This book contains programmatic essays that focus on broad-ranging proposals for re-envisioning a discipline of comparative philosophy of religions. It also contains a number of case studies focussing on the interpretation of particular religio-historical data from comparatively oriented philosophical perspectives.

Machine generated contents note: 1 Introduction 1 -- 2 Central themes and critical issues 10 -- Introduction 10 -- Core themes 11 -- Differences which have surfaced in the move from -- margins to mainstream 15 -- The claims of restorative justice: a brief examination 21 -- Some limitations of restorative justice 25 -- Some dangers of restorative justice 29 -- Debunking restorative justice 32 -- 3 Reviving restorative justice traditions 36 -- The rebirth of an ancient practice 36 -- (...) Pre-modem criminal justice 37 -- The renaissance of native justice traditions 43 -- Navajo peacemaking 44 -- Can one characterise ancient and indigenous -- justice as restorative? 47 -- Can one revive restorative justice traditions? 49 -- Conclusion: did restorative justice ever die? 59 -- 4 Healing the victim 62 -- Introduction 62 -- The experiences and needs of victims 64 -- The inadequacy of punitive justice for the victim 67 -- Victim reforms 70 -- Restitution from the offender 74 -- Beyond restitution: restoring victims 76 -- Restorative justice or 'clubbing together'? 78 -- Using victims to rehabilitate offenders 81 -- Paternalism towards victims 83 -- Balancing the needs of the victim with those of society 84 -- 5 A restorative approach to offenders 87 -- Introduction 87 -- Restorative justice as an alternative to retributive justice 88 -- Restorative justice as an alternative to treatment 94 -- The goals and methods of restorative justice in relation -- to offenders 95 -- An alternative to punishment or an alternative form of -- punishment? 106 -- An alternative to treatment? 111 -- 6 Shame, apology and forgiveness 114 -- Introduction 114 -- Restorative cautioning 115 -- The psychological routes of restorative conferencing 116 -- The idea of reintegrative shaming 118 -- Some questions about shaming 123 -- Apology and forgiveness 132 -- 7 Mediation, participation and the role of community 136 -- Introduction: handling criminal conflicts 136 -- The rationale for the restorative justice process 140 -- Achieving restorative goals 141 -- Moral development and the strengthening of community 144 -- The role of community 151 -- 8 The future of restorative justice 161 -- Introduction 161 -- Implementing restorative justice: the paths less likely 163 -- The implementation of restorative techniques 166 -- Restorative justice and the pattern of penal control 169 -- The future of restorative justice research 170 -- Appendix to chapter 3: the theological roots of judicial -- punishment 172. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Moore’s assessment of Lewis’s metaphysical theorizing. While I am sympathetic to Moore’s complaint that much contemporary metaphysics lacks the scope and reach of older metaphysical theories, I take issue with Moore’s diagnosis: neither lack of self-consciousness, nor Quinean naturalism, nor the post-Quinean restitution of necessity is to blame. Rather, the lack of impact of Lewis’s system should be attributed to the very high weight he attaches to conservatism: the preservation of commonsense and ordinary thought and (...) talk. Yet one can agree with Quine that there should be no first philosophy without, as Lewis does, putting philosophy last. Finally, I argue against Moore that, for the Quinean naturalist, there is no conflict between the metaphysician’s armchair methodology and the view that the truths so discovered are on a par with science. (shrink)

One of the responses to the attacks upon the contemporary university, particularly upon the humanities, has been to encourage faculty to engage in so-called ‘public intellectualism.’ In this paper I urge philosophers to embrace this turn, but only if the academy can effectively address how to credit such work in the tenure and promotion process. Currently, public philosophy is typically placed under ‘service’, even though the work is often more intellectually and philosophically rigorous than committee work, even sometimes more than (...) publications. I address this problem by providing an analysis of what is academically valuable about good scholarship and then showing how much of public philosophy achieves those goods. From this I argue that the academy should abandon the traditional categories of teaching/research/service and replace them with a holistic and qualitative single category of “teacher-scholar.” I then recommend that evaluation criteria should be very inclusive, giving credit to the wide range of activities in which faculty participate and I provide some suggestions for how those criteria should read. (shrink)

Hitherto, the contribution of philosophers to Neuroscience and Education has tended to be less than enthusiastic, though there are some notable exceptions. Meanwhile, the pervasive influence of neuromyths on education policy, curriculum design and pedagogy in schools is well documented. Indeed, philosophers have sometimes used the prevalence of neuromyths in education to bolster their opposition to neuroscience in teacher education courses. By contrast, this article views the presence of neuromyths in education as a call for remedial action, including philosophical action. (...) The empirical basis of this article is a survey, conducted over a period of three years, involving a total of 1144 first-year pre-service student teachers, which revealed alarming levels of belief in five common neuromyths related to children and learning. This study also attempted to probe the origins of these mistaken beliefs and why they gain traction. The findings suggest an urgent need in teacher education to address the problem of neuromyths, not simply because they are mistaken, they often misdirect valuable resources and mislabel children. The article calls for a compulsory unit on neuroscience and education in all courses of teacher education. Moreover, teaching neuroscience in education cannot be left to specialist neuroscientists, philosophers must be involved. (shrink)

To practise ‘fairly and justly’ a clinician must balance the needs of both the many and the few: the individual patient in front of them, and the many unseen patients in the waiting room, and in the county. They must consider the immediate clinical needs of those in the present, and how their actions will impact on future patients. The good medical practice guidance ‘Make the care of your patient your first concern’ provides no guidance on how doctors should act (...) when they care for multiple patients with conflicting needs. Moreover, conflicting needs extend far past simply those between different patients. At an organisational level, financial obligations must be balanced with clinical ones; the system must support those who work within it in a variety of roles; and, finally, in order for a healthcare service to be sustainable, the demands of current and future generations must be balanced.The central problem, we propose, is that there is no shared philosophical framework on which the provision of care or the development of health policy is based, nor is there a practical, fair and transparent process to ensure that the service is equipped to deal justly with new challenges as they emerge. Many philosophers have grappled with constructing a set of principles which would lead to a ‘good’ society which is just to different users; prominent among them is Rawls.Four important principles can be derived using a Rawlsian approach: equity of access, distributive justice, sustainability and openness. However, Rawls’ approach is sometimes considered too abstract to be applied readily to policymaking; it does not provide clear guidance for how individuals working within existing institutions can enact the principles of justice. We therefore combine the principles derived from Rawls with Scanlonian contractualism: by demanding that decisions are made in a way which cannot be ‘reasonably rejected’ by different stakeholders, we ensure that conflicting needs are considered robustly.We demonstrate how embedding this framework would ensure just policies and fair practice. We illustrate this by using examples of how it would help prevent injustice among different socioeconomic groups, prevent intergenerational injustice and prevent injustice in a crisis, for example, as we respond to new challenges such as COVID-19.Attempts to help individual doctors practise fairly and justly throughout their professional lives are best focused at an institutional or systemic level. We propose a practical framework: combining Scanlonian contractualism with a Rawlsian approach. Adopting this framework would equip the workforce and population to contribute to fair policymaking, and would ultimately result in a healthcare system whose practice and policies—at their core—were just. (shrink)

This article explores Carter G. Woodson’s The Mis‐Education of the Negro in terms of its political philosophical content. It examines how Woodson’s account of the miseducation of Black people and the accordant miseducation of whites is involved in the production and reproduction of an unjust basic structure, with reference to John Rawls and Frantz Fanon. It then turns to Woodson’s critique of leadership and its relationship to miseducation, drawing on E. Franklin Frazier’s study of the Black bourgeoisie and the political (...) philosophy of Enrique Dussel. Finally, it examines miseducation as a site for the reproduction of racist knowledge production in light of the work of Anténor Firmin and examines how, for Woodson, rigor in the human sciences was essential for counteracting miseducation and serving the greater cause of liberation. (shrink)

This article explores a modern approach to childhood that abandons the traditional view of children in western societies as inferior, fragile and vulnerable. The modern approach explored in this paper takes a plural perspective in the conception of children as people who are able to think for themselves and who have the absolute right to participate in the affairs that affect them. This modern approach is related in this study to the free-rangers thesis, in which childhood is interpreted as a (...) process of maturation and not as a stage of life, which is the conception linked to the traditional percepcion of childhood in the western societies. In the framework of formal education, this modern approach to childhood is related to Freire’s liberating education and the proposals for the school of philosophy with children in which philosophical practices are encouraged from an early age, thereby stimulating a much more active role for children in schools and giving their voice due recognition. So, this study highlights the importance of promoting liberating education in schools with the aim of making every effort to subvert the traditional roles of both teachers and pupils in formal education to give a more active role to children. In thi sense, this paper calls for the activity of philosophy whith children and encourages the idea of putting philosophy at the service of schools to give children’s voices greater value. (shrink)

Marx is famous for apparently dismissing the practical role of philosophy. Yet, as accumulating empirical knowledge of growing life-crises proves, the simply availability of facts is insufficient to motivate struggles for fundamental change. So too manifest social crisis. The economic crisis which began in 2008 has indeed motivated social struggles, but nothing on the order of the revolutionary struggles Marx expected. Rather than make Marx irrelevant, however, the absence of global struggles for truly radical change make his early engagement with (...) the role of philosophy more important than ever. This engagement suggests a conception of philosophy as a uniquely practical discipline distinguished from empirical science by its unique capacity to synthesise values from the facts of life. The article examines the development of this conception of philosophy in Marx’s early work and concludes with the outlines for a new critical philosophy capable of generating a new set of universal values necessary to motivate anti-capitalist struggles today. (shrink)

Speeches delivered by the author at Lucknow on 2nd April 1968, and, Hyderabad on 26th March 1977; previously serialized in the Prabuddha Bharata issues of August, September, and October 1968, and, March and April 1978.

The aim of the present paper is to discuss Socrates’ idea of philosophy asa service to the god. First the article investigates why Chaerephon wentto Delphi and why he asked Pythia the famous question concerningSocrates. The investigation provides a basis for distinguishing two majorperiods in his activity. The one preceding the Delphic oracle consists inconducting inquiries in a group of closest friends. The one following theDelphic oracle consist in addressing a much larger audience. An analysisof both periods suggests that the (...) oracle from Delphi greatly affectedSocrates’ relations with other Athenians. While the present article dealsalso with the issue of Socrates’ daimonion, it hypothesizes that the voiceof daimonion and the voice of Pythia could be regarded as Apollo’sinterventions. (shrink)

Fr. Paweł Siwek, SJ may be considered the only Polish Jesuit philosopher of the 20th century to have achieved worldwide recognition. This article surveys his work from a broad perspective reflecting philosophy, psychology and theology as pursued in Catholic circles in the 19th and 20th centuries. We review his achievements, while also offering an interpretation. We put forward the thesis that he found his own way of practising neo-Thomism in the spirit of Pope Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris. To substantiate our (...) claims, we first briefly sketch his biography, providing a synthetic overview of the relevant contexts for his philosophical oeuvre. We then identify his four main areas of interest: namely, the history of philosophy, systematic philosophy, the scientific psychology of religion and spirituality, and Christian apologetics in the face of world religions and spiritual movements. In our conclusion, we discuss the main traits of his intellectual work, along with its impact. (shrink)

Tras la Guerra Civil el filósofo catalán Eugeni d’Ors y el filósofo español José Ortega y Gasset ofrecieron una lectura de la teoría de la relatividad de Einstein in la cual conectaron discusiones de unidad y pluralidad con sus respectivas filosofías y proyectos nacionalistas de análisis y reforma política y cultural sintetizantes. Además, frecuentes referencias a Einstein distinguen sus respectivas ideas filosóficas, sus preocupaciones territoriales y sus circunstancias personales en relación a Cataluña, España y Europa. La teoría de Einstein simbolizó (...) la conexión salvadora entre lo clásico y lo moderno, Europa y el Mediterráneo, y ciencia y filosofía. En este artículo analizo los casos inseparables de Ors en relación con el nacionalismo catalán y al proyecto que denominó Noucentisme y de Ortega en relación con el nacionalismo español y a su filosofia política articulada en La España Invertebrada. (shrink)

Although Emmanuel Levinas later expressed regret that he sided with Martin Heidegger rather than the more “ideal”-minded Ernst Cassirer in their 1929 Davos encounter, Cassirer’s philosophy of culture would never have been an apt framework for Levinas’s own project, which was always directed more to fundamental orientation than to formative activities or achievements. In “Meaning and Sense” (1964), Levinas conceived a totalizing cultural “meaning” as a foil to transcendent ethical “sense.” In a 1983 paper, however, he proposed an ethical conception (...) of culture. He could have developed this further using another element from “Meaning and Sense,” an ethical conception of work as service of the Other. The work-in-progress of culture combines pure ethics and implemented morality, pure command and consistent style, infinite vulnerability and actual power. (shrink)

Although Emmanuel Levinas later expressed regret that he sided with Martin Heidegger rather than the more “ideal”-minded Ernst Cassirer in their 1929 Davos encounter, Cassirer’s philosophy of culture would never have been an apt framework for Levinas’s own project, which was always directed more to fundamental orientation than to formative activities or achievements. In “Meaning and Sense” (1964), Levinas conceived a totalizing cultural “meaning” as a foil to transcendent ethical “sense.” In a 1983 paper, however, he proposed an ethical conception (...) of culture. He could have developed this further using another element from “Meaning and Sense,” an ethical conception of work as service of the Other. The work-in-progress of culture combines pure ethics and implemented morality, pure command and consistent style, infinite vulnerability and actual power. (shrink)

Nick Bostrom’s recently patched ‘‘simulation argument’’ (Bostrom in Philos Q 53:243–255, 2003; Bos- trom and Kulczycki in Analysis 71:54–61, 2011) purports to demonstrate the probability that we ‘‘live’’ now in an ‘‘ancestor simulation’’—that is as a simulation of a period prior to that in which a civilization more advanced than our own—‘‘post-human’’—becomes able to simulate such a state of affairs as ours. As such simulations under consid- eration resemble ‘‘brains in vats’’ (BIVs) and may appear open to similar objections, the (...) paper begins by reviewing objections to BIV-type proposals, specifically those due a presumed mad envatter. In counter example, we explore the motivating rationale behind current work in the development of psychologically realistic social simula- tions. Further concerns about rendering human cognition in a computational medium are confronted through review of current dynamic systems models of cognitive agency. In these models, aspects of the human condition are repro- duced that may in other forms be considered incomputable, i.e., political voice, predictive planning, and consciousness. The paper then argues that simulations afford a unique potential to secure a post-human future, and may be nec- essary for a pre-post-human civilization like our own to achieve and to maintain a post-human situation. Long-s- tanding philosophical interest in tools of this nature for Aristotle’s ‘‘statesman’’ and more recently for E.O. Wilson in the 1990s is observed. Self-extinction-level threats from State and individual levels of organization are compared, and a likely dependence on large-scale psychologically realistic simulations to get past self-extinction-level threats is projected. In the end, Bostrom’s basic argument for the conviction that we exist now in a simulation is reaffirmed. (shrink)

This paper discusses the potential contribution of Henri Bergson’s philosophy to the theory and practice of service quality measurement. First, it summarises some of the theoretical developments within the field of service quality measurement and points to areas of controversy found within the extant publications. Then, it proposes that a greater appreciation of philosophy, in particular the writings of Henri Bergson, can help address the apparent inconsistencies and gaps observed in the literature. Finally, the paper offers suggestions regarding the potential (...) implications of Bergson’s philosophy for the measurement of service quality in contemporary organisations. (shrink)

The question this essay takes up is that of whether Ethics as a discipline has something to learn from the literature in evolutionary moral psychology and if this mode of explanation should be part of its future. Its primary thesis is that Ethics does have much to learn because the sciences that study the evolutionary mechanisms by which ethical judgments are produced will allow us, in a naturalist and pragmatist fashion, to better understand the possibilities for achieving our ethical goals. (...) They will do so not because they demonstrate that all effective and achievable moralities must be anchored in evolutionarily derived moral faculties or intuitions but because these sciences can help to reveal the means by which our culturally derived ethical ideals might be realized as well as indicate the innate psychological and psychosocial stumbling blocks and hurdles to these ideals’ realization. (shrink)

We explore whether a Rawlsian approach might provide a guiding philosophy for the development of a healthcare system, in particular with regard to resolving tensions between different groups within it. We argue that an approach developed from some of Rawls’ principles – using his ‘veil of ignorance’ and both the ‘difference’ and ‘just savings’ principles which it generates – provides a compelling basis for policy making around certain areas of conflict. We ask what policies might be made if those making (...) them did not know if one was patient, doctor, nurse or manager – in this generation or the next. We first offer a brief summary of Rawls’ approach and how we intend to extrapolate from it. We examine how this adapted Rawlsian framework could be applied to specific examples of conflict within healthcare; we demonstrate how this framework can be used to develop a healthcare service which is both sustainable (in its training and treatment of staff, and in encouraging research and innovation) and open (to protect the powers and opportunities of those using the health service). We conclude that while Rawls’ approach has previously been rejected as a means to address specific healthcare decisions, an adapted veil of ignorance can be a useful tool for the consideration of how a just health service should be constructed and sustained. Turning the theoretical into the practical (and combining Rawls’ thought experiment with Scanlonian contractarianism), managers, doctors, patients, carers and nurses could come together and debate conflicting issues behind a hypothetical veil. (shrink)

Should one use philosophy in service of religion? I argue that Dionysius the Areopagite gives a negative answer to this question. The relevant text is Dionysius’ Letter 7, in which he explains why he does not use philosophy to attack Greco-Roman paganism. Philosophy, according to Dionysius, is something divine. In fact, in Letter 7 he goes so far as to identify philosophy with what St. Paul calls the “wisdom of God.” As a result, philosophy should not be treated as a (...) tool to be used in service of anything, even the true religion, which Dionysius of course identifies with Christianity. In order to elucidate Dionysius’ position, I provide a detailed account of how he understands philosophy, religion (thrêskeia), and use (chraô). (shrink)

Elsewhere I have defended utilitarianism as a philosophy peculiarly well suited to the conduct of public affairs, on grounds of the peculiar tasks and instruments confronting public officials. Here I add another plank to that defence of ‘utilitarianism as a public philosophy’, focusing on the peculiar role responsibilities of people serving in public capacities. Such ‘public service utilitarianism’ is incumbent not only upon public officials but also upon individuals in their capacities as citizens and voters. I close with reflections on (...) how best to evoke appreciation of these utilitarian role responsibilities from officials and electors alike. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas, a twentieth century French Continental philosopher, proposed an original understanding of ethics which has serious implications for the particular activities within higher education designated as service learning and community service. First I will define service learning and community service and briefly review the theoretical and philosophical justifications typically employed to substantiate and ground these activities within higher education. Next, I will explicate key aspects from Levinas’ ethical philosophy important for reconceptualizing service learning, and discuss their significance for related (...) concerns in higher education about language and justice. Finally, in light of these considerations, I will suggest the profound implications of a Levinasian conception of service for higher education. (shrink)

In recent years the view that the non-instrumental value of democracy is a relational value, particularly relational equality, gained prominence. In this paper I challenge this relational egalitarian version of non-instrumentalism about democracy’s value by arguing that it is unable to establish a strong enough commitment to democracy. I offer an alternative view according to which democracy is non-instrumentally valuable for it establishes relationships of mutual service among citizens by enlisting them in the collective project of ruling the polity justly (...) together which is a self-standing source of value for them. Relating in the mode of mutual service is not a species of relating as equals; it is a distinct relational value. Democracy is uniquely suited to realize this relational value, for it renders citizens co-authors of the fundamental rules of the system of social cooperation under which they live, and only as co-authors of these rules are they able to mutually serve each other in a way that is appropriate within their relationship as citizens of the same polity. For this reason, a strong commitment to democracy can be based on the relational value of mutual service, which therefore better fits the theoretical purposes of non-instrumentalism than relational equality. (shrink)

Despite the great promise that service learning has shown and the attention paid to it by educators, it is not commonly taken up in the courses or discussions of ethicists. But service learning should concern ethicists (especially applied ethicists) if it should concern anyone: ethicists frequently devote their courses and studies to questions of social responsibility and service learning provides a unique opportunity for students and teachers to fulfill that responsibility. After rehearsing several arguments for the basis of social responsibility, (...) the author relates these arguments to the duties of ethics teachers and ethics students and discusses the practical question of how to incorporate service learning into ethics classes. After recounting in detail his own attempt to do so, the author analyses a student survey from the course and summarizes the benefits and problems with his course’s implementation of service learning. Though students frequently found their service opportunity emotionally challenging, the author argues that the results of the class are encouraging. (shrink)

While available to a multitude, routine health precautions and basic, nonspecialized medical services are lacking in many societies. This may in part be the outcome of attitudinal distortions, not only at the national and global levels, but fundamentally within the patient-physician encounter. Demands for a disturbance-free subsistence clash with values of power and control within health-care sub-systems resulting in an overall neglect of primary needs and a distribution of medical services that benefits select groups. True needs are misrepresented (...) and an intensification of particular services does not fulfill one's duties toward those who realize little or no services at all. The entire institutional system of medicine requires a rebalancing of rights, intentions and outcomes, beginning with the correlative experiences of patient and physician. (shrink)

Sometimes the majority of individuals accepting a service regret their decision, and we can predict that future recipients will feel similarly. For example, a hospital might learn that the majority of patients regret accepting a given medical intervention, and a UN agency might learn that most refugees it has helped repatriate regret returning home. I argue that agents providing services that lead to likely regret have one pro tanto reason to discontinue their services, and this reason is weighty (...) if the service is epistemically transformative. (shrink)

Those of us engaged in the education of future businesspersons need to ask about the efficacy of our efforts. The business person is, first and foremost, a member of the community, a citizen, attempting to meet the needs of that community by providing goods and services.The general public often perceives the businessperson as violating the ethical standards of the community. Business risks losing its social legitimacy by such activity. Universities are the appropriate institutions in which to inculcate the importance (...) of ethics and should go as far as it can to influence the ethical reasoning of graduates. However, research suggests that the traditional way of integrating ethics education into required functional courses actually results in a decline in moral reasoning. It is suggested that ethics educating needs to be personalized based on the individual student and that there is a need for experiential learning methods which would supplement and enhance standard classroom based ethics education. An appropriate goal for business ethics courses would be to make students aware of the ethical and social dimensions of the business decision making process. (shrink)