The purpose of this paper is to introduce and define self psychology and its concepts so that they can be applied toward a new understanding of the human-nonhuman animal bond. The paper utilizes selected literature from both self psychology and the human-animal bond fields. The paper contains four primary conclusions: 1. Self psychology provides a unique model for understanding the depth and meaning of human-animal relationships; 2. Companion animals and humans can be (...) equally important in their selfobject roles; 3. Self psychology can offer a model for understanding individual differences in attachment to companion animals; and 4. A future direction includes finding ways to assess self psychology constructs in order to measure the depth and function of the selfobject relationship. (shrink)

This paper examines the bond between humans and dogs as demonstrated in the life and work of Emily Brontë . The nineteenth century author, publishing under the pseudonym, Ellis Bell, evinced, both in her personal and professional life, the complex range of emotions explicit in the human-dog bond: attachment and companionship to domination and abuse. In Wuthering Heights, Brontë portrays the dog as scapegoat, illustrating the dark side of the bond found in many cultures. Moreover, she (...) writes with awareness of connections - unknown in the nineteenth century - between animal abuse and domestic violence. In her personal life, Brontë's early power struggles with her companion animal mastiff, Keeper, evolve into a caring relationship. In a human-dog bond transformation that survives Brontë's death, Keeper, becomes both bridge and barrier to other human relationships. A dog may, and in this case Keeper does, take on a comprehensive role in which he both mourns his own loss and comforts others in their collective grief. (shrink)

Diphtheria is an acute toxin-mediated superficial infection of the respiratory tract or skin caused by the aerobic gram-positive bacillus Corynebacterium diphtheriae. The epidemiology of infection and clinical manifestations of the disease vary in different parts of the world. Historical accounts of diphtheria epidemics have been described in many parts of the world since antiquity. Developed in the late 19th century, the diphtheria antitoxin played a pivotal role in the history of public health and vaccinology prior to the advent of the (...) diphtheria-tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine. One of the most significant demonstrations of the importance of DAT was its use in the 1925 diphtheria epidemic of Nome, Alaska. Coordinated emergency delivery of this life-saving antitoxin by dog-sled relay in the harshest of conditions has left a profound legacy in the annals of vaccinology and public health. Lead dogs Balto and Togo, and the dog-led antitoxin run of 1925 represent a dynamic illustration of the contribution made by non-human species towards mass immunization in the history of vaccinology. This unique example of cooperative interspecies fellowship and collaboration highlights the importance of the human-animal bond in the one-health initiative. (shrink)

Mehr et al. propose a theory of the evolution music that can potentially account for most animal vocalizations as precursors to human music. Therein lies its appeal but also its Achilles' heel, for the wider the range of animal vocalizations treated as premusical expressions, the wider the gap to human music. Here, I offer a few critical observations and constructive suggestions that I hope will help the authors strengthen their case.

This book presents a new way to understand human-animal interactions. Offering a profound discussion of topics such as human identity, our relationship with animals and the environment, and our culture, the author channels the vibrant Italian traditions of humanism, materialism, and speculative philosophy. The research presents a dialogue between the humanities and the natural sciences. It challenges the separation and oppression of animals with a post-humanism steeped in the traditions of the Italian Renaissance. Readers discover a vision (...) of the human as a species informed by an intertwining with animals. The human being is not constructed by an onto-poetic process, but rather by close relati ons with otherness. The human system is increasingly unstable and, therefore, more hybrid. The argument it presents interests scholars, thinkers, and researchers. It also appeals to anyone who wants to delve into the deep animal-human bond and its philosophical, cultural, political instances. The author is a veterinarian, ethologist, and philosopher. He uses cognitive science, zooanthropology, and philosophy to engage in a series of empirical, theoretical, and practice-based engagements with animal life. In the process, he argues that animals are key to human identity and culture at all levels. (shrink)

Like any broad narrative about the history of ideas, this one involves a number of simplifications. My hope is that by taking a closer look Spinoza's notorious remarks on animals, we can understand better why it becomes especially urgent in this period as well as our own for philosophers to emphasize a distinction between human and nonhuman animals. In diagnosing the concerns that give rise to the desire to dismiss the independent purposes of animals, we may come to focus (...) on a new aspect of what needs to change about contemporary thinking on species divisions. In what follows, I will bring out Spinoza's contradictory and ambivalent remarks pertaining to the specific differences between humans and animals. It is my suspicion that this ambivalence continues to plague us today. Like Spinoza, we want to say that humans are like and unlike animals. As a simply descriptive claim, it may be true and innocuous. Yet, the way we affirm our proximity and distance from nonhuman animals requires careful attention. Spinoza viewed this proximity as a source of danger. We might do well to emphasize, with thinkers such as Donna Haraway (2003),how our proximity and difference are also sources of pleasure and power, both to be able to enjoy the affectionate bond that can often develop between humans and our animal companions but also to quell the anxiety that might encourage us to exploit and abuse them. (shrink)

The roles companion animals have played in our lives has dramatically changed over the last few decades. At the same time, the terms we use to describe both the people and animals in these human-animal relationships have also changed. One example includes the use of the terms ‘owner’ or ‘guardian’ to refer to the human caretaker. While preferences by society appear to indicate increased interest in referring to companion animal caretakers as ‘guardians’, others have cautioned against (...) its use or attempted to restrict it. Additionally, the use of animal welfare terminology has direct implications for how we conduct both welfare research and practice. Our paper examines the use of ‘owner’ and ‘guardian’ with respect to (1) the implications for changing terminology on the function, clarity and uniformity of their use, and (2) the ethical and welfare impact that coincides with each term’s use. Our goal is to propose terminological considerations that could influence future welfare research, as well as help guide our interactions with companion animals. (shrink)

The relation and collaboration of human and animal medicine had its ups and downs throughout history. The interaction between these two disciplines has been especially fruitful in the broad areas of patho-physiology and of epidemiology. An exploration of the interaction between the two disciplines, using historical and contemporary examples in comparative medicine, zoonoses, zooprophylaxis, and human-animal bond, reveals that a better understanding of animal and human disease, as well as societal changes such as (...) interest in non-conventional medicine, are leading to a broader concept of one medicine that includes animal and human medicine as well as social and other sciences. (shrink)

The relation and collaboration of human and animal medicine had its ups and downs throughout history. The interaction between these two disciplines has been especially fruitful in the broad areas of patho-physiology and of epidemiology. An exploration of the interaction between the two disciplines, using historical and contemporary examples in comparative medicine, zoonoses, zooprophylaxis, and human-animal bond, reveals that a better understanding of animal and human disease, as well as societal changes such as (...) interest in non-conventional medicine, are leading to a broader concept of one medicine that includes animal and human medicine as well as social and other sciences. (shrink)

J. Macgregor Wise and R. van de Vall kindly reviewed my analysis of the potential of webcams on nature conservation sites for developing networks of care. I am indebted to them for their subtle and intelligent deliberation and their valuable suggestions for further elaboration of the project. My focus, as stated in the article, is on the study of users, technology and animals as assemblages, bound together by physical, visual and affective bonds in the process of ‘doing something’.

A person of good character treats other sentient beings with care and compassion. Yet virtue ethics apparently has trouble accounting for the moral status of nonhuman animals because of its focus on excellent character traits, rather than the moral “patient,” and because of its non-codifiability, at least in some forms. The task of this article is to answer the question: How can virtue ethics account for the moral value of nonhuman animals in the context of biomedical research? I argue that (...) it can do so through attention to animal good lives, human-animal bonds, and the virtues themselves. The virtue ethics resources I draw on to support nonhuman animal value are not the same as those typically brought to bear in moral status discussions, but I suggest that moral status as usually conceived has its own problems as a tool for use in practical contexts like animal research. (shrink)

The debate over whether human animals are linked by bonds of justice to nonhu-man animals is ancient and has been several times settled. The Roman jurists defined the j us naturae in terms of what nature had taught 'all animals', but Grotius and other natural-law theorists rejected this view and redefined the jus naturae as that which accorded with human nature, thereby founding the 'modern' view which has excluded nonhuman animals from the sphere of justice. This paper examines (...) Grotius's argument as part of a larger seventeenth-century 'counter-revolution' in thought and argues that its incoherence becomes intelligible only when viewed as an attempt to deal with the embarrassing phenomenon of inhumane warfare. Warned by the example of Grotius, we may wish to inquire to what extent any discussion of animal justice, whatever side it takes, may be an exercise in the perpetration of injustice. (shrink)

This book is a phenomenological investigation of the zoo visit experience. Why Do We Go to the Zoo? is rooted in Husserlian phenomenology and focuses on the communicative interactions between humans and animals in the zoo setting.

The care ethics tradition has long argued for the merits of understanding the self as relational. Inspired by this tradition, but also by ecofeminist philosophies that insist on the need to consider our wider ecological and interspecies connections, this paper focuses on the relational elements of breast/chestfeeding and their ethical implications. I show nursing to be an act that not only 1) connects us to one another through bonds of nourishment and care but also 2) reconnects us to our (...) class='Hi'>animal selves and enlivens connections to non-human animals. Moreover, I argue that nursing 3) exposes our entwinement in a web of ecological relationships through which the toxic harm we have wrought on our environment returns to us. To draw out the ethical implications of these connections, I introduce the concept of ‘relational vulnerabilities.’ Relational vulnerabilities are forged through our connections to others, be they bonds of dependence and need, historical harm and ongoing violence, love and joy, or all at once. I contend that all relational vulnerabilities call for ethical attention, yet, when it comes to nursing, these vulnerabilities are often neglected or, worse, made the targets of heinous abuse. (shrink)

A content analysis of 48 children's realistic animal stories shows an emphasis on pets and petkeeping that can both challenge and support traditional human-animal boundaries. The genre's sympathetic portrayal of pet animals and the condemnation of theirmistreatment invite the reader to challenge such boundaries. Yet the genre's stereotypical portrayal of these animals also constrains our conceptualization of the human-animal bond. The author discusses these and other narrative elements which render this form of popular culture (...) ambiguous terrain for negotiating an ethic of respect for nonhuman others which goes beyond most contemporary arrangements. (shrink)

This paper addresses the biosemiotic dimensions of human relationship with captive animals and aims to uncover how these factors influence handling practices and human-animal interactions within zoological gardens. Zoological gardens are quintessential hybrid environments, and as such, they are places of interspecies interactions and mutual influences. These interactions are profoundly shaped by human attitudes towards animals. The roots of these attitudes can be found at the cultural and institutional levels as well as at the biosemiotic level. (...) Previous studies have suggested that keepers’ attitudes towards animals have direct influences on their handling style and, consequently, have an impact on animals’ perception of keepers and other humans. This suggests that the type of relationship between keepers and animals can translate into handling styles that may affect animals’ perceptions of humans and worsen or improve their welfare. In this paper, we present a case study involving chimpanzees’ keepers at the Tallinn Zoological Gardens. A series of interviews were conducted, which aimed to uncover the way keepers understand their relationships with captive animals and how this influences handling. This work offers a comparative approach by bringing forward the experiences of keepers who work with various animal species belonging to different taxa and class. Such an approach aims to highlight the biosemiotic factors behind the emergence of different types of keeper-animal relationships. We expect to uncover whether extremely different Umwelten may shape human-animal bonds. By highlighting the agency of animals in daily activities and work routine, we also aim to initiate a discussion on the way animals influence handling practices within zoological gardens. Our objective is to understand how individual animals influence handling practices within zoological gardens. (shrink)

El momento donde los humanos caen en el estado de "bestioni" ("grandes bestias") es pensado claramente por G. B. Vico como el de una segunda caída: una caída en lo anterior a todos los vínculos, ya sea entre aquellos que existen entre los humanos mismos o entre aquellos con la divinidad. El Diritto universale y la Scienza Nuova se dan entonces como tarea el pensar las modalidades (simbólicas, poéticas, políticas…) del porvenir del humano, bajo el fondo de una reactivación de (...) la fuerza de lo verdadero ("vis veri") y de una relación con la divinidad. Así se ve aparecer el espacio familiar, luego el espacio político con sus diversas disposiciones sucesivas, sin que por eso desaparezca la dimensión animal del humano. The moment when humans fall into a state of "bestioni" ("big beasts") is clearly envisioned by G. B. Vico as a second fall: a fall into something previous to all bonding, be it among humans themselves or with the divinity. The Diritto universale and the Scienza Nuova assume then the thinking of new forms (symbolic, poetic, political…) of human's future, under the reactivation of truth as a force ("vis veri") and a relationship with the divinity. Thus emerges the family space, then the politics space with its successive and diverse dispositions, but always keeping the human's animal dimension. (shrink)

In the prehistoric time, there was an inclination of human beings to protect their existence by living in societies. They confine themselves in the society because of having their qualities of mutual love and amity. The general tendencies of human beings are to develop bonds. These bonds happen in various ways. Society cannot survive without bonds. Bonds have significance in philosophical discussion. In the history of contemporary philosophy, applied philosophy is one of the several other aspects. Applied philosophy (...) deals with Human rights, Euthanasia, Feminism, Abortion, Animal rights, Bonds etc. Brenda Almond, a leading figure in applied philosophy, has offered arguments in favor of her viewpoint regarding the importance of human bonds. In this paper, Almond‟s view on the nature and significance of bond has been analyzed. However, bond has also been studied from ethical perspective in this paper. And finally, it is claimed that marriage and cosmopolitanism make bonds stronger. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#61-62; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2017 P 147-164. (shrink)

The contemporary animal rights movement encompasses a wide range of sometimes-competing agendas from vegetarianism to animal liberation. For people for whom pets are family members—animal lovers outside the fray—extremist positions in which all human–animal interaction is suspect often discourage involvement in the movement to end cruelty to other beings. In _Loving Animals_, Kathy Rudy argues that in order to achieve such goals as ending animal testing and factory farming, activists need to be better attuned (...) to the profound emotional, even spiritual, attachment that many people have with the animals in their lives. Offering an alternative to both the acceptance of animal exploitation and radical animal liberation, Rudy shows that a deeper understanding of the nature of our feelings for and about animals can redefine the human–animal relationship in a positive way. Through extended interviews with people whose lives are intertwined with animals, analysis of the cultural representation of animals, and engaging personal accounts, she explores five realms in which humans use animals: as pets, for food, in entertainment, in scientific research, and for clothing. In each case she presents new methods of animal advocacy to reach a more balanced and sustainable relationship association built on reciprocity and connection. Using this intense emotional bond as her foundation, Rudy suggests that the nearly universal stories we tell of living with and loving animals will both broaden the support for animal advocacy and inspire the societal changes that will improve the lives of animals—and humans—everywhere. (shrink)

Animal production, especially pork production, is facing growing international criticism. The greatest concerns relate to the environment, the animals’ living conditions, and the occupational diseases. But human and animal conditions are rarely considered together. Yet the living conditions at work and the emotional bond that inevitably forms bring the farm workers and the animals to live very close, which leads to shared suffering. Suffering does spread from animals to human beings and can cause workers physical, (...) mental, and also moral suffering, which is all the more harmful due to the fact that it is concealed. The conceptual tools used to conceal suffering ( animal welfare, stress, pain) suggest that the industrial system can be improved, whereas for farmers it is by definition incompatible with animal husbandry. (shrink)

Humans interact with animals in numerous ways and on numerous levels. We are indeed living in an “animal”s world,’ in the sense that our lives are very much intertwined with the lives of animals. This also means that animals, like those dogs we commonly refer to as our pets, are living in a “human’s world” in the sense that it is us, not them, who, to a large degree, define and manage the interactions we have with them. In (...) this sense, the human-animal relationship is nothing we should romanticize: it comes with clear power relations and thus with a set of responsibilities on the side of those who exercise this power. This holds, despite the fact that we like to think about our dogs as human’s best friend. Dogs have been part of human societies for longer than any other domestic species. Like no other species they exemplify the role of companion animals. Relationships with pet dogs are both very widespread and very intense, often leading to strong attachments between owners or caregivers and animals and to a treatment of these dogs as family members or even children. But how does this relationship look from the dogs’ perspective? How do they perceive the humans they engage with? What responsibilities and duties arise from the kind of mutual understanding, attachment, and the supposedly “special” bonds we form with them? Are there ethical implications, maybe even ethical implications beyond animal welfare? The past decades have seen an upsurge of research from comparative cognition on pet dogs’ cognitive and social skills, especially in comparison with and reference to humans. We will therefore set our discussion about the nature and ethical dimensions of the human–dog relationship against the background of the current empirical knowledge on dog (social) cognition. This allows us to analyze the human–dog relationship by applying an interdisciplinary approach that starts from the perspective of the dog to ultimately inform the perspective of humans. It is our aim to thereby identify ethical dimensions of the human–dog relationship that have been overlooked so far. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to extend and replicate previously published results from a random probability sample of university faculty. The sample assessed reasons given for companion-animal guardianship and for belief in the beneficial health effects of owning pets. In this replication and extension design, these two non-random samples responded to the same questionnaire items as those addressed to university faculty. Results indicated that avoidance of loneliness was the most frequent reason for owning pets among both students and (...) middle-aged community members. This result is consistent with the view that animals provide social support and companionship to humans at various stages of the life cycle. Suggesting an emergent feature of the human-nonhuman animal bond, both groups selected, “the pet helps keep me active” as the second-most common reason. Older women reported a greater belief in the health-giving benefits of pet ownership than did younger persons or men. This belief may contribute to human benefits of pet ownership and requires further research. (shrink)

There is no systematic research on the rites and rituals associated with companion animal death in modern Australian society. Three cremation service providers were interviewed and asked to consider which caretakers have their companion animals cremated. Seven people who had recently had a companion animal cremated were then asked about their views on the process. Five interrelated themes emerged from the two data sets about who uses cremation services for companion animals: “Everyone uses companion animal cremation services”; (...) “People who consider the companion animal as a family member, as a child”; “People who want memorials for their companion animals”; “Grieving people”; and “People who seek compassion and social support.” With scant recognition of the impact of companion animal death and the role of rites and rituals in facilitating the grieving process, further research in the area is needed, including into attachment as a possible mediator. (shrink)

Robots as social companions in close proximity to humans have a strong potential of becoming more and more prevalent in the coming years, especially in the realms of elder day care, child rearing, and education. As human beings, we have the fascinating ability to emotionally bond with various counterparts, not exclusively with other human beings, but also with animals, plants, and sometimes even objects. Therefore, we need to answer the fundamental ethical questions that concern human-robot-interactions per (...) se, and we need to address how we conceive of »good lives«, as more and more of the aspects of our daily lives will be interwoven with social robots. (shrink)

Why do humans make music? Theories of the evolution of musicality have focused mainly on the value of music for specific adaptive contexts such as mate selection, parental care, coalition signaling, and group cohesion. Synthesizing and extending previous proposals, we argue that social bonding is an overarching function that unifies all of these theories, and that musicality enabled social bonding at larger scales than grooming and other bonding mechanisms available in ancestral primate societies. We combine cross-disciplinary evidence from archeology, anthropology, (...) biology, musicology, psychology, and neuroscience into a unified framework that accounts for the biological and cultural evolution of music. We argue that the evolution of musicality involves gene–culture coevolution, through which proto-musical behaviors that initially arose and spread as cultural inventions had feedback effects on biological evolution because of their impact on social bonding. We emphasize the deep links between production, perception, prediction, and social reward arising from repetition, synchronization, and harmonization of rhythms and pitches, and summarize empirical evidence for these links at the levels of brain networks, physiological mechanisms, and behaviors across cultures and across species. Finally, we address potential criticisms and make testable predictions for future research, including neurobiological bases of musicality and relationships between human music, language, animal song, and other domains. The music and social bonding hypothesis provides the most comprehensive theory to date of the biological and cultural evolution of music. (shrink)

Prior interpretations of the tattoos of nonhuman animals etched upon the preserved human bodies from the Pazyryk archaeological culture of Inner Asia have focused on solely human-generated meanings. This article utilizes an ethnoarchaeological approach to reassess these tattoos, by analogizing the nature and possibilities of human-ridden horse intersubjectivities in the present with those of the past. As enlightened by people who live with horses, including the author, the process of learning to ride can be seen as an (...) interspecies apprenticeship process, where both humans and horses pass along social knowledge as thoughtful actors with defined roles. From this perspective, the horse tattoos are presented as polysemic materializations of the bonds between particular Pazyryk horses and people, of blended identities, and of cosmological values related to time, memory, and belonging. The article concludes that exploring smaller-scale human-nonhuman animal interactions in the present allows for fresh interpretations of similar interactions in the past and provides a means for archaeology to move beyond the objectification of animals as sets of resources or symbols. (shrink)

With their organic neural queues, the Na'vi are able to communicate with other species in a way human beings cannot. Along with their insights into other minds, the Na'vi have a deep respect for the other animals of Pandora. There are two primary ways in which we human beings can infer what another creature is experiencing, including whether it is suffering. The first involves studying its physiology and drawing inferences from the activity of its nerves and brain. The (...) second way in which we infer the presence of pain in others is by analogy. The Na'vi have yet another way to know the minds of other creatures, one that we lack. Through their tsaheylu or neural bond with other animals, the Na'vi can access the memories, thoughts, and perceptions of other animals. (shrink)

Animal agriculture predominantly involves farming social animals. At the same time, the nature of agriculture requires severely disrupting, eliminating, and controlling the relationships that matter to those animals, resulting in harm and unhappiness for them. These disruptions harm animals, both physically and psychologically. Stressed animals are also bad for farmers because stressed animals are less safe to handle, produce less, get sick more, and produce poorer quality meat. As a result, considerable efforts have gone into developing stress-reduction methods. Many (...) of these attempt to replicate behaviours or physiological responses that develop or constitute bonding between animals. In other words, humans try to mitigate or ameliorate the damage done by preventing and undermining intraspecies relationships. In doing so, the wrong of relational harms is compounded by an instrumentalisation of trust and care. The techniques used are emblematic of the welfarist approach to animal ethics. Using the example of gentle touching in the farming of cows for beef and dairy, the paper highlights two types of wrong. First, a wrong done in the form of relational harms, and second, a wrong done by instrumentalising relationships of care and trust. Relational harms are done to nonhuman animals, whilst instrumentalisation of care and trust indicates an insensitivity to morally salient features of the situation and a potential character flaw in the agents that carry it out. (shrink)

The endogenous opioid system has received attention and extensive research for its effects on reward, pleasure, and pain. However, relative to other neurochemicals, such as oxytocin, vasopressin and dopamine, the function of opioids in regulating human attachment, sociosexuality, and other aspects of human sociality has not received much consideration. For example, nonapeptides have been extensively studied in animals and humans for their possible roles in mother-offspring attachment, romantic attachment, fatherhood, and social cognition. Likewise, others have proposed models wherein (...) oxytocin and vasopressin are moderators of the relationship between steroid hormones and human social behaviors. Recently, opioids have generated renewed interest in relation to social pain, and importantly, the brain opioid hypothesis of social attachment, which suggests that endogenous opioids are a key implementer in primate and human bonding, has received some support. Here we focus on romantic bonds by proposing that endogenous opioids are an important mechanism mediating reproductive trade-offs through their inhibitory effects on testosterone production. (shrink)

Music and language are universal human abilities with many apparent similarities relating to their acoustics, structure, and frequent use in social situations. We might therefore expect them to be understood and processed similarly, and indeed an emerging body of research suggests that this is the case. But the focus has historically been on the individual, looking at the passive listener or the isolated speaker or performer, even though social interaction is the primary site of use for both domains. Nonetheless, (...) an important goal of emerging research is to compare music and language in terms of acoustics and structure, social interaction, and functional origins to develop parallel accounts across the two domains. Indeed, a central aim of both of evolutionary musicology and language evolution research is to understand the adaptive significance or functional origin of human music and language. An influential proposal to emerge in recent years has been referred to as the social bonding hypothesis. Here, within a comparative approach to animal communication systems, I review empirical studies in support of the social bonding hypothesis in humans, non-human primates, songbirds, and various other mammals. In support of this hypothesis, I review six research fields: (i) the functional origins of music; (ii) the functional origins of language; (iii) mechanisms of social synchrony for human social bonding; (iv) language and social bonding in humans; (v) music and social bonding in humans; and (vi) pitch, tone and emotional expression in human speech and music. I conclude that the comparative study of complex vocalizations and behaviors in various extant species can provide important insights into the adaptive function(s) of these traits in these species, as well as offer evidence-based speculations for the existence of “musilanguage” in our primate ancestors, and thus inform our understanding of the biology and evolution of human music and language. (shrink)

Over the past decade cultural theory has seen a number of 'turns' - the materialist turn, the animal turn, the affective turn - that address the human as an affective, embodied, and ultimately vulnerable animal embedded in dense webs of more-than-human relations, in short as a posthuman phenomenon. Care philosophy shares this focus on embodiment and vulnerability in its insistence on interdependence as the defining condition of human life, making it well positioned for a posthuman (...) turn. To this end, Curious Kin in Fictions of Posthuman Care draws together contemporary narrative fictions that challenge humanist conceptions of care in their imaginative depiction of more-than-human affective bonds, arguing for an expansion care philosophy's central figure: the embodied, embedded, and encumbered 'human'.Fictional narratives of care between humans and robots, bioengineered creatures, clones, nonhuman animals, aliens or inanimate things, highlight the limits of humanist ethical models' capacity to register and accommodate posthuman relational intimacies, while gesturing towards a model of care able to accommodate networked interdependencies that extend beyond the human realm. Texts by Margaret Atwood, Louise Erdrich, Louisa Hall, Eva Hornung, Kazuo Ishiguro, Bhanu Kapil, and Jesmyn Ward, along with films and television programmes like Robot and Frank, Under the Skin, and Real Humans, depict a range of scenarios in which more-than-human care relations not only supersede human-human relationships, but suggest new human/animal/machine ways of being that offer novel insights into the possible presents and futures of posthuman care. Curious Kin in Fictions of Posthuman Care reveals how these fictions do their own theorizing, imagining the politics, ethics and aesthetics of specific, contextualized scenarios of posthuman contact and companionship.Interweaving posthuman theory, care philosophy and contemporary fiction, Curious Kin in Fictions of Posthuman Care offers generative visions of care that make room for the incredible range of affects, energies, behaviours, attachments and dependencies that produce and sustain life in more-than-human worlds. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MIMESIS AND EMPATHY IN HUMAN BIOLOGY William B. Hurlbut, M.D. Stanford University Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself: I am the Lord. (Leviticus. 19:18) The light of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, (...) thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness! (Matthew. 6:22-23) On the levels both ofcommon discourse and scientific description, the concept of empathy has found renewed popularity. Like a bridge that spans disparate realms, the idea of empathy can reconnect neurophysiology with psychology and social theory, and reestablish the grounds for a natural concept of ethics. Specifically, it can connect mimetic theory with a possible basis in biology, since empathy seems to represent an extension ofmimetic processes across the animal kingdom. For this reason, empathy/mimesis might be the grounds for a concept of ethics based on natural observation. Drawn from a German term Einfühlung, which means "feeling into," empathy carries the concept of "getting into the feelings of someone else" (deWaal 79). As a medium for the formation of meaningful bonds and William Hurlbut15 sensitive associations, the concept of empathy has taken on, in popular discourse, the somewhat sentimental notion ofsympathy. In the scientific description, however, empathy is seen as the highest human expression of a broader biological capacity for mimesis that seems inextricable from the very progress ofthe phylogenetic process. Among the earliest life forms, organisms drew information from one another to pattern and coordinate such basic biological functions as reproduction and nurture. But with the increased complexity of multicellular creatures, new means of communication arose, making possible more flexible adaptation and sociability. Gradually the direct chemical coordination suitable for collectives or swarms gave way to richer and more individual communication between organisms of higher forms of differentiation. The externally evident demarcation ofthe head region, with its organs ofsensory perception and communication, evolved in parallel with internal cerebral structures capable ofprocessing more complex impressions of the surrounding environment and coordinating greater freedom of motion. These vital powers of action and awareness in turn came to be governed, guided and integrated by an inner felt sense of need, goal or purpose. As Leon Kass says, "desire, not DNA, is the deepest principle of life" (Kass 1994, 48). This quality of "inwardness" is paralleled by an equally complex differentiation and integration of the external "look" ofthe animal. This "look," which is the literal translation of the Latin root of our word species, is the result of a genetically determined plan as important as any internal vital organ. It provides the unity of form that reveals or selectively conceals the inner life of the organism. It communicates and coordinates vital information regarding sexual and other social interactions. This upward process ofcomplex integrated organization of the "inner life" and the external action and presentation of selfreaches its fullest expression in the human form. Along with upright posture and its freeing ofthe hands as tools of "gnostic touching," comes a reordering of the senses and a highly flexible, furless canvas of selfpresentation we call the face (Kass 1985, 287). Upwards through mammalian evolution there is a progressive refinement of the structures of the face that facilitate active and increasingly subtle communication and penetration into the life of the other. With more than 30 finely tuned muscles of facial expression and vocal control, human beings are capable of a wide array of communicative 16 Mimesis andEmpathy expressions of emotions and intentions. Paul Ekman claims to have discerned more than 1 8 forms of smiling, each with a distinct meaning (66). With upright posture came a retraction ofthe snout and bilateral stereoscopic vision. Sight replaced smell as the prominent sense. Whereas smell required direct chemical contact, and sound gave formless information, sight gave a knowing and accurate encounter with the form and unity ofwholes. Sight allowed rapid perception ofobjects and actions at distant horizons. The detached beholding of sight allowed a deeper and more accurate apprehension of... (shrink)

Dogs and cats have been domesticated through different processes. Dogs were the first domesticated animals, cooperating with humans by hunting and guarding. In contrast, cats were domesticated as predators of rodents and lived near human habitations when humans began to settle and farm. Although the domestication of dogs followed a different path from that of cats, and they have ancestors of a different nature, both have been broadly integrated into—and profoundly impacted—human society. The coexistence between dogs/cats and humans (...) is based on non-verbal communication. This review focuses on “gaze,” which is an important signal for humans and describes the communicative function of dogs’ and cats’ eye-gaze behavior with humans. We discuss how the function of the gaze goes beyond communication to mutual emotional connection, namely “bond” formation. Finally, we present a research approach to multimodal interactions between dogs/cats and humans that participate in communication and bond formation. (shrink)

This paper seeks to unveil and investigate the close bond existing between the critical project developed by Axel Honneth and Hans Joas in Social Action and Human Nature (1980) and John Dewey’s naturalistic humanism and social criticism. I will contend that these authors develop an original and compelling approach to the critique of the social world, which relies on a naturalistic redefinition of human beings with intersubjective premises. By reconsidering human beings in their continuity and discontinuity (...) with nature, they attempt to identify the specific quality of human action with respect to animal behavior and to employ this category as a criterion for the critique of the social world. On the other hand, the paper will underline how Dewey significantly contributes to the outlining of a contemporary critical project with naturalistic premises. Indeed, his naturalistic humanism provides a systematic metaphysics of human experience to ground social criticism, wherein the underdeveloped elements of Social Action and Human Nature’s analysis of human action are better explained and justified from a theoretical point of view. (shrink)

This article focuses on the social structure of domestic cat colonies, and on the various ways these are represented in ethological literature. Our analysis begins with detailed accounts of different forms of cat societies from the works of Leyhausen, Tabor, and Alger and Alger, and then puts these descriptions into a broader epistemological perspective. The analysis is inspired by the bi-constructivist approach to ethological studies formulated by Lestel, which highlights the position of the ethologist in the constitution of particular (...) class='Hi'>animal activities. We propose a third layer should be added to post hoc analyses of ethological enterprises: i.e., the ontological commitments shaping the conceptual framework of a given research. It is through these commitments we find a hierarchical structure in a caged colony of cats, different territorial patterns in the case of urban cats, and egalitarian friendly bonds within the society of a cat shelter. Our critical tri-constructivist approach can be utilized for contemporary biosemiotics as it is centered on a multi-level process of interpretation. (shrink)

This paper provides a theoretical exploration of how comparative research on the expression of emotions has traditionally focused on the visual mode and argues that, given the neurophysiological, developmental, and behavioral evidence that links touch with social interactions, focusing on touch can become an ideal mode to understand the communication of emotions in human and nonhuman primates. This evidence shows that touch is intrinsically linked with social cognition because it motivates human and nonhuman animals from birth to form (...) social bonds. It will be shown that touch is one of the modes of interaction used by the mother-infant or caregiver- infant dyad that facilitates the expression of emotions by the infant (and later the expression of emotions by the adult that the infant has become) in ways that are understood by other members of the group. (shrink)

The conditions of life of many companion animals and the rate at which they are surrendered to shelters raise many ethical issues. What duties do we have towards the dogs that live in our society? To suggest answers to these questions, I first give four possible ways of looking at the relationship between man and dog: master–slave, employer–worker, parent–child, and friend–friend. I argue that the morally acceptable relationships are of a different kind but bears family resemblances to the latter three. (...) As dogs are beings with an interest in their wellbeing, society has certain duties towards the dogs, which can be translated in legislation. But human beings also have special responsibilities towards the dogs they take into their care. Such responsibilities entail caring for their emotional and physical welfare, but also ensuring a bond of trust, which should not easily be broken. (shrink)

This article examines how the authorization of scientific discourses in the US Endangered Species Act of 1973 has influenced the ways people make claims about culturally significant animals. In it, I focus on struggles over the management of two endangered fish species among a federally recognized Native American tribe, state resource managers, and other actors. I discuss how the requirements of the ESA, namely that decisions regarding the protection of endangered species must be made based “solely on the basis of (...) the best scientific…data available,” have pushed people to reframe their cultural claims about the environment as scientific claims in order to gain legal authority. I argue that these animals span the social worlds of indigenous hunters and fishers, regulators, and ecological scientists. As such, they offer the opportunity to interrogate the relationships among ways of knowing the environment. I suggest that strict divisions among “types” of knowledge as well as hard-and-fast bonds between groups and “their” knowledge become problematic. Instead, people assemble eclectic articulations of knowledge to make the most authoritative claim possible in a given context, contradicting the assumption that certain people know the world only, or primarily, in a particular way. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory has largely been anthropocentric in its focus on human actors and interests, failing to recognise the impact of nonhumans in business and organisations. This leads to an incomplete understanding of organisational contexts that include key relationships with nonhuman animals. In addition, the limited scholarly attention paid to nonhumans as stakeholders has mostly been conceptual to date. Therefore, we develop a stakeholder theory with animals illustrated through two ethnographic case studies: an animal shelter and Nordic husky businesses. (...) We focus our feminist reading of Driscoll and Starik’s (J Bus Ethics 49:55–73, 2004) stakeholder attributes for nonhumans and extend this to include affective salience built on embodied affectivity and knowledge, memories, action and care. Findings reveal that nonhuman animals are important actors in practice, affecting organisational operations through human–animal care relationships. In addition to confirming animals are stakeholders, we further contribute to stakeholder theory by offering ways to better listen to nontraditional actors. (shrink)

This paper takes up Axel Honneth’s suggestion that we, in the 21st century Western world, should revisit the Marxian idea of reification; unlike Honneth, however, this paper applies reification to the ways in which humans relate to non-human animals, particularly in the context of scientific experiments. Thinking about these practices through the lens of reification, the paper argues, yields a more helpful understanding of what is regarded as problematic in those practices than the standard animal rights approaches. The (...) second part of the paper offers ways of overcoming reification that go beyond Honneth’s idea of recognition by introducing Iris Murdoch’s idea of attention. This proposed strategy makes the ethical relevance of reification more salient and makes it possible to counter reification through a practice such as attention which, unlike recognition, can be consciously established. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Affect Attunement in the Caregiver-Infant Relationship and Across SpeciesExpanding the Ethical Scope of ErosCynthia WillettCompelling glimpses into the ethical capacities of our animal kin reveal new possibilities for ethical relationships encompassing humans with other animal species. Consider the remarkable report of a female bonobo in a British zoo who assists a bird found in her cage by retrieving the fallen bird, and spreading its wings so that (...) this fellow creature might fly away to its freedom. Or the report of a cat in a nursing home who curls up around dying elderly patients, and remains steadily by their side as they, unbeknownst to the medical personnel, pass away.1 Or of a sacred moment of silence by a stream for baboons in East Africa.2 Or of the ethics that spontaneously emerges among wolves at play.3 On the basis of extensive studies, biologist Frans de Waal argues that such anecdotes are far from rare, and that some core elements of moral understanding and compassion occur among a significant range of nonhuman as well as the human animal species. Apes, monkeys, and perhaps all nonhuman animals fail to display a distinctly human capacity for abstract moral reasoning. As de Waal (2006) remarks, it is difficult to tell (173–75). But our furry and feathery kin do without a doubt demonstrate rich elements of ethical response, and they often enough extend their moral concern to creatures beyond their own species. Of course, they will also bite each other’s heads off or eat their own young as well. But this is just to say that animals are neither natural [End Page 111] innocents nor savage brutes. Like us, they belong to what post-Nietzschean philosophers might frame, somewhat ironically, as a postlapsarian world of good and evil.What kind of philosophical approach could account for these postlapsarian genealogies of ethics? Biologists, primatologists, and anthropologists are drawing upon investigations of prosocial behavior to remap the boundaries of ethics, as for example in Isabelle Stengers’s call for cosmopolitical ecologies of relationships (2010, 33). Such a cosmopolitics aims to encompass our kin and kind from diverse species within the ethical boundaries of common worlds. Donna Haraway discovers an opening for Stengers’s ecology of relationships in the intimate encounters among co-evolving species, especially those she calls companion species (2008, 83). She argues, following Derrida, that the abstract reasoning processes of Stoic and Kantian cosmopolitan ethics remain closed to the participation of nonhuman animals as anything more than dependents, failing to observe the ways in which they act as companions, if not moral subjects. But then, what normative force might bind together an ethically attuned biosocial sphere that we as humans co-inhabit with other animal species?To explore this question, this essay takes its cues from well-established research on the responsive, preverbal connection of the human infant and adult caregiver (Bateson 1979; Trevarthen 1984; Stern 1985, 2010; Gibbs 2001, 2010; Hansen 2004; Anderson 2006; Papoulias and Callard 2010; Willett 1995, 2001). To this research we can add new animal studies (Smuts 1999, 2001; Fudge 2002; de Waal 2006, 2009; Bekoff 2007; Molnar 2008; Haraway 2008). These animal studies provide a basis for extending an “ethics of eros” with roots in Luce Irigaray, Michel Foucault, Enrique Dussel, Africana feminism, Freudo-Marxist critical theory, and Plato (for discussions of this tradition, see Bergoffen 1997; Huffer 2009; Willett 2001)—but reconfigured in terms of social bonds across multiple animal species. In this tradition of ethics, the lack of a cognitive-based moral subjectivity that can translate into human terms does not consign nonhuman species to a mute moral status. On the contrary, some more primordial basis for relationship and meaning may weave thin but substantial threads of a postmoral ethics across regions of the biosphere.Given the diverse modes of subjectivity among animal species, and even the lack of what we call a moral subject altogether in many species, neither ordinary modes of empathy nor of moral understanding go very far in forging multispecies social bonds. For this reason, we turn to research on “the attunement of affects” in the infant-caregiver relationship (Stern 1985). As we shall see, this... (shrink)

Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several famous thought-experiments (...) dealing with personal identity. He argues, instead, that one could survive the destruction of all of one's psychological contents and capabilities as long as the human organism remains alive--as long as its vital functions, such as breathing, circulation, and metabolism, continue. (shrink)

What is love? Is it an uncontrollable emotion? Is it, instead, socially shaped, both an emotion and a social practice? Can the bonds of care and affection between humans and non-human animals be said to be on a par with parent-child relationships between humans? Do parents owe love to their children – and do mothers and fathers, respectively, owe it to different degrees? Do subversive weddings challenge normative ideals about love? What is the significance of love for the value (...) of close personal or family relationships? All these questions and more are discussed in the articles included in this special issue. The contributors draw from a variety of disciplines including philosophy, sociology, political science, religious studies, and history, as well as from empirical work that they have undertaken in Canada, Belgium, Portugal, or Romania. From these different perspectives and experiences, each contribution addresses important questions about love and its relation to sexuality, monogamy, friendship, the family, parenthood, or society in general. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Amicus BriefMartha C. Nussbaumii. summary of the argumentThis brief argues that the law requires reformation to protect our modern scientific and philosophical understanding that many animals can live their own meaningful lives and that the Court should reform the law in this case.1 Modern science demonstrates that elephants are complex beings that can form a conception of the self, as observed by Judge Fahey, form strong social and emotional (...) bonds among themselves and others, and that the Zoo's conduct harms Happy in both physical and intangible ways.Furthermore, this brief argues that the lower courts in Lavery I and II applied the wrong philosophical framework to the question of whether certain non-human animals should be considered legal persons. Instead of animal rights being based on the capacity to engage in a social contract and to bear legal duties, the proper framework for animal rights is the capabilities approach, which asks how the law can help animals like Happy not only live but thrive. Accordingly, this brief explains the importance of this appeal, the Court's opportunity to reform [End Page 15] the field of animal law, and the potential to release Happy from a life of captivity, ensuring she lives the rest of her life in a manner that respects her capabilities.iii. argument1. This Case Matters Because It Is Time to Reform the Law to Protect Our Modern Scientific and Philosophical Understanding That Many Animals Are Capable of Living Their Own Meaningful LivesModern science now recognizes a very important fact about many animals, including elephants. They are not merely biological units that simply need food and a suitable environment to survive and maintain a viable population. Today, scientists view many animals as beings capable of living their own meaningful lives. Early Indian and Roman cultures understood the complexity of animal lives and the implications of this complexity surrounding the humane treatment of animals; public awareness of this fact is widespread today. Almost all ancient Greek and Roman philosophical schools attributed complex forms of cognition and numerous emotions to animals,2 a precursor to our current laws against cruel practices to animals.What philosophy and, more recently, science have understood but the law has not, is that elephants are sentient beings who can feel emotion, foster relationships, create communities, and form a conception of the self. Our current legal system fails to respect species-specific, central capabilities. Although each of the fifty states has animal cruelty laws,3 these laws protect only a small number of animals and fail to constrain, to any meaningful extent, the widespread infliction of suffering. They ban only the intentional, purposeful suffering of some animals, and fail to recognize the impact that captivity, lack of relationships, and solitude cause a creature like Happy.This Court has the opportunity to create legal precedent that provides these living creatures the legal right to thrive and survive in ways that coincide with their specific capabilities, and prevent not only the infliction of physical pain, but emotional and psychological injury as well.2. The Magical Lives of ElephantsElephants are cognitive, complex creatures with distinct societies, emotions, and lives. They form societies that foster the wellbeing of each member, in which their emotions and development from childhood through adulthood are readily apparent.4 A combat staged between humans and elephants in 55 B.C. by the Roman leader Pompey paints a prime example of these complex emotions and connections with other animals, namely humans. Surrounded in the arena, the elephants perceived that they had no hope of escape. According to Pliny, the elephants then "entreated the crowd, trying to win its compassion with indescribable [End Page 16] gestures, bewailing their plight with a sort of lamentation."5 The audience, moved to pity and anger by their plight, rose to curse Pompey—feeling, wrote Cicero, that the elephants had a relation of commonality (societas) with humans.6 However, this connection with humans cannot be substituted for true, similar companionship from other elephants, which Happy has lacked for almost two decades.Elephants' ability to connect with other elephants and animals may be attributable to their long life spans; they are the most... (shrink)

Research with human–animal chimera raises a number of ethical concerns, especially when neural stem cells are transplanted into the brains of non-human primates . Besides animal welfare concerns and ethical issues associated with the use of embryonic stem cells, the research is also regarded as controversial from the standpoint of NHPs developing cognitive or behavioural capabilities that are regarded as “unique” to humans. However, scientists are urging to test new therapeutic approaches for neurological diseases in primate (...) models as they better mimic human physiology than all current animal models. As a response, various countries have issued reports on the topic. Our paper summarizes the ethical issues raised by research with human–animal brain chimeras and compares the relevant regulatory instruments and different recommendations issued in national reports from three important European research nations: Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. We assess and discuss the focus and priorities set by the different reports, review various reasons for and perspectives on the importance of the brain in chimera research, and identify critical points in the reports that warrant further specification and debate. (shrink)

The prefix “trans-” surrounds “animal” with a pluralizing effect: tranimals. This portmanteau word describes creatures at once real and imagined who traverse taxonomic categories. This essay considers two of many threads of trananimality: the transgenic and the prosthetic. Artist Jodi Clark imagines the Menagerie à Trois as a space for carnal humanimality, where sexual entanglements commingle with chimeric forms. This menagerie à tranimals extends Clark’s ever-expanding Menagerie à Trois by articulating a framework for contemplating and indexing humanimal networks of (...) engineered organisms while simultaneously attending to the agency-in-captivity experienced by prosthetic and transgenic tranimals. The results of genetic interventions, transgenic tranimals have been engineered to serve a range of roles in biomedical research. Prosthetic tranimals are not always born with their modifications, but are instead engaged by other human and non-human animals by way of mechanical devices and symbiotic systems. These physical bonds destabilize concepts of part and whole: synecdoche becomes an important way of conceptualizing the labour performed by tranimals. Tranimals signal entangled relations, framing potentially infinite configurations of cooperation and adaptation. Visitors to this menagerie are encouraged to rethink the ethical and moral space created by becoming with tranimals. (shrink)

At first glance, it looks like Aristotle can’t make up his mind about the ethical or moral status of non-human animals in his ethical treatises. Somewhat infamously, the Nicomachean Ethics claims that “there is neither friendship nor justice towards soulless things, nor is there towards an ox or a horse” (EN 8.11.1161b1–2). Since Aristotle thinks that friendship and justice are co-extensive (EN 8.9.1159b25–32), scholars have often read this passage to entail that humans have no ethical obligations to non-human (...) animals. By contrast, although the Eudemian Ethics denies that non-human animals can participate in “primary” friendships, EE 7.2 claims that “the other kinds of friendship are also found among animals; and it is evident that utility is present to some extent among them both in relation to humankind, in the case of tame animals, and in relation to each other” (EE 7.2.1236b3–11). Does the Nicomachean account of non-human animals contradict that of the Eudemian Ethics? Ultimately, I believe the Nicomachean account is consistent with the Eudemian account. Nonetheless, I argue that Aristotle’s treatment of non-human animals differs significantly in the two texts. My chapter explores this difference in greater detail and considers the ramifications of such a difference for our understanding of Aristotle’s place in the philosophical tradition concerning the ethical status of non-human animals. (shrink)

Human‐animal chimeras—creatures composed of a mix of animal and human cells—have come to play an important role in biomedical research, and they raise ethical questions. This article focuses on one particularly difficult set of questions—those related to the moral status of human‐animal chimeras with brains that are partly or wholly composed of human cells. Given the uncertain effects of human‐animal chimera research on chimeric animals’ cognition, it would be prudent to ensure (...) we do not overlook or underestimate their moral status. However, to assess moral status, we first need to determine what kinds of capacities are morally relevant. The standard view holds that it matters, morally, if chimeric animals develop uniquely human cognitive capacities. I argue that this view is mistaken, highlighting three problems with it: that we can think of examples of uniquely human cognitive capacities that are not morally significant, that we can think of examples of morally significant cognitive capacities that are not uniquely human, and that evidence that some cognitive capacity is shared with nonhuman animals does not undermine claims that this capacity is morally significant. We need a better framework for thinking about the moral status of part‐human beings. (shrink)