In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45, which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction over the California Dental Association ; and the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court (...) unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns. (shrink)

Legal minds have utilized the principle of double effect as proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas for centuries to shape legal authority in cases where moral judgment and legal reasoning meet. The U.S. Supreme Court had uti­lized double-effect reasoning in the realm of self-defense cases. This article discusses more recent use of double-effect reasoning in the landmark Supreme Court case Vacco v. Quill and its companion case, Washington v. Glucksberg. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the (...) class='Hi'>Court in Vacco, introduced double-effect reasoning to identify the distinctions between palliative care and assisted suicide in an effort to uphold the constitutionality of the ban on assisted suicide in New York. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.1 (Spring 2011): 41–48. (shrink)

The U.S. Supreme Court held, in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 988, that state workers’ compensation system insurers cannot be sued for withholding health care benefits for work-related injuries while they decide whether the treatment is “reasonable” and “necessary.” The respondents, ten employees and two organizations representing employees who received medical benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against state officials, the Pennsylvania State Workers’ Insurance Fund, (...) private insurers, and the school district, alleging that their due process rights were violated by provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1 et seq.. The Act permits suspension of benefits without notice or opportunity to be heard pursuant to a “utilization review” process.To control costs, Pennsylvania amended its workers’ compensation system in 1993. Under the Act, an employer or its insurer must pay for all reasonable and necessary medical treatment. (shrink)

On June 18, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court in the matter of Amgen, Inc. et al. v. Sanofi, et al.1 unanimously upheld the 2021 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,2 striking down as overbroad Amgen’s patent claim to an entire functional genus of monoclonal antibodies. Amgen’s patent claims were not limited to antibody structure or antibody amino acid sequences. This is significant because Amgen’s patent claims did have amino acid sequences, but they (...) were directed to the epitope. (shrink)

Natural law, as a school of jurisprudence or a means to decide or consider legal cases, is considered by some as nothing more than an emotive reminiscence and by others as a foundational system upon which legal reasoning must depend.

Recently, the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Tega Esabunor v Faweya & Ors (2019) LPELR 46961 (SC) dismissed an appeal seeking to quash the order of a magistrate court for the transfusion of blood to a baby. The appellants contended that the court had no jurisdiction to make theorder. The crux of the case was whether the parents’ right to consent to the child’s treatment based on religious beliefs supersedes the child’s right to live, thus reflecting (...) the tension between a parent’s right to give consent to the choice of treatment for their child, and the court’s power to override such rights through the inherent parens patriae jurisdiction of the state. The case also reflects the tension between the freedom of a parent to practise their religion and the right of a child to live, in the medical context. This article examines the findings of the Supreme Court in Tega Esabunor’s case, considering whether the court’s decision is in line with the generally accepted practice on when the state can intervene if persons with parental responsibility refuse medical treatment for an incompetent child because of religious beliefs.Cases from other jurisdictions are analysed to ascertain the position of foreign courts. It is submitted that the Supreme Court’s judgmentreflects accepted international practice regarding parental refusal of consent for medical treatment of a child. (shrink)

Recent critics of the Roberts Court chide it for its lack of regard for precedent. Fred Schauer faults these critics for erroneously assuming that a rule of stare decisis formerly played a significant role in the Supreme Court's decision-making. In fact, it has long played only a rare and weak role in the Court's work. Nonetheless, according to Schauer, the critics are to be thanked for invigorating a needed debate about the importance of "stability, consistency, settlement, (...) reliance, notice, and predictability" in the Court's decisions. This article argues that Schauer exaggerates the weakness of stare decisis in the Court's practices; and that his call for a public debate on the merits of the norm of stare decisis can only weaken it. (shrink)

Philosophy professor Bryan Hilliard begins this unusual medical ethics textbook, composed of selections from U.S. Supreme Court cases, commentaries, and discussion questions, by addressing a questi...

Philosophy professor Bryan Hilliard begins this unusual medical ethics textbook, composed of selections from U.S. Supreme Court cases, commentaries, and discussion questions, by addressing a questi...

(1996). Centrifugal states and Centripetal Courts: Early state reaction to European Court of Justice (1958–1994) and U.S. Supreme Court (1789–1860) The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 703-709.

The purpose of this paper is to address the question of whethercomputer source code is speech protected by the First Amendmentto the United States Constitution or whether it is merelyfunctional, a ``machine'', designed to fulfill a set task andtherefore bereft of protection. The answer to this question is acomplex one. Unlike all other forms of ``speech'' computer sourcecode holds a unique place in the law: it can be copyrighted, likea book and it can be patented like a machine or process.Case (...) law, intellectual property law and encryption exportregulations all reflect this contradictory dichotomy. (shrink)

The Israeli Supreme Court has become increasingly polarized between liberal and conservative judges. This phenomenon is relatively new to the Israeli Supreme Court and follows the much older and more well-known example of the U.S. Supreme Court. This article surveys both U.S. and Israeli court polarization and shows the history, reasons, and special features of polarization of both courts, including the important differences between them. It also adds a distinction to existing literature on (...) court polarization—the distinction between court polarization and politicization, and especially the distinction between “regular” polarization and “one-side” polarization. Regular court polarization happens when the court is divided roughly equally between the two main political contenders. One-side polarization happens when there is a clear advantage to one side of the political map in the make-up of the court. The current U.S. Supreme Court, with six conservative justices and only three liberal justices, is an example of one-side court polarization that is tilted to the right. The current Israeli Supreme Court is an example for one-side court polarization tilted to the left; there are 10 liberal judges and only five conservative judges on the court. The article’s main argument is that one-side court polarization presents a particularly vexing problem for the legitimacy of the court, even more so than “regular” polarization. The article concludes with a survey of possible solutions to help Israel retract itself from one-side court polarization. (shrink)

On January 11, 2024, the United Kingdom (U.K.) Supreme Court rendered its judgment in _Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust_, restricting the circumstances in which “secondary victims” can successfully claim for damages in clinical negligence cases. This ruling has provided welcome clarity regarding the scope of negligently caused “pure” psychiatric illness claims, but the judgment may well prove controversial. In this article, I trace the facts and opinion from the majority and also discuss an important dissenting opinion. I (...) then reflect on what the ruling means for psychiatric illness claims by secondary victims, and more broadly on the implications for clinical negligence law. I suggest that while much-needed clarity has been injected in this area of the law, it is difficult, reading the majority of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the restricted scope of a medical practitioner’s duty, to envision a scenario in which secondary victim could ever succeed in a clinical negligence context. (shrink)

Note: The author holds the copyright, and there was no agreement, express or implied, not to use a facsimile PDF. -/- Using erotetic logic, the paper defines the "the whole truth" in a manner consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. It cannot mean "the whole story," as witnesses in an adversary system are permitted /only/ to answer the questions put to them, nor are they permitted to speculate, add irrelevant material, etc. Nor can it mean not to add (...) an admixture of falsity, as that is already included in "nothing but the truth," and, strictly speaking, in "the truth," as any such as admixture renders the whole thing false (given bivalence is presupposed) by &-introduction. (shrink)

The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Until recently, no federal appellate court had ever struck down any gun law as a violation of the Second Amendment. In fact, even laws outlawing most handgun possession, or restricting other types of firearms, had been upheld, in part, because the laws did not interfere (...) with the functioning of state militias.Then, in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court — for the first time in nearly 70 years — decided a case squarely addressing the meaning of the Second Amendment. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to own handguns in the home, invalidating a Washington, D.C. law.But Heller left many issues undecided, including the precise scope of the Second Amendment. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in the same-sex marriage caseObergefell v. Hodgesas the springboard for a general enquiry into the nature and existence of a constitutional right to liberty under the American Constitution. The discussion is divided into two main parts. The first examines the meaning and the justifiability of there being a moral right to liberty as a matter of political philosophy. Two such rights are distinguished and defended: first, a right not to (...) be coerced by the state when the state is motivated by improper reasons ; and second, a right not to be coerced by the state when there are insufficient justifying reasons for the state to do so, irrespective of how such state coercion may be motivated. Neither right is regarded as “absolute,” and so it is morally permissible for the state to override such rights in certain circumstances. The second part of the article examines the distinct and additional considerations that must be taken into account when these two moral rights to liberty are fashioned into corresponding legal rights under American constitutional law. Both such rights survive the transformation, but each becomes altered somewhat in its content. This legal transformation includes recognition of the nonabsolute nature of moral rights, such recognition taking the form of some doctrine of “compelling state interests.” The discussion in these two main parts of the article is prefaced with a defense of the article's use of political philosophy to inform constitutional law, a defense motivated by Chief Justice Robert's denunciation of such an approach to constitutional law in his opinion inObergefell. (shrink)

The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, a post-Civil War law inspired by cases of defense contracting fraud, was revitalized in 1986. Since then it has been used to sue both manufacturers and providers of pharmaceuticals. In some cases, these suits were meant to target offlabel marketing of pharmaceuticals. In 2009, the 11th Circuit rendered a decision in Hopper v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals that dramatically limits the ability of private plaintiff whistle-blowers to bring qui tam suits under the FCA (...) for such marketing. In June 2010, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, making the Circuit court decision final. The Solvay decision creates a significant barrier to certain kinds of qui tam suits, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the intent to market off-label, including by showing specific prescriptions that were written as a result of efforts to do so. (shrink)

Over the past two decades ethics committees have proliferated in healthcare institutions across the country. Catalysts for this growth include the endorsement of ethics committees by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Quinlan case, by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Research in its report entitled Deciding to Forgo Life Sustaining Medical Treatment, by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in its 1985 “Baby Doe” regulations, by numerous other (...) courts in treatment decisionmaking opinions issued after Quinlan, and more recently by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. (shrink)

The most remarkable thing about the U.S. Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Bragdon v. Abbott was that it was necessary at all. Seventeen years into the epidemic of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, the Supreme Court, by a mere 5-4 majority, finally affirmed what most public health officials, health providers, and lawyers working with people with human immunodeficiency virus believed all along: that individuals with HIV infection are entitled to the protections of antidiscrimination law, and that health (...) care providers must respond to a patient's infection based on reason and science, not fear and prejudice. For individuals with HIV, and for those with other disabilities, the Court's ruling was a critical victory. But the very fact that the issues had to be decided by the Supreme Court and that only five justices joined the majority, shows the fragility of legal rights pertaining to HIV as well as the wide gulf between the perspectives of public health and those of public law. (shrink)

By lopsided majorities, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of cases, persistently commanded the lower courts to condition the admission of proffered expert testimony on the demonstrated validity of the proponents’ claims of expertise. In at least one broad area–the so-called forensic sciences–the courts below have largely evaded the Supreme Court's holdings. This paper aims to try to explain this massive defiance by the lower courts in terms of social epistemology.

The most remarkable thing about the U.S. Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Bragdon v. Abbott was that it was necessary at all. Seventeen years into the epidemic of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, the Supreme Court, by a mere 5-4 majority, finally affirmed what most public health officials, health providers, and lawyers working with people with human immunodeficiency virus believed all along: that individuals with HIV infection are entitled to the protections of antidiscrimination law, and that health (...) care providers must respond to a patient's infection based on reason and science, not fear and prejudice. For individuals with HIV, and for those with other disabilities, the Court's ruling was a critical victory. But the very fact that the issues had to be decided by the Supreme Court and that only five justices joined the majority, shows the fragility of legal rights pertaining to HIV as well as the wide gulf between the perspectives of public health and those of public law. (shrink)

Almost everyone involved in the legal profession today is aware of the wide, and perhaps insurmountable, chasm between the scholarly research that takes place in elite law schools and the actual work of practicing lawyers and judges. To a greater extent than other academic professions like medicine and public health, law professors too often have little to say to working lawyers and judges, even those judges on the U.S. Supreme Court. Perhaps this has been the case from the (...) beginning, but the gap appears more dramatic in recent decades, as legal scholarship has departed from traditional doctrinal analysis and moved in more interdisciplinary and abstract theoretical directions. (shrink)

. On June 13, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, holding that a naturally occurring DNA segment that has merely been “isolated” is not patent eligible, and effectively overturning a longstanding policy that had allowed for patents to be issued on thousands of human genes. Drawing largely on the expert testimony and arguments presented during the court proceedings, this paper provides an overview of the discovery and patenting (...) of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes at issue in the case, the impacts of gene patents on biomedical research and innovation and clinical practice, and the legal analysis presented by the plaintiffs throughout the case for how patents issued on genes violate the Patent Act and the U.S. Constitution. Finally, it discusses how the Court’s decision in this case marked an extraordinary victory not only for the plaintiffs directly involved, but more generally for women, patients, researchers, civil liberties, and the future of medicine. (shrink)

This study explored relations between willingness to disclose in 5 psychotherapy scenarios and 2 independent variables. Scenarios involved suicidal, gravely disabled, physically abusive, and sexually abusive patients, and a police officer patient who shot a suspect. For each of the 5 scenarios, participants in the privilege condition had significantly higher willingness-to-disclose scores than participants in the no-privilege condition. There were no significant differences between willingness-to-disclose scores of participants with and without therapy experience; neither was there a significant interaction between privilege (...) condition and therapy experience. Privilege condition was more predictive of willingness to disclose than personal characteristics or therapy experience. Results provide empirical support for the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond. (shrink)

By lopsided majorities, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of cases, persistently commanded the lower courts to condition the admission of proffered expert testimony on the demonstrated validity of the proponents’ claims of expertise. In at least one broad area – the so-called forensic sciences – the courts below have largely evaded the Supreme Court's holdings. This paper aims to try to explain this massive defiance by the lower courts in terms of social epistemology.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that a parody by the rap group 2 Live Crew of Ray Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman" was "fair use" and thus did not infringe the copyright. Although the court insisted that it was not evaluating the quality of the parody, I argue that it does in fact make several aesthetic evaluations and sometimes even seems to praise the content of the parody. I first consider the stated reasons for the claimed (...) refusal of the court to evaluate aesthetic quality. Second, I examine the evaluations which the court in fact does make, at least some of which are clearly aesthetic evaluations. I then argue that aesthetic value judgments are both necessary and possible for determinations of "fair use" for such works as the "Pretty Woman" parody. (shrink)

In 2001, Betty Dukes, then a 54‐year‐old African American, filed suit against her employer, Wal‐Mart, alleging that she had been the victim of gender discrimination. Ms. Dukes alleged that Wal‐Mart, the nation's largest private employer, routinely paid women less than men for comparable work and arbitrarily favored men over women in promotion decisions. In 2004, a U.S. District Court entered an order granting class certification, potentially extending the retailer's financial liability to thousands of current and past Wal‐Mart employees. At (...) that time, the Wal‐Mart suit was the largest class action lawsuit ever approved in the United States. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia cited Wal‐Mart's long‐standing explicit gender‐neutral employment policy and the decentralized manner in which local managers have discretion to adjust salaries and recommend applicants for promotion—factors that led the majority to question “the glue” binding the class together. Proponents of the Court's decision hailed the ruling as a victory for business and a step in the direction of needed legal reform. Critics viewed the decision as another in a series of defeats for minority interests by a pro‐business, ideologically divided Court. Did the Court get it right, or is this yet another example of might defeating right? (shrink)

The Supreme Court decided Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky in 2019. Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion in the case claimed there was a direct connection between the legalization of abortion, in the late 20th Century, and the beginnings of the birth control movement a full three quarters of a century earlier. “Many eugenicists,” Thomas argued, “supported legalizing abortion.”Justice Samuel Alito highlighted similar claims in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, citing a brief entitled “The Eugenic Era Lives (...) on through the Abortion Movement.” That brief was an echo of Justice Thomas’ misguided attempt at history in the Box opinion. Similar claims reoccur in Judge Matthew Kacsmaryk’s opinion in the Texas mifepristone case, Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration.These false claims are the focus of this article. There is no evidence that early leaders of the eugenics movement supported abortion as part of the movement for birth control. It is accurate to describe those leaders as anti-abortion, and their followers as people who condemned abortion for moral, legal, and medical reasons. (shrink)

In the United States, a longstanding legal rule exists against patenting natural phenomena. The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to help define the boundaries and clarify the implications of this “natural phenomenon doctrine” in Laboratory Corporation of America v. Metabolite Labs., dismissed as improvidently granted. This article argues that the natural phenomenon doctrine renders both the patent claim at issue in LabCorp, and the patents that directly or indirectly claim biological correlations between genotypes and medical phenotypes, invalid (...) or unenforceable under U.S. patent law. (shrink)

In Barrett v. Danbury Hospital ), the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the fear of contracting or transmitting HIV or any other blood-borne pathogens is not a compensable injury and does not give rise to a negligence or a medical malpractice claim. The court's decision affirmed the holding of a Connecticut trial court.In June 1990, Allen Barrett was admitted to Danbury Hospital complaining of abdominal pain. He had a history of gall bladder trouble. Barrett was (...) placed on a stretcher in the emergency room. The attending physician diagnosed Barrett's pain as a gallstone condition. During the course of his examination, the doctor noticed that Barrett was sitting in blood. The physician subsequently performed a rectal examination of Barrett to locate the source of the blood. The physician determined that the patient was not bleeding, but that the blood was in fact coming from two slits in the vinyl pad that covered the stretcher on which Barrett sat. (shrink)

In a recent 5‐to‐4 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada denied to Harvard University a patent on a genetically modified mouse. In their reasoning, the majority Justices, concerned obviously about the implications of granting the patent for the human case, argue that higher organisms (mammals) are not “compositions of matter” in the sense intended by the Canadian Patent Act. But if a mouse is not a composition of matter, what—indeed, what on earth—is it? As the minority Justices complain, (...) the majority decision smacks of dubious metaphysics and theology. Appealing to a quite unlikely source, the Bible, I show that the distinction between mice and men can be defended without introducing problematic metaphysical and question‐begging theological materials. I also show, en route, that the biblical position on the special status of men and women is not inconsistent with evolutionary theory. Granting a patent on the mouse (as was done in the U.S.A.) is compatible with denying it to human organisms. (shrink)

This article presents the new German law on advance directives from 1 September 2009. The history of the parliamentary process of this law is described, the present regulations are explained, their relevance for medical practice discussed and shortcomings are identified. Finally, the new law is compared with other regulations in the international context. Previously established legal practice in Germany has now become largely confirmed by the new law: An advanced directive must be respected in any decision concerning medical treatment, regardless (...) of the stage of the illness. It can be informally revoked at any time, even with limited decision-making capacity. Nobody may be obliged to issue a directive in any way. Advance directives do not need notarisation or routine updating after certain time intervals. Provided that the patient, who is no longer mentally competent, has issued a lasting power of attorney, or provided that the patient has been appointed a healthcare proxy by the courts, this authorised surrogate must assert the patient's will. The role of the guardianship court is clarified: it only needs to be involved in cases of disagreement as to the patient's will. The new German law thus combines more legal certainty with a liberal emphasis on patient autonomy and flexible, adaptable regulations. (shrink)

The papers collected in the present volume arose from a 2009 seminar organized by the Society of Legal Scholars and the University of Birmingham, and convened at the Law Society’s Hall in Bristol, England. The seminar, “Judges and Jurists: Reflections on the House of Lords,” commemorated the centenary of the Society; and it chiefly focused on the transition from the House of Lords, as the U.K.’s court of final appeals, to the prospects of the newly instituted United Kingdom (...) class='Hi'>Supreme Court. “The aim of the volume,” according to the book-jacket description, “is to reflect upon the jurisprudence of the House of Lords and to consider the prospects for judging in the new Supreme Court.” Given the aims of the Society of Legal Scholars, considerable focus is placed on the relationship between the work of judges and that of scholars of law and jurisprudence. The book pervasively highlights the continuing voice of the scholars. Though their writings have no legal authority, the volume’s editor remarks in his Introduction that in 2009, “in six out of the seven final decisions of the House, reference was made to academic literature” (p. 2). (shrink)

Examining the psychology of Supreme Court decision-making, this book seeks to understand almost all aspects of the Supreme Court's functioning from a psychological perspective. It addresses many factors of influence, including the background of the justices, how they are nominated and appointed, the role of their law clerks, and more.

Heath services come with the promise of confidentiality.1 The ethical mandate to safeguard the confidentiality of personal health information aligns with legal mandates to do the same. Numerous state and federal laws demand one form of health data confidentiality or another, best illustrated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.2 In early 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services decided to take a tougher stand against HIPAA violators, utilizing powers created by the Health Information Technology for Economic and (...) Clinical Health Act.3 Ushering in a new era, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services imposed an unprecedented civil penalty of $4.3 million on Cignet Health of .. (shrink)

The original text of the Constitution of the United States of America, written over 200 years ago, constitutes the supreme source of law in the American legal system. The seven articles and twenty seven amendments dictate understanding of fundamental principles of the federation’s functioning and its citizens’ rights. The paper aims to present the evolution of the U.S. Constitution’s language interpretation as provided by its final interpreter - the Supreme Court of the United States. Example of the (...) Second Amendment will be analyzed to present the change in understanding of the language grammar and, as a consequence, the sense of the right to keep and bear arms in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of District of Columbia v Heller ). It will argue for the accuracy of statement of Charles Evans Hughes, former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court: “We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is...”. (shrink)

The 2000 U.S. presidential election was one of the most bizarre and fateful in American history. Described in books as a “deadlock,” “thriller,” “the perfect tie,” and even “Grand Theft 2000,” studies of the election have dissected its anomalies and scandals and have attempted to describe and explain what actually happened.1 In this study, I will analyze how the turn toward media politics and spectacle in U.S. political campaigns and the curious and arguably archaic system of proportional voting in the (...) U.S. tilted the campaign toward George W. Bush and were prejudicial to the election of Al Gore. Gore received over 540,000 votes more than Bush, but because of the U.S. system of proportional voting won less electoral votes and lost the crucial state of Florida. In this chapter, I will argue that media representation of the two candidates and the anomalies of the U.S. system of proportional representation in an arguably archaic Election College were major factors in the highly controversial ascent to the presidency of George W. Bush. Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court decision directly decided the election results and the story of Election 2000 is highly complex and contested. Yet focus on the media in the election and problems with the system of proportional representation provide revealing lenses on the events of the 2000 election and call attention to major problems in the U.S. system of representational democracy. (shrink)

Drawing on themes important in moral and political philosophy, much of the scholarship on the constitutional law of privacy in the United States distinguishes between privacy understood as a person's control over information and privacy understood as a person's ability to make autonomous decisions. For example, Katz v. United States established the framework for analyzing whether police activity constituted a “search” subject to the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the police either obtain a warrant before conducting a search or otherwise act (...) reasonably. The defendant was a professional gambler who knew enough about police techniques to use a public telephone to make his business calls. Police agents attached a listening device to the outside of the phone booth, and sought to use the recordings against the defendant. The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that the Fourth Amendment had been violated. Justice John Marshall Harlan's influential concurring opinion asserted that a person's privacy, in the sense of control over information, depended on two factors: “that a person have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Fourth Amendment cases like Katz involve informational control; they define the circumstances under which the government may acquire information from or about a person without first obtaining the person's agreement. In contrast, cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, which barred the state from making it a criminal offense to use contraceptives, and Roe v. Wade, which restricted the state's power to prohibit or regulate abortions, used the language of privacy rights to protect a much broader interest in autonomous decision-making. Seeing these cases and related ones through lenseees provided by moral and political philosophy, scholars have attempted to describe what a morally sound constitutional law of privacy would be, and the broadest sense, dworkinian. That is, they seek to provide an account of privacy with two characteristics: it is broadly consistent with the relevant constitutional decisions, and it is the most morally attractive account possible that satisfies the requirement of consistency with the decisions. (shrink)

January 21, 2010 will go down as a dark day in the history of American democracy, and its decline. The editors of the New York Times did not exaggerate when they wrote that the Supreme Court decision that day "strikes at the heart of democracy" by having "paved the way for corporations to use their vast treasuries to overwhelm elections and intimidate elected officials into doing their bidding" -- more explicitly, for permitting corporate managers to do so, since (...) current laws permit them to spend shareholder money without consent. (shrink)