Wijsgerige overdenkingen in de geest van Heidegger.

Phrasing the question is one of the most delicate points of a referendum. A first problem is to choose the most important alternatives. Several procedures to select these alternatives and to avoid some kinds of manipulation, exist. There are a lot of arguments for the voting on principles, but also a lot against.The Swiss criterion for «unity of matter» is not workable; a new criterion is proposed. The danger of suggestivity is real. Rules to prevent these dangers are discussed. Finally, (...) some remarks are made on the problem «who decides on the question?». A neutral commission is wishful. (shrink)

In most referenda, only two alternatives are used. In this article, the possibility to find procedures for three and more alternatives is discussed.The Swiss voting system for the revision of the constitution is not logically correct. Most procedures used in Swiss cantons are not either. Voting systems with two rounds, with points, or based on a relative majority are not defendable too. Nevertheless, a workable and logically correct procedure for 3 alternatives exists.Using 4 of more alternatives is only possible in (...) case of single-peakedness or some kinds of value-restrictedness. When this is not the case, systems which are logically correct, are getting too complex to be workable. (shrink)

We re-examine Peres' statement “opposite momenta lead to opposite directions”. It will be shown that Peres' statement is only valid in the large distance or large time limit. In the short distance or short time limit an additional deviation from perfect alignment occurs due to the uncertainty of the location of the source. This error contribution plays a major role in Popper's orginal experimental proposal. Peres' statement applies rather to the phenomenon of optical imaging, which was regarded by him as (...) a verification of his statement. This is because this experiment can in a certain sense be seen as occurring in the large distance limit. We will also reconsider both experiments from the viewpoint of Bohmian mechanics. In Bohmian mechanics particles with perfectly opposite momenta will move in opposite directions. In addition it will prove particularly useful to use Bohmian mechanics because the Bohmian trajectories coincide with the conceptual trajectories drawn by Pittman et al. In this way Bohmian mechanics provides a theoretical basis for these conceptual trajectories. (shrink)

One of the central explananda in the debate on social cognition is the interpretation of other people in terms of reasons for action. There is a growing dissatisfaction among participants in the debate concerning the descriptive adequacy of the traditional belief-desire model of action interpretation. Applying this model as an explanatory model at the subpersonal level threatens to leave the original explanandum largely unarticulated. Against this background we show how Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping model can be used as a valuable descriptive (...) tool for making folk psychology explicit. Following Brandom’s non-formalist and non-mentalistic account of reason discourse, we suggest that the process of making sense of others is best captured as proceeding from a ‘factive’ baseline. According to this picture the ascription of beliefs and desires is not the default interpretation strategy, but rather the result of prior scaffolding of the agent’s deontic score. We close by discussing Brandom’s model in the light of empirical findings on the ontogeny of reason attribution. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 55-59 [Access article in PDF] One Stage Is Not Enough Andrew W. Young and Karel W. de Pauw Keywords: delusions, Cotard delusion, Capgras delusion, cognitive neuropsychiatry. WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY to offer our reflections on Philip Gerrans' interesting paper. Our opinion is that on fundamental issues we agree quite a bit—but there are clear differences when it comes to details.The most basic issue (...) concerns the nature of the enterprise. Like Gerrans, we think that it is possible to create testable accounts of the formation and maintenance of what would otherwise seem bizarre and inexplicable delusions, and that these accounts should be grounded in theoretical models of factors that underpin our everyday perception and reasoning. This general approach certainly forms part of what has been called cognitive neuropsychiatry. However, we disagree with Gerrans in that we see cognitive neuropsychiatry as an attempt to draw on the underlying logic of cognitive neuropsychology, rather than (as Gerrans implies) its current methods. The underlying logic of cognitive neuropsychological approaches has been to try to understand the effects of brain injury in terms of disruption of different components of theoretical models of normal abilities. In this approach, a model of normal performance is tested by its ability to account for the effects of brain injury. Where the model of normal performance also provides a convincing account of brain injury it is retained, and when it fails to account for effects of brain injury, it is revised or abandoned. In cognitive neuropsychiatry, the key theoretical move has been to argue that an adequate model of normal performance should be able to account for any disordered pattern (Ellis and Young 1990). The same logic of seeking to explain disordered performance by reference to models of normal function is then attempted, but for disorders that would usually fall within the province of psychiatry.In our opinion, however, cognitive neuropsychiatry will not simply involve importing the methods of cognitive neuropsychology into the new domain; they will need to be developed and adapted to fit the new agenda (Young 2000).In cognitive neuropsychology, progress has often come from the careful investigation of people with stable, selective deficits of fundamental cognitive functions involved in sensory analysis, memory, and verbal or motor output. In contrast, delusional beliefs can be relatively unstable; often they are only held for a few weeks or even days. When the delusions change, patients may modify or abandon them as suddenly as they seemed to form them, or they may give them up much more slowly and reluctantly. At the very least, this creates difficulties in the timing of investigations and in interpreting the relation of deficits and symptoms, which may be recorded on separate dates. These methodological problems [End Page 55] are exacerbated by the fact that deficits linked to complex abnormal experiences such as delusions may be multifaceted and diffuse, even when the delusions themselves have a specific content or theme. Such complications do not invalidate cognitive neuropsychiatry, but they do mean it will need to develop its own methods for dealing with them and making appropriate inferences.One of the key complexities that has surfaced already involves the idea that delusional beliefs might reflect the interaction of two or more contributory factors. Gerrans discusses a particular variant of this idea, which had been suggested by Young and Leafhead (1996) as an approach to understanding the Cotard delusion: The Cotard delusion represents a depressed person's attempt to account for abnormal perceptual experiences. It follows that the delusion is based on an unfortunate interaction between different contributory factors. One set of factors creates the abnormal perceptual experiences, which are characterised by lack of emotional responses and feelings of emptiness, depersonalisation and derealisation. The other factors result in a misinterpretation of these perceptual changes, in which the patients' depressed moods lead them correctly to attribute the changes to themselves, but to exaggerate their consequences. (Young and Leafhead, 1996, 166) Gerrans describes this as a two-stage account, but argues that a one-stage account based only on abnormal perceptual... (shrink)

This article examines the role of philosophy in the development of the kinetic theory of gases. Two opposing accounts of this role, by Peter Clark and John Nyhof, are discussed and criticized. Contrary to both accounts, it is argued that philosophical views of scientists can fundamentally influence the results of their scientific work. This claim is supported by a detailed analysis of the philosophical views of Maxwell and Boltzmann, and of their work on the kinetic theory, especially concerning the so-called (...) specific heat anomaly. It leads to the conclusion that the scientific development of the kinetic theory cannot be understood without taking into account the role of philosophy. (shrink)

One of Anchor books, new Problems in Philosophy Series, this slim and simple volume gives a clear yet comprehensive account of the mind-body problem and its various solutions. Campbell brings to light the assumptions which lead to the mind-body problem, and examines each in terms of the evidence for it and the way it is handled in some of the solutions to the problem. He then formulates the basic mind-body problem as an inconsistent tetrad and examines the evidence upon which (...) each of the four propositions has been accepted at one time or another. After this preliminary study, Campbell examines two Dualisms and their solutions, the Behaviorist 'solution' or dissolution, and different forms of a Causal Theory of the Mind, including Central State Materialism and what he calls a 'new Epiphenomenalism'. In his examination of these solutions to the problem, Campbell always states both the reasons for accepting it and the problems that the solution itself raises. Not intended for a sophisticated audience, this lucid account will provide the beginner with a solid basis for further studies in this central problem. With this in mind, the author has included an extensive bibliography for the beginning student.--W. de V. (shrink)

This book is part of Prentice-Hall's new Central Issues in Philosophy series, and seems a welcome addition. The editor's introduction does little more than state the problem and review some of the ways with which it has been dealt. We are then brought immediately to the meat: the first section of the book contains selections from Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes intended to acquaint us with some of the more classical solutions to the problem. The second part, entitled "The Identity Thesis," (...) contains one of J. J. C. Smart's influential essays for this thesis and two replies, one by Jerome Shaffer and one by James Cornman. Part three, entitled "Theoretical Materialism," contains essays by Jaegwon Kim, in which he denies the validity of having only physical property descriptions; and Thomas Nagel and Keith Gunderson, who both argue that the case for materialism is stronger than the case against it. The fourth part, containing essays by Jerry Fodor, Hilary Putnam, and David Lewis, focuses on functional materialism. The fifth section of the book is devoted to the rather radical view of the eliminative materialists. There is a short note by Paul Feyerabend, a full length essay by Richard Rorty, a reply by Richard Bernstein and a rejoinder by Rorty. All of the essays in this book are well-written pieces of solid philosophy, but none is so technical that it can not be understood by a relative beginner. After finishing this book and thoroughly digesting its contents, the reader will be well versed in modern thought on this problem and well capable of continuing his research in any of several directions. To aid the student in this task there is a large bibliography included.--W. de V. (shrink)

The introduction and six essays in this book originally appeared as a continuing series in the Southern Journal of Philosophy, and are gathered together here for the first time in one volume. In the introduction, E. M. Adams briefly touches upon the major questions of the philosophy of mind and how they have been dealt with in the past; his suggestion for the future is that philosophers give themselves a little more "categorial room" in which to handle these problems. In (...) the first essay Douglas Browning argues for the essential privacy of the verbal and adverbial functionings of feeling. This is followed by an essay by Charles Hartshorne in which he argues that feelings are by no means essentially private, and that in fact God shares all of our feelings in their full totality. The essay by Donald F. Gustafson continues the non-privacy argument in a different mode. He argues that there is an essential connection between feeling and the expression of that feeling, and that keeping feelings to oneself is something that is learned and by no means necessary. I am not sure his rather narrow notion of privacy keeps the argument philosophically interesting, however. In contrast, the fourth essay, by Erwin W. Straus, is basically phenomenological, and, unfortunately, sounds more like a polemic than a clear description of the incommensurability between the lived world and the "scientific world." In the fifth essay Edward H. Madden gives a synoptic view of the recent work in the philosophy of mind by C. J. Ducasse. Madden sees in his work an extremely promising analysis of the problems in this field, and attempts to show why this is so. The most interesting essay in this book is, I found, the last, by the editor, in which he adds another discussion of Strawson's concept of a person. Van de Vate argues that the analogy upon which Strawson launches his account is misleading. Rather than seeing the concept of a person allied with a tool of the sort Wittgenstein described, Van de Vate would have us understand it in the light of public tools like parliaments. From here, Van de Vate argues that persons are not natural facts, but social facts. I should like to see a more complete handling of this idea and its problems at some future date.--W. de V. (shrink)

This excellent collection of essays is aimed at what the editor feels is a gap in the subjects of the present proliferation of anthologies: ontology. Specifically, the essays are aimed at the problems raised by universals, mainly whether they exist and if so what is their status, and the nature of particulars. There are, correspondingly, two sections in the book; the first, on universals, arranged chronologically because the essays form a continuous stream of philosophical dialogue, contains articles by Russell, Quine, (...) Pears, Strawson, Wolterstorff, Bambrough and others. The sequential arrangement is very pleasing, for it gives the reader a chance to get the feel of real philosophical dialogue. To both sections, Loux provides clear introductory essays setting forth both the problems and possible solutions. The second section, on particulars, is arranged topically, although within each topic the sequential form is preserved. The first section is on the identity of indiscernibles principle, with essays by Max Black, Ayer, and O’Conner. [[sic]] The second is on the theme of bare particulars, including articles by Allaire, Chappell, and Meiland. The final section is on characterized particulars and essentialism, with essays by Long, Copi, and Chandler. An essay by David Wiggins rounds out this part of the book. This book can serve both as an introduction to the problem of ontology and a source for on-going inquiry. A large bibliography is included for those who wish to pursue the question.—W. de V. (shrink)

In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give up (...) AU in light of the cross-cultural evidence; or (ii) defend AU with respect to core capacities underlying different culture-specific folk psychologies, and explain why the BD-model will be genuinely explanatory at this level. (shrink)

Artifacts are probably our most obvious everyday encounter with technology. Therefore, a good understanding of the nature of technical artifacts is a relevant part of technological literacy. In this article we draw from the philosophy of technology to develop a conceptualization of technical artifacts that can be used for educational purposes. Furthermore we report a small exploratory empirical study to see to what extent teachers’ intuitive ideas about artifacts match with the way philosophers write about the nature of artifacts. Finally, (...) we suggest a teaching and learning strategy for improving teachers’ concepts of technical artifacts through practical activities. (shrink)

While the relation between visualization and scientific understanding has been a topic of long-standing discussion, recent developments in physics have pushed the boundaries of this debate to new and still unexplored realms. For it is claimed that, in certain theories of quantum gravity, spacetime ‘disappears’: and this suggests that one may have sensible physical theories in which spacetime is completely absent. This makes the philosophical question whether such theories are intelligible, even more pressing. And if such theories are intelligible, the (...) question then is how they manage to do so. In this paper, we adapt the contextual theory of scientific understanding, developed by one of us, to fit the novel challenges posed by physical theories without spacetime. We construe understanding as a matter of skill rather than just knowledge. The appeal is thus to understanding, rather than explanation, because we will be concerned with the tools that scientists have at their disposal for understanding these theories. Our central thesis is that such physical theories can provide scientific understanding, and that such understanding does not require spacetimes of any sort. Our argument consists of four consecutive steps: (a) We argue, from the general theory of scientific understanding, that although visualization is an oft-used tool for understanding, it is not a necessary condition for it; (b) we criticise certain metaphysical preconceptions which can stand in the way of recognising how intelligibility without spacetime can be had; (c) we catalogue tools for rendering theories without a spacetime intelligible; and (d) we give examples of cases in which understanding is attained without a spacetime, and explain what kind of understanding these examples provide. (shrink)

Mole's (2008 [this issue]) argument that consciousness is a necessary concomitant of attention rests on the question of what is being attended in spatial attention. His answer is space. Some authors, including ourselves, claim that the fact that the processing of unseen objects can be modulated by spatial attention (e.g. Kentridge et al., 1999; 2004; 2008; Marzouki et al., 2007; Sumner et al., 2006) demonstrates that visual attention is not a sufficient precondition for visual awareness. Mole, however, contends that as (...) space, rather than any object that might occupy that space, is what is being attended, these experiments do not constitute evidence for a dissociation between attention and consciousness. We disagree. To understand the source of this disagreement we need to understand the various processes encompassed by the term 'attention' and to consider experimental evidence illustrating how these processes operate. We review evidence that spatial attention can be deployed with the specific goal of determining the properties of objects occupying the attended region of space. One might, for example, attend to a location with the goal of determining the colour of objects occupying that space as efficiently as possible. Mole's assumption that all that is attended in spatial attention is space is not consistent with this evidence. We conclude that attention can be directed at objects by mechanisms of so- called 'spatial attention' without those objects necessarily eliciting conscious visual experience and hence that attention is not a sufficient precondition for visual awareness. (shrink)

Decisions related to animal welfare standards depend on farmer’s multiple goals and values and are constrained by a wide range of external and internal forces. The aim of this paper is twofold, i.e., to develop a theoretical framework for farmers’ AW decisions that incorporates farmers’ goals, use and non-use values and to present an approach to empirically implement the theoretical framework. The farmer as a head of the farm household makes choices regarding production to maximize the utility of the household. (...) The overall utility of the farmer is determined by his multiple objectives. For the analysis of multi-objective problems, the multiple criteria decision - making paradigm provides an appropriate theoretical framework. However, theories from the field of social-psychology are needed to facilitate the identification of all relevant aspects in the decision making. The practical use of the conceptual framework is demonstrated using a simple numerical application of a multi-objective programming model. Two workshops were devoted to examining the scientific consistency and the practical usefulness of the approach. Implementing this approach will increase knowledge of the main factors and barriers that determine farmers’ decisions with regard to AW standards. This knowledge is relevant during the development of new AW concepts that aims to supply products that comply with above-legal AW standards for middle-market segments. (shrink)

A major concern of public health authorities is to also encourage adults to be exposed to enriched environments during the pandemic lockdown, as was recently the case worldwide during the COVID-19 outbreak. Games for adults that require physical activity, known as exergames, offer opportunities here. In particular, the output of the gaming industry nowadays offers computer games with extended reality which combines real and virtual environments and refers to human-machine interactions generated by computers and wearable technologies. For example, playing the (...) game in front of a computer screen while standing or walking on a force plate or treadmill allows the user to react to certain infrastructural changes and obstacles within the virtual environment. Recent developments, optimization, and minimizations in wearable technology have produced wireless headsets and sensors that allow for unrestricted whole-body movement. This makes the virtual experience more immersive and provides the opportunity for greater engagement than traditional exercise. Currently, XR serves as an umbrella term for current immersive technologies as well as future realities that enhance the experience with features that produce new controllable environments. Overall, these technology-enhanced exergames challenge the adult user and modify the experience by increasing sensory stimulation and creating an environment where virtual and real elements interact. As a therapy, exergames can potentially create new environments and visualizations that may be more ecologically valid and thus simulate real activities of daily living that can be trained. Furthermore, by adding telemedicine features to the exergame, progress over time can be closely monitored and feedback provided, offering future opportunities for cognitive-motor assessment. To more optimally serve and challenge adults both physically and cognitively over time in future lockdowns, there is a need to provide long-term remote training and feedback. Particularly related to activities of daily living that create opportunities for effective and lasting rehabilitation for elderly and sufferers from chronic non-communicable diseases. The aim of the current review is to envision the remote training and monitoring of physical and cognitive aspects for adults with limited mobility, through the implementation of concurrent telehealth and exergame features using XR and wireless sensor technologies. (shrink)