A cidade do Rio de Janeiro é considerada um centro difusor de moda, inovações, modismos, cultura. Até mesmo quem nunca colocou os pés na cidade tem um julgamento a respeito dos estilos de vida locais e de seus habitantes. Sede de um dos principais eventos do calendário brasileiro de lançamentos, o Fashion Rio, é do Rio que saem as maiores tendências da temporada primavera-verão. O objetivo deste artigo é analisar as representações da cidade, dos seus habitantes e dos estilos de (...) vidas locais por meio das fotografias que circulam nas principais publicações de moda; imagens essas que repercutem no imaginário visual brasileiro, através das mediações exercidas pelos meios de comunicação. (shrink)

In this article, the author compares two Spanish translations of Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own. Taking into account that Spanish is a language in which words referring to human beings have a feminine and a masculine form, and grammatical gender corresponds to sex, all translators must interrogate the sex of the referent in order to translate gendered words. They are thus compelled to assign sex to genderless forms in the source text. Patriarchal translation has a long tradition (...) of devaluing and excluding the feminine in this process, as the author demonstrates here by revealing how Jorge Luis Borges translated the pronouns you and we in Woolf’s essay. In contrast, in her feminist translation of the essay, María Milagros Rivera-Garretas not only chooses the gender which most accurately represents the likely intended meaning of the source text, but recovers its message and legacy. (shrink)

In order to understand why Orlando was not published in Spain until 1977, almost forty years after the original publication in England, the Francoist regime context is analyzed in this reflection paper, as well as the editorial censorship and self-censorship procedures. It is assumed that this novel by Virginia Woolf is an example of the latter, based on the censorship criteria established by Abellán, since the text transgressed at least three of them. Moreover, the first translation of Orlando in (...) Spain, carried out by Enrique Ortenbach, is analyzed and compared to the one by Borges, not only the first translation of this novel to Spanish, but also the most popular and commercial to date, in order to determine the motivations to commission this retranslation to Ortenbach and the features of this text, in the light of the changes in the Spanish social context. To this end, the paper also draws from the concepts and practices of paratexts, retranslation, and translation criticism. It is concluded that the retranslation by Ortenbach is active, according to Pym’s proposal, and that it could have been dictated by the commercial success of the film adaptation of the novel in 1992. Also, although the translation decisions are not linked to the Spanish social changes, Ortenbach retrieves from the original the feature of Orlando’s gender distinction, through the use of the personal pronouns she/he when alluding to the character. (shrink)

There are, of course, many important differences between the deployment of cultural authority in the social context of second-century Christianity and that of twentieth-century academia. The editors of the Norton Anthology, for example, do not actively seek to suppress those voices which they exclude, nor are their principles for inclusion so narrowly defined as were the church fathers’. But the literary academy and its institutions developed from those of the Church and continue to wield a derivative, secular version of its (...) social and cultural authority. Since Matthew Arnold, the instutition of literature has been described in terms which liken its authority to that of religion, not only by outsiders—Woolf’s woman “divining the priest”—but by insiders who continue to employ the stances and language of religious authority; see, for instance, J. Hillis Miller’s credo in a recent issue of the ADE Bulletin: “I believe in the established canon of English and American literature and in the validity of the concept of privileged texts. I think it is more important to read Spenser, Shakespeare, or Milton than to read Borges in translation, or even, to say the truth, to read Virginia Woolf.”9 Such rhetoric suggests that the religious resonances in literary texts are not entirely figurative, a point brought out strikingly by revisionary religious figures in feminist texts. In her recent essay “ ‘The Blank Page’ and the Issues of Female Creativity,” Susan Gubar cites as some of the “many parables in an ongoing revisionary female theology” Florence Nightingale’s tentative prophecy that “the next Christ will perhaps be a female Christ,” H. D.’s blessed Lady carrying a “Bible of blank pages,” and Gertrude Stein’s celebration of The Mother of Us All.10 The revisionary female theology promoted in literary writing by women implicitly counters the patriarchal theology which is already inscribed in literature. The prophesied female Christ, blank Bible, and female Creator revise images familiar in the literary tradition, and, in contrast to earlier appropriations of religious imagery by Metaphysical, Pre-Raphaelite, and other poets, make visible the patriarchal preoccupations of literary “theology.” These voices, like the Gnostic voices recovered at Nag Hammadi, are only now being heard in chorus; and Pagels’ study of “the gnostic feminism” helps to illuminate some aspects of a cultural authority predicated on the suppression or domination of other voices. Christine Froula, associate professor of English at Yale University, is the author of A Guide to Ezra Pound’s “Selected Poems” and of the forthcoming “To Write Paradise”: Syle and Error in Pound’s Cantos. She is currently working on a book about literary authority in James Joyce and Virginia Woolf. (shrink)

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status (...) of one’s belief in the conclusion of an argument is a function of the epistemic status of the attitudes one has to the premises of that argument. One gets what one puts in: S’s belief in the conclusion C of an argument A has epistemic status E for S only if S’s belief in each of the premises C depends on also has epistemic status E.1 This is compatible, of course, with the epistemic status of S’s conclusion being greater than the epistemic status of the premises on which the conclusion of her reasoning depends. Furthermore, even though KFK applies more straightforwardly to non-suppositional inferences, we can also plausibly apply the principle to sup- positional reasoning if we treat S’s assuming for the sake of argument that p,2 as S assuming for the sake of argument that she knows that p.3 Although extremely plausible, philosophers have failed to present a concerted case in support of KFK. Most of their energy goes to articulating and/or defending some form of closure principle for knowledge.4 What is more, recently versions of this principle have been dismissed as problematic but I think without the reasons in its support been fully appreciated. This paper is an e fort to change the current state of affairs. Its focus is positive, however: my goal is to make the best case I can in support of KFK.5 To that end, the paper presents the reasons we have to accept KFK (§1), consid- ers an objection to the principle (§2), and situates the principle in the broader normative context of knowledge norms (§3). (shrink)

In this paper, the relationship between the e-value of a complex hypothesis, H, and those of its constituent elementary hypotheses, Hj, j = 1… k, is analyzed, in the independent setup. The e-value of a hypothesis H, ev, is a Bayesian epistemic, credibility or truth value defined under the Full Bayesian Significance Testing mathematical apparatus. The questions addressed concern the important issue of how the truth value of H, and the truth function of the corresponding FBST structure M, relate to (...) the truth values of its elementary constituents, Hj, and to the truth functions of their corresponding FBST structures Mj, respectively. (shrink)

The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.

Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.

In this paper I analyze Kant’s ideas about eating and drinking. First, I show that gluttony and drunkenness are considered ways to oppose to the duty to oneself as an animal being. Second, I claim that for Kant there is a healthy way of having meals, which consists in eating together with friends. Then I indicate that Kant accepts that one can drink at dinner parties but has to avoid drinks that lead to drunkenness and unsocial behavior. In this sense, (...) he draws a classification of the various kinds of alcoholic drinks, according to their potential harm. Afterwards, I illustrate how Kant’s own intimate life was a daily practice of his thoughts on dietetic conceptions and on what is better for digestion and health. To conclude, I mention the idea of a philosopher’s medicine of the body and why a strict diet should be avoided. (shrink)

John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.

In semiotics, final causation can be related to the process of determination (PAPE, 1993). From Peirce’s point of view, determination is not a causal determinism, but a delimitation of a range of possibilities. One starts from objects towards interpretants, in a process mediated by the sign, in which the dynamic object works as a force that constrains interpretants to correspond to their objects. The correspondence between object and interpretant is important because it is through a generated interpretant that the object (...) of a sign can be known. Even though this process of determination coincides with the idea of final causation, there is a certain indeterminacy in it. For Peirce (EP 2:353, 1905), vagueness and generality are two types of indeterminacy. In the terms of the phenomenological categories, vagueness is an indeterminacy of the order of firstness, generality an indeterminacy of the order of thirdness, and both, to some extent, are opposed to that which is defined, which belongs to secondness. Each aspect of the sign may vary according to the three phenomenological categories. Consequently, degrees of imprecision are added to the semiotic process, which is a determination process. Peirce asserts that the perfect precision of thought is theoretically unattainable (SS 11, 1903). Every sign is vague or general at least to some degree. In this paper, we seek to perceive degrees of indetermination and causality from an analysis of the kinds of objects and interpretants proposed by Peirce in the system of 28 sign classes. (shrink)

Background The expressions of a “wish to hasten death” or “wish to die” raise ethical concerns and challenges. These expressions are related to ethical principles intertwined within the field of medical ethics, particularly in end-of-life care. Although some reviews were conducted about this topic, none of them provides an in-depth analysis of the meanings behind the “wish to hasten death/die” based specifically on the ethical principles of autonomy, dignity, and vulnerability. The aim of this review is to understand if and (...) how the meanings behind the “wish to hasten death/die” relate to and are interpreted in light of ethical principles in palliative care. Methods We conducted a meta-ethnographic review according to the PRISMA guidelines and aligned with Noblit and Hare’s framework. Searches were performed in three databases, Web of Science, PubMed, CINAHL, with no time restrictions. Original qualitative studies exploring the meanings given by patients, family caregivers and healthcare professionals in any context of palliative and end-of-life care were included. A narrative synthesis was undertaken. PROSPERO registration CRD42023360330. Results Out of 893 retrieved articles, 26 were included in the analysis, accounting for the meanings of a total of 2,398 participants. Several factors and meanings associated with the “wish to hasten death” and/or “wish to die” were identified and are mainly of a psychosocial and spiritual nature. The ethical principles of autonomy and dignity were the ones mostly associated with the “wish to hasten death”. Ethical principles were essentially inferred from the content of included articles, although not explicitly stated as bioethical principles. Conclusions This meta-ethnographic review shows a reduced number of qualitative studies on the “wish to hasten death” and/or “wish to die” explicitly stating ethical principles. This suggests a lack of bioethical reflection and reasoning in the empirical end-of-life literature and a lack of embedded ethics in clinical practice. There is a need for healthcare professionals to address these topics compassionately and ethically, taking into account the unique perspectives of patients and family members. More qualitative studies on the meanings behind a wish to hasten death, their ethical contours, ethical reasoning, and implications for clinical practice are needed. (shrink)

Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ . In the (...) Anthropology and the Doctrine of Virtue, apathy is taken in the sense of freedom from affects. In these texts, Kant maintains that we must strive toward a state in which affects are absent. (shrink)

This is a collection of new essays written in honor of the work of Peter D. Klein, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein’s work by engaging directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors.

There is an important part in Schopenhauer's bibliography dedicated to reflections on a good life. Between 1826 and 1829, the German philosopher started to think about a eudemonology, an unfinished project, which relied on the rescue of the thought of ancient philosophers. In his discussions there is a great appreciation for Stoic thinking in order to produce a life as little unhappy as possible. Therefore, it seems relevant to revisit Schopenhauer's ideas and compare them with Seneca, who focused on the (...) same topics: the appropriation of the concepts of praecepta and decreta and their connection with happiness. (shrink)

Action, reason, and causes in Kant -- Can we act without feelings? Respect, sympathy and other forms of love -- A place for affects and passion in the Kantian system -- What can Kant teach us about emotions? -- Physiology and the controlling of affects in Kant's philosophy -- Virtue as a cure for affects and passions -- The beautiful and the good: refinement as an introduction to morality -- Women and emotion -- Evil and passion -- An emotional Kant?

No soy periodista. Debo confesar que tampoco he buscado, para mi primera ocasión como entrevistadora, ninguna información acerca de los procedimientos aceptados como válidos para esta forma de comunicación. Y menos aún, no pensaba saber cómo se hace una entrevista de corte académico o científico. Pero las cosas pasan por algo y no todo se resuelve dominando pasos o procedimientos. Dejarme llevar por la fluidez de verbo y pensamiento de mi entrevistado, me ha hecho sentirme muy cómoda. El tiempo transcurrió (...) de manera tan natural que mi guión prestablecido fue desdibujándose. Fue un pasear por las vivencias y asombrosos pensamientos de un sabedor y aprendiente, infinito. (shrink)

Partindo do debate de Paris, com Derrida, que se defende ter tido uma importante repercussão no caminho de Gadamer, pretende aclarar-se a noção de boa vontade. Tardiamente surgida e não isenta de certa imprecisão, que se detecta no debate em que ganha relevo, está ausente de Verdade e Método e só chega a explicitar-se posteriormente em relação com a solidaridade. O presente trabalho procura mostrar que antes do conteúdo ético, que chega a assumir, tem inicialmente um sentido pré-ético, que o (...) aproxima do conceito hermenêutico de abertura da compreensão. Finalmente, fenomenologicamente considerado, defende-se que tem a sua raiz na empatia. (shrink)

In this commentary we describe the interplay between 1) contemporary popular and professional understandings of “risk” and “normality” in health and healthcare, and 2) the promotion by state and market forces of individual self-regulation of health. We draw upon the work of critical theorists who have described the relationship between risk, fear, and the notion of “normal” in health discourse to argue that these factors act, primarily via the popular media, to shape the discourse on, and overuse of, diagnostic tests (...) in Canada. (shrink)

Anti-luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck (...) is of no help to the anti-luck epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti-luck epistemologist's coveted noncircular analysis of knowledge. (shrink)

The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper (...) starts the job of mapping what can be said about this feature of Gettier situations. The goal is to stimulate further exploration into this yet uncharted territory. (shrink)

The notion of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger’s phenomenological way. Heidegger’s phenomenology of Befindlichkeit and the different kinds of affection was initiated still before Being and Time, and developed in its essential features till the end of the 1930’s. The current paper argues that, since its very origins in a philosophical framework, back to the translation of the affectiones in Augustine, the notion of Befindlichkeit sets the beginning of a structural understanding of existence - displayed both at the ontological levei of Grundstimmungen (...) (such as anguish, boredom or reservedness), and at the ontic level of different factual Stimmungen. Any comprehensive analysis of those affections counts on a tripie background with a Wovor, a Worum and the full-fledged exercise (Vollzug) of such and such affective understanding. In Being and Time this analysis is dedicated to fear, in its different nuances. But this phenomenon was already dealt with in Heidegger’s Lectures on Augustine (1921) and will reoccur in the Beiträge (1936-38). A reading of this conceptual evolution will here ground a defense of the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s way of thinking. (shrink)

The paper introduces a new problem for fallibilist and infallibilist epistemologies – the diachronic threshold problem. As the name suggests, this is a problem similar to the well–known threshold problem for fallibilism. The new problem affects both fallibilism and infallibilism, however. The paper argues that anyone who worries about the well known problem for fallibilism should also worry about this new, diachronic version of the problem.

In this paper, I aim at relating passions to evil in Kant's philosophy. I begin by explaining the difference between affects and passions in the text Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Kant claims that both affects and passions are illnesses of the mind, because both affect and passion hinder the sovereignty of reason. I show that passions are worse than affects for the purpose of pure reason. Second, I relate affects and passions to the degrees of the propensity (...) to evil in the Religion. I analyze the idea of an ethical community as a way to overcome the evil, which goes beyond political and anthropological solutions suggested by Kant. (shrink)

Este artigo objetiva sustentar a hipótese de que sob o procedimento metodológico-filosófico assumido por Guilherme de Ockham em suas Oito questões, subjaz, de forma velada, uma possível metodologia de ensino de Filosofia, a qual poderia representar uma significativa diretriz frente às atuais discussões concernentes ao ensino de Filosofia na Educação Básica. Nesse sentido, buscaremos estabelecer algumas aproximações, ainda que breves, entre o pensamento de Ockham e a nova Base Nacional Comum Curricular (BNCC), homologada em 2018, sobretudo no que se refere (...) às competências a serem desenvolvidas, no Ensino Médio, na área de Ciências Humanas e Sociais Aplicadas. (shrink)

O presente artigo visa investigar se a afirmação eu sou, eu existo, presente no quarto parágrafo da Segunda Meditação, expressa única e exclusivamente uma existência, ou se é a expressão, também, do conhecimento sobre o que é o Eu que se descobre existente. Para tanto, além dos textos cartesianos, serão abordadas algumas linhas interpretativas que se ocupam desta questão sobretudo as teses de Alquié, Frankfurt e Marion. A partir da discussão realizada, pretende-se defender que o eu sou, eu existo expressa, (...) concomitantemente, o conhecimento da existência do Eu e o conhecimento de que o Eu existe como ser pensante. (shrink)

Considero, para entender a parresía de Orestes, a noção de leitura diagnóstica, numa perspectiva foucaultiana do discurso, neste caso, uma leitura da política no presente. Então, toda vez que se lê, se está de certa forma também pensando no presente e estabelecendo relações com esse tempo atual, acerca de várias questões que afetam a nossa constituição, enquanto sujeitos no mundo. As perguntas feitas acerca de que parresía fala Foucault, pressupõem que há outras possiblidades de pensá-la, para mostrar como essa parresía (...) insurge hoje no campo da grande polis brasileira. Então, defendo que cabe a nós não pensarmos que estamos fazendo uma leitura apenas desse mito Orestes e de uma discussão de um conceito que é feito por Foucault, mas que estamos trazendo essa discussão para o presente com o objetivo de ampliar a discussão e reflexão de nossa atualidade. Faz-se pertinente perguntar que relação existe entre parresía e democracia? Que sentidos produzo toda vez que eu digo a verdade? Pressuponho que o mesmo se possa perguntar com relação à democracia e vice versa, é exatamente assim que acontece ou existem nuances? Se toda parresía é garantia de um Estado democrático, de que parresía trata, então, a tragédia de Orestes? É possível falar de uma má parresía? Este conjunto de questões são exatamente o que fundamenta as discussões que Foucault vai trazer a partir de Orestes. Temos, a partir desta leitura de Orestes, o Michael Foucault em seu anúncio de uma genealogia da política, o que é muito relevante para um diagnóstico da política na atualidade. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Parresía; Estado Democrático; Orestes. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze Kant’s theory of action and if human beings can act morally without being moved by sensible feelings. I will show that the answer of the Critique of Pure Reason, Groundwork and the Critical of Practical Reason is without any doubt “yes”, but Kant is ambiguous in the Metaphysics of Morals and also in the Anthropology. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that there are some sensible conditions to the reception of the concept of duty: (...) moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for one self . I examine moral feeling and love of human beings, trying to figure out whether or not they are necessary sensible pre- conditions to moral actions. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar comparativamente as semelhanças contidas nas críticas à democracia liberal presentes em alguns trabalhos selecionados de Carl Schmitt e Robert Kurz. A despeito da estreita associação do primeiro autor com o regime nazista após 1933 e do segundo ser normalmente caracterizado como um pensador marxista, são verificáveis inúmeras similitudes entre ambos quando se propõem a analisar as características do liberalismo parlamentar das democracias do século XX. Uma hipótese que pode explicar tais semelhanças seria a influência (...) exercida por Schmitt sobre diversos teóricos da escola de Frankfurt, com os quais Kurz frequentemente dialoga em seus escritos e que foram inspiradores de algumas de suas reflexões – em especial, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno e Max Horkheimer, embora Schmitt também tenha influenciado Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Karl Korsch e Herbert Marcuse. Outra via de interpretação abordada aqui se refere à possibilidade de Schmitt ter encontrado, em suas teorias sobre o Estado e sobre o direito, os limites epistemológicos do liberalismo moderno, o que constitui o principal objeto de pesquisa de Kurz e foi tema recorrente nos escritos dos teóricos de Frankfurt. (shrink)