While philosophers hold that it is patently absurd to blame robots or hold them morally responsible [1], a series of recent empirical studies suggest that people do ascribe blame to AI systems and robots in certain contexts [2]. This is disconcerting: Blame might be shifted from the owners, users or designers of AI systems to the systems themselves, leading to the diminished accountability of the responsible human agents [3]. In this paper, we explore one of the potential underlying reasons for (...) robot blame, namely the folk's willingness to ascribe inculpating mental states or "mens rea" to robots. In a vignette-based experiment (N=513), we presented participants with a situation in which an agent knowingly runs the risk of bringing about substantial harm. We manipulated agent type (human v. group agent v. AI-driven robot) and outcome (neutral v. bad), and measured both moral judgment (wrongness of the action and blameworthiness of the agent) and mental states attributed to the agent (recklessness and the desire to inflict harm). We found that (i) judgments of wrongness and blame were relatively similar across agent types, possibly because (ii) attributions of mental states were, as suspected, similar across agent types. This raised the question - also explored in the experiment - whether people attribute knowledge and desire to robots in a merely metaphorical way (e.g., the robot "knew" rather than really knew). However, (iii), according to our data people were unwilling to downgrade to mens rea in a merely metaphorical sense when given the chance. Finally, (iv), we report a surprising and novel finding, which we call the inverse outcome effect on robot blame: People were less willing to blame artificial agents for bad outcomes than for neutral outcomes. This suggests that they are implicitly aware of the dangers of overattributing blame to robots when harm comes to pass, such as inappropriately letting the responsible human agent off the moral hook. (shrink)

In two recent papers in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Howard Sankey has argued that there is an intimate relationship between Pyrrhonian skepticism and recent approaches to epistemic relativism.Though the general argument and idea of Sankey’s papers is very much appreciated, it is argued that the epistemic relativist’s recourse to the skeptical strategy outlined by the Pyrrhonian is not a good one. This diagnosis gives rise to an objection against the epistemic relativist who argues on the basis of (...) the skeptical strategy that differs from Sankey’s naturalistic response. Furthermore, it can be shown that what is really at stake between epistemic relativism and epistemic absolutism is the question of which criteria there are for variation of epistemic norms and epistemic systems. (shrink)

The book addresses the constitution of the high culture of modernity as an uneasy unity of the sciences, including philosophy, and the arts. Their internal dynamism and strain is established through, on the one hand, the relationship of the author - work - recipient, and, on the other, the respective roles of experts and the market.

In a reply to Howard Sankey I have maintained that the epistemic relativist cannot use the strategy of the sceptic since the relativist is at pains not to draw the sceptical solution. Sankey has objected to my argument by distinguishing between weak and strong justification: according to Sankey, the relativist using the sceptic’s strategy aims to provide an argument against the latter form of justification but still maintains that we can have the former.In this counter-response I argue that if this (...) is really the relativist’s strategy then she cannot provide any argument against the absolutist at all. The reason is that she simply fails to address the key question in the debate about relative/absolute justification: are there any absolutely correct epistemic standards? The epistemic relativist using the sceptic’s strategy is thus trapped between the Scylla of undermining her right to maintain that there is relative justification and the Charybdis of providing no argument against absolutism at all. (shrink)

People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor-analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral (...) uncertainty and to rate different aspects of their uncertainty about this case. Across this wide range of moral scenarios, our items loaded onto three reliable factors: lack of information, unclear consequences, and normative uncertainty. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure using predefined stimulus material. N = 402 participants each rated eight scenarios that systematically varied in their degree of uncertainty regarding the consequences of the described actions and in the value conflict that was inherent to them. The empirical uncertainty factors were mainly affected by the introduction of uncertainty regarding consequences, and the normative uncertainty factor was mainly affected by the introduction of value conflict. Our studies provide evidence that the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty accurately describes a psychological reality. We discuss the relevance of our findings for research on moral judgments and decision-making, and folk metaethics. (shrink)

Dass wir durch Wahrnehmung einen Zugang zur materiellen Welt haben, scheint selbstverständlich zu sein. Und dass die visuelle Wahrnehmung dabei einen prominenten Platz einnimmt, scheint ebenfalls selbstverständlich zu sein. Doch was genau sehen wir: die Gegenstände selbst oder bloß ihre wahrnehmbaren Eigenschaften? Wie gelingt es uns überhaupt, etwas zu sehen? Können wir allein aufgrund von optischen und physiologischen Vorgängen etwas sehen, oder setzt das Sehen bereits Begriffe voraus, mithilfe derer wir etwas als etwas sehen können? -/- Diese Fragen, die in (...) der gegenwärtigen Wahrnehmungs- und Erkenntnistheorie ausgiebig erörtert werden, waren bereits in der Frühen Neuzeit Gegenstand intensiver Debatten. In vielfacher Hinsicht legten die Diskussionen im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert sogar die Grundlage für heutige Theorien, da sie zum einen die Probleme in aller Schärfe benannten, zum anderen aber auch Lösungsstrategien vorlegten, die auch heute noch von Bedeutung sind. -/- Der Band soll diese Debatten (von Descartes bis Reid) neu erschließen und einem breiten philosophisch interessierten Publikum zugänglich machen. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass die Frühe Neuzeit kein ehrwürdiges Museum der Philosophiegeschichte ist, sondern eine äußerst produktive und anregende philosophische Epoche, die zu einem Dialog einlädt. (shrink)

Is the assessment of a view of life only a matter of personal preference? I argue that there is more than personal preference. I defend the position that a view of life must be useful for the ascription of meaning and therefore needs to fulfil the requirements of the process of ascribing meaning. In this article I analyse this process and its requirements and deduce from them a set of criteria by which views of life can be assessed.

Reliabilists have often noticed a kind of circularity in their reasoning, but they have insisted that the circularity in question is not vicious. On the contrary, they think typically that reliabilism resolves even the traditional problems of circularity. It is argued in the paper that there is a real problem of circularity that relates to the method by which we are supposed arrive at our epistemology. Different methods are considered, including methodism and particularism that Roderick Chisholm distinguishes as possible responses (...) to the problem of the criterion and the method of reflective equilibrium due to Nelson Goodman and John Rawls. It is argued that only the method of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) doesn't cause serious problems for reliabilism. Then it is argued that the method of WRE can actually be seen as the method of epistemology of which the approaches discussed earlier are just different versions. Finally, it is pointed out that the source of the troubles with circularity lies actually in certain non-epistemic background assumptions, that are therefore discarded. This brings reliabilism closer to the commonsense tradition and its characteristic anti-skepticism. (shrink)

This book presents the latest research, conducted by leading philosophers and scientists from various fields, on the topic of top-down causation. The chapters combine to form a unique, interdisciplinary perspective, drawing upon George Ellis's extensive research and novel perspectives on topics including downwards causation, weak and strong emergence, mental causation, biological relativity, effective field theory and levels in nature. The collection also serves as a Festschrift in honour of George Ellis' 80th birthday. The extensive and interdisciplinary scope of this book (...) makes it vital reading for anyone interested in the work of George Ellis and current research on the topics of causation and emergence. (shrink)

Miles Burnyeat famously argued that there could, in principle, be no idealism in Greek philosophy, because it was not yet prepared to regard the existence of an external world beyond our veil of perception as a serious philosophical problem. I believe that this thesis is historically and systematically false. Burnyeat's claim is backed up by a short sketch of the most important philosophical systems in Greek philosophy that might seem to contradict his no-idealism view, viz. ancient skepticism and Neo-Platonism. In (...) this paper, I argue against Burnyeat's view on the basis of a reconstruction of Sextus Empiricus' epistemological skepticism regarding the external world. Then, I try to show that Plotinus' idealism and his theory of νος are built on the assumption that metaphysical realism entails the problem of the external world and is, therefore, potentially inconsistent because of its skeptical results. Plotinus shows how skepticism about the external world can be avoided by idealism which can, thus, be seen as an explicit overcoming of epistemological skepticism. This whole train of thought explicitly refers to the problem of an external world. Therefore, Plotinus can be seen as answering the skeptical challenge with an idealistic metaphysic of experience. (shrink)

In the current theoretical discourse, human dignity as it is enshrined in the German Basic Law, is often interpreted as a special „right to non-instrumentalization“ which overturns any other human right. This interpretation usually refers to Kant’s concept of human dignity, according to which any person is an “end-in-itself”. By discussing the different possibilities on how to understand this idea, I want to point out that none of possible interpretations of Kant’s concept can give good reasons for an understanding of (...) human dignity as a special “right to non-instrumentalization”. Instead I propose to understand human dignity as the principle of and the reason for the absolute inviolability of basic human rights. (shrink)

Kapitel XV von Über Annahmen (1. Aufl.) beginnt mit einigen bitteren Bemerkungen über den Mangel an Einsicht unter Logikern und Philosophen über das Wesen logischen Schließens. Meinong beklagt, daß man sich mit der Klassifizierung von Schlußformen aufgehalten habe, ohne den Versuch einer Analyse des Folgerungsbegriffs zu unternehmen. Es überrascht wenig, daß Meinong auch bei der Analyse des Folgerungsbegriffs der Annahme eine Schlüsselrolle zuweist. Seine Diskussion führt ihn dabei zu einer UntersuChung des Verhältnisses von Schlüssen aus Urteilen, hypothetischen Urteilen und „Annahmeschlüssen", (...) d.h. Argumenten, deren Prämissen Annahmen sind.Meinongs These, daß es so etwas wie Annahmeschlüsse gibt, erscheint selbstverständlich genug. Die Einführung von Annahmen als Prämissen ist heutzutage nicht nur in Kalkülen natürlichen Schließens eine Standardprozedur, die keiner Rechtfertigung bedarf. Umso mehr muß es daher überraschen, daß Russell in seiner ansonsten enthusiastischen Rezension in Mind (\904) vorgibt, für Schlüsse aus Annahmen nichts übrig zu haben: „I cannot understand how the notion of assumptive inference... can be maintained." Daß es hier in der Tat nicht um einen bloßen Streit um Worte oder ein Mißverständnis geht, wird spätestens dadurch offenkundig, daß auch Frege in diesem Punkt mit Russell vollkommen übereinstimmt. Wie sich jedoch herausstellt, ist der eigentliche Streitpunkt das korrekte Verständnis hypothetischer Urteile: Nach Meinong sind hypothetische Urteile keine Urteile, sondern verkappte Annahmeschlüsse, während Russell (und Frege) genau umgekehrt Annahmeschlüsse als verkappte hypothetische Urteile auffassen. (shrink)

Starting from the premise that what calls for and happens in the work and thinking of translation is inseparable from the experience of reading Heidegger’sphilosophy, this article suggests that translation in Heidegger’s work is a philosophical problem fundamentally implicated in the thinking of Being. The article first examines Heidegger’s distinction between Übersetzen—a form of translation that seeks correspondences between words of different languages, and Übersetzen—a translation within one’s own language that seeks to respond to the “claim” of language itself. The (...) second part of the article links translation with Heidegger’s later reflections on language in Unterwegs zur Sprache, arguing that what is at stake in the work of translation is a thinking of our relation to language. Focusing on the notion of “usage/Brauch,” it concludes with the suggestion that insofar as thinking translation according to Heidegger requires a “response” to the claim of language, it also calls for a more sustained engagement with the question of how the human is claimed and used by language. (shrink)

English summary: 'Metamorphoses of the holy' denotes the changing aesthetic presentation of the sacred which is connected to the creation and institutionalization of religion as art. The focus of the essays in this volume is the structure and dynamic of this process, something which affects all art genres. The sacralization of aesthetic subjectivity is prerequisite to religion as art as evidenced by the belief in the partaking of the sacred through aesthetic experience. On the basis of aesthetic subjectivity's sacralization, it (...) becomes possible to interpret its various forms of expression as witnesses to the holy and award them a fitting reception. These contributions dedicate themselves to an interdisciplinary scrutiny of religion as art and its cross-points of reference with political and civil religion. German description: 'Metamorphosen des Heiligen' bezeichnen hier den Gestaltwandel asthetischer Vergegenwartigung des Heiligen, der sich mit der Entstehung und Institutionalisierung von Kunstreligion verbindet. Im Zentrum der Beitrage des Bandes stehen Struktur und Dynamik dieses Gestaltwandels, der alle Kunstgattungen betrifft. Kunstreligion hat die Sakralisierung der asthetischen Subjektivitat zur Voraussetzung, erkennbar an der Uberzeugung, der Mensch konne durch das Vermogen asthetischer Erfahrung Anteil am Heiligen haben. Auf der Grundlage der Sakralisierung asthetischer Subjektivitat wird es moglich, auch deren verschiedene Ausdrucksformen als Zeugnisse des Heiligen zu deuten und eine entsprechende Rezeption dieser Zeugnisse anzusinnen. Die Beitrage widmen sich der Kunstreligion sowie ihren Interferenzen mit der politischen Religion und der Zivilreligion in interdisziplinarer Perspektive. Mit Beitragen von: Stefan Alkier, Bernd Auerochs, Manuel Bauer, Wolfgang Braungart, Reinhard Brandt, Heinrich Detering, Hermann Deuser, Carola Groppe, Gunter Hantzschel, Joachim Jacob, Markus Kleinert, Dietrich Korsch, Volkhard Krech, Johann Kreuzer, Dorit Messlin, Jurgen Oelkers, Bernhard Schafers, Magnus Schlette, Peter Steinacker. (shrink)

In this paper, we call for a new approach to the psychology of free will attribution. While past research in experimental philosophy and psychology has mostly been focused on reasoning- based judgment (“the courtroom approach”), we argue that like agency and mindedness, free will can also be experienced perceptually (“the perceptual approach”). We further propose a new model of free will attribution—the agency model—according to which the experience of free will is elicited by the perceptual cues that prompt the attribution (...) of agency. Finally, developing new stimuli that fit the perceptual approach, we present some preliminary evidence in support of the agency model. (shrink)

The problematics of alienation have played a rather significant role in the discussions\nabout the sense and relevance of Marxism which have taken place in\nthe last twenty years. &dquo;Back to Marx&dquo; was at least one of the main slogans of\nthat ideological/intellectual movement, which evolved both in the East and\nWest from the mid-fifties and which is sometimes referred to as the trend of\n&dquo;humanist&dquo; Marxism. The idea of a &dquo;Marx-Renaissance&dquo; was undoubtedly\ndirected first of all against the completely petrified framework of institutionalized\nMarxism, turned into (...) a &dquo;religion of state&dquo; legitimating the domination\nof a bureaucratic apparatus over the population of East European societies.\nThe &dquo;rediscovery&dquo; and &dquo;rehabilitation&dquo; of the young Marx, the emphasis on\nthe continuity of his thought, meant not only a reintroduction of a number\nof categories, problems and ideas, which were thought fruitful in their critical\ninsight into contemporary conditions and which the impoverished and distorted\nversion of Marxism in official communist ideology (deliberately) failed\nto take into account: it also meant a global challenge to the appropriation of\nthe Marxian tradition by an apologetic ideology, which disguised its positivistic\ncontent through the form of an old-fashioned, dogmatic metaphysics; it\nwas an attempt to recover the critical/emancipatory meaning of this tradition\nwithin the realities of the twentieth century. It was in this context that the\nnotion of &dquo;alienation&dquo; again reappeared -- as a concept through which one\ncould articulate an attitude which was critical simultaneously of Western\ncapitalist and so-called &dquo;socialist&dquo; Eastern societies. Within the framework of\nEast European realities even the rather abstract character of this notion found\nin young Marx, was well suited to the theoretical vagueness and the practical\nlimitations of this new-found leftist criticism of home-societies. (shrink)

This study explores the relation between pain sensitivity and the cognitive processing of words. 130 participants evaluated the pain-relatedness of a total of 600 two-syllabic nouns, and subsequently reported on their own pain sensitivity. The results demonstrate that pain-sensitive people (based on their self-report) associate words more strongly with pain than less sensitive people. In particular, concrete nouns like syringe, wound, knife, and cactus, are considered to be more pain-related for those who are more pain-sensitive. We discuss our results in (...) the light of three theoretical frameworks – cognitive bias, prototype theory, embodied account. We argue that the latter is best suited to explain the results of this study in the sense in which it implies the principle of body specificity, according to which different bodily characteristics lead to corresponding differences in the way in which people construct concepts and word meanings. (shrink)

The notion of sound symbolism receives increasing interest in psycholinguistics. Recent research – including empirical effects of affective phonological iconicity on language processing (Adelman et al., 2018; Conrad et al., 2022) – suggested language codes affective meaning at a basic phonological level using specific phonemes as sublexical markers of emotion. Here, in a series of 8 rating-experiments, we investigate the sensitivity of language users to assumed affectively-iconic systematic distribution patterns of phonemes across the German vocabulary:After computing sublexical-affective-values (SAV) concerning valence (...) and arousal for the entire German phoneme inventory according to occurrences of syllabic onsets, nuclei and codas in a large-scale affective normative lexical database, we constructed pseudoword material differing in SAV to test for subjective affective impressions.Results support affective iconicity as affective ratings mirrored sound-to-meaning correspondences in the lexical database. Varying SAV of otherwise semantically meaningless pseudowords altered affective impressions: Higher arousal was consistently assigned to pseudowords made of syllabic constituents more often used in high-arousal words – contrasted by less straightforward effects of valence SAV. Further disentangling specific differential effects of the two highly-related affective dimensions valence and arousal, our data clearly suggest arousal, rather than valence, as the relevant dimension driving affective iconicity effects. (shrink)

An important and long over-due study of the significance of Hegel's dialectic.

Hegel's Philosophy of Right represents a unique theory type in the history of political philosophy. It is a normative theory that departs in its construction from an empirical facticity without reducing norms to facts. It unifies teleological and deontic considerations. It is a theory of the normatively requisite institutional structures able to realize the demands of a historically particular form of individuality, and simultaneously it presents the phenomenology of modern subjectivity committed to the ultimate value of true freedom. In this (...) way it aims to transform into genuine self-knowledge the illusory social-political self-image of its addressees. The paper discusses the connection between this phenomenological method and Hegel's conception of freedom - his critique of unconditional, abstract normativity, his solution to the problem of collision between equally valid norms and the possible relevance of his methodological principles to contemporary political philosophy. (shrink)

Die Untersuchung von Strukturen des Exemplarischen ist in den letzten Jahren vermehrt in den Fokus geisteswissenschaftlicher Forschung gerückt. Der Band beleuchtet in systematischer und historischer Perspektive Funktionen der Verwendung von Bildern als Beispielen, Illustrationen und Exempla. Im Mittelpunkt des Buches steht die Frage, wie Bilder in epistemologische, kunsttheoretische und philosophische Diskurse eingebunden sind. Die grundlegende Annahme lautet: Der theoretische Umgang mit Bildern gehorcht einer Logik des Exemplarischen, welche die Allgemeinheit der Argumente an die konkrete Gegebenheit eines Anschaulichen bindet. 'Logik' wird (...) dabei in einem weiten, inklusiven Sinn verstanden, der die lange Tradition der Rhetorik, aber auch Kants Überlegungen zum reflexiven ästhetischen Urteil und die psychoanalytische Analyse des singulären Falls umfasst. (shrink)