Este trabajo intenta mostrar en primer lugar que las diversas interpretaciones de la identidad proporcionadas por tendencias recientes en la fenomenología pueden ser reunidas en dos grupos diferentes. De un lado, se ha proporcionado una descripción de los movimientos, estructuras u órdenes en que supuestamente se dispersa o descentra la subjetividad (J. Patocka,H. Rombach, B. Waldenfels). Del otro, se ha sostenido que la subjetividad se desarrolla sobre la base de una dimensión emocional originaria como una respuesta a la exigencia de (...) responsabilidad por los otros (M. Henry, E. Levinas, P. Ricoeur). En segundo lugar, el artículo procura poner en claro que las fenomenologías posthusserlianas no pueden eludir el sentido primario de la identidad que Husserl ha designado con el nombre de polo-yo a fin de poner de relieve dentro de la mónada un momento de centralización y unidad por el cual "el ego mismo es existente para sí mismo en una evidencia continua" (Hua. I, 1 00). Lo cual significa que el ego se percata de sí mismo de un modo radical y peculiar invariablemente involucrado en toda experiencia. Este análisis sugiere además que Husserl anticipa algunas posiciones de la segunda tendencia cuando indaga retrospectivamente un horizonte indiferenciado o descubre un modo de impatía que escapa a la objetivación. (shrink)

La publicación de los escritos y los cursos impartidos por Heidegger en la primera mitad de los años veinte ha dejado en claro la importancia de Aristóteles en el camino filosófico que conduce hacia Ser y tiempo. El presente trabajo intenta explicitar aspectos centrales de esa relación. En concreto, se mostrará que la influencia de Aristóteles es decisiva para el paso de la fenomenología de la vida fáctica hacia la ontología del Dasein, y esto a partir de un doble aporte: (...) por una parte, Heidegger encuentra en los estudios aristotélicos de la praxis un modelo donde enriquecer e integrar las determinaciones de la vida fáctica anteriormente obtenidas. Por otra parte, los estudios de Aristóteles sobre las significaciones del ser le ofrecen el acceso a la perspectiva ontológica, desde la cual, y presentando su propia posición, ha de reinterpretar las estructuras de la praxis como estructuras del Dasein. (shrink)

O artigo se ocupa da Hermenêutica da facticidade, do filósofo alemão contemporâneo Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Nosso propósito inicial é apresentar, sumariamente, os termos do referido projeto filosófico e como este pretende uma abordagem do fenômeno humano enfocado como “vida fática” (faktische Leben). Neste modo de visar, importa para Heidegger a determinação dessa vida, a qual ele denomina de “facticidade” (Faktizität), conceito que, ao longo de sua investigação, vai, progressivamente, ganhando importância e centralidade. Tratado no seio de Ontologia: Hermenêutica da Facticidade (...) (preleção do semestre de verão ministrada na Universidade de Friburgo em 1923), o conceito de facticidade tem lugar no tentame de elaboração de um modo de tornar nosso ser mais claro a nossa própria compreensão. Justamente por isso, uma tal hermenêutica de nós mesmos não constitui uma metodologia de interpretação de um objeto que pretensamente seríamos. Assim, hermenêutica diria, antes, do procedimento que, contando com a compreensão que temos de nosso próprio ser, pode tomar o sentido de nosso factum, de nosso fato de ser. Intentamos evidenciar o quanto a hermenêutica da facticidade é tão hermenêutica quanto também fenomenológica e que, a ideia de “tomar o nosso próprio ser nas mãos”. O artigo ainda se empenhará por deixar claro o quanto a facticidade não é um traço natural, substancial ou essencial do ente que somos; em sua caracterização fenomenológica, tal figura constitui, para Heidegger, uma dinâmica de “fazer-se”, o que nos leva a pensar no caráter em aberto e continuamente criador da vida em seu “dar-se”. Ao fim, ensaiamos, como nosso título anuncia, uma indicação do quanto a hermenêutica da facticidade teria a contribuir para o modo de compreender e comportar-se de uma psicologia fenomenológico-existencial. (shrink)

En este escrito me propongo examinar la filosofía política republicana como una concepción en diálogo con el liberalismo. Según intentaré mostrar -a través del recurso a ejemplos históricos provenientes de los orígenes del constitucionalismo- ambas filosofías se encuentran unidas por sus comunes aspiraciones igualitarias, pero al mismo tiempo muestran entendimientos diferentes acerca del significado y los alcances de la idea de igualdad. El republicanismo, según diré, viene a «reparar» los déficits del liberalismo en tanto postura igualitaria. Sin embargo -sostendré también-, (...) el éxito del republicanismo en esta empresa resulta, en todo caso, sólo parcial. Para proceder en este análisis, primero haré referencia a algunos rasgos salientes del liberalismo; luego mostraré las respuestas del republicanismo frente a los mismos; y finalmente mencionaré algunos de los límites propios de la respuesta republicana. Desde ya, me interesa dejar en claro que siendo tantas y tan disímiles las posibles caracterizaciones de las dos teorías aquí en juego -el liberalismo y el republicanismo- mi presentación sólo resultará de algún interés para quienes acepten las descripciones que aquí propongo sobre las mismas. (shrink)

Although historians and philosophers of science usually try to explain the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories by scientists, there are no well definite criteria to evaluate when a scientist accepts or rejects a theory/hypothesis. This work proposes a new method of analysis. The attitudes of scientists towards a theory or hypothesis are classified according to three dimensions (cognitive, instrumental and strategic). This method is exemplified by the study of the attitude of the British naturalist William Bateson (1861-1924) towards (...) chromosome theory. The analysis shows that Bateson never rejected the chromosome theory – a conclusion opposite to most historical accounts. RESUMEN: Los historiadores y los filósofos de la ciencia intentan explicar la aceptación o lo rechazo de determinadas hipótesis ó teorías por los científicos, pero no hay criterios claros que nos permitan decir lo qué es aceptación o rechazo. Este trabajo propone un nuevo método de análisis. Las actitudes de los investigadores son analizadas en relación a tres dimensiones (cognitiva, instrumental y estratégica). El método es ejemplificado por el estudio de la postura del naturalista inglés William Bateson (1861-1924) frente a la teoria cromosómica. El análisis que se realizó permitió verificar que Bateson jamás rechazó la teoría cromosómica, en contrario de lo que la mayoría de los historiadores afirman. (shrink)

Lamarck's evolutionary theory has been regarded as groundless speculation by both coeval naturalists and modern historians of science. Lamarck is usually regarded as belonging to the group of the " idéologues" – followers of Condillac, with a strong empiricist outlook. Indeed, Lamarck refers respectfully to Condillac, and in his methodological discourse presents himself as an empiricist. However, if one compares his evolutionary theory with the empiricist requirements, Lamarck's work should be dismissed as groundless – a mere metaphysical " système" – (...) in the pejorative sense used by the followers of Condillac. There is, however, another way of looking at Lamarck's method. The analysis of his later works – specially Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres and Système analytique des connaissances positives de l'homme – shows that he did not follow an empiricist method. His point of departure is indeed metaphysical, but it is exactly the kind of metaphysics now accepted by the biological sciences: a strict physicalism, that requires that all natural phenomena be explained by natural laws. Following this requirement, Lamarck's method seems the best available solution of that time to the fundamental biological problems: the nature, origin and structure of living bodies. Lamarck's work was criticized as purely speculative and non-scientific because it was evaluated in the context of empiricism. He was not altogether clear about his method and maybe he did not realize that he was departing from the empiricist tradition. The reinterpretation of Lamarck's theory from the point of view of his non-empiricist physicalism allows a favorable evaluation of his work. RESUMO: A teoria evolucionista de Lamarck tem sido considerada como uma especulação sem fundamento, tanto por naturalistas de sua época quanto por historiadores atuais da ciência. Lamarck é usualmente considerado como pertencendo ao grupo do "idéologues" – seguidores de Condillac, com uma forte tendência empirista. De fato, Lamarck se refere com respeito a Condillac, e em seu discurso metodológico apresenta a si próprio como empirista. No entanto, se compararmos sua teoria evolucionista com as exigências empiristas, o trabalho de Lamarck deveria ser rejeitado como desprovido de fundamentos – um mero "système" metafísico – no sentido pejorativo utilizado pelos seguidores de Condillac. Há, no entanto, outro modo de considerar o método de Lamarck. A análise de seus últimos trabalhos – especialmente os livros Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres and Système analytique des connaissances positives de l'homme – mostra que ele não seguia um método empirista. Seu ponto de partida era na realidade metafísico, mas é exatamente o tipo de metafísica que é atualmente aceita pelas ciências biológicas: um fisicalismo estrito, que exige que todos os fenômenos naturais sejam explicados por leis naturais. Seguindo essa exigência, o método de Lamarck parece a melhor solução disponível naquela época para os fenômenos biológicos fundamentais: a natureza, a origem e a estrutura dos seres vivos. O trabalho de Lamarck foi criticado como puramente especulativo e não-científico porque foi avaliado no contexto do empirismo. Ele não foi totalmente claro sobre seu método, e talvez ele próprio não tivesse percebido que estava se afastando da tradição empirista. A reinterpretação da teoria de Lamarck sob o ponto de vista de seu fisicalismo não empirista permite uma avaliação positiva de seu trabalho. (shrink)

Resumen La historia ocupa un papel marginal en las teorías actuales de la globalización. Esto no deja de sorprender, pues “globalización” es, en esencia, un concepto que describe un proceso de la historia. Menos aún se habla de la filosofía de la historia, sobre todo porque ha caído en descrédito. Sin embargo, casi todas las argumentaciones emplean modelos de interpretación propios de la filosofía de la historia. Se conjetura qué tendencias generales le son inherentes a la globalización y si apuntan (...) a un “progreso” o a una “decadencia” de la civilización humana. Por último, el problema ético de la justicia global debe tomar en consideración el desarrollo de la historia acontecida. Estos temas dejan claro que el recurso a la historia con implicaciones filosóficas es imprescindible para resolver los problemas de la globalización.Contemporary theories of globalisation seldom mention history. This is surprising, because “globalisation” is essentially a term describing an historical process. There is still less mention of the philosophy of history, especially due to the discredit cast upon it. And yet nearly all of the relevant arguments operate with patterns of interpretation borrowed from the philosophy of history. The authors speculate on which general tendencies are inherent to globalisation and whether they are more indicative of the “progress” or of the “downfall” of human civilisation. Finally, the ethical problem of global justice requires us to take into account the course of history thus far. These topics underline that resorting to history with all of its philosophical implications is essential if we are to resolve the problems caused by globalisation. (shrink)

Recordando a Bachelard a medio siglo de su muerte (2011) -- Filosofia de la relatividad (2011) -- La proliferación de los conceptos de especie en la biología evolucionista (2010).

This high-level study discusses Newtonian principles and 19th-century views on electrodynamics and the aether. Additional topics include Einstein's electrodynamics of moving bodies, Minkowski spacetime, gravitational geometry, time and causality, and other subjects. Highlights include a rich exposition of the elements of the special and general theories of relativity.

Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page 37-39.

A critical survey of the main philosophical theories about events and event talk, organized in three main sections: (i) Events and Other Categories (Events vs. Objects; Events vs. Facts; Events vs. Properties; Events vs. Times); (ii) Types of Events (Activities, Accomplishments, Achievements, and States; Static and Dynamic Events; Actions and Bodily Movements; Mental and Physical Events; Negative Events); (iii) Existence, Identity, and Indeterminacy.

This paper is concerned with certain ontological issues in the foundations of geographic representation. It sets out what these basic issues are, describes the tools needed to deal with them, and draws some implications for a general theory of spatial representation. Our approach has ramifications in the domains of mereology, topology, and the theory of location, and the question of the interaction of these three domains within a unified spatial representation theory is addressed. In the final part we also consider (...) the idea of non-standard geographies, which may be associated with geography under a classical conception in the same sense in which non-standard logics are associated with classical logic. (shrink)

Considering topology as an extension of mereology, this paper analyses topological variants of mereological essentialism (the thesis that an object could not have different parts than the ones it has). In particular, we examine de dicto and de re versions of two theses: (i) that an object cannot change its external connections (e.g., adjacent objects cannot be separated), and (ii) that an object cannot change its topological genus (e.g., a doughnut cannot turn into a sphere). Stronger forms of structural essentialism, (...) such as morphological essentialism (an object cannot change shape) and locative essentialism (an object cannot change position) are also examined. (shrink)

This book describes the mathematical aspects of the semantics of programming languages. The main goals are to provide formal tools to assess the meaning of programming constructs in both a language-independent and a machine-independent way, and to prove properties about programs, such as whether they terminate, or whether their result is a solution of the problem they are supposed to solve. In order to achieve this the authors first present, in an elementary and unified way, the theory of certain topological (...) spaces that have proved of use in the modelling of various families of typed lambda calculi considered as core programming languages and as meta-languages for denotational semantics. This theory is now known as Domain Theory, and was founded as a subject by Scott and Plotkin. One of the main concerns is to establish links between mathematical structures and more syntactic approaches to semantics, often referred to as operational semantics, which is also described. This dual approach has the double advantage of motivating computer scientists to do some mathematics and of interesting mathematicians in unfamiliar application areas from computer science. (shrink)

Reasons-first theorists claim that facts about reasons for attitudes are normatively primitive, and that all other normative facts ultimately reduce to facts about reasons. According to their view, for example, the fact that something is good ultimately reduces to facts about reasons to favour it. I argue that these theories face a challenging dilemma due to the normativity of arational lifeforms, for instance the fact that water is good for plants. If all normative facts are, ultimately, facts about reasons for (...) attitudes, then reasons-first theorists must either (a) show that these facts do reduce to facts about reasons, or (b) concede that they do not and, instead, show that this is not a problem for their view. Both options, however, are riddled with difficulties—or so I will try to argue. (shrink)

Neste artigo, temos como objetivo perscrutar o funcionamento da verbo-visualidade de uma perspectiva dialógica do discurso, utilizando, como material de análise, uma videomontagem humorística acerca do ator político Dilma Rousseff, durante a campanha presidencial brasileira do ano de 2010. Primeiramente, procuramos refletir acerca de alguns pressupostos teórico-metodológicos de Bakhtin e de Brait, qual seja, o de verbo-visualidade, alicerçado na concepção bakhtiniana de linguagem. Em um segundo momento, detivemo-nos na análise do texto objeto do artigo, que se pautou na seguinte indagação: (...) como contribuem e funcionam os elementos verbais e visuais para produção e direcionamento de sentidos na videomontagem? Nossa hipótese é a de que os discursos carregados pela montagem criam uma trilha ideológica de sentido que leva os interlocutores a interpretar a então candidata como uma pessoa sem discurso, manipulável. Diante do exposto, tentaremos demonstrar a hipótese que sustentamos. (shrink)

Ces trois ouvrages collectifs, qui se complètent et se prolongent mutuellement, sont des exemples révélateurs du dynamisme des études de genre en Russie. A. Temkina et E. Zdravomyslova ont joué depuis les années 1990 un rôle incontournable dans l’institutionnalisation de ce champ de recherches, à la marge du système universitaire russe, et se revendiquent d’une « sociologie publique ». A. Rotkirch (finlandaise) est professeure à l’Université d’Helsinski et directrice du Population Research In...

Dans le contexte du régime autoritaire soviétique des années Brejnev, on ne saurait retrouver des mobilisations féministes ou de patientes autour de la gynécologie similaires à celles qui ont pu se déployer à l’Ouest. Néanmoins, des dissidentes féministes se sont emparées de ce sujet dans des publications clandestines du début des années 1980 (les samizdats), restées très confidentielles en URSS. Ensuite, pendant la perestroïka, un abondant courrier de lectrices publié dans le magazine féminin grand public Rabotnitsa a véhiculé des témoignages (...) et des revendications extrêmement similaires à ceux des dissidentes féminines. L’article mobilise ces deux corpus. Les militantes et les lectrices ont notamment dénoncé le manque de contraceptifs menant à des avortements à répétition, l’absence d’anesthésie lors des avortements et des accouchements, l’indifférence et la « cruauté » d’un personnel soignant débordé, travaillant « à la chaîne ». Certaines ont même parlé de « tortures » gynécologiques. Ces critiques ordinaires et féministes ont porté, plus largement, sur le manque de moyens du système de santé. Après avoir examiné les politiques publiques soviétiques en matière de santé sexuelle et reproductive, l’article analyse les processus par lesquels des frustrations largement partagées par les patientes en gynécologie ont pu être mises en discours et politisées. Une mise en perspective sur la base de comparaisons internationales permet également d’interroger les impensés de ces discours critiques. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The philosophical tradition approaches to morals have their grounds predominantly on metaphysical and theological concepts and theories. Among the traditional ethics concepts, the most prominent is the Divine Command Theory (DCT). As per the DCT, God gives moral foundations to the humankind by its creation and through Revelation. Morality and Divinity are inseparable since the most remote civilization. These concepts submerge in a theological framework and are largely accepted by most followers of the three Abrahamic traditions: Judaism, Christianity, and (...) Islam: the greatest part of the human population. Holding faith and Revelation for its grounds, the Divine Command Theories are not strictly subject to the demonstration. The opponents to the Divine Command conception of morals, grounded in the impossibility of demonstration of its metaphysical and religious assumptions, have tried for many centuries (albeit unsuccessfully) to devalue its importance. They held the argument that it does not show material evidence and logical coherence and, for this reason, cannot be taken into account for scientific nor philosophical purposes. It is just a belief and, as so, should be understood. Besides these extreme oppositions, many other concepts contravene the Divine Command theories, in one or another way, in part or in full. Many philosophers and social scientists, from the classic Greek philosophy up to the present date, for instance, sustain that morality is only a construct, and thus culturally relative and culturally determined. However, this brings many other discussions and imposes the challenge to determine what is the meaning of culture, which elements of culture are morally determinant, and finally, what are the boundaries of such relativity. Moral determinists claim that everything related to human behavior, including morality, is determined, once free will does not exist. More recently, modern thinkers argued that there is a strict science of morality. However, the scientific method alone, despite explaining several facts and evidence, cannot enlighten the entire content and full meaning of ethics. Morals’ understanding requires a broader perception, and an agreement among philosophers, which they have never achieved. All of these questions have many different configurations depending on each philosophical strand, and start complex analysis and endless debates, as long as many of them are reciprocally conflictive. The universe and the atmosphere involving this thesis are the dominions of all these conceptual conflicts, observed from an objective and evolutionary standpoint. Irrespective of this circumstance and its intrinsic importance, however, these questions are far distant from the methodological approach of an analytical discussion on objective morals, what is, indeed, the aim and scope of this work. We should briefly revisit these prominent traditional theories because this thesis shelters a comparative study, and its assumptions at least differ profoundly from all traditional theories. Therefore, it becomes necessary offering direct and specific elements of comparison to the reader, for the right criticism, dispensing interruptive researches. However, even revisiting the traditional theories, for this comparative and critical exposure purpose, they will be kept by the side of our main concerns, as “aliena materia.” Irrespective of the validity of any or all of the elements of this discussion, and their meaning as the philosophical universe of this thesis, the purpose of this work is demonstrating and justifying the existence and meaning of prehistoric moral archetypes arisen directly from the very first social needs and efforts for survival. These archetypes are the definition of the essential foundation of ethics, its aggregation to the collective unconscious and corresponding logic organization and transmission to evolutionary stages of the human genome and different relations space-time, irrespective of any contemporary experience of the individuals. The system defined by these archetypes composes an evolutionary human social model. Is this a metaethical position? Yes, it is. Moreover, as in any metaethical reasoning, we should look carefully for the best and coherent routes, as the Analytical Philosophy offers them. Thus, this work should reasonably demonstrate that morals are not a cultural product of the civilized men or modern societies and that despite being subject to several cultural relative aggregations and subtractions, its essential foundations are archetypal and have never structurally changed. This reasoning induces that morality is an original attribute of the “homo sapiens”; it is not a property and nor an accident: it integrates the human essence and belongs to the realm of the ontological human identity. The human phenomena is a continuing process, playing its role between random determination and free will, and we need to question how morality began and how did it come to us in the present. (shrink)

In this paper, we extend the expressive power of the logics K3, LP and FDE with anormality operator, which is able to express whether a for-mula is assigned a classical truth value or not. We then establish classical recapture theorems for the resulting logics. Finally, we compare the approach via normality operator with the classical collapse approach devisedby Jc Beall.

"A pleasure to read. Gracefully written by a scholar well grounded in the relevant philosophical, historical, and technical background. . . . a helpfully clarifying review and analysis of some issues of importance to recent philosophy of science and a source of some illuminating insights."--Burke Townsend, Philosophy of Science.

"Perhaps not all the stories that follow are true. They could, however, be true, and the Reader is invited to ponder this." So begins _Insurmountable Simplicities_, Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi's colorful incarnation of the many philosophical conundrums that hide in the wrinkles of everyday life. Why do mirrors seem to invert left and right but not up and down? How do we know whether strawberries taste the same for everyone? Where is it written that we must observe the (...) law, and if it is not written, why should we observe it? What if we could swap brains-or the rest of our bodies? _Insurmountable Simplicities_ is filled with stories, dialogues, and epistolary exchanges that cover a range of themes-such as personal identity, causality and responsibility, fortune, the nature of things, the paradoxes of time and space, the interface between logic and language-in captivating and inventive ways. Clear, concise, and intellectually engaging, this internationally acclaimed book brilliantly demonstrates that the beauty of philosophy resides in its thorough engagement with the simplicities of the world, insurmountable as they might initially appear. (shrink)

v. 1. A alma é o corpo -- v. 2. A arma é o corpo.

Roberto Esposito is one of the most prolific and important exponents of contemporary Italian political theory.