paradoxale par des raisons « pratiques » et avec des arguments fondés sur les fonctions des modèles et sur leurs usages. (shrink)

Comment expliquer la persistance d’objets techniques ou scientifiques qui semblent en tout point dépassés? Cet article étudie ce problème, à travers un cas portant sur les modèles d’évaluation du passage de la radioactivité dans l’environnement. Ces modèles apparaissent dans les années 1950 et se fondent alors sur un coefficient unique. De nombreux problèmes conceptuels et pratiques concernant ce paramètre apparaissent et sont alors menés de nombreux travaux de développement d’alternatives à ces modèles qui semblent dépassés. Malgré cela, ceux-ci sont encore (...) aujourd’hui largement majoritaires. Nous expliquons cette situation a priori paradoxale par des raisons « pratiques » (coûts techniques, structure sociale de l’expertise) et avec des arguments fondés sur les fonctions des modèles et sur leurs usages. (shrink)

Loudness is the magnitude of the auditory sensation that a listener experiences when exposed to a sound. Several sound attributes are reported to affect loudness, such as the sound pressure level at the listener's ears and the spectral content. In addition to these physical attributes of the stimulus, some subjective attributes also appear to affect loudness. When presented with a sound, a listener interacts with an auditory object and can focus on several aspects of the latter. Loudness appears to differ (...) depending on how listeners apprehend this object, notably whether they focus on the sound that reaches their ears or that is produced by the source. The way listeners focus on the auditory object may depend on the stimulus itself. For instance, they might be more likely to focus on the sound emitted by the source if the latter is visible. The instructions given by the experimenters can also explicitly direct the listener's focus on the sound reaching the ears or emitted by the source. The present review aims at understanding how listeners focus on the auditory object depending on the stimuli and instructions they are provided with, and to describe how loudness depends on this focus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave1 David Gauthier Hume's account in the Treatise ofthe artificial virtues, their obligation and motivation, resists easy interpretation. Two passages, taken from his discussion of promises, will introduce, the problems I propose to examine. First: No action can be requir'd of us as our duty, unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive, capable of producing the action. This (...) motive cannot be the sense of duty. A sense of duty supposes an antecedent obligation: And where an action is not requir'd by any natural passion, it cannot be requir'd by any natural obligation; since it may be omitted without proving any defect or imperfection in the mind and temper, and consequently without any vice. Now 'tis evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises, distinct from a sense of duty. If we thought, that promises had no moral obligation, we never shou'd feel any inclination to observe them.... But as there is naturally no inclination to observe promises, distinct from a sense of their obligation; it follows, that fidelity is no natural virtue, and that promises have no force, antecedent to human conventions.2 Ignore for the present the last sentence quoted. Hume seems clearly to be claiming that (1) an action can be a duty only if there is some motive to perform it other than a sense of duty, and (2) there is no motive to perform an act of promise-keeping other than a sense of duty. From (1) and (2) we may infer that (3) an act of promise-keeping can not be a duty. But since the sense of duty motivates an action only ifit is apprehended to be a duty, then from (2) and (3) we may conclude that (4) there is no motive to perform an act of promise-keeping that does not involve the mistaken apprehension that it is a duty. And the second passage: Afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs with interest, and becomes a new obligation upon mankind.... The difficulties, Volume XVIII Number 2 401 DAVID GAUTHIER that occur to us, in supposing a moral obligation to attend promises, we either surmount or elude. For instance; the expression of a resolution is not commonly suppos'd to be obligatory; and we cannot readily conceive how the making use of a certain form of words shou'd be able to cause any material difference. Here, therefore, we feign a new act ofthe mind, which we call the willing an obligation; and on this we suppose the morality to depend. But we have prov'd already, that there is no such act of the mind, and consequently that promises impose no natural obligation. (T 523) This time, ignore for the present the first sentence. The remainder would seem to confirm my reading ofthe first passage. Hume claims that (5) there is no natural obligation to perform an act of promise-keeping, but (6) we feign the willing of such an obligation. If, as Hume has claimed in the previous passage, (2) there is no motivation to perform an act ofpromise-keeping other than a sense ofduty, and if obligation and duty may be taken as equivalent, then we may conclude as before that (4) there is no motive to perform an act of promise-keeping that does not involve the mistaken apprehension that it is a duty. In his theory of the artificial virtues and vices, Hume considers "the three fundamental laws ofnature, thatofthestabilityofpossession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises" (T 526). It would seem, from the passages cited, that Hume must suppose that there is no real obligation to keep promises, but only a feigned obligation. And since the reasoning that Hume employs in the first ofthe passages that I have cited is explicitly identified with "that reasoning, which prov'd justice in general to be an artificial virtue" (T 518), it seems clear that he must also suppose that there is no real obligation to uphold stability of possession and its transference by consent—no real obligation to observe the other laws of justice or equity.3... (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1996) has exerted a profound influence on 20th-century continental philosophy. This anthology, including Levinas's key philosophical texts over a period of more than forty years, provides an ideal introduction to his thought and offers insights into his most innovative ideas. Five of the ten essays presented here appear in English for the first time. An introduction by Adriaan Peperzak outlines Levinas's philosophical development and the basic themes of his writings. Each essay is accompanied by a brief introduction (...) and notes. This collection is an ideal text for students of philosophy concerned with understanding and assessing the work of this major philosopher. (shrink)

The principle of respect for autonomy is increasingly under siege as a valuable component of healthcare ethics. Its critics charge that it has been elevated to a position out of proportion to its contribution, so that the individual's wishes and rights have come to dominate healthcare decisionmaking, while obligations and responsibilities are ignored or devalued. If we are to salvage respect for autonomy we must find a way to reconnect the individual and the community, rights and responsibilities, in the way (...) we think about, discuss, and make healthcare decisions. (shrink)

The current interest in and discussion of virtue ethics suggests that this approach to moral decisionmaking has several distinct advantages as applied to ethical issues in healthcare delivery. For the most part, calls to incorporate the virtues of the healthcare provider in discussions of these issues have sought to supplement rather than totally replace traditional ethical theories, such as the utilitarian focus on maximizing the best overall consequences and the Kantian concern to act on the duty of respect for persons. (...) Including virtue-based ethics in such discussions allows for a more eclectic view of what should be considered in resolving difficult moral problems. As many critics of the purely principle-based approach have noted, real moral dilemmas are usually quite messy and are not easily susceptible to satisfactory resolution solely on the basis of abstract moral theories or principles. (shrink)

As Emmanuel Levinas states in the preface to Existence and Existents, "this study is a preparatory one. It examines . . . the problem of the Good, time, and the relationship with the other [person] as a movement toward the Good." First published in 1947, and written mostly during Levinas's imprisonment during World War II, this work provides the first sketch of his mature thought later developed fully in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence. This (...) new edition marks the first time this important work has been made available in an inexpensive paperback edition. Levinas's project in Existence and Existents is to move from anonymous existence to the emergence of subjectivity; to subjectivity's practice, theory and morality; to its encounter with the alterity of the other person. He is concerned here primarily with the time of the solitary subject; time is the inner structure of subjectivity, of the movement of existing. "Levinas's work," says Alphonso Lingis, "contains not only wholly new analyses of the forms of time of the present, the past, the future but also a new conception of the work of time." Beginning with Existence and Existents, then, it is possible to begin tracing the progressive "alterization" of time as it unfolds across the development of Levinas's entire philosophy. As a "preparatory" study, Existence and Existents introduces the major themes and concerns that occupied Levinas throughout his career. This is essential reading for understanding both Levinas's own philosophy and the developments in philosophical thought in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Des millions d'années avant l'apparition de l'homme, la vie avait déjà inventé la roue, le moteur atomique, le sonar, le vol stationnaire, la capture de l'énergie solaire, l'éclairage électrique, le GPS et des myriades de techniques qui nous dépassent encore complètement : cicatrisation, reproduction, congélation suivie de réanimation, et des cerveaux dont chacun des milliards de neurones est un univers informatique. Pour le comprendre, il a fallu attendre que nos propres technologies atteignent les profondeurs moléculaires du vivant, nous révélant que (...) les inventions de la nature étaient infiniment plus complexes que les nôtres. " Le service Recherche et Développement de la nature a 3,8 milliards d'années d'avance sur ceux de nos entreprises ", aime dire Janine Benyus, la naturaliste américaine qui a inventé le concept de biomimétisme. " Il s'agit de nous en inspirer pour pousser plus loin nos propres inventions, mais surtout pour corriger le tir de ces dernières, qui nous ont conduits dans les impasses écologiques que l'on sait. " Il existe trois niveaux de biomimétisme. Le premier consiste à imiter les formes de la nature. Le second, de plus en plus prisé des industriels, repose sur l'imitation des matériaux et des processus naturels. La vraie révolution repose cependant sur le troisième niveau, qui consiste à imiter les stratégies du vivant, sa philosophie. Ce troisième niveau a des implications fascinantes. Ainsi, contrairement à l'image que nous nous faisons de la " loi de la jungle ", la nature ne pratique la compétition que dans 10 % des rapports entre organismes. Les 90 % restants sont fondés sur la coexistence, le mutualisme, la coopération, le commensalisme, le parasitisme et la symbiose. A imiter absolument! (shrink)

A masterful series of interviews with Levinas, conducted by French philosopher Philippe Nemo, which provides a succinct presentation of Levinas's philosophy.

This squib attempts to constrain semantic theories of agree wh constructions by broadening the data set and collecting naive speakers’ intuitions. Overall, our data suggest relatively permissive truth-conditions for these constructions. They also suggest a previously undiscussed presupposition for agree wh and also indicate that agree wh is not straightforwardly reducible to agree that. Although some accounts suggest differences in truth conditions among different asymmetrical agree with constructions and symmetrical agree constructions, we do not find any indication of such truth-conditional (...) distinctions. In the course of our exploration of the data, we offer a new approach to distinguishing between truth, falsity and presuppositional failure. (shrink)

Shareholder activism has become a force for good in the extant corporate governance literature. In this article, we present a case study of Nigeria to show how shareholder activism, as a corporate governance mechanism, can constitute a space for unhealthy politics and turbulent politicking, which is a reflection of the country’s brand of politics. As a result, we point out some translational challenges, and suggest more caution, in the diffusion of corporate governance practices across different institutional environments. We contribute to (...) the literature on corporate governance in Africa, whilst creating an understanding of the political embeddedness of shareholder activism in different institutional contexts—i.e. a step closer to a political theorising of shareholder activism. (shrink)

Reproduit quatre conférences faites en 1946 et 1947 sous ce titre au Collège de philosophie, et interroge la notion de temps comme limitation même de l'être fini ou comme relation de l'être fini à Dieu (Electre).

This is a translation of ‘Socialité et argent’, a text by Emmanuel Levinas originally published in 1987. Levinas describes the emergence of money out of interhuman relations of exchange and the social relations – sociality – that result. While elsewhere he has presented sociality as ‘nonindifference to alterity’ it appears here as ‘proximity of the stranger’ and points to the tension between an economic system based on money and the basic human disposition to respond to the face of the (...) other person. Money both encodes and effaces sociality, both designates and disguises social relations. It arises from the way that needs and interests are manifested in exchange relations, in what he calls the ‘interestedness’ of economic life. But interests are always already cut through by the fact that being is always ‘being with others’. Being is always ‘interbeing’. Interestedness is always confronted by disinterestedness, that is, by a sociality marked by the ‘goodness of giving’, attachment to and concern for the poverty of the other person. Levinas concludes with a discussion of sociality and justice, posing questions about the tension between the demand to respond to an Other immediately before me and at the same time to respond to the demands of an other Other (the third person) who also invites a response. (shrink)

We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

Spirituality connotes praxis informed by religious or faith convictions. This can transform the individual and society at large. Christian spirituality is centered on how a person’s relationship with the God of Jesus Christ informs and directs one’s approach to existence and engagement with the world. The ecosystem concerns humanity and relationship with it is invariably influenced by faith or religious informed praxis. The reality of climate change is convincing many people that humankind’s common homeland needs to be treated with care (...) and respect if created beings are to have a congenial habitat now and in the future. This article avers that Christian spirituality can contribute to eco-friendly behavior through re-formation of the behavior of people and emboldening their goodwill as regards the responsibility of all towards the care of the earth. Finally, this research proffers a three-fold model of eco-spirituality - scriptural, selfcontrol, and sacramental approaches to the earth – as a contribution towards stemming the tide of ecological assaults on creation. Textual analysis is the method used in this research. (shrink)

One of the most influential philosophers of our day has selected 16 previously uncollected pieces that are unified by Levinas's project of revising the phenomenological description of the world in light of our experience of other persons.

The people's right to know and press rights to gather and publish information remain dominant justifications for controversial media activities. Yet, the power of the media to set the agenda for public discourse in our country warrants a careful analysis of these rights, their corresponding responsibilities, and their moral limits. This article examines the right to know and press freedom from the perspective of their shared purpose, facilitation of informed decision making. This article also demonstrates moral justification of limits on (...) right to know and press freedom based on traditional ethics theories and media impact on public discourse. (shrink)

Feiffer expresses my deep feeling of unease with Scanlon’s view of morality. Scanlon claims that if I’m for something because it’s right, or against it because it’s wrong, the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are to be understood in terms of what we owe to each other. And I reject the idea that, at the deepest level, a core part of morality is to be understood in terms of what is owed. The fundamental moral idea, I think, is that of not taking (...) advantage—not bettering ourselves by worsening others without their consent. And that would be very misleadingly expressed in the language of moral debt. But having registered my unease with what is revealed in and by Scanlon’s title, I shall attend to more particular matters that fail to convince me. Scanlon has made what is surely the most powerful and plausible case we have for a broadly Kantian contractualism. But I still believe that what is really wanted is an Hobbesian contractarianism. (shrink)