Various considerations are adduced toshow that we require that a testifier know hertestimony. Such a requirement apparentlyimproves testimony. It is argued that the aimof improving testimony explains why we have anduse our concept of knowledge. If we were tointroduce a term of praise for testimony, usingit at first to praise testimony that apparentlyhelped us in our practical projects, it wouldcome to be used as we now use the word``know''.

Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we (...) express as assertions only beliefs that appear to us to be knowledge. If we are doing our best, there is little point in further sanctions. So a norm of knowledge for assertion would lead to a secondary norm of justified belief as the appearance of knowledge, marking a point at which our assertions may be corrected but should not be blamed. (shrink)

Standard philosophical explanations of the concept of knowledge invoke a personal goal of having true beliefs, and explain the other requirements for knowledge as indicating the best way to achieve that goal. In this highly original book, Steven L. Reynolds argues instead that the concept of knowledge functions to express a naturally developing kind of social control, a complex social norm, and that the main purpose of our practice of saying and thinking that people 'know' is to improve our system (...) for exchanging information, which is testimony. He makes illuminating comparisons of the knowledge norm of testimony with other complex social norms - such as those requiring proper clothing, respectful conversation, and the complementary virtues of tact and frankness - and shows how this account fits with our concept of knowledge as studied in recent analytic epistemology. His book will interest a range of readers in epistemology, psychology, and sociology. (shrink)

The literature on ethical decision-making is rooted in a cognitive perspective that emphasizes the role of moral judgment. Recent research in interpersonal dynamics, however, has suggested that ethics revolves around an individual’s perceptions and views of others. We draw from both literatures to propose and empirically examine a contingent model. We theorize that whether the individual relies on cognitions about the ethical issue or perceptions of others depends on the level of social consensus surrounding the issue. We test our hypotheses (...) in three studies. Results suggest that not only does social consensus determine whether an individual relies on ethical cognitions about the issue or perceptions of others, but also that an individual’s view of self is an important moderator in these relationships. We conclude by considering implications of this research for theory and practice. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory is widely recognized as a management theory, yet very little research has considered its implications for individual managerial decision-making. In the two studies reported here, we used stakeholder theory to examine managerial decisions about balancing stakeholder interests. Results of Study 1 suggest that indivisible resources and unequal levels of stakeholder saliency constrain managers’ efforts to balance stakeholder interests. Resource divisibility also influenced whether managers used a within-decision or an across-decision approach to balance stakeholder interests. In Study 2 we (...) examined instrumental and normative implications of these two approaches. We conclude by considering the contributions of this research. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory is widely recognized as a management theory, yet very little research has considered its implications for individual managerial decision-making. In the two studies reported here, we used stakeholder theory to examine managerial decisions about balancing stakeholder interests. Results of Study 1 suggest that indivisible resources and unequal levels of stakeholder saliency constrain managers’ efforts to balance stakeholder interests. Resource divisibility also influenced whether managers used a within-decision or an across-decision approach to balance stakeholder interests. In Study 2 we (...) examined instrumental and normative implications of these two approaches. We conclude by considering the contributions of this research. (shrink)

Integrating research on empowering leadership with the literature on power in social psychology, we examine how empowering leaders affect the propensity of followers to engage in deviance. Across a multi-source, multi-wave field study and a controlled laboratory experiment, we find that, compared to the followers of less-empowering leaders, the followers of more empowering leaders feel subjectively more powerful and engage in more deviant behaviors. Moreover, we find that the propensity of empowered followers to engage in more deviance depends on their (...) prosocial attributes. Specifically, empowered followers engage in the highest levels of deviance when they have a weak moral identity and a strong desire for dominance. We further find that empowering leadership does not increase follower deviance when followers either have a strong moral identity or a weak desire for dominance. In sum, although past research suggests that empowering leadership may facilitate productivity and employee engagement, our work demonstrates that it can also cultivate harmful effects, such as increased deviance among certain types of followers. We discuss our theoretical contributions as well as practical implications for practicing empowering leadership. (shrink)

Though there are many factors that contribute to the perceived legitimacy of business ethics education, this research focuses on one factor that is given great attention both formally and informally in many business schools: student satisfaction with the course. To understand the nature of student satisfaction, the authors draw from multiple theories with central claims relating expectations with satisfaction. The authors then compare student expectations of business ethics courses with instructor objectives and discover that business ethics courses are not necessarily (...) designed to meet student expectations. The authors speculate that this general mismatch between student expectations and instructor objectives has material consequences. As one example, the authors analyze student evaluations from three business schools and identify a “business ethics course effect”: a negative association between business ethics courses and student evaluations. The authors discuss the implications for business ethics education of a situation where pedagogical objectives and market prescriptions point in different directions. (shrink)

Abstract:The literature contains many recommendations, both explicit and implicit, that suggest how an ethics program ought to be designed. While we recognize the contributions of these works, we also note that these recommendations are typically based on either social scientific theory or data and as a result they tend to discount the moral aspects of ethics programs. To contrast and complement these approaches, we refer to a theory of the right to identify the characteristics of an effective ethics program. We (...) draw from Kant’s ethical theory to identify three guiding principles of a moral ethics program and then apply those principles to the specific components of ethics programs as discussed in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Doing so provides insights as to how an ethics program ought to be designed from a moral point of view and sparks discussion of the moral aspects of ethics programs. (shrink)

Non-propositional experiences can help justify beliefs, contrary to recent claims made by Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour. It is argued that a perceptual belief is justified if there are no undermining beliefs and it was arrived at in response to an experience through an adequate exercise of properly learned recognitional skills.

Imagining that I am Napoleon is not (normally) imagining an impossibility. It is (or at least may be) just adopting a first person way of imagining Napoleon. The images and bits of narrative using 'I' are intended to refer to Napoleon and his surroundings, in something like the way that a salt shaker can stand for a regiment of troops when the general says "This is the third regiment' while explaining his plans at the breakfast table.

We theorize that victim anonymity is an important factor in ethical decision making, such that actors engage in more self-interested and unethical behaviors toward anonymous victims than they do toward identifiable victims. Three experiments provided empirical support for this argument. In Study 1, participants withheld more life-saving products from anonymous than from identifiable victims. In Study 2, participants allocated a sum of payment more unfairly when interacting with an anonymous than with an identifiable partner. Finally, in Study 3, participants cheated (...) more from an anonymous than from an identifiable person. Anticipated guilt fully mediated these effects in all three studies. Taken together, our research suggests that anonymous victims may be more likely to incur unethical treatment, which could explain many unethical business behaviors. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger are arguably the two most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Their work not only reshaped the philosophical landscape, but also left its mark on other disciplines, including political science, theology, anthropology, ecology, mathematics, cultural studies, literary theory, and architecture. Both sought to challenge the assumptions governing the traditions they inherited, to question the very terms in which philosophy’s problems had been posed, and to open up new avenues of thought for thinkers of all stripes. (...) And despite considerable differences in style and in the traditions they inherited, the similarities between Wittgenstein and Heidegger are striking. Comparative work of these thinkers has only increased in recent decades, but no collection has yet explored the various ways in which Wittgenstein and Heidegger can be drawn into dialogue. As such, these essays stage genuine dialogues, with aspects of Wittgenstein’s elucidations answering or problematizing aspects of Heidegger’s, and vice versa. The result is a broad-ranging collection of essays that provides a series of openings and provocations that will serve as a reference point for future work that draws on the writings of these two philosophers. (shrink)

This paper discusses Plato’s question from the Meno : Why should we prefer knowledge that p over mere true belief that p? I find I just do prefer knowledge, and not for any further benefit that I am aware of in the particular case. But I should have that preference, because given our practice of approving of testimony only if uttered with knowledge, I could fail to prefer knowledge, when other things seem to me to be equal, only by having (...) the sorts of serious social or psychological defects that would make me unresponsive to the approval of others. Finally, the social practice that produces this particular preference is good for all of us because it improves the average quality of the testimony we receive, which results in greater success in our projects. (shrink)

This paper attempts to give an experiential explanation of the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification in some of our judgments about ourselves. The main idea is that in most of these judgments we respond to the type of presentation -- e.g., proprioceptive -- and not to presented properties of the perceived object.

A recent account of the meaning of 'real' leads to a view of what anti-realism should be that resembles fictionalism, while not being committed to fictionalism as such or being subject to some of the more obvious objections to that view. This account of anti-realism explains how we might 'make up' what is true in areas such as mathematics or ethics, and yet these made-up truths are resistant to alterations, even by our collective decisions. Finally it is argued that the (...) sort of anti-realism suggested explains the appearance that the ethical domain supervenes on the naturalistic. (shrink)

Abstract:Scholars have developed many theories of international strategy and many theories of international ethics. Separating strategy and ethics in this way, though, perpetuates a perception that profit and ethics are mutually exclusive. Accordingly, I offer a framework that links international strategy and international ethics. I suggest that at an abstract level the strategic concepts of integration and responsiveness and the ethical concepts of justice and caring are concerned with the same theoretical quandaries. Therefore, in any situation there are behaviors that (...) are both integrative and just and/or both responsive and caring, and these behaviors are both strategic and ethical. To demonstrate the potential descriptive and prescriptive value of the framework, I descend the ladders of abstraction associated with these concepts and apply the framework to two business situations. (shrink)

In an attempt to revive discussion of the argument from illusion this paper amends the classic version of the argument to avoid Austin's main objection. It then develops and defends a version of the intentional object reply to the argument, arguing that an "unendorsed story" account of reports of dreams and hallucinations avoids commitment to nonexistent objects.

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as S ought to believe that p , or S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p . However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons that make (...) it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief, if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that we have epistemic norms for assertion and action. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In 2010,Business Ethics Quarterlypublished ten articles that considered the potential contributions to business ethics research arising from recent scholarship in a variety of philosophical and social scientific fields (strategic management, political philosophy, restorative justice, international business, legal studies, ethical theory, ethical leadership studies, organization theory, marketing, and corporate governance and finance). Here we offer short responses to those articles by members ofBusiness Ethics Quarterly’s editorial board and editorial team.

A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking (perhaps not too clearly) that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the (...) direct realist view of perception still find these arguments plausible, although, according to this diagnosis, they shouldn't. To avoid this objection, I argue that the Cartesian skeptical arguments exploit, not our representationalist tendencies, but our habits for evaluating causal explanatory justifications. (shrink)

A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking (perhaps not too clearly) that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the (...) direct realist view of perception still find these arguments plausible, although, according to this diagnosis, they shouldn’t. To avoid this objection, I argue that the Cartesian skeptical arguments exploit, not our representationalist tendencies, but our habits for evaluating causal explanatory justifications. (shrink)

Objection to Quine's argument for the inscrutability of reference. The proxy functions don't preserve the relations to experience, contrary to Quine's claims.

Drawing from existing theory and empirical evidence on mindfulness, we posit that trait mindfulness is associated with less accurate memories of immoral conduct. We report three studies that provide evidence of this argument. One significant implication of this finding is that it provides a more balanced and complete view of mindfulness. Specifically, while mindfulness is widely promoted for its positive effects for employee well‐being, mindfulness may inadvertently promote a biased moral self‐perception based on inaccurate memories of one's past immoral conduct. (...) In a fourth study, we explore this implication and demonstrate that memory mediates the negative relationship between trait mindfulness and self‐reported immoral conduct. This research contributes to literatures on mindfulness, memory, morality, and to the growing body of work assessing the importance of mindfulness. (shrink)

The familiar Cartesian sceptical arguments all involve an explanation of our experiences. An account of the persuasive power of the sceptical arguments should explain why this is so. This supports a diagnosis of the error in Cartesian sceptical arguments according to which they mislead us into regarding our perceptual beliefs as if they were justified as inferences to the best explanation. I argue that they have instead a perceptual justification that does not involve inference to the best explanation and that (...) should not be put in doubt by the sceptical hypotheses. (shrink)

The existing literature provides conflicting evidence of whether a collectivistic value orientation is associated with ethical or unethical behavior. To address this confusion, we integrate collectivism theory and research with prior work on social identity, moral boundedness, group morality, and moral identity to develop a model of the double-edged effects of collectivism on employee conduct. We argue that collectivism is morally bounded depending on who the other is, and thus it inhibits employees’ motivation to engage in unethical pro-self behavior, yet (...) strengthens their motivation to engage in unethical pro-organization behavior. We further predict that these effects are mediated by the psychological mechanism of organizational goal commitment and moderated by a person’s strength of moral identity. Results of three studies conducted in China and the United States and involving both field and experimental data offer strong support for our hypotheses. Theoretical and practical implications of the research are discussed. (shrink)

A new account of the semantic function (character) of ‘real’ and ‘really’ is defended. ‘Really’ as a sentential operator typically indicates that a report of what has been represented elsewhere ends and subsequent discourse is to be taken as making claims about the world. ‘Real’ and ‘really’ as applied to nouns or predicate phrases indicate that something is not being called an F merely because it represents an F. A way of drawing the distinction between realism and anti-realism based on (...) this new account is also defended. (shrink)

An attempt to defend Davidson's omniscient interpreter argument against various attempts to show that it does not succeed in showing that most of our beliefs must be true. It doesn't argue that this is a good answer to skepticism.

Le care : le mot et la chose. Si la chose a toujours existé – le fait de prendre en charge et de soigner les enfants, les malades, les blessés, les vieilles personnes, entre autres – ce terme a connu une modification et revêtu une importance dans les pays anglophones qu’il n’avait pas il y a une trentaine d’années. En France, l’adoption – sans le traduire – du mot anglais dans ce sens moderne serait encore plus récente, datant des années (...) 2000. Que ce soit aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni ou en... (shrink)

En 1999, à la suite d’un référendum (1997) organisé sous le gouvernement travailliste de Londres, l’Écosse s’est dotée de nouvelles institutions, un parlement et un gouvernement situés à Édimbourg, dans le cadre de la ‘dévolution’, tout en restant intégrée au Royaume Uni. En septembre 2014, à l’initiative du Parti National Écossais (SNP) qui détient actuellement la majorité à Édimbourg, un nouveau référendum a posé la question de l’indépendance. Quel qu’en ait été le résultat, l’émergence d’u...

La première édition de cet impressionnant ouvrage (885 pages) est parue en 1997 : Mathilde Dubesset en a fait le compte-rendu pour Clio (n° 7, 1998, p. 254-256). Sa réussite a provoqué des versions américaine et espagnole, et la nouvelle édition en a tenu compte pour réaliser une réactualisation profonde. Une nouvelle génération de chercheurs/ses et d’étudiant(e)s va donc découvrir ce recueil déjà très riche mais qui a été élargi et remis à jour. Ne sous-estimons pas l’énorme travail qui con...

Issu d’une thèse soutenue à l’université de Lausanne, le livre de C. Schoeni est un ouvrage dense traitant d’une question en apparence limitée, mais qui s’insère dans la longue histoire de la division sexuelle du travail : celle des femmes fonctionnaires – institutrices ou autres employées des autorités publiques – lors de la crise des années 1930. L’auteur s’est concentré sur la Suisse et la France comme cas d’études. Le titre, qui suggère une synthèse plus vaste, aurait peut-être pu indique...

Although Descartes apparently needs first person authority for his anti-skeptical project, his scattered remarks on it appear to be inconsistent. Why did he neglect this issue? According to E M Aurley, Descartes was answering Pyrrhonian skeptics, who could not consistently challenge him on it. This paper argues instead that Descartes assumed that his first person premises were certain qua clear and distinct perceptions, leaving first person authority a side issue.

Dans ce livre original et provocant, le linge n’est pas qu’une métaphore. On y trouvera beaucoup de matérialité : « les rideaux, les étoffes et tissus, les linges du corps et les uniformes », entre autres choses. Mais le linge y est aussi une métaphore, aux développements insoupçonnés : Le linge est le rappel du faste, du drapé, des brocarts. Linge de maison, il est le rappel des heures et des jours, des ordonnancements quotidiens, des servitudes du privé et du (...) public, des pratiques de l’int... (shrink)

« Aucun siècle n’a commencé avec un aussi grand nombre de femmes de lettres ; aucun siècle, sans doute, n’aura vu l’éducation des femmes plus soignée. » Nous sommes en 1804, il s’agit du jeune xixe siècle, et Fortunée Briquet, 22 ans, dédie son Dictionnaire, que l’on peut qualifier de « proto-manifeste féministe », au… Premier Consul et Président, Napoléon Bonaparte. Ce n’est pas le moindre des paradoxes et particularités de ce livre admirablement commenté, annoté et présenté par Nicole Pelle...

Lors d’une grève dans la bonneterie troyenne en 1921, un incident s’est produit dont les archives ne gardent quasiment pas de trace, mais qui est resté dans la mémoire populaire. Un patron d’usine est séquestré par une foule en colère : on parle même de le faire pendre. L’intervention, paraît-il, d’une femme, syndicaliste, lui sauve la vie : elle propose qu’on l’humilie plutôt,en l’envoyant éplucher des pommes de terre. On se calme, et le patron est conduit aux autorités municipales. Pour...

Dites-moi où n’en quel pays, Est Flora la belle Romaine? Parmi les « outils indispensables de recherche » pour l’histoire des femmes et du genre, il faut compter les dictionnaires biographiques. En n’exagérant que peu, on pourrait dire que les femmes étaient non seulement minoritaires, mais quasiment introuvables dans la plupart des anciens dictionnaires nationaux, mis à part certains personnages ultra-célèbres. Depuis les années 1970 pourtant, un nouveau genre, l’ouvrage de référence consacr...

« Premier achat de notre nouveau couple : un tandem rouge, magnifique. Je l’ai encore. » Il n’est pas étonnant que Louis-Pascal Jacquemond ait reproduit (p. 305) ce témoignage d’une femme ayant vécu 1936, ni que Michelle Zancarini-Fournel l’ait mis en exergue de sa préface à ce « panorama » sur la question des femmes à l’époque du Front populaire. Cela correspond si bien aux images de « l’embellie » célébrée par Léon Blum, ou de « l’euphorie » citée par (...) ce témoin, Marie-Françoise Spannente :... (shrink)

« Héros et héroïnes sont le produit de discours historiques », écrivent Sophie Cassagnes-Brouquet et Mathilde Dubesset dans le numéro 30 de Clio. HFS, consacré aux Héroïnes (2009). C’est aussi le titre d’une collection éditée chez Grasset, dont l’intention n’est pas de célébrer encore une fois les femmes pionnières, connues depuis trente ans par les historien/ne/s du féminisme. Il s’agit plutôt, pour Fiammetta Vener et Caroline Fourest, qui la dirigent, de « sortir de l’obscurité » des femmes...

Le 14 novembre 1868, dans un des procès les plus remarqués du Second Empire, le jeune avocat Léon Gambetta prononce une plaidoirie « sensationnelle » contre le régime. Dans l’auditoire, une jeune femme du demi-monde, Léonie Léon, est tellement impressionnée qu’elle se lance à sa poursuite, sans succès d’ailleurs. Gambetta – bientôt célèbre pour son rôle pendant le siège de Paris, élu député de Belleville en juin 1871, futur président du Conseil – n’accorde un rendez-vous à son admiratrice que...

En Écosse (xvie-xxe siècle) Siân Reynolds Comment se fait-il qu’en Écosse, contrairement aux coutumes de l’Angleterre, une femme mariée ait pu garder son nom de naissance/de jeune fille (maiden name ou birth name) après le mariage? C’est au moment où je co-dirigeais le Dictionnaire biographique des femmes écossaises (première édition 2005) que j’ai constaté qu’en Écosse, par le passé, et jusqu’à une époque relativement récente, les femmes étaient souvent connues par leur propre nom de fami...