book 1. Knowledge.--book 2. Truth.--book 3. Certitude.

In this paper, I offer an immanent critique of John Rawls’s theory of justice which seeks to show that Rawls’s understanding of his theory of justice as criteriological and contractarian is ultimately incompatible with his claim that the theory is grounded on the primacy of the practical. I agree with Michael Sandel’s observation that the Rawlsian theory of justice rests on substantive metaphysical and epistemological claims, in spite of Rawls’s assurances to the contrary. But while Sandel argues for even more (...) substantive metaphysical and epistemological commitments, I argue in the opposite direction. Following J. G. Fichte, I argue for a normative theory of society, not based on some particular notion of the good or on some contentious account of what all reasonable persons would agree to, but based only on the radical primacy of the practical, that is, based only on the seemingly empty premise that free beings - precisely because they are free - cannot be imagined in advance as all agreeing to any particular thing at all. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an immanent critique of John Rawls's theory of justice which seeks to show that Rawls's understanding of his theory of justice as criteriological and contractarian is ultimately incompatible with his claim that the theory is grounded on the primacy of the practical. I agree with Michael Sandel's observation that the Rawlsian theory of justice rests on substantive metaphysical and epistemological claims, in spite of Rawls's assurances to the contrary. But while Sandel argues for even more (...) substantive metaphysical and epistemological commitments, I argue in the opposite direction. Following J. G. Fichte, I argue for a normative theory of society, not based on some particular notion of the good or on some contentious account of what all reasonable persons would agree to, but based only on the radical primacy of the practical, that is, based only on the seemingly empty premise that free beings - precisely because they are free - cannot be imagined in advance as all agreeing to any particular thing at all. Key Words: contractualism • J. G. Fichte • primacy of the practical • Rawls. (shrink)

On the point that, in practices of critical thinking, we respond spontaneously in concrete situations, this paper presents an account on behalf of Wittgenstein. I argue that the ‘seeing-things-aright’ model of Luntley's Wittgenstein is not adequate, since it pays insufficient attention to radically new circumstances, in which the content of norms is updated. While endorsing Bailin's emphasis on criteria of critical thinking, Wittgenstein would agree with Papastephanou and Angeli's demand to look behind criteriology. He maintains the primacy of the (...) practical, and yet contends that a reasonable person lets rules of rationality compel her. These rules are not mere heuristics. I further examine Burbules' conception of communicative reason, and, among others, his interpretation of Wittgenstein's sign-post example. (shrink)

The paper offers a running commentary on ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and Sense Perception (composed ca. 80 BCE), with the aim to provide a clear description of Hellenistic/post-Hellenistic Pythagorean epistemology. Through an analysis of the process of knowledge and of the faculties that this involves, ps-Archytas presents an original epistemological theory which, although grounded in Aristotelian and Platonic theories, results in a peculiar Pythagorean criteriology that accounts for the acquisition and production of knowledge, as well as for the specific competences (...) of each cognitive faculty. (shrink)

The World Psychiatric Association has emphasised the importance of idiographic understanding as a distinct component of comprehensive assessment but in introductions to the idea it is often assimilated to the notion of narrative judgement. This paper aims to distinguish between supposed idiographic and narrative judgement. Taking the former to mean a kind of individualised judgement, I argue that it has no place in psychiatry in part because it threatens psychiatric validity. Narrative judgement, by contrast, is a genuinely distinct complement to (...) criteriological diagnosis but it is, nevertheless, a special kind of general judgement and thus can possess validity. To argue this I first examine the origin of the distinction between idiographic and nomothetic in Windelband’s 1894 rectorial address. I argue that none of three ways of understanding that distinction is tenable. Windelband’s description of historical methods, as a practical example, does not articulate a genuine form of understanding. A metaphysical distinction between particulars and general kinds is guilty of subscribing to the Myth of the Given. A distinction based on an abstraction of essentially combined aspects of empirical judgement cannot underpin a distinct empirical method. Furthermore, idiographic elements understood as individualised judgements threaten the validity of psychiatric diagnosis. In the final part I briefly describe some aspects of the logic of narrative judgements and argue that in the call for comprehensive diagnosis, narrative rather than idiographic elements have an important role. Importantly, however, whilst directed towards individual subjects, narratives are framed in intrinsically general concepts and thus can aspire to validity. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 45, Issue 3, pp 412 - 429 In the 1980s Ricoeur conceptualized metaphoricity and narrativity as twin ends of a discursive field governed by the productive imagination. A decade earlier Ricoeur was working at a significantly different proposition. He wanted to establish a parallel, in fact a strong homology, between metaphor and _text_. In both cases Ricoeur articulated a complex criteriology to establish the parallelism between the terms. Should we regard the earlier parallel as a first (...) and less precise version of the later? a distinct thesis? a reconcilable claim? a category error? Was the rejection and return an evolution, a clarification, or simply a different topic? The thesis of this close reading of Ricoeur’s middle period writings on metaphor is that the shift of analogical relations is actually a migration from the first to the second homology, and that the second homology is the correct one. (shrink)

Franz Brentano upheld the medieval Aristotelian doctrine of intentionality as a mark of the mental, distinguishing physical from psychological phenomena by the intentionality of the psychological and nonintentionality of the physical. But to implement, even to fully understand and appreciate Brentano’s thesis, it is necessary to know when intentionality does or does not obtain. The task of formulating satisfactory criteria of intentionality has proved elusive. The magnitude of difficulty is indicated by the number and variety of criteria proposed and defeated (...) by counter examples. Intentionality may be a primitive irreducible property incapable of reductive conceptual analysis. But nonreductive criteriological characterizations of intentionality demonstrate an equally stubborn resistance to philosophical methods. (shrink)

This paper purports a limited study of the concept of reason. It analyzes the claim of religious belief to be reasonable. The context for this analysis is an examination of some evidential (criteriological) connections between reasonable belief and ?(good) reasons? for such belief. Consideration of the typical sort of evidential connection shows, not surprisingly, that religious belief cannot claim to be reasonable. But it is argued that there is (at least) one other sort of connection, and that it is philosophically (...) plausible to regard this connection as definitive of a quite distinctive sense of ?reasonable?, with its own kind and style of criteria, according to which religious belief can be thought reasonable. (shrink)

SummaryCertain revolutionary changes in medicine—measurement, chemistry, genetics—have led to recasting both the criteriology and the conceptualization of the terms of discourse. But advances along this path rest no longer on naive observation but intimately and inextricably involve modeling, that is, a system of inference which derives no immediate warrant from the primordial data of the senses. This system is not totally new in quality, since all “fact” involves interpretation of data; nor is it entirely new in having heuristic value (...) in unearthing, or calling attention to, unsuspected evidence. But it differs in two major respects. First, it requires patterns of surmise which can no longer be immediately corroborated at all stages by naive means but rest more and more on internal theoretical consistency and confirmatory predictions to be verified by other sophisticated and indirect means. Second, it is leading to fundamental upheavals in even the broad perception of human biology, undermining well-established groupings and exposing certain classical fields of inquiry as meaningless. The problem yet to be confronted in this field is how an epistemology of the model (in this sense) is to be constructed. The model is useless (as the whole scientific endeavor is useless) if it has not a more economical structure than the totality of the raw data, even if the success of this economy is in some degree factitious (“robustness”). On the other hand, the model is also useless unless it has heuristic value and helps in adjudicating among competing interpretations (“power”). A good model will help also to distinguish relevant aspects of the data from the irrelevancies ascribed to error. The paradigmatic function of the model, then, defines certain “sufficient statistics” which condense the relevant features of the data. In fact a close analogy can be developed between the methodology of statistical inference and nosology. Both are necessarily tentative, and healthy development of both, in practice, is iterative; that is, the evidence and the model are mutually correcting and lead to advancement one of another. (shrink)

In a recent article (Inquiry, Vol. 19 [1976]), J. W. Meiland addresses the issue of psychologism in logic, which holds that logic is a branch of psychology and that logical laws (such as the Principle of Non?Contradiction) are contingent upon the nature of the mind. Meiland examines Husserl's critique of psychologism, argues that Husserl is not convincing, and offers two new objections to the psychologistic thesis. In this paper I attempt to rebut those objections. In question are the acceptable criteria (...) for determining the possibility or impossibility of systems of logic significantly different from our own. I argue that a criteriological application of our accepted laws of logic to this question commits a circular fallacy. I then argue that, even if we accept logical consistency as a criterion for possibility, a plausible argument for the possibility of valid alternative logics can be constructed by using the functionalist analogy between minds and automata. Finally, I attempt to rebut the claim that in logic the only changes possible are conceptual changes that would not permit a proposition to be both true and false. (shrink)

Excellence is a salient category of quality assessment across a vast range of applications. It invariably involves a complex criteriology that cannot be uniformly formalized, although it always pivots on a dialectical interaction between quantity and quality. In the end, however, the purpose of excellence-assessment is invariably functional, the evaluation at issue being made with a view to some purposive objective with respect to which quality matters.

Cardinal Mercier’s Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy is a standard work, prepared at the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Louvain, mainly for the use of clerical students in Catholic Seminaries. Though undoubtedly elementary, it contains a clear, simple, and methodological exposition of the principles and problems of every department of philosophy, and its appeal is not to any particular class, but broadly human and universal. Volume I includes a general introduction to philosophy and sections on cosmology, psychology, criteriology, and metaphysics (...) or ontology. (shrink)

In this paper I explore some ways in which Africa can contribute to the discourse on global justice. I first note the wide range in the circumstances in which judgements of justice continue to be made—from the domestic to the local and national, and from the national to the international. I conclude the paper with a look at the international human rights situation, suggesting areas where African wisdom and criteriology can be brought to bear on discussions of global justice. (...) In doing this, I call attention to John Rawls’s important distinction between a people and the state which the people call their own. The state does not constitute the people, but the people may constitute a state. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evidence-Based Medicine and EvaluativismTim Thornton (bio)KeywordsPhilosophy, psychiatry, values, causalThe rise of evidence-based medicine (EBM) in psychiatry has brought, in its train, a concentration on the validity of psychiatric taxonomy to augment the previous focus on reliability (in the medical sense of inter-subject agreement). This is not surprising. If EBM is to be a trustworthy guide to future events, such as patient recovery, it must be based on projectible predicates (...) (Goodman 1983). Not all the predicates that apparently fit past observations would produce true predictions for the future. Furthermore, there is reason to think that employing projectible predicates goes a long way to satisfy the (widespread if contested) aim of being based on a nomological science (Papineau 1986). Thus, the successful implementation of EBM within psychiatry requires the successful articulation of a valid psychiatric taxonomy.This connection helps to explain why fears about the application of EBM to psychiatry often turn on fears about the application of the criteriological model of diagnosis to individuals. In her commentary in this issue, Gloria Ayob has examined some of the arguments concerning the application of EBM to individuals. In this brief commentary, I examine a different potential source of disquiet focused on the underlying nature of psychiatric taxonomy.Dimensions for Psychiatric TaxonomyIn their recent paper, Peter Zachar and Kenneth Kendler suggest a number of different dimensions according to which rival conceptions of psychiatric taxonomy can be mapped. These include (1) causalism–descriptivism, (2) essentialism– nominalism, (3) objectivism–evaluativism, (4) internalism–externalism, (5) entities–agents, and (6) categories–continua (2007, 557). At the heart of the objectivism-evaluativism dimension is the question:Is deciding whether or not something is a psychiatric disorder a simple factual matterY (objectivism), or does it inevitably involve a value-laden judgment (evaluativism)?(Zachar and Kendler 2007, 558)Objectivists argue that the concept of disorder is a simple or plain factual matter by contrast with an evaluation. The apparently evaluative connotations of disorder, they argue, can either be reduced to, or explained away in, more basic terms, which are not themselves essentially evaluative. Thus, for example, the attempt to explain disorder in statistical terms is a form of objectivism. The more plausible attempt to explain disorder through the idea of a biological or proper function is also usually presented as a form of objectivism. (The most famous proponent of a biological approach, however, Jerome Wakefield, adds to an objectivist-aspiring core an explicit value in the form of harm [End Page 175] [Wakefield 1999].) Whether or not it can be successful as a form of objectivism, in addition to whether an analysis in biological terms is possible, depends on whether the account of function can fully discharge any initial evaluative or normative assumptions.There seems to be good evidence that current psychiatric taxonomy, at least, contains values. John Sadler, for example, makes a powerful case for this in his substantial work Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis (2005). Sadler, furthermore, addresses in some detail a further set of questions concerning the kinds and nature of the values involved. I outline just one further question about the nature of values involved.Zachar and Kendler contrast the presence of values with objectivism. Objectivity has at least two relevant senses reflecting contrasts with two senses of subjectivity. It—objectivity—might mean requiring no special subject for the conception and framing of relevant judgments. (This mirrors primary, by contrast with secondary qualities, and Williams' idea of an absolute conception [Williams 1978]). Or, it might mean disciplining and providing a contrast between correctness and incorrectness, or truth and falsity, for the relevant judgments. This contrasts with subjective whimsy.Although it seems relatively straight forward that the conception and framing of value judgments requires that subjects have a particular kind of mind, that still leaves open the other issue. Are value judgments disciplined by anything or does the "truth" of a value judgment collapse back into its being sincerely made?Evaluativism in Psychiatric Taxonomy and EBMThis question relates to the application of EBM to psychiatry in this way. On a disciplined account, psychiatric taxonomy can aim to get right the mixture or, better, the compound of simple facts and values... (shrink)

The notion that "the holy reality wills it" can provide both the rational justification (the move from "is" to "ought") and the psychological motivation for acting morally. But can the will of God be the criterion for the morally right? Although what is right cannot be reduced to what God wills (due to the perceptual aspect of the meaning of "right"), it can be deduced from it, given an understanding of perception that implies that an omniscient perceiver would necessarily be (...) an impartial sympathizer. This, however, presupposes the ideal observer criterion of rightness, which is based upon an appeal to holiness. Recognizing that the criteriological and religious meanings of moral terms are finally identical overcomes the problems of justification and motivation inevitable in apparently non-religious moral theories. (shrink)

In the debate on peace ethics in Germany, it is constantly argued that the ‘doctrine of just war’ must be replaced by a ‘doctrine of just peace’. The criteriology of just war can at best be preserved within a doctrine of just peace. However, it is often overlooked that—although the word ‘peace’ may sound nicer than ‘war’—a doctrine of just peace is also fraught with great difficulties in terms of content. The concept of peace can be interpreted in different (...) ways; the concept of justice must even be differentiated if it is to have meaning at all. Ultimately, the two concepts point to a different understanding of tradition and historicity: while the doctrine of just war takes its criteria from the tradition, the idea of just peace attempts to draw conclusions for the present from drafts or blueprints of the future. However, since the drafts can turn out differently, new conflicts will arise precisely for this reason. Talk of ‘just peace’ might be more pleasing to the public, but does not necessarily have to be more restrictive in terms of violence. (shrink)

From the standpoint of the theory of medicine, a formulation is given of three types of reasoning used by physicians. The first is deduction from probability models (as in prognosis or genetic counseling for Mendelian disorders). It is a branch of mathematics that leads to predictive statements about outcomes of individual events in terms of known formal assumptions and parameters. The second type is inference (as in interpreting clinical trials). In it the arguments from replications of the same process (data) (...) lead to conclusions about the parameters of a system, without calling into question either the probabilistic model or the criteria of evidence. The third is illation (as in the elucidation of symptoms in a patient). It is a process whereby, in the light of the total evidence and the conclusions from the other types of reasoning, one may modify, expand, simplify or demolish a conceptual framework proposed for deductions, and modify the nature of the evidence sought, the criteriology, the axioms, and the surmised complexity of the scientific theory. (The process of diagnosis as applied to a patient may in extreme cases lead to the discovery of an entirely new disease with its own, quite new, set of diagnostic criteria. This course cannot be accommodated inside either of the other two types of reasoning.) Illation has something of the character of Kuhn's scientific revolution in physics; but it differs in that it is the nature, not the degree or frequency of change that distinguishes it from Kuhn's normal science. (shrink)

Thomas McCarthy has provided a trenchant critique of the deconstructionist turn in recent philosophy and has outlined a program of reconstruction in its aftermath. He develops his version of reconstructionist philosophy against the backdrop of Kant's doctrine of critical reason and the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas. However, McCarthy's reconstructionist design is not simply an appropriation and defense of Habermas. He provides a critical reformulation of the Habermasian position, deftly using Habermas against himself. The author is in accord both with (...) McCarthy's disposition to problematize the premises of deconstruction and his call for philosophical reconstruction. In continuing the conversation, however, he distances himself farther than does McCarthy from the criteriological concept of rationality that was proposed by Kant and which continues to inform Habermas's requirement for the grounding of validity claims. In the process the author proposes a new approach to the resources of reason along the lines of what he has come to call the dynamics of transversal rationality. (shrink)

The author examines the role the teaching of authoritative church bodies can or should play in academic theology, taking into account that theology claims conformity with epistemological standards. First, he analyses different forms of authority – non-formal, formal and constitutional, as well as epistemic and deontological. Secondly, he focuses on the subject of theology understood as the relationship between God and humanity. Theology has a threefold approach in the way it studies this relationship. The starting point of theology is the (...) human manifestations of faith . However, unlike a non-theological approach of religious studies, theology seeks the revelation of the Word of God behind these manifestations . Divine revelation can then become a criterion by which to judge whether such human manifestations of faith correspond to the Word of God . In the third part the author analyses the relationship between authority and theology.Teaching by constitutional church authorities is itself a human manifestation of faith and thus theologically relevant for the descriptive and explanatory approach. However, such teaching can come into tension with other manifestations of faith, and academic theology cannot accept its authoritative status as a criterion of truth. Within the speculative approach, theology may consider other manifestations of faith as more relevant to its task. Pursuing the normative and criteriological approach, theology will come to criticise certain human religious practice, including the teaching of church authorities, and may legitimately do so. Since, however, the two other approaches depend on the descriptive and explanatory approach, theology cannot simply ignore the teaching of church authorities, rather it must recognise it as a relevant aspect of its research. (shrink)

In response to the concern that criteriological psychiatric diagnosis, based on the DSM and ICD classifications, pigeon-holes patients, there have been calls for it to be augmented by an idiographic formulation [IDGA Workgroup, WPA 2003]. I have argued elsewhere that this is a mistake [Thornton 2008a, 2008b, 2010]. Looking back to its original proponent Wilhelm Windelband yields no clear account of the contrast between idiographic and nomothetic judgement. Abstracting from Jaspers’ account of understanding an idea of idiographic judgement based on (...) the contrast between singular and general causal relations also fails. I argue, however, that Windelband does provide a helpful clue in his remark that ‘every interest and judgement, every ascription of human value is based upon the singular and the unique... Our sense of values and all of our axiological sentiments are grounded in the uniqueness and incomparability of their object’ [Windelband 1980: 182]. This suggests a role for the idiographic not as the content of a particular kind of judgement but rather as characterising its aim. I argue that this connects to the issue of the generalisability of small scale qualitative social science research and to the critique of ‘looking away’ in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Kant shows that a fundamental theory of normativity and morality can give neither an explanation nor an explication of normativity, but can only articulate and render explicit its origin. It can do so by indicating the place or topos and the turn or trope of its originating. According to Kant, the topos of normativity is the will qua practical reason and its trope is the general, typically instrumental use of this reason, i.e. reflection. The trope of the origin of morality (...) is autonomy, i.e. practical reason turning on itself and thus becoming pure practical reason, thereby establishing its own form as law: the categorical imperative. Consequently, fundamental ethics serves two functions : formally, it provides evidence for the originality or authenticity of morality; materially, it gives a criteriological principle for the content of morality. The article argues that Kant was right in his view of the foundation of ethics, but was wrong in the manner in which he met the requirements thus established. The topos of normativity and, consequently, of morality cannot be reason, but must be consciousness or, more precisely, knowledge de se; and its fundamental trope cannot be reflection, but must be what can be described as a conversion of consciousness. This conversion can be identified with philein in the sense of Aristotle. It has four different aspects: desire, cognition, benevolence, and recognition. When philein is reciprocal and lived, philia ensues. Friendship is then described as the topos of the origin of Normativity and Morality. (shrink)

Theologians have long appealed to Newman’s Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine as a source for criteria to determine the genuineness of doctrinal developments. After pointing out that Newman changed his terminology from “tests” in the original edition to “notes” in the third edition, this article examines their current criteriological usefulness both in retrospect and in prospect.

Idiographic understanding has been proposed as a response to concern that criteriological diagnosis cannot capture the nature of human individuality. It can seem that understanding individuals requires, instead, a distinct form of ‘individualised’ judgement and this claim receives endorsement by the inventor of the term ‘idiographic’, Wilhelm Windelband. I argue, however, that none of the options for specifying a model of individualised judgement, to explain what idiographic judgement might be, will work. I suggest, at the end, that narrative, rather than (...) idiographic, understanding is a more promising response to the limitations of criteriological diagnosis. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling, Ran Lahav and others claim, helps clients deepen their philosophical self‐understanding. The counsellor's role is the minimalist one of providing the client with the philosophical tools needed for reflective self‐evaluation. Respect for the client's autonomy entails refraining from intervening with substantive moral criticism, theories, and methods; the client's ways of working out fundamental questions like ‘Who am I and what do I really want?’cannot be assessed by the counsellor in terms of their truth‐value, but only in terms of (...) whether they reflect the client's autonomous choice to express him/herself in a certain way. I argue that this view, which is informed by an anti‐realist account of self and life‐history, undermines the distinction between self‐knowledge and self‐deception. Once interpretive and criteriological free rein is given to the client, and once personal, pragmatic and aesthetic considerations take precedence over truth‐value, then the way is left open to clients to generate the most morally convenient self‐interpretation to suit their current needs. I defend the view that truth matters in philosophical counselling; more specifically, that there is a basic distinction between true and false forms of self‐understanding. To do this, I offer a broadly realist account of self and reflective self‐evaluation. If this is right, then philosophical counsellors shoulder a significant burden of responsibility in helping their clients achieve an accurate, defensible, action‐guiding and truth‐oriented self‐understanding. (shrink)

To analyse and explain Charles Taylor′s understanding of secularity in terms of “optionality” or “plurality” and to illuminate the nature of the hypothetical stance and the virtuality of beliefs it entails requires one to engage in a larger than empirical and, as it were, deeper than merely historical inquiry, one that is, if not metaphysical, then at least ontological or pre-ontological. The conditions of the secular age should, on this view, not be confused with the epistemological or, more broadly normative, (...) criteriological terms that categorize experience and the search for the spiritual “fullness”. As a consequence, neither specific elements or forms of belief nor their successive repudiation, neither historical nor empirical, neither sociological nor psychological findings will ever allow us to determine where or when, exactly, secularity begins, let alone suspect whether it might very well come to an end. What is required is, rather, to take a step back and to investigate why and how the advocacy of “public secularity” and the broader assumption of the eventual practical and existential demise or irrelevance of faith – which has been falsified by recent trends and current affairs in “global religion” – could have emerged as a theoretical construct at all. (shrink)

I. General introduction to philosophy, by Cardinal Mercier. Cosmology, by D. Nys. Psychology, by Cardinal Mercier. Criteriology, by Cardinal Mercier. General metaphysics; or, Ontology, by Cardinal Mercier. Appendix to Cosmology, by D. Nys.--II. Natural theology; or, Theodicy, by Cardinal Mercier. Logic, by Cardinal Mercier. Ethics: General ethics, by A. Arendt (based on Cardinal Mercier's notes); Special ethics, by J. Halleux. History of philosophy, by M. de Wulf. Synopsis in the form of the principal theses. Glossary of scholastic terms, by (...) G. Simons. (shrink)

Este trabajo estudia la relación entre escepticismo pirrónico y medicina en el escenario contemporáneo a partir de una caracterización del escepticismo contemporáneo y de las escuelas médicas del presente. Para ello se propone (i) que hay un tipo de saber que corresponde a la noción de una experiencia purificada por la epokhé y es el conocimiento narrativo, (ii) que la Medicina Basada en Narraciones (MBN) es la escuela médica que se pueda vincular con el proyecto neopirrónico y (iii) que MBN (...) es un caso testigo para analizar el rol criteriológico del conocimiento narrativo. This paper studies the relationship between Pyrrhonian skepticism and medicine in the contemporary scenario and tries to offer a characterization of contemporary skepticism and of present day medical schools. We propose (i) that there is a kind of knowledge that corresponds to the notion of an experience purified by epokhé which is the narrative knowledge, (ii) that Narrative Based Medicine (MBN) is the medical school that can be linked to the neopyrrhonian project and (iii) that MBN is a leading case for analyzing the criteriological role of narrative knowledge. (shrink)

Evaluation is, as J. R. Maze has recently suggested, central to the concept of attitude. But it is argued that Maze's noncognitivist analysis of evaluation yields an inadequate account of our ordinary concept of attitude. A criteriological account of evaluation is sketched which allows for an objective dimension to evaluation and hence to attitudes. In the case of attitudes, it is argued that some criteria will be chosen at least in part for their consequences, and hence will not be chosen (...) solely on the basis of interest, preference or affect. (shrink)

Este trabajo estudia la relación entre escepticismo pirrónico y medicina en el escenario contemporáneo a partir de una caracterización del escepticismo contemporáneo y de las escuelas médicas del presente. Para ello se propone (i) que hay un tipo de saber que corresponde a la noción de una experiencia purificada por la epokhé y es el conocimiento narrativo, (ii) que la Medicina Basada en Narraciones (MBN) es la escuela médica que se pueda vincular con el proyecto neopirrónico y (iii) que MBN (...) es un caso testigo para analizar el rol criteriológico del conocimiento narrativo. This paper studies the relationship between Pyrrhonian skepticism and medicine in the contemporary scenario and tries to offer a characterization of contemporary skepticism and of present day medical schools. We propose (i) that there is a kind of knowledge that corresponds to the notion of an experience purified by epokhé which is the narrative knowledge, (ii) that Narrative Based Medicine (MBN) is the medical school that can be linked to the neopyrrhonian project and (iii) that MBN is a leading case for analyzing the criteriological role of narrative knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evidence-Based Medicine and EvaluativismTim Thornton (bio)KeywordsPhilosophy, psychiatry, values, causalThe rise of evidence-based medicine (EBM) in psychiatry has brought, in its train, a concentration on the validity of psychiatric taxonomy to augment the previous focus on reliability (in the medical sense of inter-subject agreement). This is not surprising. If EBM is to be a trustworthy guide to future events, such as patient recovery, it must be based on projectible predicates (...) (Goodman 1983). Not all the predicates that apparently fit past observations would produce true predictions for the future. Furthermore, there is reason to think that employing projectible predicates goes a long way to satisfy the (widespread if contested) aim of being based on a nomological science (Papineau 1986). Thus, the successful implementation of EBM within psychiatry requires the successful articulation of a valid psychiatric taxonomy.This connection helps to explain why fears about the application of EBM to psychiatry often turn on fears about the application of the criteriological model of diagnosis to individuals. In her commentary in this issue, Gloria Ayob has examined some of the arguments concerning the application of EBM to individuals. In this brief commentary, I examine a different potential source of disquiet focused on the underlying nature of psychiatric taxonomy.Dimensions for Psychiatric TaxonomyIn their recent paper, Peter Zachar and Kenneth Kendler suggest a number of different dimensions according to which rival conceptions of psychiatric taxonomy can be mapped. These include (1) causalism–descriptivism, (2) essentialism– nominalism, (3) objectivism–evaluativism, (4) internalism–externalism, (5) entities–agents, and (6) categories–continua (2007, 557). At the heart of the objectivism-evaluativism dimension is the question:Is deciding whether or not something is a psychiatric disorder a simple factual matterY (objectivism), or does it inevitably involve a value-laden judgment (evaluativism)?(Zachar and Kendler 2007, 558)Objectivists argue that the concept of disorder is a simple or plain factual matter by contrast with an evaluation. The apparently evaluative connotations of disorder, they argue, can either be reduced to, or explained away in, more basic terms, which are not themselves essentially evaluative. Thus, for example, the attempt to explain disorder in statistical terms is a form of objectivism. The more plausible attempt to explain disorder through the idea of a biological or proper function is also usually presented as a form of objectivism. (The most famous proponent of a biological approach, however, Jerome Wakefield, adds to an objectivist-aspiring core an explicit value in the form of harm [End Page 175] [Wakefield 1999].) Whether or not it can be successful as a form of objectivism, in addition to whether an analysis in biological terms is possible, depends on whether the account of function can fully discharge any initial evaluative or normative assumptions.There seems to be good evidence that current psychiatric taxonomy, at least, contains values. John Sadler, for example, makes a powerful case for this in his substantial work Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis (2005). Sadler, furthermore, addresses in some detail a further set of questions concerning the kinds and nature of the values involved. I outline just one further question about the nature of values involved.Zachar and Kendler contrast the presence of values with objectivism. Objectivity has at least two relevant senses reflecting contrasts with two senses of subjectivity. It—objectivity—might mean requiring no special subject for the conception and framing of relevant judgments. (This mirrors primary, by contrast with secondary qualities, and Williams' idea of an absolute conception [Williams 1978]). Or, it might mean disciplining and providing a contrast between correctness and incorrectness, or truth and falsity, for the relevant judgments. This contrasts with subjective whimsy.Although it seems relatively straight forward that the conception and framing of value judgments requires that subjects have a particular kind of mind, that still leaves open the other issue. Are value judgments disciplined by anything or does the "truth" of a value judgment collapse back into its being sincerely made?Evaluativism in Psychiatric Taxonomy and EBMThis question relates to the application of EBM to psychiatry in this way. On a disciplined account, psychiatric taxonomy can aim to get right the mixture or, better, the compound of simple facts and values... (shrink)

This paper explores R.G. Collingwood's argument that a new type of archaeology, taking fairy tales as its subject matter, is capable of expanding our historical knowledge of cultural practices. I suggest that it is interesting from the point of view of current discussions about cosmopolitanism and communitarianism and also for understanding past practices, such as magic, without having to attribute failure of reasoning or a breakdown in mentality to the participants, as Le Roy Ladurie does. Collingwood maintains that the natural (...) sciences are unsuitable models for the human sciences. They are incapable of distinguishing between the inside and outside of an event. They do not acknowledge that a historical process is very different from a natural process. In addition, the natural sciences cannot take account of the self-critical or criteriological aspect of thought. Human sciences are criteriological in that they are capable of taking individuals who formulate intentions and purposes, and employ criteria to judge the extent to which they succeed or fail. Thought is self-critical, and to say that a certain thought conforms to a type of neurosis is to ignore its criteriological character. The implication is that when magic is viewed as bad science, or a failure in rationality, the criteriological character of magical thought is being denied. When magic is understood as an integral part of fairy tales and as a practice designed to arouse specific emotions to be channelled into practical effects, such as to inspire courage in warriors in battle, its character as purposive and intentional thought is being acknowledged. (shrink)

Philip Pettit's ethocentric account of rule-following is elaborated and defended in this paper as basically a story about the capacity to reason organized around largely implicit assumptions about what is and what is not normal. It is argued that this account can be insightfully used to elucidate the practical reasoning of agents confronted with the normative indeterminacy that seems to be characteristic of radically new situations. It is shown that practical reasoning consists to a large extent in the capacity to (...) articulate, specify, and evaluate implicit assumptions about what is and what is not normal. One corollary of this account of practical reason is investigated in some detail: the predominant role of intrapersonal divergence of habits in reasoning about an apparent normative indeterminacy and the related, merely criteriological role of convergence with respect to determining the right rules to follow. (shrink)

Cardinal Mercier's A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy is a standard work, prepared at the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Louvain, mainly for the use of clerical students in Catholic seminaries. Though undoubtedly elementary, it contains a clear, simple, and methodological exposition of the principles and problems of every department of philosophy, and its appeal is not to any particular class, but broadly human and universal. Volume I includes a general introduction to philosophy and sections on cosmology, psychology, criteriology, and (...) metaphysics or ontology. Volume II contains sections on natural theology, logic, ethics, and outlines of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In general, the eleven, previously unpublished papers are not as strong as those in the first series. Bromberger attempts to detail the necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being an explanation; Anscombe offers some provocative but inconclusive remarks on the intentionality of sensation; Malpas examines some criteriological puzzles which arise in considering the location of sound as a bit of unlearned perceptual behavior. The rest of the papers are second order assessments and attacks upon positions maintained by other analytical philosophers. (...) Of these Putnam's attack on Malcolm's brand of behaviorism and Butler's attempted dissolution of Goodman's "grue" paradox make their points most effectively. Moravcsik contends, against Strawson, that events are at least as primitive in our conceptual scheme as physical bodies. Wiggins questions some Fregean analyses of the logic of identity-statements; taking off from Strawson, Woods distinguishes a principle of individuation from a criterion of identity and attempts to clarify their separate but related roles by an analysis of the sorts of questions that require their use in giving answers. Rundle is concerned to modify certain Quinean answers to paradoxes of tense requirements that arise in the quantification of modal statements; Savan questions Vlastos' ascription of fallacies to the Socratic argument on the unity of Wisdom and Temperance in the Protagoras. Finally, Shorter points out the general inconclusiveness of "transformational analysis" by exhibiting specific shortcomings of Vendler's analysis of causality in the first volume of this series.—E. A. R. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction A Brief Historical Note Failed Shortcuts Looking Deeper The Richness of Biology The Persistence of Design Real Design? Conclusion Postscript: Counterpoint Notes References.