We show how metagenomic analysis of the human gut antibiotic resistome, compared across large populations and against environmental or agricultural resistomes, suggests a strong anthropogenic cause behind increasing antibiotic resistance in bacteria. This area has been the subject of intense and polarized debate driven by economic and political concerns; therefore such recently available insights address an important need. We derive and compare antibiotic resistomes of human gut microbes from 832 individuals from ten different countries. We observe and describe significant differences (...) between samples from these countries in the gut resistance potential, in line with expectations from antibiotic usage and exposure in medical and food production contexts. Our results imply roles for both of these sources in increased resistance among pathogens in recent history. In contrast, other available metadata such as age, body mass index, sex, or health status have little effect on the antibiotic resistance potential of human gut microbes.Also watch the Video Abstract. (shrink)

O presente trabalho retrata os resultados de uma pesquisa realizada nos moldes da observação participante e da etnobiografia com o objetivo de compreender a dinâmica existente entre o ensino e aprendizagem e os valores civilizatórios inerentes às práticas cotidianas de uma comunidade tradicional afro-brasileira. O estudo foi realizado por meio da observação e participação de atividades litúrgicas de um terreiro de Umbanda e Candomblé – o “Ilè Asè Tobi Babá Olòrigbìn” - localizado na cidade de Ituiutaba, MG. O ensinar como (...) uma responsabilidade partilhada, a reafirmação de princípios éticos/civilizatórios (como a circularidade, a ancestralidade, a corporalidade, a conduta), a centralidade da oralidade e as relações entre a vida comunitária e uma singularidade que se funda no coletivo foram aspectos percebidos como características de uma dimensão formativa que orienta os aprendizados no interior desse grupo. Considerando que o modelo praticado por essas comunidades seja um modelo de sucesso (que tem resistido ao tempo e a um histórico de opressão), destacamos o grande desafio de aprender com os ensinamentos dos territórios afro-brasileiros e encontrar maneiras de incorporá-los às nossas práticas educativas, para que assim, vislumbremos uma escola mais diversa e humanizada. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism is said by many critics to be arrogant. In emphasizing universal principles and granting no fundamental moral significance to national or other group belonging, it wrongly treats those making non-universalist claims as not authorized to speak, while treating those in non-Western societies as not qualified. This book works to address such objections. It does so in part by engaging the work of B.R. Ambedkar, architect of India's 1950 Constitution and revered champion of the country's Dalits (formerly "untouchables"). Ambedkar cited (...) universal principles of equality and rights in confronting domestic exclusions and the "arrogance" of caste. He sought to advance forms of political humility, or the affirmation of equal standing within political institutions and openness to input and challenge within them. This book examines how an "institutional global citizenship" approach to cosmopolitanism could similarly advance political humility, in supporting the development of input and challenge mechanisms beyond the state. It employs a grounded normative theory method, taking insights for the model from field research among Dalit activists pressing for domestic reforms through the UN human rights regime, and from their critics in the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. Insights also are taken from Turkish protesters challenging a rising domestic authoritarianism, and from UK Independence Party members demanding "Brexit" from the European Union-in part because of possibilities that predominantly Muslim Turkey will join. Overall, it is shown, an appropriately configured institutional cosmopolitanism should orient fundamentally to political humility rather than arrogance, while holding significant potential for advancing global rights protections and more equitable rights specifications. (shrink)

Este artigo objetiva sustentar a hipótese de que sob o procedimento metodológico-filosófico assumido por Guilherme de Ockham em suas Oito questões, subjaz, de forma velada, uma possível metodologia de ensino de Filosofia, a qual poderia representar uma significativa diretriz frente às atuais discussões concernentes ao ensino de Filosofia na Educação Básica. Nesse sentido, buscaremos estabelecer algumas aproximações, ainda que breves, entre o pensamento de Ockham e a nova Base Nacional Comum Curricular (BNCC), homologada em 2018, sobretudo no que se refere (...) às competências a serem desenvolvidas, no Ensino Médio, na área de Ciências Humanas e Sociais Aplicadas. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

Aesthetic subjectivism takes the truth of aesthetic judgments to be relative to the individual making that judgment. Despite widespread suspicion, however, this does not mean that one cannot be wrong about such judgments. Accordingly, this does not mean that one cannot gain higher-order evidence of error and fallibility that bears on the rationality of the aesthetic judgment in question. In this paper, we explain and explore these issues in some detail.

Mit dem erstmals in einer zweisprachigen, umfangreich kommentierten Edition vorliegenden Liber de platano (1537) erschließt sich ein außergewöhnliches Zeugnis des portugiesischen Humanismus. Das aus einer Abhandlung sowie einem Briefwechsel zwischen dem Dichter João Rodrigues de Sá de Meneses und dem Rhetorikprofessor Juan Fernández bestehende Werk greift mit dem Platanenbaum ein Motiv auf, das durch Platons Phaidros und Ciceros De oratore popularisiert wurde: In beiden Texten finden philosophische Gespräche unter einer Platane statt. Allerdings wird der Baum im Liber de platano zu (...) einem mehrdeutigen Sinnbild. Zwar geht es durchaus um die botanische Frage nach dem Vorkommen der Platane im zeitgenössischen Portugal, doch erweist sich der Buam darüber hinaus auch als Inbild antiker Gesprächskultur und eines an der Antike orientierten genussvollen Lebensstils. In der einleitenden Studie stellt Roger Friedlein neben einer Einführung in den Text die Autoren sowie weitere Humanisten - Miguel da Silva, Jorge Coelho und Luís Teixeira - vor, die einerseits durch ihre Präsenz im Liber de platano von Bedeutung sind. Doch vor dem Hitergund ihrer Aufenthalte in Italien und ihrer Kontakte zu herausragenden Vertretern der italienischen Renaissance wie Pietro Bembo erscheint der Liber de platano zudem als zentrales Zeugnis für den portugiesisch-italienischen Kulturkontakt. (shrink)

James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the free will defense. In this paper, I will try to show that once we take care to focus on what the free will defense is trying to (...) accomplish, and by what means it tries to do so, we will see that Sterba’s criticism of it misses the mark. (shrink)

We point out the need to clarify some of the ideas related to the connection between development and sustainability in the Report of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development. In particular, the meaning of ‘sustainable’ is not clear when applied to specific areas of human activity. A more detailed explanation of the kind of equality sought for in the proposal is also needed. Because of potential conflicts between goals, we miss some considerations on the impact (...) of population increase both on development and on sustainability. A distinction is made here between two kinds of goals included in the Report. Some of the proposed 17 goals can then be seen as ends in themselves, whereas others seem to be means for the first set. The two sets thereby established should be seen in theory and dealt with in practice in a differentiated manner. (shrink)

This is not a guide for your writing process. You should write in whatever way expressing and making sense of your ideas feels most natural and most productive to you. This is a guide for organizing your ideas, after you have captured some of them in fits and starts of prose, into a particular kind of final product: the basic philosophy paper.

“Literature and the Right to Death” is probably the most quoted of French thinker Maurice Blanchot’s texts. For decades it has been discussed by such important figures as Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, or even the writer Paul Auster. Its importance is twofold: on the one hand, it is often considered an important gateway to Blanchot’s literary thought. On the other hand, it constitutes a substantial example of the new reception of Hegel in France after the Second World War. Although there (...) is no doubt about its Kojèvo-Hegelian inspiration and its center in what we could call “literary experience”, this article intends to explore another of its layers: its relation to the discussion around humanism and the Terror, as forgotten as it was central in France at the end of the 1940’s. We will thus try to lay the foundations for a new reading of this fundamental piece in Blanchot’s production. (shrink)

In this article, we will make the case for an intercultural philosophy of religion with a special focus on interculturality between Chinese and African philosophies. We will provide an overview of the kind of intercultural philosophy that has already been undertaken between the East and the South and point out that a philosophy of religion has been left out. We will then make the case for a global philosophy of religion approach and why Chinese and African philosophies of religion should (...) engage in philosophical interchanges. We will then highlight some directions for carrying out such a philosophy and explain why the problem of evil may be better addressed from an intercultural perspective. (shrink)

The tendency to idealise artificial intelligence as independent from human manipulators, combined with the growing ontological entanglement of humans and digital machines, has created an “anthrobotic” horizon, in which data analytics, statistics and probabilities throw our agential power into question. How can we avoid the consequences of a reified definition of intelligence as universal operation becoming imposed upon our destinies? It is here argued that the fantasised autonomy of automated intelligence presents a contradistinctive opportunity for philosophical consciousness to understand itself (...) anew as holistic and co-creative, beyond the recent “analytic” moment of the history of philosophy. Here we introduce the concept of “crealectic intelligence”, a meta-analytic and meta-dialectic aspect of consciousness. Intelligent behaviour may consist in distinguishing discrete familiar parts or reproducible functions in the midst of noise via an analytic process of segmentation; intelligence may also manifest itself in the constitution of larger wholes and dynamic unities through a dialectic process of association or assemblage. But, by contrast, crealectic intelligence co-creates realities in the image of an ideal or truth, taking into account the desiring agent imbued with a sense of possibility, in a relationship not only with the Real but also with the creative sublime or “Creal”. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue (...) that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism. (shrink)

Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...) principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. (shrink)

Contemporary studies in unconscious cognition are essentially founded on dissociation, i.e., on how it dissociates with respect to conscious mental processes and representations. This is claimed to be in so many and diverse ways that one is often lost in dissociation. In order to reduce this state of confusion we here carry out two major tasks: based on the central distinction between cognitive processes and representations, we identify and isolate the main dissociation paradigms; we then critically analyze their key tenets (...) and reported findings. (shrink)

One of the potentially most significant objections to a cosmopolitan moral approach charges an essential arrogance: cosmopolitanism disdains particularist moral insights even while – in what is said to be its most coherent form – it seeks to bind all persons within global political institutions. It is argued here that adopting a form of institutional cosmopolitanism actually helps to meet this sort of objection. An appropriately configured such approach will have a conception of equal global citizenship at its core. It (...) will seek to place individuals in relations of political humility, understood not as plain deference to competing moral claims, but as concrete recognition of the equal moral status of others. It will seek to progressively empower as actual citizen equals those whose interests are often ‘arrogantly’ neglected in the current system, and to multiply mechanisms of input and challenge for them over time. (shrink)

My starting point is what I call the Normative Authority Conception of justification, where S is justified in their belief that p at t (to some degree n) if and only if their believing that p at t is not ruled out by epistemic norms that have normative authority over S at t. With this in mind, this paper develops an account of doxastic justification by first developing an account of the normative authority of epistemic norms. Drawing from work in (...) political philosophy, I argue that (a) the cognitive and evaluative commitments and concerns behind our actual practices of holding each other and ourselves accountable for our beliefs reveal which epistemic norms we have consented to be under, and that (b) it is because we have consented to be under the authority of these norms – by actually holding ourselves and others accountable to them – that they in turn have normative authority over us. By connecting the authority of epistemic norms to the authority we have over ourselves in this way, the resulting account of doxastic justification (i) explains why it can be appropriate to criticize, resent, or sanction someone for having unjustified beliefs, (ii) avoids the phenomena of normative alienation and normative parochialism, and (iii) respects the social and collective nature of epistemic justification. (shrink)

Análisis historiográfico del relato de las vicisitudes del alfaquí Ṭālūt, elaborado por Ibn al-Qūṭiyya y reproducido por numerosas fuentes andalusíes y orientales. De dicho análisis se desprende que la supuesta versión amplia de la crónica de Ibn al-Qūṭiyya nunca existió y que la coincidencia entre varias obras en presentar una versión extensa del relato es debida a su común dependencia de un subarquetipo que amplificó retóricamente el texto original de Ibn al- Qūṭiyya.

El presente artículo aborda las consideraciones de la alteridad del otro en las elaboraciones tempranas de Heidegger. Entendidas como condición de posibilidad para un abordaje propio de las cuestiones éticas, aquí analizamos tensiones y limitaciones en la tematización del otro, con el objetivo de dar cuenta de la transición hacia una comprensión radical de la alteridad en sus trabajos posteriores a 1930, más allá de las limitaciones antropológicas y subjetivas de las elaboraciones de Husserl. Para dar cuenta de ello, en (...) primer lugar, analizamos los tratamientos respectivos en la fenomenología de Husserl, poniendo énfasis en los límites de su enfoque. En segundo lugar, abordamos las elaboraciones en torno a la alteridad del otro en los trabajos de Heidegger, para dilucidar el carácter transicional de la comprensión de base, a partir de sus desplazamientos y limitaciones propias. Finalmente, circunscribimos su enfoque sobre las estructuras relacionales, destacando algunas discusiones sobre implicancias éticas. De este modo, nos proponemos dar cuenta del carácter fronterizo de una comprensión filosófica del otro, en su empuje hacia su radicalización en el pensamiento contemporáneo. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este trabajo analizaremos las consideraciones sobre la neutralidad y la sexualidad del Dasein en sus articulaciones con la dispersión fáctica y la libertad en las elaboraciones de Heidegger entre 1927 y 1929.En este marco nos proponemos argumentar que tales consideraciones tienen como función poner de manifiesto el carácter primario de la estructura ontológica del Ser-con y el horizonte originario de la temporeidad, desde la cual circunscribe el empuje de las dinámicas respectivas. Para ello, en primer lugar analizaremos la (...) consideración de la neutralidad y la dispersión en Sein und Zeit en el marco de sus especificaciones respecto del Dasein cotidiano. Luego, distinguiremos las especificaciones y reelaboraciones en su curso de Marburg, respecto del estatuto ontológico que le confiere a la neutralidad en sus relaciones con la concreción fáctica y la libertad. Finalmente dedicaremos el último apartado al análisis e interpretación del sentido de la neutralidad y la dispersión que articula de modo diferencial en su curso de Freiburg. Junto a ello, buscamos aportar con la clarificación del lugar que ocupa las consideraciones de la corporalidad física en este período, en diálogo con interpretaciones relevantes de su obra. ABSTRACT In this work we will analyze the considerations about Dasein´s neutrality and sexuality in their articulations with the factual dispersion and freedom in Heidegger’s elaborations between 1927 and 1929. In this framework we propose to argue that such considerations have the function of highlighting the primary character of the ontological structure of Being-with and the original horizon of temporality, from which it circumscribes the thrust of the respective dynamics. To do this, we will first analyze the consideration of neutrality and dispersion in Sein und Zeit within the framework of its specifications regarding everyday Dasein. Then, we will distinguish the specifications and reworkings in his course from Marburg, regarding the ontological status that he confers on neutrality in its relations with factual concretion and freedom. Finally, we will dedicate the last section to the analysis and interpretation of the meaning of neutrality and dispersion that he articulates in a differential way in his Freiburg course. Next to it, we seek to contribute with the clarification of the place occupied by the considerations of physical corporeality in this period, in dialogue with relevant interpretations of his work. (shrink)

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

Cosmopolitan political theorists hold that our obligations to distribute resources to others do not halt at state borders, but most do not advocate a restructuring of the global system to achieve their distributive aims. This article argues that promoting democratically accountable economic and political integration between states would be the most effective way to enable cosmopolitan, or routine, tax-financed, trans-state distributions. Movement toward a more integrated global system should encourage the view that larger sets of persons have interests in common (...) that should be protected and promoted in common. Democratically accountable integration also should enable those within less-affluent states to more vigorously press trans-state distributive claims. The still-evolving E.U. is examined as a partial model for the integrated alternative in other geographic regions, as well as, in the much longer term, for some form of democratic global government capable of ensuring that any person born anywhere would have access to adequate resources and life opportunities. (shrink)

Since Freud and his co-author Breuer spoke of dissociation in 1895, a scientific paradigm was painstakingly established in the field of unconscious cognition. This is the dissociation paradigm. However, recent critical analysis of the many and various reported dissociations reveals their blurred, or unveridical, character. Moreover, we remain ignorant with respect to the ways cognitive phenomena transition from consciousness to an unconscious mode. This hinders us from filling in the puzzle of the unified mind. We conclude that we have reached (...) a Kuhnian crisis in the field of unconscious cognition, and we predict that new models, incorporating partly the relevant findings of the dissociation paradigm—but also of dynamic psychology—, will soon be established. We further predict that some of these models will be largely based on the pairs representation–process and analog–digital. (shrink)

W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.

This article explores Bernard Stiegler’s philosophical approach to culture in dialogue with Oliver Marchart’s postfoundational framework and conflictual aesthetics. Through the exposition of two different cases of gestural devices, it exposes Stiegler’s potential postfoundational aesthetics as an attempt to establish the necessary conditions for re-thinking the grounded-ungrounded existing relationship between humans, technical objects, and the composition of potential realities to grasp from an autopoietic relationship. These artistic and cultural examples are considered critical concepts that enhance and interrupt the philosophical discourse. (...) The article argues that Stiegler’s aesthetics is committed to the capacity that art, as a technology of the spirit, can contribute as agency in shaping public power, even when these agents are not directly in conflict and develop lesser and fragile performative technics through which a memory becomes present again. (shrink)

This article is an introduction to the Synthese Special Issue, Natural Kinds: Language, Science, and Metaphysics. The issue includes new contributions to some of the main questions involved in the present philosophical debates on natural kinds and on natural kind terms. Those debates are relevant to philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and metaphysics. In philosophy of language it is highly debated what the meaning of natural kind terms is, how their reference is determined, as well as whether there are (...) differences and similarities between the semantics of natural kind terms and that of other sorts of kind terms. In philosophy of science, natural kinds are relevant because they are the basis for scientific classifications and play an explanatory role in scientific theories; thus one aim of science is to discover natural kinds and theorize about them. Natural kinds are also relevant in metaphysics, where many questions involving natural kinds are debated and especially those concerning the sort of entities we refer to when using natural kind terms, i.e., the ontological status of natural kinds; in this regard there are different views, such as conventionalism, realism and essentialism. Another metaphysical question is what it is that characterizes the naturalness of kind divisions. The introduction sketches the antecedents of some of the present views on natural kinds and natural kind terms, and indicates some of the topics dealt with in the articles that make up the issue, which can be classified in the following groups: the metaphysics and epistemology of natural kinds the semantics of natural kind terms and other kind terms questions on species and other related issues on natural kinds. However, many of the articles cover more than just one of these topics. (shrink)

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)

Abstracting away from its various particular versions, contemporary externalism about knowledge can be broadly characterized as the rejection of two central ideas: that knowledge is incompatible with reflective awareness of the possibility of error, and that knowledge is necessarily tied to the resources that are available from within the first-person perspective. In this brief introduction, I outline five distinctly externalist accounts of knowledge, and two distinctly externalist methodological approaches to knowledge, all fitting this general description.

En este trabajo nos proponemos indagar en la modalidad práctica del pensamiento de Heidegger a partir de sus consideraciones en torno a la praxis y la acción, en trabajos fundamentales de la época de Sein und Zeit en comparación con elaboraciones de su período posterior a la Kehre. En este marco, buscaremos demostrar cierta continuidad entre ambos períodos a partir de sus consideraciones ontológicas de la praxis, lo cual permite interpretar el carácter correlativo del pensar y la acción. Para dar (...) cuenta de ello, en primer lugar, abordaremos su respectiva interpretación de la tradición aristotélica en paralelo con las elaboraciones de la analítica en 1927. En segundo lugar, analizaremos un conjunto de consideraciones prácticas del pensar en trabajos posteriores a 1930.De esta manera, esperamos especificar la modalidad práctica del pensamiento de Heidegger, tanto en sus elaboraciones como en su propia articulación. (shrink)

En el presente artículo proponemos un abordaje de los análisis en torno al cuerpo en trabajos fundamentales de Husserl y Heidegger, a partir de una distinción de diferencias y continuidades. Buscaremos demostrar que las especificaciones de la corporeidad de Heidegger remiten a una aclaración del entramado comprensivo y de significación en el que también se hallan articulados los análisis fenomenológicos de su maestro. Para ello, en primer lugar, especificaremos las consideraciones de Husserl sobre la corporalidad y la inter-corporalidad, distinguiendo su (...) perspectiva gnoseológica y ética. Luego, dedicaremos un apartado a las aclaraciones de Heidegger en la década de 1920 y otro, a sus descripciones específicas en sus seminarios de la década de 1960, donde desarrolla el carácter ontológico de la corporeidad. Finalmente, analizaremos algunas implicancias relativas a estas tematizaciones, distinguiendo sus enfoques y orientaciones comprensivas sobre el cuerpo. (shrink)

En este trabajo indagaremos en torno al estatuto de la acción y la praxis en la obra de Heidegger a partir de un análisis de la figura del despertar relativa al aburrimiento profundo, en su trabajo de 1929-1930. Con ello, buscaremos demostrar que las implicancias relativas al actuar, pensar y filosofar allí expuestas, permiten cotejar continuidades y diferencias de tipo fronterizo tanto con sus elaboraciones anteriores, como respecto a su perspectiva posterior a la kehre. Para dar cuenta de ello, primero (...) abordaremos aspectos fundamentales de su interpretación de la filosofía práctica aristotélica y sus reelaboraciones hasta Sein und Zeit. (shrink)

This article’s assumption is that ordinary aesthetics does not necessarily imply a distancing from art and artists; rather, it can benefit from the input of creators when they use everyday scenes or objects as their theme. This approach focuses on the practice of twentieth-century Italian painter Giorgio Morandi, who depicted compositions of common objects such as bottles, jars, and vases. Through Morandi’s meditative and artistic search, these objects are given value and aesthetic elevation in his paintings. Thomas Leddy’s aesthetics of (...) everyday life will also be called upon in my analysis, insofar as the author recognizes a continuity between the ordinary and the extraordinary, through auratic experiences. If Morandi discovers the extraordinary in the trivial, this is achieved through a gradual process of selection regarding the objects he favoured, which allows for the interaction of various levels of aesthetic intensity. Morandi’s objects and models and their preparation suggest a circulation between aesthetic degrees that, in turn, suggests a timeless “language of things” fixed through the discourse of the paintings. Along these lines, it will be necessary to address the enchantment related to common things, a mesmerizing presence of which we became more aware through Morandi compositions. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), Kant argues for the impossibility of theistic arguments, namely the ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological arguments. However, his objection relies on his classification of theistic arguments, which has been criticized by analytical philosophers of religion such as Plantinga (2012) and Swinburne (2019). Therefore, this paper aims to critically investigate two problems related to this classification: the systematic criteria of its classification and the historical sufficiency of its three theistic proofs. Regarding (...) the first problem, it will be argued that it is possible to recognize a certain systematic artificiality in Kant's classification of theistic proofs, given the criticisms of Strawson (1966) and Hegel (1812, 1830), as well as the internal critique developed by the authors of this work. Regarding the second problem, it will be argued that it is possible to indicate a certain historical insufficiency in Kant's classification of the three theistic proofs, based on brief critiques focused on some classical theologians such as Anselm, Aquinas, and Al-Ghazali. Finally, once it is justified that Kant's objection depends on this possibly artificial and insufficient classification, it will be briefly indicated that Kant does not seem as justified as he intended in his objection to theistic arguments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:.. MERELY A MAN OF LETTERS" an interview with Jorge Luis Borges* Philosophy and Literature: Why don't you tell us about some of the philosophers who have influenced your work and in whom you have been the most interested? Jorge Luis Borges: Well, I think that's an easy one. You might talk in terms of two: Berkeley and Schopenhauer. But I suppose Hume might be worked in also, because, (...) after all, Hume refutes Berkeley. Really, he comes from Berkeley—even if Berkeley comes from Locke. You might think of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume as being three links in an argument..... But I suppose that when someone refutes someone else in philosophy, he is carrying on the argument. P&L: And Schopenhauer? Borges: Schopenhauer is very different from Hume. Of course, Schopenhauer had his idea of the Will. That is not to be found in Hume.... The case of Berkeley was different. I suppose he thought of God as being aware of all things all the time, if I don't get him wrong. If we go away, does this room disappear? No, because God is thinking about it. Now, in the case of Schopenhauer, I was rereading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, The World as Will and Idea, and I was rather taken aback, or baffled I should say, puzzled by something that keeps on recurring in Schopenhauer. Of course it may have been a slip of the pen, but as he goes back to it, and as he was a very careful writer, I wonder if it is a slip of the pen. For example, Schopenhauer begins by saying that the universe, the stars, the spaces in between, the planets, *On April 14, 1976, two editors of Philosophy and Literature, along with an interested colleague, interviewed Jorge Luis Borges at Michigan State University, where he held a position as visiting professor for the winter term. These remarks are edited from the transcript of that conversation. 337 338Philosophy and Literature this planet, those things, have no existence—except in the mind which perceives them. But then, to my surprise—and I suppose you can explain this to me, since you are philosophers and I am not—what Schopenhauer says is that all those things have no existence except in the brain. And that the universe—I remember these words, I don't think I'm inventing them now—"ist ein Gehirnphänomen," that the world is a cerebral phenomenon. Now, I was baffled. Because, of course, if you think of the universe, I suppose the brain is as much a part of the external world as the stars or the moon. The brain after all is a system of visual, of tactile, perceptions. He keeps on insisting on the brain. I don't think, for example, that Bishop Berkeley insists on the brain, or Hume, who would have insisted on the mind, consciousness. P&L: People sometimes say that they see Berkeley in stories like "Orbis Tertius." Borges: Yes, I suppose they do. Well, of course. But in that story I was led by literary means also. P&L: How do you distinguish the literary from the philosophical means in that story? Could you explain that? Borges: Very easily.... Encyclopedias have been my chief reading. I have always been interested in encyclopedias. I used to go to the Biblioteca National in Buenos Aires—and since I was so shy, I felt I could not cope with asking for a book, so I looked on the shelves for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I would pick up any chance volume and I would read it. One night I was richly rewarded, because I read all about the Druses, Dryden and the Druids—a treasure trove, no?—all in the same volume, "Dr-." Then I came to the idea of how fine it would be to think of an encyclopedia... a very rigorous one of course, of an imaginary world, where everything should be linked. For example, you would have a language and then a literature, and then a history and so on. Then I thought I would write a story of a fancy encyclopedia. Of course that would require many different people to write it... (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between individual work values and unethical decision-making and actual behavior at work through two complementary studies. Specifically, we use a robust and comprehensive model of individual work values to predict unethical decision-making in a sample of working professionals and accounting students enrolled in ethics courses, and IT employees working in sales and customer service. Study 1 demonstrates that young professionals who rate power as a relatively important value are more likely to violate professional conduct guidelines (...) despite receiving training regarding ethical professional principles. Study 2, which examines a group of employees from an IT firm, demonstrates that those rating power as an important value are more likely to engage in non-work-related computing even when they are aware of a monitoring software that tracks their computer usage and an explicit policy prohibiting the use of these computers for personal reasons. (shrink)