In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a ...

Current treatments of practical rationality understand reasons as considerations counting in favor of or against some practical option, treating the positive and the negative case as symmetrical. Typically the focus is on examples of positive reasons. However, I want to shift the spotlight to negative reasons, as making a tighter or more direct link to rationality — and ultimately to morality, which is what much of the current interest in reasons is meant to clarify. Recognizing a positive/negative asymmetry in normative (...) force will let us reconcile the view of moral or other requirements as based on reasons with the denial that reasons as such, even all-thingsconsidered reasons, yield requirements — or as I like to put it, rationally compel. (shrink)

Empirically minded philosophers have raised questions about judgments and theories based on moral intuitions such as Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium. But they work from the notion of intuitions assumed in empirical work, according to which intuitions are immediate assessments, as in psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s definition. Haidt himself regards such intuitions as an appropriate basis for moral judgment, arguing that normal agents do not reason prior to forming a judgment and afterwards just “confabulate” reasons in its defense. I argue, first, (...) that the notion of “considered intuitive judgment” that Rawls spells out when he first presents his method is pre-theoretical, but not at all pre-reflective, in the way Haidt’s definition supposes; it may rest on various forms of reasoning short of systematic derivation from theoretical principles. I go on to take issue with Haidt’s dismissal of ex post facto moral reasoning, arguing that it can play both a causal role in an individual’s later intuitions or judgments and a legitimate normative role, as required by moral competence in judging non-taboo cases. I suggest that the move from intuition to judgment and thence to ex post facto reasoning makes sense as a justificatory version of Peircean abduction, or what is now mainly called “inference to the best explanation.”. (shrink)

Via a close reading of The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, this chapter examines how Simone de Beauvoir's analogical thinking about race and gender shape her arguments concerning oppression and freedom. First, Beauvoir uses gender as an analytical category to examine women's oppression. In contrast, Beauvoir uses race, age, class and ethnicity as descriptive experiences that provide evidence for her analysis of women's oppression. Second, Beauvoir's analysis of women's oppression relies on an uncritical analogical method to develop arguments (...) about gender oppression, with the race/gender analogy granted special prominence. Third, the substance of Beauvoir's analogies undermines her theory of existentialist freedom: manipulating root metaphors that depict Black people as silent slaves or non‐independent women as complicit in their own subordination makes existential freedom difficult if not impossible for the majority of human beings. (shrink)

Studies on informed consent to medical research conducted in low or middle-income settings have increased, including empirical investigations of consent to genetic research. We investigated voluntary participation and comprehension of informed consent among women involved in a genetic epidemiological study on breast cancer in an urban setting of Nigeria comparing women in the case and control groups.

This book explains how P4C can facilitate young people's exploration of key ethical concerns of our time, such as sustainability, justice and intercultural and ...

With the demise of Marxism and socialism, the United States is becoming a model not merely for free enterprise, but also for employment practices worldwide. I believe that free enterprise is the least worst economic system, given the alternatives, a position I shall assume, but not defend, here. However, I shall argue, a successful free enterprise political economy does not entail mimicking US employment practices. I find even today in 1998, as I shall outline in more detail, these practices, when (...) consistently carried out, by and large erode trust in the workplace, they are, on balance unfair to workers and managers, and, if Jeffrey Pfeffer is correct, they do not maximize long-term corporate earnings or growth. Getting clear on US employment practices and their weaknesses may help to shape other models for employment that neither contravene free enterprise nor are degrading to workers. (shrink)

In GIVING WELL: THE ETHICS OF PHILANTHROPY, an accomplished trio of editors bring together an international group of distinguished philosophers, social scientists, lawyers and practitioners to identify and address the most urgent moral questions arising today in the practice of philanthropy.

This important book proposes a new account of the nature of language, founded upon an original interpretation of Wittgenstein. The authors deny the existence of a direct referential relationship between words and things. Rather, the link between language and world is a two-stage one, in which meaning is used and in which a natural language should be understood as fundamentally a collection of socially devised and maintained practices. Arguing against the philosophical mainstream descending from Frege and Russell to Quine, Davidson, (...) Dummett, McDowell, Evans, Putnam, Kripke and others, the authors demonstrate that discarding the notion of reference does not entail relativism or semantic nihilism. A provocative re-examination of the interrelations of language and social practice, this book will interest not only philosophers of language but also linguists, psycholinguists, students of communication and all those concerned with the nature and acquisition of human linguistic capacities. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that Heidegger offers a philosophy of science by explicating that philosophy of science. The following chapter presents Heidegger's early analysis of modern science, from 1916 to the mid-1930s. During these years Heidegger maintains two theses: that the essence of science is the mathematical projection of nature; and that metaphysics is the science of being. As the latter thesis becomes more problematic, Heidegger turns from metaphysics as a science, to the sciences. ;The pivot for this turn (...) is the experiment. Chapter 3 is an analysis of three specific issues surrounding the experiment. I raise the question of whether a single experimental result is enough to overturn a theory, the problem of the theory-loadedness of observation, and the question of representation. ;These issues serve to explicate Heidegger's claim that the essence of science is research, and to show that Heidegger's philosophy of science shares issues with contemporary analytic philosophy of science. Further, I take Heidegger's claim that the essence of science is the ground from out of which the essence of the modern epoch can be shown, as proof that his consideration of science is not secondary in his thinking but rather is the basis from which his critique of the modern epoch is made. ;Chapter 4 is an account of Heidegger's view of the role of science in the university. Heidegger's vision is that the German university can serve to guide historical destiny. His complete disillusionment with that vision comes with his realization that, whereas he calls for a renewal of science for the sake of the sciences in their service of the people, the Nazi call for a renewal of the sciences is toward their own political ends. What little I have to say about Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis is found in this chapter. ;Chapter 5 considers Heidegger's view of ancient science. It lays out Aristotle's distinction between physis and techne under Heidegger's reading. In Chapter 6, I argue that the ancient distinction between physis and techne is not sustained in the modern epoch under Heidegger's account. ;I close with a brief account of Heidegger on quantum theory. (shrink)

Children's comprehension of the universal quantifiers all and each was explored in a series of experiments using a picture selection task. The first experiment examined children's ability to restrict a quantifier to the noun phrase it modifies. The second and third experiments examined children's ability to associate collective, distributive, and exhaustive representations with sentences containing universal quantifiers. The collective representation corresponds to the "group" meaning (for All the flowers are in a vase all of the flowers are in the same (...) vase). The distributive representation implies a pairing (e.g., each flower paired with a vase for Each flower is in a vase). The exhaustive representation exhausts both sets (e.g., for The flowers are in the vases all the flowers are in vases and all the vases have flowers in them). Four- to 10-year-olds children had little difficulty restricting the quantifier all to the noun it modified in a task which required them to attend to the group feature of all. In contrast, only 9- and 10-year-olds were able to solve the task when the quantifier was each and the pictures showed entities in partial one-to-one correspondence. Children showed a preference for associating collective pictures with sentences containing all and distributive pictures with sentences containing each. The results suggest that between the ages of 5 and 10 years, children's semantic representations undergo less radical changes than others have proposed. Instead, developmental change may occur gradually as children acquire linguistic cues which map onto existing semantic representations. (shrink)

Ruth Marcus has offered an account of moral dilemmas in which the presence of dilemmas acts as a motivating force, pushing us to try to minimize predicaments of moral conflict. In this paper, I defend a Marcus-style account of dilemmas against two objections: first, that if dilemmas are real, we are forced to blame those who have done their best, and second, that in some cases, even a stripped down version of blame seems inappropriate. My account highlights the importance of (...) collective responsibility in understanding dilemmas, and I suggest that it sheds light on understanding moral progress. (shrink)

Recent biological studies have wrought a sea-change in our understanding of our intimate relations with the microbiota dwelling within or upon the human body. Since these microorganisms are imperceptible, we have access to them only indirectly, through data analysis, rather than through experiments or tools that enhance human observation. Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the human subject and our relations with animals depends upon perception in a dynamic of reversibility. Thus both the scientific method of approach and the extension of subjectivity to (...) microbiota challenge his views. Yet, with Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of intertwining and the anonymous visibility that subtends it, we can redefine the human being as a community in kinship with multiple microbial species, sharing space, metabolic functions, and future.Des études biologiques récentes ont provoqué un bouleversement dans notre compréhension de nos relations intimes avec les microbiotes habitant dans ou à la surface du corps humain. Puisque ces micro-organismes sont imperceptibles, nous n’accédons à eux qu’indirectement, par l’analyses des données, plutôt que par l’expérience ou les outils qui renforcent l’observation humaine. La compréhension merleau-pontienne du sujet humain et de nos relations avec les animaux dépend de la dynamique de la réversibilité. Par conséquent, la méthode de saisie scientifique et l’extension de la subjectivité aux microbiotes interrogent et défient sa conception. Cependant, à partir des concepts d’entrelacement et de visibilité anonyme qui le sous-tend, nous pouvons redéfinir l’être humain comme une communauté d’affinités avec de multiples espèces microbiennes, qui partage un espace, des fonctions métaboliques et même un futur.Studi biologici recenti hanno introdotto una profonda trasformazione nella nostra comprensione dell’intima relazione che intratteniamo con i microbiota che dimorano all’interno o sulla superficie del corpo umano. Poiché questi micro-organismi sono impercettibili, abbiamo accesso ad essi solo indirettamente, attraverso l’analisi di dati, oppure attraverso esperimenti o strumenti che accrescano l’osservazione umana. La comprensione di Merleau-Ponty del soggetto umano e della nostra relazione con gli animali si basa sulla percezione in una dinamica di reversibilità. Una simile prospettiva è messa alla prova se confrontata sia con il metodo dell’approccio scientifico, che con una possibile estensione della soggettività ai microbiota. Allo stesso tempo, attraverso il concetto merleau-pontiano di intreccio, e a partire dall’idea di una visibilità anonima che lo sottende, diviene possibile ridefinire la natura umana come una comunità condivisa dalle diverse specie microbiche, in quanto compartecipano degli stessi spazi, funzioni metaboliche e avvenire. (shrink)

In 1785, George Washington described a “knowing farmer” as “one who can convert every thing he touches into manure, as the first transmutation towards Gold.” With these words, Washington linked the “knowing farmer” to the alchemist who endeavored to transform base metals into gold with the aid of a philosopher's stone. In each instance, the challenge was to convert raw materials into something new and precious.Today, the “knowing bioethicist” is in a similar position. American bioethics harbors a variety of ethical (...) methods that emphasize different ethical factors, including principles, circumstances, character, interpersonal needs, and personal meaning. Each method reflects an important aspect of ethical experience, adds to the others, and enriches the ethical imagination. (shrink)

This paper explores the intellectual relationship between three eighteenth century women thinkers: Catharine Trotter Cockburn, and the Bluestockings Elizabeth Carter and Catherine Talbot. All three share a virtue-ethical approach according to which human happiness depends on the harmonization of our essentially rational and sociable natures. The affinity between the Bluestockings and Cockburn, I show, illuminates important new avenues for thinking about the Bluestockings as philosophers in their own right and for thinking about the feminist dimensions of Cockburn's morality. Further, their (...) shared moral outlook sheds interesting light on the burgeoning feminism of the eighteenth century and the contributions of Cockburn and the Bluestockings to a new and growing discourse about women and their social and political role. (shrink)

This book is a review of some of the main variations of feminist theorizing since 1970. It charts the ways in which feminist thought has reconfigured the relationship between desire, power and academic discourse. It shows how feminist theorists have profoundly challenged the assumptions of social science, freely crossing disciplinary boundaries and giving shape to a new social criticism concerned not only with sexual difference, but also with the differences of race, class, ethnicity, nationality and sexuality.

As neuroscience uncovers these and other mechanisms regulating choices and social behaviour, we cannot help but wonder whether anyone truly chooses anything (though see "Is the universe deterministic?"). As a result, profound questions about responsibility are inescapable, not just regarding criminal justice, but in the day-to-day business of life. Given that, I suggest that free will, as traditionally understood, needs modification. Because of its importance in society, any description of free will updated to fit what we know about the nervous (...) system must also reflect our social need for a working concept of responsibility. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (= Eudemian Ethics 6.7), Aristotle distinguishes softness (malakia) from lack of self-control (akrasia) and endurance (karteria) from self-control (enkrateia). This paper argues that unqualified softness consists of a disposition to give up acting to avoid the painful toil (ponos) required to execute practical resolutions, and (coincidentally) to enjoy the pleasures of rest and relaxation. The enduring person, in contrast, persists in her commitments despite the painful effort required to enact them. Along the way, I argue that (...) this interpretation qualifies our understanding of the pleasures and pains with which temperance and intemperance are concerned. (shrink)

The last twenty years have seen a remarkable increase in scholarly work on the Presocratics: new texts have appeared, new interpretations have been advanced, and a new appreciation for the scientific and philosophical claims of the early Greek thinkers is evident.1 There has been a general broadening of the questions that have been examined: scholars have been exploring the supposed boundaries of Presocratic thought, and new work on reception history and on the transmission of texts has enriched our understanding of (...) the earliest Greek philosophers. Here, I survey some of the trends and results of the new Presocratic scholarship.2Because no complete Presocratic text survives, those who work with the early Greek .. (shrink)

Locke's moral theory consists of two explicit and distinct elements — a broadly rationalist theory of natural law and a hedonistic conception of moral good. The rationalist account, which we find most prominently in his early Essays on the Law of Nature, is generally taken to consist in three things. First, Locke holds that our moral rules are founded on universal, divine natural laws. Second, such moral laws are taken to be discoverable by reason. Third, by dint of their divine (...) authorship, moral laws are obligatory and rationally discernible as such. Locke's hedonism, which is developed most fully in his later Essay Concerning Human Understanding, consists in the view that all good amounts to pleasure, with specifically moral good taken to consist in the pleasurable consequences of discharging one's moral duties. (shrink)

Locke's moral theory consists of two explicit and distinct elements — a broadly rationalist theory of natural law and a hedonistic conception of moral good. The rationalist account, which we find most prominently in his early Essays on the Law of Nature, is generally taken to consist in three things. First, Locke holds that our moral rules are founded on universal, divine natural laws. Second, such moral laws are taken to be discoverable by reason. Third, by dint of their divine (...) authorship, moral laws are obligatory and rationally discernible as such. Locke's hedonism, which is developed most fully in his later Essay Concerning Human Understanding, consists in the view that all good amounts to pleasure, with specifically moral good taken to consist in the pleasurable consequences of discharging one's moral duties. (shrink)

What we humans call ethics or morality depends on four interlocking brain processes: caring. Learning local social practices and the ways of others – by positive and negative reinforcement, by imitation, by trial and error, by various kinds of conditioning, and by analogy. Recognition of others' psychological states. Problem-solving in a social context. These four broad capacities are not unique to humans, but are probably uniquely developed in human brains by virtue of the expansion of the prefrontal cortex.1.

Recently, the study of gender has focused on processes by which gender is brought into social relations through interaction. This article explores implications of a two-sided dynamic—gendering practices and practicing of gender—for understanding gendering processes in formal organizations. Using stories from interviews and participant observation in multinational corporations, the author explores the practicing of gender at work. She defines practicing gender as a moving phenomenon that is done quickly, directionally, and nonreflexively; is informed by liminal awareness; and is in concert (...) with others. She notes how other conceptions of gender dynamics and practice inform the analysis and argues that adequate conceptualization of harmful aspects of gendering practices/practicing will require attention to agency, intentionality, awareness, and reflexivity; positions, power, and experience; and choice, accountability, and audience. She calls for incorporating the “sayings and doings” of gender into organization theory and research. (shrink)

Building on Deleuze’s theories of the becoming of bodies, and notions of the geographic maturity of the disabled body we formulate an emplaced model of disability wherein bodies, social expectations and built form intersect in embodied experiences in specific environments to increase or decrease the capacity of disabled children to act in those environments. We join a growing effort to generate a more comprehensive model of disability, which moves beyond a binary between the individual and the social. Drawing on in-depth (...) case studies conducted with 13 physically disabled children, we consider the intersections between their primary environments (homes, schools and neighbourhoods) and the multiple subjectivities they embody. Ultimately we make a case about the importance of responsive, situated models of subjectivity for the development of adaptations, and that physical and social adaptations must respond to these children’s complex and varied needs and desires. (shrink)

Clinical next generation sequencing is a term that refers to a variety of technologies that permit rapid sequencing of large numbers of DNA segments, up to and including entire genomes. As an approach that is playing an increasingly important role in obtaining genetic information from patients, it may be viewed by public and private payers either positively, as an enabler of the promised benefits of personalized medicine, or as “the perfect storm” resulting from the confluence of high market demand, an (...) uproven technology, and an unprepared delivery system. A number of recent studies have noted that coverage and reimbursement will be critical for clinical integration of NGS, yet the evidentiary pathway for payer decision-making is unclear. Although there are multiple reasons for this uncertain reimbursement environment, the situation stems in large part from a long-standing lack of alignment between the information needs of regulators and post-regulatory decision-makers such as payers. (shrink)

The Primary and Secondary Handbooks on the National Curriculum for England state that children ‘should learn how to forgive themselves and others’. But what is involved in forgiveness? It is suggested that there is a strict view, which is shown to involve some ethically questionable attitudes, and a more relaxed view. Schools, it is suggested, need to introduce their students to an understanding of the complexities of these notions of forgiveness and other possible attitudes to wrongdoers. In the life and (...) organisation of the school, however, it is argued that the more generous-spirited attitude should prevail. (shrink)