One of the most common criticisms one hears of the idea of granting a legitimate role for social values in theory choice in science is that it just doesn’t make sense to regard social preferences as relevant to the truth or to the way things are. “What is at issue,” wrote Susan Haack, is “whether it is possible to derive an ‘is’ from an ‘ought.’ ” One can see that this is not possible, she concludes, “as soon as one expresses (...) it plainly: that propositions about what states of affairs are desirable or deplorable could be evidence that things are, or are not, so” (Haack 1993a, 35, emphasis in original). The purpose of this chapter is not to determine whether this widespread view is correct, but rather to show that even if we grant it (which I do), we may still consistently believe that social values have a legitimate role in theory choice in science. I will defend this conclusion by outlining a view about social values and theory choice that is available to a Constructive Empiricist anti-realist, but not to a realist. (shrink)

Van Fraassen defines constructive empiricism as the view that science aims to produce empirically adequate theories. But this account has been misunderstood. Constructive empiricism in not, as it seems, a description of the intentional features of scientific practice, nor is it a normative prescription for their revision. It is rather a fiction about the practice of science that van Fraassen displays in the interests of a broader empiricism. The paper concludes with a series of arguments designed to show (...) that constructive empiricism so understood is self-undermining. (shrink)

In this article I present a disagreement between classical and constructive approaches to predicativity regarding the predicative status of so-called generalised inductive definitions. I begin by offering some motivation for an enquiry in the predicative foundations of constructive mathematics, by looking at contemporary work at the intersection between mathematics and computer science. I then review the background notions and spell out the above-mentioned disagreement between classical and constructive approaches to predicativity. Finally, I look at possible ways of (...) defending the constructive predicativity of inductive definitions. (shrink)

Are our beliefs justified only relatively to a specific culture or society? Is it possible to give reasons for the superiority of our scientific, epistemic methods? Markus Seidel sets out to answer these questions in his critique of epistemic relativism. Focusing on the work of the most prominent, explicitly relativist position in the sociology of scientific knowledge – so-called 'Edinburgh relativism' or the 'Strong Programme' –, he scrutinizes the key arguments for epistemic relativism from a philosophical perspective: underdetermination and norm-circularity. (...) His main negative result is that these arguments fall short of establishing epistemic relativism. -/- Despite arguing for epistemic absolutism, Seidel aims to provide an account of non-relative justification that nevertheless integrates the basic, correct intuition of the epistemic relativist. His main positive result is that the epistemic absolutist can very well accept the idea that people using different standards of justification can be equally justified in holding their beliefs: Rational disagreement, he maintains, is perfectly possible. -/- The book provides a detailed critique of relativism in the sociology of scientific knowledge and beyond. With its constructive part it aims at making conciliatory steps in a highly embittered discussion between sociology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

As we envision constructive undertakings in the field of religion and science for the next decade, the emerging agenda of astrotheology is opening up a new theater for enquiry. Astrotheology provides a critical theological response to the field of astrobiology while critically assessing exciting new research on life in our solar system and the discovery of exoplanets. This article proposes four tasks for the astrotheologian: deliberate on (1) the scope of creation: is God's creation Earth-centric or does it include (...) the entire cosmos? (2) the question whether a single divine incarnation on Earth suffices for the cosmos or whether multiple incarnations—one for each inhabited planet—is required; (3) whether astrobiologists and other space scientists are sticking to their science or smuggling in ideology; and (4) readying terrestrial life for contact with extraterrestrial life by enumerating issues to be taken up by astroethics. (shrink)

We develop a constructive version of nonstandard analysis, extending Bishop's constructive analysis with infinitesimal methods. A full transfer principle and a strong idealisation principle are obtained by using a sheaf-theoretic construction due to I. Moerdijk. The construction is, in a precise sense, a reduced power with variable filter structure. We avoid the nonconstructive standard part map by the use of nonstandard hulls. This leads to an infinitesimal analysis which includes nonconstructive theorems such as the Heine-Borel theorem, the Cauchy-Peano (...) existence theorem for ordinary differential equations and the exact intermediate-value theorem, while it at the same time provides constructive results for concrete statements. A nonstandard measure theory which is considerably simpler than that of Bishop and Cheng is developed within this context. (shrink)

Sören Halldén’s logic of nonsense is one of the most well-known many-valued logics available in the literature. In this paper, we discuss Peter Woodruff’s as yet rather unexplored attempt to advance a version of such a logic built on the top of a constructive logical basis. We start by recalling the basics of Woodruff’s system and by bringing to light some of its notable features. We then go on to elaborate on some of the difficulties attached to it; on (...) our way to offer a possible solution to such difficulties, we discuss the relation between Woodruff’s system and two-dimensional semantics for many-valued logics, as developed by Hans Herzberger. (shrink)

A constructivisation of the cut-elimination proof for sequent calculi for classical, intuitionistic and minimal infinitary logics with geometric rules—given in earlier work by the second author—is presented. This is achieved through a procedure where the non-constructive transfinite induction on the commutative sum of ordinals is replaced by two instances of Brouwer’s Bar Induction. The proof of admissibility of the structural rules is made ordinal-free by introducing a new well-founded relation based on a notion of embeddability of derivations. Additionally, conservativity (...) for classical over intuitionistic/minimal logic for the seven (finitary) Glivenko sequent classes is here shown to hold also for the corresponding infinitary classes. (shrink)

I examine Harvey Brown’s account of relativity as dynamic and constructive theory and Michel Janssen recent criticism of it. By contrasting Einstein’s principle-constructive distinction with a related distinction by Lorentz, I argue that Einstein's distinction presents a false dichotomy. Appealing to Lorentz’s distinction, I argue that there is less of a disagreement between Brown and Janssen than appears initially and, hence, that Brown’s view presents less of a departure from orthodoxy than it may seem. Neither the kinematics-dynamics distinction (...) nor Einstein’s principle- and constructive theory distinction ultimately capture their disagreement, which may instead be a disagreement about the role of modality in science and the explanatory force of putatively nomic constraints. (shrink)

In response to parts I-III of G Rosen's "What is Constructive Empiricism?", "Philosophical Studies", 74, 1994, 143-178, this paper examines several construals of the position of constructive empiricism. At issue, in part, is the equation of intentional aspects of science with the intentions and opinions of scientists. In addition it is necessary to distinguish the constructive empiricist -- a philosopher holding that acceptance of theories in science need not involve belief that they are true -- from the (...) scientific agnostic' who accepts but does not believe current science. What is at stake for empiricism is a view of science that will admit it as a paradigm for rational inquiry. (shrink)

Martin and Deutscher’s remarkable 1966 paper ‘Remembering’ still offers great riches to memory researchers across distinctive traditions, both in its methodological ambition (successfully marrying phenomenological and causal discourses) and in its content. In this short discussion, after briefly setting the paper in its context, we hone in on two live and under-explored issues which have gained attention recently under new labels – the extended mind hypothesis, and the constructive nature of memory. We suggest that Martin and Deutscher’s causal analysis (...) of memory is compatible with the idea that activities of remembering may be distributed across heterogeneous social and external resources, focussing in on their neglected example of creatures who ‘remember as we do’ as long as they carry round metal boxes which are given to them at birth. We then argue that the causal analysis is in some tension with the extent to which remembering is a constructive activity, because there may be no clear way to determine the appropriate ‘limits of accuracy’ within which a past event or experience must be represented. (shrink)

Alan Musgrave, Michael Friedman, Jeffrey Foss, and Richard Creath raised different objections against the Distinction between observables and unobservables when drawn within the confines of Bas C. van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism, to the effect that the Distinction cannot be drawn there coherently. Van Fraassen has only responded to Musgrave but Musgrave claimed not to understand van Fraassen's succinct response. I argue that van Fraassen's response is not enough. What remains in the end is an unsolved problem which CE cannot (...) afford to leave unsolved, or so I argue; I then strengthen Musgrave's criticism and indicate that an extension of the epistemic policy of CE is mandatory to solve the problem. I also argue that Friedman's and Foss' objection against the Distinction in CE misses the mark on closer inspection. An objection due to Creath does hit the mark but can be taken care of without too much ado. All these objections seem alive and kicking until the present day; I try to put them all to rest. (shrink)

This essay argues that fulfilling the promise of participatory democratic theory requires ways for citizens to reconstruct the world, not simply to improve its governance processes. The concept of public work, expressing civic agency, or the capacity of diverse citizens to build a democratic way of life, embodies this shift. It posits citizens as co-creators of the world, not simply deliberators and decision-makers about the world. Public work is a normative, democratizing ideal of citizenship generalized from communal labors of creating (...) the commons, with roots in diverse cultures. Shaped through contention with forces which threaten shared ways of life and their commons, grounded in an understanding of human plurality, public work has political qualities that unmask sentimentalized civic discourses of modern elites. Public work places citizens, not markets or states, as the foundational agents of democracy. It opens a path beyond the political crisis. (shrink)

ONE Methodical Thinking Motto: When we teach men how to think, instead of what to think, then we also reduce misunderstanding. ...

A central object of study in the field of algorithmic randomness are notions of randomness for sequences, i.e., infinite sequences of zeros and ones. These notions are usually defined with respect to the uniform measure on the set of all sequences, but extend canonically to other computable probability measures. This way each notion of randomness induces an equivalence relation on the computable probability measures where two measures are equivalent if they have the same set of random sequences. In what follows, (...) we study the equivalence relations induced by Martin-Löf randomness, computable randomness, Schnorr randomness and Kurtz randomness, together with the relations of equivalence and consistency from probability theory. We show that all these relations coincide when restricted to the class of computable strongly positive generalized Bernoulli measures. For the case of arbitrary computable measures, we obtain a complete and somewhat surprising picture of the implications between these relations that hold in general. (shrink)

A proof is given that the set of maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property and the set of maximal intermediate predicate logics with the disjunction property and the explicit definability property have the power of continuum. To prove our results, we introduce various notions which might be interesting by themselves. In particular, we illustrate a method to generate wide sets of pairwise "constructively incompatible constructive logics". We use a notion of "semiconstructive" logic and define wide sets of (...) "constructive" logics by representing the "constructive" logics as "limits" of decreasing sequences of "semiconstructive" logics. Also, we introduce some generalizations of the usual filtration techniques for propositional logics. For instance, "filtrations over rank formulas" are used to show that any two different logics belonging to a suitable uncountable set of "constructive" logics are "constructively incompatible". (shrink)

Both the constructive and predicative approaches to mathematics arose during the period of what was felt to be a foundational crisis in the early part of this century. Each critiqued an essential logical aspect of classical mathematics, namely concerning the unrestricted use of the law of excluded middle on the one hand, and of apparently circular \impredicative" de nitions on the other. But the positive redevelopment of mathematics along constructive, resp. predicative grounds did not emerge as really viable (...) alternatives to classical, set-theoretically based mathematics until the 1960s. Now we have a massive amount of information, to which this lecture will constitute an introduction, about what can be done by what means, and about the theoretical interrelationships between various formal systems for constructive, predicative and classical analysis. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to evaluate a potential resolution to the gamer’s dilemma that arises from Gary Young’s metaethical theory of constructive ecumenical expressivism. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the gamer’s dilemma is reformulated as a paradox and the potential resolution is evaluated in light of this new formulation. Findings The author argues that this resolution does resolve the dilemma, but CEE itself has limited appeal. Originality/value This paper contributes to the growing scholarship dedicated to resolving the gamer’s dilemma.

We introduce a predicative version of topos based on the notion of small maps in algebraic set theory, developed by Joyal and one of the authors. Examples of stratified pseudotoposes can be constructed in Martin-Löf type theory, which is a predicative theory. A stratified pseudotopos admits construction of the internal category of sheaves, which is again a stratified pseudotopos. We also show how to build models of Aczel-Myhill constructive set theory using this categorical structure.

I present a semantics for the language of first-order additive-multiplicative linear logic, i.e. the language of classical first-order logic with two sorts of disjunction and conjunction. The semantics allows us to capture intuitions often associated with linear logic or constructivism such as sentences = games, SENTENCES = resources or sentences = problems, where “truth” means existence of an effective winning strategy.The paper introduces a decidable first-order logic ET in the above language and gives a proof of its soundness and completeness (...) with respect to this semantics. Allowing noneffective strategies in the latter is shown to lead to classical logic.The semantics presented here is very similar to Blass's game semantics. Although there is no straightforward reduction between the two corresponding notions of validity, my completeness proof can likely be adapted to the logic induced by Blass's semantics to show its decidability, which was the main problem left open in Blass's paper.The reader needs to be familiar with classical logic and arithmetic. (shrink)

This article reflects one scholar's attempt to locate herself within emerging ethical methodologies given a specific concern with cross-cultural women's moral praxis. The field of comparative ethics's debt to past debates over methodology is considered through a typology of three waves of methodological invention. The article goes on to describe a specific research focus on U.S. Catholic and Iranian Shii women that initiated a search for a distinct method. This method of comparative ethics, which focuses on the production of ethical (...) knowledge through the interaction of discursive logics of various moral agents, is described. The conclusion turns to how methodological invention can itself become a constructive project through the way it (1) locates the scholar in relation to her subject of study and (2) allows for isolation of tactics within specific moral discourses. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question: how should the traditional doxastic attitude of agnosticism be represented in a Bayesian framework? Bas van Fraassen has one proposal: a Bayesian is agnostic about a proposition if her opinion about the proposition is represented by a probability interval with zero as the lower limit. I argue that van Fraassen's proposal is not adequate. Mark Kaplan claims that this leads to a problem with constructive empiricism; I show that Kaplan's claim is incorrect.

We define and investigate Heyting-valued interpretations for Constructive Zermelo–Frankel set theory . These interpretations provide models for CZF that are analogous to Boolean-valued models for ZF and to Heyting-valued models for IZF. Heyting-valued interpretations are defined here using set-generated frames and formal topologies. As applications of Heyting-valued interpretations, we present a relative consistency result and an independence proof.