Much of the recent discussion of problematic aspects of quantum-mechanical measurement centers around that feature of quantum theory which is called "the projection postulate." This is roughly the claim that a change of a certain sort occurs in the state of a physical system when a measurement is made on the system. In this paper an argument for the projection postulate due to von Neumann is considered. Attention is focused on trying to provide an understanding of the notion of "the (...) state of a physical system" which is compatible with the argument von Neumann offers. An attempt is made to formulate the argument in terms of an objectivistic interpretation of probability concepts. It is seen that such an interpretation does not provide a suitable way of understanding the argument. An attempt is made to illustrate the source of this failure in terms of a non-quantum-mechanical example. (shrink)
The theory of subjective probability and utility recently proposed by professor richard jeffrey has several unique features and appears to be in some ways distinctly more satisfactory than earlier theories. There is, However, One very important class of decision problems which is not discussed by professor jeffrey--Problems concerned with decisions about strategies for using information. The principal task of this paper is to point out some questions which arise in attempting to deal with these decision problems within jeffrey's theory. To (...) do this it will be necessary to examine in some detail jeffrey's discussion of the relation between his theory and those of ramsey and savage. (shrink)
This paper describes the way in which a certain representation of basic scientific knowledge can be coupled with traditional microeconomic analysis to provide an analysis of rational research planning or agenda setting in basic science. Research planning is conceived as a resource allocation decision in which resources are being allocated to activities directed towards the solution of basic scientific problems. A structuralist representation of scientific knowledge is employed to provide a relatively precise characterization of a basic scientific problem.
La cuestión de si los lenguajes intensionalesson más expresivos que los lenguajes nointensionalessurge en el marco de unaperspect i va semánt i ca de l as t eorí as.Desde esta perspectiva, la cuestión esesta. ¿Hay clases modelo que se puedencaracterizar mediante teorías que usanconceptos intensionales que no se puedencaracterizar mediante teorías que no usanconceptos intensionales? Se sugiere unaformulación precisa de esta cuestión, perono se ofrece una respuesta.Para aproxi marse a est a cuest i ón, seresume la teoría de modelos de (...) primerorden [II] y se revisa el enfoque semánticode las teorías que emplea incrementost eóri cos, no i nt ensi onal es, de pri merorden [III].Los i nc r e me nt os t e ór i c os de pr i me rorden se bosquejan pero no se definenr i g u r o s a me n t e [ I V] . E s t e l e n g u a j ei n t e n s i o n a l pr o po r c i o n a e l a p a r a t op a r a a t r i b u i r u s o d e l l e n g u a j e yact i t udes i nt ens i onal es a i ndi vi duoscuyo comportami ento es el obj eto deinvestigación. También proporciona elaparato para habl ar sobre traducci óndel lenguaj e atribuido al lenguaj e delinvestigador.La cuestión inicial se convierte entoncesen si hay clases modelo que se puedanc a r a c t e r i z a r me d i a n t e i n c r e me n t o sintencionales de lógica de primer ordenq ue n o pue de n s e r c a pt ur a do s po rincrementos teóricos no-intensionales [V].The ques t i on of whet her i nt ens i onallanguages are more expressive than nonintensional languages is raised within the framework of a semantic view of theories. Fromthis perspective, the question isthis. Are there model classes that can becharacterized by theories using intensionalconcepts that cannot be characterizedby theories that do not use intensionalconcepts? A precise formulation of thisquestion is suggested, but no answer isgiven.To approach this question, model theory offirst order theories is summarized [II] andthe semantic approach to theories usingnon-intensional, theoretical augmentationsof first order theories is reviewed [III].I n t e n s i o n a l a u g me n t a t i o n s o f f i r s torder theories are sketched [IV] but notr i gor ous l y de f i ne d. Thi s i nt e ns i onall anguage provi des t he apparat us f orattributing language use and intensionalattitudes to individuals whose behavioris the object investigation. It also providesapparatus for talking about translationf r om t he at t r i but e d l anguage t o t heinvestigator’s language.T h e i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n t h e n b e c o me swhet her t here are model cl asses t hatc a n be c ha r a c t e r i z e d by i nt e ns i ona laugmentations of first order logic thatcannot be captured by non-intensionaltheoretical augmentations [V]. (shrink)
growth industry, and currently exhibits such bullish prospects that its present competitor seems content to merely slow its rate of growth. Thus the government would have us rejoice that the alligator is eating us slowly. Such a tremendous achievement with the second derivative of..
It is argued that John Rawls' theory of social justice as well as the contract argument for it are misleading, if not actually mistaken, in that they appear to take institutional features of societies as fundamental objects of moral evaluation. An alternative view is expounded. Principles involving institution as features are only contingently related to principles involving the distribution of things people care about. These distributions are taken as the fundamental objects of moral evaluation. Social, political and economic institutions are (...) means to achieve more desirable distributions. It is argued that the alternative provides a more accurate reconstruction of the moral foundations of social-democratic liberalism than does Rawls' theory. (shrink)
A method of using co-citation data to identify scientific specialties and trace their development through time is outlined. These are related to the structuralist "theory net" construct. The method is purely "theoretical in that no algorithms for implementing the method are suggested. Even at this theoretical level, the discussion is incomplete in several ways. Important formal properties of some of the concepts employed remain to be clarified. The specific way these constructs relate to theory nets remains to be specified in (...) detail. (shrink)
Veeraswamy, JD; Gogineni, Babu As part of the Adopt a Dalit Village Project the following awareness programs were organized to help bring the Dalits of Ravulapally out of a life of superstition and to point them to a life of scientific temper. This was done through various activities, all of which were aimed to provide an overall boost to the human development of the community, by involving them in their own growth, in such a manner as to build capacity and (...) capability within the community. (shrink)
Since early 1991 when the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust began soliciting ad space in university papers to disprove the existence of the holocaust, campus journalists have faced a tough ethical dilemma. Some papers took a laissez faire or libertarian stance, arguing that a journalist presents facts without making judgments. Other staffs displayed mixed feelings, choosing what would yield the greater good overall. A third group rejected the essay altogether. The decisions resulted in campus protests, death threats, sit-ins, (...) and censure. (shrink)
A structuralist “reconstruction sketch” of an idealized theory is provided. This theory, QM, has some essential features of quantum mechanics. QM is a theory about abstract “result-observation events”, formal characterizations of interactions among physical systems and their results. QM is a stochastic theory and in the stochastic apparatus some features of “real life” quantum mechanics are recognizable. The result-observation events themselves exhibit neither essentially quantum mechanical features nor essentially physical features. At the level of the basic theory element QM is (...) more like a specialization of probability theory than a physical theory. It is only at the level of specialization of the basic theory element that essentially physical and quantum mechanical features may be introduced. The account provides a “reconstruction sketch” rather than a reconstruction largely in that no account is given of physically interesting specializations. It also falls short of a full reconstruction in that the mathematical apparatus is restricted to finite structures. (shrink)
Particle theories intend to describe the fundamental constituents from which all matter is constructed and the interactions among them. These constituents include atoms and molecules as well as their subatomic constituents, nuclei and their component parts including elementary particles. We consider an alternative to the usual particle theories, but dealing with the same phenomena. We call these theories ‘QT’s’. This is an attempt to provide a formal description of the essential features of elementary particle theories within the framework of metatheoretical (...) structuralism. (shrink)