Cooperation between doctors of various specialties and other medical specialists is the standard of care in the treatment of patients. Due to the variety of diseases and the dynamic development of medicine in general, it is difficult to be an expert in every field and know all the recommended treatments. An example of such cooperation is the joint treatment of patients with the problem of ingrown toenails. The article contains an analysis of patients who received treatment in a doctor’s office (...) in cooperation with podiatrists. A conservative approach towards the treatment of this condition sees the patient being initially diagnosed and treated by a podiatrist and then later, if necessary, being referred to a doctor for surgical treatment. The exchange of experiences and information on patients treated by interdisciplinary teams allows doctors and podiatrists to find the best possible treatment and improve the quality of life of patients. The follow-up of patients after surgery can be performed later in podiatry offices. Owing to modern electronic communication, it is possible for a doctor to constantly monitor the patient’s condition without the need for direct visits to the doctor’s office. (shrink)

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a widespread tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which acts violate the rule. This tendency’s strength varied markedly across (k = 15) field sites, owing to cultural variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared to laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether, and consequently exhibited more pronounced textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for (...) the emergence of textualism: In a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (Ntotal = 5495) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an easily identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers and judges. (shrink)

Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa (1906-1981) was a Polish philosopher and student of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. In 1938 she went to the University of Cambridge (Newnham College) on a Sarah Smitton Fellowship. There she attended George Edward Moore’s lectures as well as one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics in 1939. In this interview which was conducted with Alois Eder she talks about her encounter with Wittgenstein. It was published in 1978 in the Polish art (...) and culture magazine Odra and is her only published memoir about Wittgenstein. The interview is republished here both in English translation and as facsimile of the original publication with the kind permission of the Odra magazine. (shrink)

In this interview, Tomasz Zarębski speaks with Allan Janik, co-author of _Wittgenstein’s Vienna_ (1973, with Stephen Toulmin), on the occasion of the 50 th anniversary of the publication of this pathbreaking book. The conversation concerns the circumstances, motivations and reasons for his undertaking the work on the book, as well as its reception and place in Wittgenstein scholarship. A large part of the discussion refers to his perspective of Wittgenstein, Toulmin’s philosophical writings, and Janik’s own vision of philosophy. The (...) interview took place in Innsbruck on 23 rd and 25 th August 2023. (shrink)

In this paper I present an argument in favour of a parental duty to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). I argue that if embryos created in vitro were able to decide for themselves in a rational manner, they would sometimes choose PGD as a method of selection. Couples, therefore, should respect their hypothetical choices on a principle similar to that of patient autonomy. My thesis shows that no matter which moral doctrine couples subscribe to, they ought to conduct the PGD (...) procedure in the situations when it is impossible to implant all of the created embryos and if there is a significant risk for giving birth to a child with a serious condition. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate Boolean connexive logics in a language with modal operators: □, ◊. In such logics, negation, conjunction, and disjunction behave in a classical, Boolean way. Only implication is non-classical. We construct these logics by mixing relating semantics with possible worlds. This way, we obtain connexive counterparts of basic normal modal logics. However, most of their traditional axioms formulated in terms of modalities and implication do not hold anymore without additional constraints, since our implication is weaker than (...) the material one. In the final section, we present a tableau approach to the discussed modal logics. (shrink)

Standard deontic logic (SDL) is defined on the basis of possible world semantics and is a logic of alethic-deontic modalities rather than deontic modalities alone. The interpretation of the concepts of obligation and permission comes down exclusively to the logical value that a sentence adopts for the accessible deontic alternatives. Here, we set forth a different approach, this being a logic which additionally takes into consideration whether sentences stand in relation to the normative system or to the system of values (...) under which we predicate the deontic qualifications. By taking this aspect into account, we arrive at a logical system which preserves laws proper to a deontic logic but where the standard paradoxes of deontic logic do not arise. It is a logic of strictly-deontic modalities DR. (shrink)

Consider how we evaluate how normal an object is. On the dual-nature hypothesis, a normality evaluation depends on the object’s goodness and frequency. On the single-nature hypothesis, the evaluation depends solely on either frequency or goodness. To assess these hypotheses, I ran four experiments. Study 1 shows that normality evaluations vary with both the goodness and the frequency assessment of the object. Study 2 shows that manipulating the goodness and the frequency dimension changes the normality evaluation. Yet, neither experiment rules (...) out that some people evaluate normality solely based on frequency, and the rest evaluate normality solely based on goodness. Whence two more experiments. Study 3 reveals that when scenarios are contrasted—presented one after another—only frequency matters. But, as study 4 shows, when scenarios are evaluated alone, both frequency and goodness influence normality evaluations in a single person, although the more a person is sensitive to one dimension, the less she’s sensitive to the other. The dual-nature hypothesis seems thus true of uncontrasted applications of the concept of normality, whereas the single-nature hypothesis seems true of contrasted applications. (shrink)

To analyze potential negative consequences of adopting generative AI solutions in the digital afterlife industry (DAI), in this paper we present three speculative design scenarios for AI-enabled simulation of the deceased. We highlight the perspectives of the data donor, data recipient, and service interactant – terms we employ to denote those whose data is used to create ‘deadbots,’ those in possession of the donor’s data after their death, and those who are meant to interact with the end product. We draw (...) on the scenarios to map out several key ethical concerns posed by ‘re-creation services’ and to put forward recommendations on the ethical development of AI systems in this specific area of application. The recommendations, targeted at providers of AI-enabled re-creation services, include suggestions for developing sensitive procedures for retiring deadbots, ensuring meaningful transparency, restricting access to such services to adult users only, and adhering to the principle of mutual consent of both data donors and service interactants. While we suggest practical solutions to the socio-ethical challenges posed by the emergence of re-creation services, we also emphasize the importance of ongoing interdisciplinary research at the intersection of the ethics of AI and the ethics of the DAI. (shrink)

According to psychological research, people are more eager to help identified individuals than unidentified ones. This phenomenon significantly influences many important decisions, both individual and public, regarding, for example, vaccinations or the distribution of healthcare resources. This paper aims at presenting definitions of various levels of identifiability as well as a critical analysis of the main philosophical arguments regarding the normative significance of the identifiability effect, which refer to: (1) ex ante contractualism; (2) fair distribution of chances and risks; (3) (...) anti-aggregationist principles that recommend the distribution of bad effects and the concentration of good ones. I will show that these arguments, although connected with interesting philosophical problems regarding e.g. counterfactuals, aggregation, or probability, are unconvincing. (shrink)

Here, we discuss historical, philosophical and technical problems associated with relating logic and relating semantics. To do so, we proceed in three steps. First, Section 1 is devoted to providing an introduction to both relating logic and relating semantics. Second, we address the history of relating semantics and some of the main research directions and their philosophical applications. Third, we discuss some technical problems related to relating semantics, particularly whether the direct incorporation of the relation into the language of relating (...) logic is needed. The starting point for our considerations presented here is the 1st Workshop On Relating Logic and the selected papers for this issue. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct and correct one argument in support of the symmetrization postulate in quantum mechanics. I identify the central premise of the argument as a thesis specifying a particular ontic property of quantum superpositions. The precise form of this thesis depends on some underlying assumptions of a metaphysical character. I compare the exchange degeneracy argument with alternative formal arguments for the symmetrization postulate, and I discuss the role and meaning of labels in the symmetric/antisymmetric (...) representations of the states of many particles. (shrink)

The article proves that the term mouseion used by Plato in Phaedrus 278b cannot mean “sanctuary/shrine of the Muses” here, but it probably refers to the cicadas chirping under the plane tree of which Socrates speaks earlier in the dialogue (259b-c). Such an interpretation is consistent with our knowledge of the early stage of development of the concept of mouseion, and also with its use elsewhere in Plato’s dialogue (267b). It should therefore be concluded that the cult of the Muses (...) at the Ilissus, known from late testimonies, did not come from the classical era and appeared under the influence of reading Plato’s dialogue. Plato’s testimony should also not be raised as an important argument in disputes regarding the relationship of the nymphs and the Muses and the early identification of the Muses with water. (shrink)

Incorporating normality ascriptions into counterfactual theories of causation was supposed to handle isomorphs. It doesn’t—conjoining isomorphs can produce cases that such ascriptions cannot resolve.

“If the tower is any taller than 320 ms, it may collapse,” Eiffel thinks out loud. Although understanding this counterfactual poses no trouble, the most successful interventionist semantics struggle to model it because the antecedent can come about in infinitely many ways. My aim is to provide a semantics that will make modeling such counterfactuals easy for philosophers, computer scientists, and cognitive scientists who work on causation and causal reasoning. I first propose three desiderata that will guide my theory: it (...) should be general, yet conservative, yet useful. Next, I develop a formalization of events in the form of an algebra. I identify an event with all the ways in which it can be brought about and provide rules for determining the referent of an arbitrary event description. I apply this algebra to counterfactuals expressed using underdeterministic causal models-models that encode non-probabilistic causal indeterminacies. Specifically, I develop semaphore interventions, which represent how the target system may be modified from without in a coordinated fashion. This, in turn, allows me to bring about any event within a single model. Finally, I explain the advantages of this semantics over other interventionist competitors. (shrink)

Cet article vise à présenter les principales étapes de l’histoire des traductions polonaises des dialogues de Platon, qui sont intimement liées à l’histoire de la Pologne et à la renaissance de la vie académique dans l’entre-deux-guerres. L’attention se porte en particulier sur les travaux de traductions de F.A. Kozłowski, A. Bronikowski, S. Lisiecki et W. Witwicki, qui représentaient diverses approches et appliquaient des méthodes différentes pour rendre les textes de Platon en polonais. Le développement de cette série de dialogues accessibles (...) au public polonais dans différentes traductions a suscité des discussions sur les méthodes mêmes pour rendre Platon. Chaque nouveau dialogue était discuté et examine par les philologues classiques, les enseignants, les spécialistes de littérature, et même les théologiens, et seulement accessoirement par les philosophes. Bien que de nouvelles traductions de Platon commencent de plus en plus à apparaître, les productions anciennes, en particulier celles de Witwicki, restent populaires et sont encore largement lues. (shrink)

In the paper, we examine tableau systems for R. Epstein’s logics of content relationship: D (Dependence Logic), DD (Dual Dependence Logic), Eq (Logic of Equality of Content), S (Symmetric Relatedness Logic) and R (Nonsymmetric Relatedness Logic) (cf. Epstein in Philos Stud 36:137–173, 1979, Epstein in Rep. Math. Logic 21:19–34, 1987, Klonowski in Logic Log Philos 30(4):579–629, 2021, Krajewski in J Non Class Logic 8:7–33, 1991). The first tableau systems for those logics were defined by Carnielli. However, his approach has some (...) limitations, for example, it requires a proof of functional completeness and axiomatization. Notwithstanding the first two constraints, it does not include all Epstein logics, e.g., logic Eq. Unlike Carnielli’s approach, here we use set-assignment semantics to determine those logics. Since syntax and semantics of a given logic usually determine a minimal syntax and structure of a tableau system for the logic along with other properties, we propose a uniform tableau framework for the logics determined by set-assignment semantics. What distinguishes our tableau systems is that they combine the features of tableaux for propositional logics and syllogistic logics when the problem of content of propositions is analysed in tableau proofs. To denote the content of propositions in the proofs, we use generalised labels (see Jarmużek and Goré in Landscapes in Logic, College Publications, London, 2021). (shrink)

In the late 2010s, various international committees, expert groups, and national strategy boards have voiced the demand to ‘open’ the algorithmic black box, to audit, expound, and demystify artificial intelligence. The opening of the algorithmic black box, however, cannot be seen only as an engineering challenge. In this article, I argue that only the sort of transparency that arises from critique—a method of theoretical examination that, by revealing pre-existing power structures, aims to challenge them—can help us produce technological systems that (...) are less deceptive and more just. I relate the question of AI transparency to the broader challenge of responsible making, contending that future action must aim to systematically reconcile design—as a way of concealing—with critique—as a manner of revealing. (shrink)

According to constitutive reductionism of Derek Parfit, a subject/person is not a separate existing being but his existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, performance of actions, thinking and occurrence of other physical and mental events. The identity of the subject in time comes down only to “Relation R” - mental consistency and/or connectedness – elicited by appropriate reasons. In the following article, I will try, relying on Frank Johnson's Knowledge Argument, to argue in favour of the (...) following conclusions: a person/subject is a “fact”irreducible to body and physical relations with the environment and a subject is something/”fact” non-reducible to mental occurrences. (shrink)

My paper builds on the conceptual tools from three interrelated philosophical debates that—as I believe—may help structure important if chaotic discussions about surrogates for living human brains and resolve some practical issues related to regulatory matters. In particular, I refer to the discussions about the “moral precautionary principle” in research ethics (Koplin and Wilkinson 2019); about normative uncertainty in ethics (MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord 2020), and about the inductive risk problem for animal welfare scientists (Birch 2018). I elucidate upon the (...) possible meanings of the phrase “a too good human brain surrogate” used by Henry T. Greely (2021), and I demonstrate that the evaluation of the practical and regulatory implications of the “goodness” of such surrogates created for research purposes should be sensitive to the possible consequences of two types of errors: the under-attribution and over-attribution of moral status to such beings. Many authors writing about this topic (including Greely 2021, but see also, e.g., Koplin and Savulescu 2019) concentrate only on the first type of error, neglecting the negative consequences of the second type, i.e., over-attribution. (shrink)

According to the New Angle, any explanation of the Knobe effect must be gradable and asymmetric. It has been argued that only Hindriks’ approach meets both criteria. First, we argue that Holton’s hypothesis also meets the criteria. Second, we show that the authors are not justified in taking the criteria to be empirically justified. We have failed to replicate the asymmetry result in two experiments. Moreover, gradability can be objective or epistemic. We show that the New Angle presupposes objective gradability. (...) In our experiments, the patterns of responses to questions about epistemic and objective gradability are the same, irrespective of whether the feature is objectively gradable (e.g., blameworthiness) or not (e.g., intentionality). Our results thus question the extent to which the New Angle is empirically grounded. Moreover, they raise doubt whether the answers to questions about epistemic and objective gradability can be taken at face value at all. (shrink)

One can often hear that intuitions are standardly “appealed to”, “relied on”, “accounted for”, or “used as evidence” in ethics. How should we interpret these claims? I argue that the typical understanding is what Bernard Molyneux calls “descriptive evidentialism”: the idea that intuition-states are treated as evidence of their propositional contents in the context of justification. I then argue that descriptive evidentialism is false- on any account of what intuitions are. That said, I admit that ethicists frequently rely on intuitions (...) to clarify, persuade, discover, or to support things other than the intuitions’ contents. The contents of intuitions are also commonly used as starting premises of philosophical arguments. However claims about these practices need to be sharply distinguished from the prevalent dogma. (shrink)

Już od blisko 50 lat etyka medyczna realizowana jako odrębny przedmiot znajduje się w programach kształcenia studentów medycyny. W trakcie wieloletnich dyskusji o formach i treściach takiego nauczania wykształciły się dwa, alternatywne modele nauczania etyki medycznej. Pierwszy model – aplikacyjny traktuje nauczanie etyki, jako etyki stosowanej, w ramach tradycyjnego modelu akademickiego. Przybiera on formę wiedzy podawanej na wykładach i utrwalanej w trakcie seminariów. Drugi model nauczania etyki – transformacyjny ma na celu ukształtowanie moralnego lekarza. Metody stosowane w kształceniu etycznym lekarzy (...) nie są jednomyślnie zaakceptowane przez wszystkie uczelnie medyczne i wciąż trwają poszukiwania najskuteczniejszego sposobu nauczania etyki. Idealnym rozwiązaniem byłoby nauczania etyki zintegrowane z nauczaniem klinicznym, lecz nie jest to w praktyce nigdzie osiągalne. Postuluje się aby nauczanie to było skupione na zdefiniowanych wynikach nauczania i stosowało sprawdzone metody nauczania i zwalidowane metody oceny. Nauczanie etyki medycznej wciąż nie dopracowało się jednolitego powszechnie zaakceptowanego standardu. Wynika to zarówno z braku uniwersalnej teorii etyki medycznej, jak i braku dowodów na skuteczność jakiekolwiek modelu edukacji etycznej. (shrink)

Człowieczeństwo to pojęcie, które oznacza cechy wspólne dla wszystkich ludzi, w tym ogół takich, które stanowią o różnicy gatunkowej pomiędzy człowiekiem a zwierzętami. Problem ten podejmował Jerzy Chmurzyński, entomolog, etolog i filozof, „ojciec polskiej etologii”, zadając pytanie: ile człowieka jest w zwierzęciu? Perspektywa badawcza etologii, przyjmując paradygmat ewolucyjny, obejmuje wszelkie organizmy żywe, zdolne do zachowania się. Artykuł przedstawia etologiczne ujęcie natury ludzkiej przez Chmurzyńskiego i formułowane na tej podstawie wnioski antropologiczne, etyczne i estetyczne. To ujęcie ukazuje z jednej strony zakorzenienie (...) człowieka w świecie przyrody, a z drugiej takie cechy jego natury, nabyte w procesie ewolucji, które sprawiają, że człowiek przerasta poziom biologiczny. Wśród tych cech można wyróżnić: myślenie abstrakcyjne, język, etykę, estetykę i kulturę. Jerzy Chmurzyński, ukazując biologiczne korzenie człowieczeństwa, pomaga lepiej zrozumieć, co to znaczy: „być sobą w swojej ludzkiej naturze”. Wnioski w ten sposób formułowane stanowią formę „biologicznych drogowskazów”, które, mając uniwersalny charakter, mogą wzmocnić tradycyjny system etyczny, przeciwstawiając się zagrożeniu w postaci dewiacji zachowań Homo sapiens. --------------------- Zgłoszono: 17/12/2021. Zrecenzowano: 04/02/2022. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 11/04/2022. (shrink)

Das vorliegende Buch unternimmt den Versuch, die polnische Platon-Rezeption einem breiten Publikum zugänglich zu machen. Die Jahre 1800–1950 umfassen die Schwerpunkte der Geschichte der polnischen Philosophie: Die Rezeption westlicher philosophischer Strömungen, die Entwicklung der Lemberg-Warschauer Schule, des Neo-Messianismus und der Neo-Scholastik. Das Buch erörtert, wie diese Phänomene in der modernen polnischen Philosophie zur Interpretation von Platon beigetragen haben.

Summary This contribution contains a critical re-assessment of the earliest archaeological material originating from the Valley of the Muses, i.e. archaic vessels and figurines, two examples of hydriai allegedly linked with the Muses, and an iconographic testimony. In the current historiography, these sources are still considered to confirm the archaic, or even earlier, origin of the cult of the Muses at the foot of Mount Helicon. An analysis of testimonies is complemented with an overview of a broader cultural context (i.e. (...) the musical agones, the Muses and nymphs and the emergence of the cult of poets/intellectuals); this enables us to assess the sources and chronological considerations. Conclusions drawn from the re-assessment of testimonies are of key importance not only to the dating of the cult of the Muses at this site, but also to our assessment of the phenomenon of the cult of these goddesses in the Greek world in general. (shrink)

In this article, I present a new interpretation of the pro-life view on the status of early human embryos. In my understanding, this position is based not on presumptions about the ontological status of embryos and their developmental capabilities but on the specific criteria of rational decisions under uncertainty and on a cautious response to the ambiguous status of embryos. This view, which uses the decision theory model of moral reasoning, promises to reconcile the uncertainty about the ontological status of (...) embryos with the certainty about normative obligations. I will demonstrate that my interpretation of the pro-life view, although seeming to be stronger than the standard one, has limited scope and cannot be used to limit destructive research on human embryos. (shrink)

Deutsch 2010 (The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1: 447–460) claims that hypothetical scenarios are evaluated using arguments, not intuitions, and therefore experiments on intuitions are philosophically inconsequential. Using the Gettier case as an example, he identifies three arguments that are supposed to point to the right response to the case. In the paper, I present the results of studies ran on Polish, Indian, Spanish, and American participants that suggest that there’s no deep difference between evaluating the Gettier case with (...) intuitions and evaluating it with Deutsch’s arguments. Specifically, I argue that one would find these arguments persuasive if and only if one is already disposed to exhibit the relevant intuition. (shrink)

In the paper a generalised method for obtaining an adequate axiomatic system for any relating logic expressed in the language with Boolean connectives and relating implication, determined by the limited positive relational properties is studied. The method of defining axiomatic systems for logics of a given type is called an algorithm since the analysis allows for any logic determined by the limited positive relational properties to define the adequate axiomatic system automatically, step-by-step. We prove in the paper that the algorithm (...) really works and we show how it can be applied to BLRI. (shrink)