This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in other (...) academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)

This ground-breaking book brings together researchers from a wide range of disciplines to discuss the control and coordination of processes involved in perceptually guided actions. The research area of motor control has become an increasingly multidisciplinary undertaking. Understanding the acquisition and performance of voluntary movements in biological and artificial systems requires the integration of knowledge from a variety of disciplines from neurophysiology to biomechanics.

Elaborating on the substantial parallels between Molina’s and Kant’s attempts to reconcile human freedom with divine foreknowledge and natural causal determinism respectively, my aim is to establish a proper historical connection as well. Leibniz is shown to be the crucial mediator in two respects: (i) Kant knew Molina’s account of divine knowledge in general in its Leibnizian version through Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. In this work, scientia media plays no role in the explication as to how God knows absolute future contingents. (ii) (...) In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant resorted to doctrines similar to Molina’s in his criticism of Leibniz’s alternative explication which drew on complete concepts of monads. (shrink)

An infinite binary sequence X is Kolmogorov–Loveland random if there is no computable non-monotonic betting strategy that succeeds on X in the sense of having an unbounded gain in the limit while betting successively on bits of X. A sequence X is KL-stochastic if there is no computable non-monotonic selection rule that selects from X an infinite, biased sequence.One of the major open problems in the field of effective randomness is whether Martin-Löf randomness is the same as KL-randomness. Our first (...) main result states that KL-random sequences are close to Martin-Löf random sequences in so far as every KL-random sequence has arbitrarily dense subsequences that are Martin-Löf random. A key lemma in the proof of this result is that for every effective split of a KL-random sequence at least one of the halves is Martin-Löf random. However, this splitting property does not characterize KL-randomness; we construct a sequence that is not even computably random such that every effective split yields two subsequences that are 2-random. Furthermore, we show for any KL-random sequence A that is computable in the halting problem that, first, for any effective split of A both halves are Martin-Löf random and, second, for any computable, nondecreasing, and unbounded function g and almost all n, the prefix of A of length n has prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity at least n−g. Again, the latter property does not characterize KL-randomness, even when restricted to left-r.e. sequences; we construct a left-r.e. sequence that has this property but is not KL-stochastic and, in fact, is not even Mises–Wald–Church stochastic.Turning our attention to KL-stochasticity, we construct a non-empty class of KL-stochastic sequences that are not weakly 1-random; by the usual basis theorems we obtain such sequences that in addition are left-r.e., are low, or are of hyperimmune-free degree.Our second main result asserts that every KL-stochastic sequence has effective dimension 1, or equivalently, a sequence cannot be KL-stochastic if it has infinitely many prefixes that can be compressed by a factor of α<1. This improves on a result by Muchnik, who has shown that were they to exist, such compressible prefixes could not be found effectively. (shrink)

The core idea of the ontological proof is to show that the concept of existence is somehow contained in the concept of God, and that therefore God’s existence can be logically derived—without any further assumptions about the external world—from the very idea, or definition, of God. Now, G.W. Leibniz has argued repeatedly that the traditional versions of the ontological proof are not fully conclusive, because they rest on the tacit assumption that the concept of God is possible, i.e. free from (...) contradiction. A complete proof will rather have to consist of two parts. First, a proof of premiseGod is possible. Second, a demonstration of the “remarkable proposition”If God is possible, then God exists. The present contribution investigates an interesting paper in which Leibniz tries to prove proposition. It will be argued that the underlying idea of God as a necessary being has to be interpreted with the help of a distinguished predicate letter ‘E’ as follows:\\). Proposition which Leibniz considered as “the best fruit of the entire logic” can then be formalized as follows:\) \rightarrow \, E)\). At first sight, Leibniz’s proof appears to be formally correct; but a closer examination reveals an ambiguity in his use of the modal notions. According to, the possibility of the necessary being has to be understood in the sense of something which possibly exists. However, in other places of his proof, Leibniz interprets the assumption that the necessary being is impossible in the diverging sense of something which involves a contradiction. Furthermore, Leibniz believes that an »impossible thing«, y, is such that contradictory propositions like \\) and \\) might both be true of y. It will be argued that the latter assumption is incompatible with Leibniz’s general views about logic and that the crucial proof is better reinterpreted as dealing with the necessity, possibility, and impossibility of concepts rather than of objects. In this case, the counterpart of turns out to be a theorem of Leibniz’s second order logic of concepts; but in order to obtain a full demonstration of the existence of God, the counterpart of, i.e. the self-consistency of the concept of a necessary being, remains to be proven. (shrink)

This book is a critical examination of Michel Foucault's relation to ancient Greek thought, in particular his famous analysis of Greek history of sexuality. Wolfgang Detel offers a new understanding of Foucault's theories of power and knowledge based on modern analytical theories of science and concepts of power. He offers a fresh and complex reading of the texts which Foucault discusses, covering topics such as Aristotle's ethics and theory of sex, Hippocratic diatetics, the earliest treatises on economics, and Plato's (...) theory of love. The result is a philosophically rich and probing critique of Foucault's later writings, and a persuasive account of the relation between ethics, power and knowledge in classical antiquity. His book will have a wide appeal to readers interested in Foucault and in Greek thought and culture. (shrink)

The article takes the term "technoscience" literally and investigates a conception of science that takes it not only as practice, but as production in the sense of a material labor process. It will explore in particular the material connection between science and ordinary production. It will furthermore examine how the historical development of science as a social enterprise was shaped by its technoscientific character. In this context, in an excursus, the prevailing notion will be questioned that social relations must be (...) conceived of as pure interactions. Finally, the article will go into the relationship between the epistemic dimension of science and its technoscientific character. (shrink)

Die vorgelegte Summe des Hochidealismus ersetzt – der neuen Forschungs- und Quellenlage entsprechend – die alte Konstruktion vom Dreischritt, der von Fichtes Jenaer Wissenschaftslehre ausgeht, in die Naturphilosophie Schellings übergeht und in Hegels System vollendet aufgeht, durch die Gegenthese: Der Deutsche Idealismus ist die Begründung der Vernunftwissenschaft im Widerstreit von drei Vollendungsansprüchen, erhoben im Identitätssystem und der positiven Philosophie Schellings, in Hegels Onto-Theo-Logik und der ungeschriebenen Lehre Fichtes, d. i. den mündlichen Vortragszyklen nach 1800. Die eingehende Ausarbeitung dieses dreiseitigen Widerstreites (...) hebt einen Vorrang heraus. Fichtes ungeschriebene Lehre ist die einzige der drei Vollendungsgestalten, die im Begreifen des Wahrheits- und Systemgrundes, des Absoluten, transzendentale Besinnung in absoluter Reflexion bewahrt und daher auch vorzüglich in der Lage ist, unser Zeitalter der Nichtbesinnung herauszufordern. (shrink)

After giving a short summary of the traditional theory of the syllogism, it is shown how the square of opposition reappears in the much more powerful concept logic of Leibniz. Within Leibniz’s algebra of concepts, the categorical forms are formalized straightforwardly by means of the relation of concept-containment plus the operator of concept-negation as ‘S contains P’ and ‘S contains Not-P’, ‘S doesn’t contain P’ and ‘S doesn’t contain Not-P’, respectively. Next we consider Leibniz’s version of the so-called Quantification of (...) the Predicate which consists in the introduction of four additional forms ‘Every S is every P’, ‘Some S is every P’, ‘Every S isn’t some P’, and ‘Some S isn’t some P’. Given the logical interpretation suggested by Leibniz, these unorthodox propositions also form a Square of Opposition which, when added to the traditional Square, yields a “Cube of Opposition”. Finally it is shown that besides the categorical forms, also the non-categorical forms can be formalized within an extension of Leibniz’s logic where “indefinite concepts” X, Y, Z\ function as quantifiers and where individual concepts are introduced as maximally consistent concepts. (shrink)

There is a tacit assumption that interpretation comes naturally, that human beings live by constantly interpreting. In this sense, we might even rephrase Descartes by saying: We interpret, therefore we are. While such a basic human disposition makes interpretation appear to come naturally, the forms it takes, however, do not. In this work, Iser offers a fresh approach by formulating an "anatomy of interpretation" through which we can understand the act of interpretation in its many different manifestations. For Iser, there (...) are several different genres of interpretation, all of which are acts of translation designed to transpose something into something else. Perhaps the most obvious example of interpretation involves canonical texts, such as the Rabbinical exegesis of the Torah or Samuel Johnson's reading of Shakespeare. But what happens when the matter that one seeks to interpret consists not of a text but of a welter of fragments, as in the study of history, or when something is hidden, as in the practice of psychoanalysis, or is as complex as a culture or system? Iser details how, in each of these cases, the space that is opened up by interpretation is negotiated in a different way, thus concluding that interpretation always depends on what it seeks to translate. For students of philosophy, literary and critical theory, anthropology, and cultural history, Iser's elucidation of the mechanics by which we translate and understand, as well as his assessment of the anthropological roots of our drive to make meaning, will undoubtedly serve as a revelation. (shrink)

Against the prevailing opinion expressed, e.g., by L. Couturat it is argued that the so-called „intensional“ point of view which Leibniz mostly preferred to the nowadays usual extensional interpretation is neither „confuse et vague“ nor may it be made responsible for the alleged „échec final de son système“ . We present a precise definition of an „intensional“ semantics which reflects the Leibnizian ideas and which may be proven to be equivalent to standard extensional semantics.

We first present an edition of the manuscript LH VII, B 2, 39 in which Leibniz develops a new formalism in order to give rigorous definitions of positive, of privative, and of primitive terms.This formalism involves a symbolic treatment of conceptual quantification which differs quite considerably from Leibniz’s “standard” theory of “indefinite concepts” as developed, e.g., in the “General Inquirles” In the subsequent commentary we give an interpretation and a critical evaluation of Leibniz’s symbolic apparatus. It turns out that the (...) definition of privative terms and primitive terms lead to certain inconsistencies which, however, can be avoided by slight modifications. (shrink)

Der Autor erklärt einen Teil der Anziehungskraft und der suggestiven Wirkungen von Film- und Fernsehbildern aus mechanisch bzw. elektronisch provozierter Psychologie. Die Präsentationsdauer der einzelnen Film- und Fernsehbilder entspricht der Darbietungszeit jener ultrakurz präsentierten Diabilder, die bei der Pötzl-Tachistoskopie experimentell genutzt werden, um in Träumen und freien Assoziationen vorbewußt psychische Nachbilder zu erzeugen. Zwar läßt beim Film die rasche Aufeinanderfolge der Einzelbilder die Inhalte und den Bewegungsablauf fotografierter Objekte bewußt werden und wie natürlich erscheinen, die Unterbrechung ist vorbewußt jedoch folgenreich: (...) die stroboskopische Darbietungsweise erregt ansatzweise -- wie bei der experimentellen Traumstimulation -- innere Nachbild-Affekt-Komplexe, setzt davon allerdings nur den Anteil der Affekte frei. Vergleichbar der Verknüpfung von Tagesrest und Traumwunsch, verbinden sich die so dissoziierten Triebabkömmlinge mit den Filmbildinhalten, die nun zum Ersatz der abgekoppelten inneren Vorstellungsbilder werden, zu einer neuen Erlebniseinheit. (shrink)

Research Integrity (RI) is high on the agenda of both institutions and science policy. The European Union as well as national ministries of science have launched ambitious initiatives to combat misconduct and breaches of research integrity. Often, such initiatives entail attempts to regulate scientific behavior through guidelines that institutions and academic communities can use to more easily identify and deal with cases of misconduct. Rather than framing misconduct as a result of an information deficit, we instead conceptualize Questionable Research Practices (...) (QRPs) as attempts by researchers to reconcile epistemic and social forms of uncertainty in knowledge production. Drawing on previous literature, we define epistemic uncertainty as the inherent intellectual unpredictability of scientific inquiry, while social uncertainty arises from the human-made conditions for scientific work. Our core argument—developed on the basis of 30 focus group interviews with researchers across different fields and European countries—is that breaches of research integrity can be understood as attempts to loosen overly tight coupling between the two forms of uncertainty. Our analytical approach is not meant to relativize or excuse misconduct, but rather to offer a more fine-grained perspective on what exactly it is that researchers want to accomplish by engaging in it. Based on the analysis, we conclude by proposing some concrete ways in which institutions and academic communities could try to reconcile epistemic and social uncertainties on a more collective level, thereby reducing incentives for researchers to engage in misconduct. (shrink)

This paper is on dangerous human experimentations with drugs against trypanosimiasis carried out in the former German colonies of German East Africa and Togo. Victory over trypanosomiasis could not be achieved in Berlin because animals were thought to be unsuitable for therapeutic laboratory research in the field of trypanosomiasis. The colonies themselves were necessarily chosen as laboratories and the patients with sleeping sickness became the objects of therapeutical and pharmacological research. The paper first outlines Robert Koch's trypanosomiasis research in the (...) large sleeping sickness laboratory of German East Africa and then focuses on the escalating human experiments on trypanosomiasis in the German Musterkolonie Togo, which must be interpreted as a reaction to the starting signal given by Robert Koch in East Africa. (shrink)

On the Lisbon earthquake of 1755; its effects on thinking of the time.