War is Hell is a study of the philosophy of war and peace, ranging critically from ancient peace thinking to today. The author uses a Socratic method, focused on political philosophy rather than on cultural or psychological aspects of war and peace making. The book is not a treatise on ethics, but rather an analysis of some aspects of the nature of war and peace. This book is a study of war – and by extension, peace – from the standpoint (...) of political theory. For all those who think there is too much war, and to deal with that we need to search for new ways of thinking. (shrink)

What do we mean when affirming ‘the powerful return of the state’? Do we have in mind the jus ad bellum employed by aggressive states, or are we thinking of the duties that a state has towards its citizens? Starting from these questions, this article aims to reconceptualize the issue of the political legitimacy of a state by reconsidering the relationship between power and violence. Among other forms of emergencies and violence, then, a legitimate state needs to (...) be capable of responding to gender-based (sexual and domestic) violence. To reinforce my suggestion, I will reinterpret some Greek and Roman myths related to the founding of cities (Thebes, Athens and Rome). Through these myths, we will be able to illustrate, in particular, the necessity for a state to be capable of combating both public and private violence, reframing the notion of nemesis (as a fate that can be changed by descendants) and fear (as a status that can be stopped in the present). (shrink)

The contrast, often painted in simplistic colours, between Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X as civil rights campaigners bolsters an erroneous reading of the freedom struggle of African-Americans, leaving the impression that the resort to violence and self-defence propounded by Malcolm X was a purely circumstantial departure from the general strategy of the civil rights movement. In fact, both of them reflected long on the capacity of violence and a contrario of non-violence to bring about political (...) and social transformation in the context of the extreme brutality and oppression being suffered by African-Americans. Their dilemma stemmed from an old intellectual tradition of the America of the slave period. Well before the ideas of Gandhi won over the African-American elite, and even before Henry David Thoreau laid the theoretical basis for civil disobedience, African slaves gave thought to the legitimacy and effectiveness of violence to amend their situation. The importance of the non-violent movement in the United States and the historical significance of Martin Luther King cannot be understood unless a true measure is taken of the anti-slavery struggle. While within the religious domain, the Black Church played a major role in dissuading violence, secular thought in favour of legitimate forceful rebellion also found itself confronted by a counter-argument which advanced the power of social change and resistance to injustice that non-violence could effect. This article particularly addresses the challenges to their consciences that confronted the militants of non-violence in their campaign for the abolition of slavery and notably those facing the central figure of that struggle, the former slave become the apostle of liberation, Frederick Douglass. (shrink)

Proceedings of the International Workshop "Islamic Peace Ethics: Legitimate and Illegitimate Violence in Contemporary Islamic Thought", organized 15-17 October 2015 by the Institute for Theology and Peace (ithf), Hamburg. More than 20 researchers from different countries including Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, Germany, UK, USA, and Belgium discussed the peace and war in contemporary Islamic thought from different disciplines such as theology, philosophy, religious studies, cultural studies, and political sciences.

Philosophers often entertain positions that they themselves do not hold. This article is an example of this. While I do not advocate localized acts of violence to combat white supremacy, I think that it is worthwhile to explore why it might be theoretically justifiable for some African Americans to commit such acts of violence. I contend that acts of localized violence are at least theoretical justifiable for some African Americans from the vantage point of racial realism. Yet, (...) I also contend that the likely detrimental consequences of engaging in such violence on economically disadvantaged African Americans outweigh its possible benefits for them; hence, it should not be used by them to combat white supremacy presently. (shrink)

One of the Machiavelli's most famous and innovative thesis states that good laws arise from social conflicts, according to the Roman Empire example of the opposition between plebs and nobles. Conflicts are able to bring about order in virtue of the characteristic constrictive force of necessity, which prevents the ambition to prevail. Nonetheless, law does not neutralize the conflict; just give it a regulation. So, law is subjected to history, to the continuous change, which means that it is potentially corruptible. (...) On this account, Machiavelli says that a State can only maintain its authority through a continuous return to the originary moment, viz. to the revival of the experiences of "fear", "terror" and "punishment" lived in the originary event of the foundation. For that reason, in the origin of law is also the violence, whose combined function is to provide legitimacy to its exercise by the State apparatus as the only form to preserve political life from ruin.Uma das mais famosas e inovadoras teses de Maquiavel é a afirmação de que as boas leis nascem dos conflitos sociais, segundo o exemplo romano das oposições entre plebe e nobres. Os conflitos são capazes de produzir ordem por conter a força constritiva própria da necessidade, que impede a ambição de reinar. Contudo, a lei não neutraliza o conflito, mas apenas lhe dá uma ordenação. A lei está, pois, exposta à história, à contínua mudança, o que significa dizer que é potencialmente corruptível. Por causa desta possibilidade, Maquiavel afirma que um Estado somente mantém sua autoridade por meio de um retorno contínuo ao momento da origem, isto é, à revivência da experiência do "medo", do "terror" e da "punição" do acontecimento originário da fundação. Assim, na origem da lei está a violência, cuja função é proporcionar a legitimação de seu exercício pelo aparato estatal como única forma de preservar da ruína a vida política. (shrink)

This book argues that nationalist violence in developed countries is the product of unresponsive political elites and nationalists blocked from attracting supporters through legal channels. Political elites are prone to ignoring a regional polity when their clout in that region is negligible and they do not rely on the region's support to maintain their positions of power. Conversely, when nationalists cannot make inroads through legal channels, incentives for violence are ripe. Thus, when nationalists in postwar Europe found elites (...) unresponsive, it was state repression that helped radicals build a new group of support around militant action. The larger this new constituency legitimizing violence grew, the longer the conflict lasted. The book elucidates this complex dynamic through a deft combination of theoretical modeling, statistical methods and comparative case studies from the Basque Country, Catalonia, Corsica, Northern Ireland, Sardinia and Wales. (shrink)

The just war-criterion of legitimate authority – as it is traditionally framed – restricts the right to wage war to state actors. However, agents engaged in violent conflicts are often sub-state or non-state actors. Former liberation movements and their leaders have in the past become internationally recognized as legitimate political forces and legitimate leaders. But what makes it appropriate to consider particular violent non-state actors to legitimate violent agents and others not? This article will examine four (...) criteria, including ‘popular support and representation of a people’; ‘monopoly of violence and effective control over a people’; ‘compliance with international legal and just war standards’; and ‘predisposition to strive for a lasting peace’. It will be shown that out of these four criteria only the first can be defended. Furthermore, it will be illustrated that non-state violent agents may perfectly well satisfy this criterion. In contrast, state actors may clearly fail in this regard. But, it will also become obvious that in exceptional circumstances violent agents do not require explicit approval from the people on whose behalf they act. Finally, the article will argue that – in principle – individuals should be entitled to employ violence for political objectives. (shrink)

In contrast to the widespread assumption that the state has the monopoly on violence and on the legal use of force, this essay draws attention to forms of violence which cannot be sublated in any political form of life that lays claim to the legitimate use of violence and force. The author asserts that any way of legitimization of violence is suspect of concealing reverse sides of new forms of violence that possibly escape political (...) attention. This insight refers back to the “political paradox” as it was described in Paul Ricoeur’s political philosophy. (shrink)

In common-sense usage, violence is usually conceptualized as intentional physical harm. This makes violence identifiable, locatable, and it facilitates the governing of those identified as committing infractions upon the non-violent community. In this article it is illustrated how this conception of violence legitimates the state by blocking the state’s own foundational violence from critical scrutiny. It argues that the liberal state rests on the differentiation between active and reactive violence, whereby the latter is seen as (...) the legitimate violence of the people against violent infractions committed by private individuals. The concept of a ‘regime of violence’ describes the relation between various forms of violence, i.e. their selective and differential articulation and negation. Regimes of violence constitute a way of governing conduct in the medium of violence. The current regime of violence consists of what is called a trias violentiae, which is a specific conception of the relations and translations between private violence, state violence and structural violence. (shrink)

The state has a foundational relation with violence that is based on a social contract in which the state protects society from violence through law and law enforcement, and in exchange it is granted the monopoly of legitimate violence. The contract holds as long as individuals receive sufficient security from the state and are not overly subjected to abuse by it. When it is not respected, either because security is denied or abuse is gross, individuals may (...) feel entitled to resist the state or even revolt against it. The foundational violence of the state as well as the potential opposition of social actors has a common site where they manifest themselves: the body. (shrink)

Domestic violence is endemic across Latin America. It is legitimated by patriarchal Christian theologies and widespread gender inequality. Drawing on the work of women theologians and activists working in Argentina, Uruguay and elsewhere, this article explores women's networks of resistance against violence. These include public and legal acknowledgement of domestic violence; the transmission of life-affirming values; pastoral support in the denouncement of violence; and the development of open and fluid household structures.

In this article, I will look at violence from a different perspective – that is, violence regarded as beautiful. For too long, this perspective has been neglected, considered taboo, and it is precisely due to the controversial character of what the word represents, and to the double standards used when considering it. Namely that, violence can also be a means of expression in art and sports, emphasizing the qualities of the artist or athlete, as well as having (...) an aesthetic and ethical significance. Such violence, of course, needs to be kept within certain limits and subjected to rules. And, as it turns out, sports rules legitimize violence and make it “beautiful”. (shrink)

Digital peddling of fake news is influential to persuasive political participation, with veritable social media platforms. Social media, with their instantaneous and widespread usage, have been exploited by ‘anonymous’ political influencers who fabricate and inundate internet community with unverified and false information. Using van Leeuwen’s Discourse Legitimation approach and insights from Discourse Analysis, this study analyses 120 purposively sampled fake news posts on Whatsapp, Facebook and Twitter, shared during the 2019 general elections in Nigeria. WhatsApp allows for the easy and (...) fast sharing of fake news as it pulled the largest occurrence of legitimation strategies, followed by Facebook. Authorisation is the highest occurring legitimation strategy at 46.6% frequency; this is followed by Moralisation which has 27% and Rationalisation at 26.4%; while Mythopoesis did not feature at all in the sampled data, leaving it at 0%. In particular, expert and role model authority are most often deployed to validate fake news such as the demise and cloning of President Buhari, ruling party’s plan to rig and destabilise the 2019 election, massive corruption in the current administration and imminent ethnic violence. The study argues that these strategies are viable persuasive tools owing to their use of discourse markers like make-believe images, emotive language, appeal to emotions, rational conclusions, hateful comments, verbal indictment and coercive verbs. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that there is an agreed upon commonsense view of violence, but beyond this view, definitions for kinds of violence are essentially contested and non-neutrally, politically ideological, given that the political itself is an essentially contested concept defined in relation to ideologies that oppose one another. The first chapter outlines definitions for a commonsense view of violence produced by Greene and Brennan. This chapter argues that there are incontestable instances of violence that are almost (...) universally agreed upon, such as when an adult intentionally smashes a child’s head against a table, purposefully causing harm. It is also claimed that, because political, ideological distinctions between kinds of violence arise from the creation of moral equivalences to the commonsense view of violence, political ideology is the source of disagreement. The second chapter argues that the concept of violence and of the political are essentially contested concepts. Gallie’s criteria for what counts as an essentially contested concept are utilized in order to argue that violence is an essentially contested concept at the level of the political, though not at the level of the commonsense view of violence. In fact, the paradigmatic cases that the commonsense view of violence pertains to serve as the core cases that are then interpreted as kinds of violence at the ideological level. To define violence as altogether wrong, or to define kinds of violence as acceptable and others as wrong is itself a politically ideological move to make, such as when liberalism defines its own uses of violence as justified and legitimate, and its enemy’s violence as unjustifiable and illegitimate. The World Health Organization and Bufacchi’s definitions for violence are presented, as are the definition for terroristic violence defined by Nagel. Erlenbusch’s critique of a liberal view, such as that of Nagel and the World Health Organization, is addressed as a reflection on the fact that, beyond the commonsense view of violence, violence is an essentially contested concept for which an ideologically, politically non-neutral definition is unlikely. The third chapter outlines numerous definitions produced by various philosophers, historians, and theorists, such as Machiavelli, Arendt, Hobbes, Kant, Treitschke, Weber, Bakunin, Sorel, Žižek, and Benjamin. The definitions produced by each demonstrates that person’s political ideological assumptions. Their definitions demonstrate an ongoing disagreement, in the sense of Rancière’s formulation for what counts as a disagreement in that each theorist defines kinds of violence under the yoke of their own political ideology. They all might agree that a single act is violent, under the commonsense view of violence, but they disagree concerning what kind of violence it is. So, though they may point to the same events and actions as examples of violence, what they mean fundamentally differs, and this means that they disagree. Their disagreement arises due to their respective political ideologies. This disagreement shows that there is no neutral justification for the neutrality of a state, particularly if a neutral state must defend itself. The state is instead defined in historically contextual terms of how the state relates to kinds of violence, and the distinctions between kinds of violence are not themselves politically, ideologically neutral. So, the concept of violence, beyond the commonsense view, is an essentially contested concept for which a non-neutral definition is unlikely. Beyond the commonsense view, political ideology is inextricably bound up within distinctions between kinds of violence. The fourth chapter then examines arguments on the question of whether nonviolence counts as a kind of violence. If distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contested and non-neutrally defined, and nonviolence is defined as distinct from violence, then it follows that nonviolence is an essentially contested concept for which no non-neutral definition is possible, at least beyond a commonsense view of nonviolence. A commonsense view of nonviolence is defined as the assumption that nonviolence is not violent in the way that the commonsense view defines violence. That is, nonviolence occurs when there is no action or event that most people would define as a violent one. Definitions for nonviolence, civil disobedience, nonviolent political actions, and nonviolent direct actions are then outlined. These definitions aim at showing that the doctrine of nonviolence does not merely refer to nonviolent acts, but to a strategy that is a means to defeating violence. Given that what counts as the nonviolence that defeats violence is ideologically a matter of disagreement, nonviolence, in this sense, can count as a kind of violence. The fifth chapter concludes, raising questions concerning how violence can be valued, the degree to which a state cannot neutrally justify its neutrality, and the degree to which, beyond the commonsense view of violence, there ever could be agreement concerning what counts as kinds of violence. 1 In this dissertation, I draw on a number of ideas/passages that appeared earlier in my paper “The Efficacy of Scapegoating and Revolutionary Violence," in Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions: A Journal of the World Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies, ed. William Sweet, 10(2014), 203-219. I am grateful to the editors of the journal for permission to draw on this material here. (shrink)

This article uses Walter Benjamin's theoretical claims in the 'Critique of violence' to shed light on some current conceptualisations of terrorism. It suggests an understanding of terrorism as an essentially contested concept. If the theorist uncritically adopts the state's account of terrorism, she occludes an important dimension of the phenomenon that allows for a rethinking of the state's claim to a monopoly on legitimate violence. Benjamin's essay conceptualises the state as resulting from a conjunction of violence, (...) law, legitimacy and power that rests on mythical ideas about nature and history. It shows why the state claims to be justified in taking exceptional measures when this link is challenged and when its prerogative to the legitimate use of force is called into question. This, I argue, is what terrorism does. Thus, Benjamin's essay adds to a more nuanced and less one-sided understanding of both terrorism and state violence. (shrink)

This text examines some parallels between Walter Benjamin’s “critique of violence” and the theory of violence proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Whatever the differences between these two approaches, they both share an important common feature, defining the violence of state and law in terms of a “violence which presupposes itself”. This circular structure of the concept of violence renders utterly problematic the attempts to envisage a wholly other, revolutionary form of violence, which (...) could be opposed to that of the state or its law. Benjamin’s hypothesis of a divine violence which breaks the circle of the mythical one, as well as the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the war machine, have been devised in order to come to terms with this situation. However, these concepts are not intended to serve as a basis for the legitimation of possible acts of counter-violence. What they assert is rather the fundamental and irreducible unavailability of the event in the sphere of social struggles, where our actions can neither be calculated in advance as to their results nor be ultimately justified. (shrink)

What is the meaning of punishment today? Where is the limit that separates it from the cruel and unusual? Clearly, for the use of violence to be legitimate it must be subject to limitation. The difficulty is that the determination of this limit should be objective, but it is not. It is this contestability of the limit that this book addresses.

Since its earliest incarnations, just war theory has included the requirement that war must be initiated and waged by a legitimate authority. However, while recent years have witnessed a remarkable resurgence in interest in just war theory, the authority criterion is largely absent from contemporary discussions. In this paper I aim to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying, by arguing that the authority criterion plays a much more important role within just war theorising than is commonly supposed. (...) As standardly understood, the authority criterion provides a necessary condition for the justification of the resort to war, but has no bearing on the question of permissible conduct in war. In opposition, I argue for an alternative interpretation of the criterion, which attributes to it a fundamental role in assessing this latter question. With this revised interpretation in place, I then demonstrate its advantages by applying it to the practical issue of armed conflicts that are initiated and fought by non-traditional belligerents. While several theorists have recognised that this common feature of modern armed conflict poses a challenge to mainstream just war theory in general—and to the authority criterion in particular—I argue that existing discussions frequently misconstrue the nature of the challenge, since they assume the standard interpretation of the authority requirement and its role within the theory. I then show that the revised interpretation provides a clearer account of both the challenge posed by non-traditional belligerency and the kind of response that it requires. (shrink)

Review of Baig, M., & Gleave, R. (Eds.). (2021). Violence in Islamic Thought from European Imperialism to the Post-Colonial Era (Vol. 3). Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP.

Peace, Culture, and Violence examines deeper sources of violence by providing a critical reflection on the forms of violence that permeate everyday life and our inability to recognize these forms of violence. Exploring the elements of culture that legitimize and normalize violence, the essays collected in this volume invite us to recognize and critically approach the violent aspects of reality we live in and encourage us to envision peaceful alternatives. Including chapters written by important scholars (...) in the fields of Peace Studies and Social and Political Philosophy, the volume represents an endeavour to seek peace in a world deeply marred by violence. Topics include: thug culture, language, hegemony, police violence, war on drugs, war, terrorism, gender, anti-Semitism, and other topics.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Collective Violence, Sacrifice, and Conflict Resolution in the Works of Paul Claudel Christopher G. Flood University ofSurrey, England Claudel's career as a writer spanned almost seventy years, from the 1880s to the 1950s. The publication of his collected works now runs to twenty-nine large volumes, excluding his correspondence and diaries, so a brief overview of any particular dimension of his writing must necessarily be reductive. On the other (...) hand, Claudel's work lends itself particularly well to discussion in terms of the relationship between violence, sacrifice and religion. In a valuable study published more than twenty years ago under the title, Claudel et l'usurpateur, Jacques Petit drew attention to the recurrence in Claudel's plays, and in many of his non- fictional writings, of a narrative structure hinging on acts of usurpation and counter-usurpation. There is a pattern of conflictual rivalry, domination and coercion, whereby acts of aggression are ultimately legitimized, or in some sense excused, in the light of a positive outcome, providential necessity and/or reconciliation between usurper and victim. Claudel's world is indeed "a world of violence," as Petit puts it (79, ch. title).1 It is also a world ofreligion: after his return to the Catholic Church in 1890, all of Claudel's major dramatic works intermesh the process of usurpation with themes deriving from his religious beliefs, and the same is true of many of his non-fictional writings. My aim is not to reinvent the wheel by going back over all of the terrain mapped out by Petit. Nor do I intend to rework Petit's empirical model wholesale in the light of René Girard's anthropological model of mimetic desire and sacrificial violence, although there are obvious areas of convergence between them. However, I shall draw implicitly on both, in order to Translations throughout this paper are my own. 160Christopher G. Flood argue that the notion of sacrifice, which is central to the resolution of rivalries in Claudel's major plays, is transformed into an idiosyncratic conception of international conflict resolution in various non-fictional writings which emerge from his forty years of experience in his parallel career as a profes sional diplomat.2 1 shall start with a schematic discussion of certain features of the plays. The first point relates to Claudel's assumptions concerning the mechanisms involved in the outbreak of individual or collective violence. It needs to be emphasized that in his plays the path towards violence is always opened by a withdrawal or weakening of temporal and/or spiritual authority. This allows the crystallization, and the direct expression, of latent rivalries which eventually lead to an explosion of aggression. The causes of the violence invariably center on the fact that one individual or group is in possession of an object which is coveted by another individual or group. The question of whether Claudel himself appears to recognize a mimetic element in this pattern of behavior would be too complex, and too fraught with imponderables, to discuss here, but there are some indications that he does so. Whatever the case, in the absence of authority, rivalry and jealousy engender verbal, and usually physical conflict, culminating in usurpation of the desired object. Thus, for example, in Tête d'or, the elderly Emperor of the unnamed kingdom has neither the authority nor the resolution to defend his kingdom against external invasion, or against the man who saves the kingdom only to usurp the throne and murder the Emperor himself.3 Similarly, in the second version of La Ville, neither Besme, the positivistic scientist and plutocrat who has created the godless City, nor his brother Lambert, the former politician, has the will to maintain or defend the society against the tensions emerging within it. Thus, the City dissolves first into immobility, then revolution. Or again, in the family drama of La Jeune Fille Violaine (second version), the obsessional rage andjealousy ofMara towards her elder sister, Violaine, explodes into coercion, slander, and horrific violence when their father absents himself from the farm for an indefinite period, leaving Violaine to marry Jacques Hury: the fact that Hury loves Violaine, but does not love Mara, makes the latter all the... (shrink)

Steinhoff defends the moral and legal permissibility of torture in a limited range of circumstances. This article criticizes Steinhoff’s arguments. The analogy between ordinary defensive violence and defensive torture which Steinhoff argues for is partly spoiled by the presence, within defensive torture, of opportunistic harm, in addition to eliminative harm. Steinhoff’s arguments that the mere legalization of defensive torture would not metastasize into a more full-fledged institutionalization of torture are also found wanting. As a minimal form of institutionalization, the (...) mere legalization of torture would already be at risk of further entrenchment and growth. (shrink)

Christopher J. Finlay claims “that a principle of moral or legitimate authority is necessary in just war theory for evaluating properly the justifiability of violence by non-state entities when they claim to act on behalf of the victims of rights violations and political injustice.” In particular, he argues that states, unlike non-state actors, possess what he calls “Lesser Moral Authority.” This authority allegedly enables states to invoke “the War Convention,” which in turn entitles even individual soldiers on the (...) aggressive side to use military violence against soldiers defending the victim state. Non-state actors, in contrast, have to fulfill more stringent requirements. If they do not, then even their attacks on military personnel can properly be called "terrorist." In the following I will argue that Finlay’s attempt to show the importance of the legitimate authority criterion of just war theory and to demonstrate that non-state violence has to satisfy heavier burdens of justification than state violence fails for a number of reasons: his claim that defenders would wrong victims if they defended them against their will is mistaken, he overlooks the fact that non-state agents need not claim to fight on someone’s behalf, the full moral authority he mentions is redundant, the powers he ascribes to “Lesser Moral Authority” are, depending on interpretation, either morally irrelevant or nonexistent, and his claim that granting states “Lesser Moral Authority” is beneficial from a “moral pragmatic” point of view while granting the same authority to non-state actors is not, is unwarranted. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DHARMA AND DESTRUCTION: BUDDHIST INSTITUTIONS AND VIOLENCE Christopher Ives Stonehill College Photographs ofgentle monks in saffron, the cottageindustry ofbooks on mindfulness, and the Dalai Lama's response to the Chinese invasion of Tibet have all helped portray Buddhism as the "religion of nonviolence." This representation ofBuddhism finds support in Buddhist texts, doctrines, and ritual practices, which often advocate ahimsa, nonharming or non-violence. The historical record, however, belies the (...) portrayal of Buddhism as a "religion of nonviolence." By reinterpreting early doctrines of ahimsa, Buddhist thinkers have legitimated violence in particular situations, practitioners have committed acts of violence, and Buddhist institutions have lent support to other institutions—social, political, and governmental —engaged in violence. In this paper I will examine Buddhist perpetration andjustifications ofviolence,1 with particularfocus on Japan, arguing that, historically, Buddhists' desire for institutional security has taken precedence over total rejection of violence. 1 I have restricted my discussion to the killing of other human beings. I do not consider suicide andthe killing ofnon-human animals. For a discussion ofBuddhism, (self-)sacrifice, and suicide in relation to Girard's theory, see Charles D. Orzech, '"Provoked Suicide' and the Victim's Behavior." 152Christopher Ives Non-violence The doctrine of ahimsa figures prominently in early and Theravadan Buddhism. The first ofthe five moral precepts (panca silani) in Buddhism is ahimsa, and in the Dhammapada the historical Buddha purportedly states, All are afraid of the rod. Of death all are afraid. Having made oneself the example, One should neither slay nor cause to slay. (Ross 202) The Buddhaalso sketches the consequences ofhurting orharming (himsa): Who with a rod does hurt Beings who desire ease [of nibbana], While himself looking for ease— He, having departed, ease does not get. Theravadan monastic codes and practices, such as the uposatha biweekly confession of moral transgressions and recitation of the 227 rules in the Patimokkha (Skt. Pratimoksa), are closely tiedto ahimsa. One ofthe Patimokkha's four "offenses of defeat" (parajika dharmas), for which the punishment is immediate expulsion of the monk or nun from the order, is killing another human being (Prebish 11). Mahayana texts continue this exhortation against violence. For example, in the Dasabhimika-sutra we read that a Buddhist "must not hate any being and cannot kill a living creature even in thought."2 Early Buddhist texts include depictions ofthe ideal Buddhist king, the cakravartin-raja or "monarch who turns the wheel [of the Dharma],"3 as an exemplar of nonviolence. Contemporary Buddhist activist Sulak Sivaraksa expresses it, this king is a "an ideal ruler, a world-conquering monarch, who subdued the earth through righteousness rather than war" (Sulak 129), and whose ten main duties include striving for peace and ruling with nonviolent benevolence (129). For well over 2000 years 2 Cited in Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine, p. 199; quoted by Kraft, 5. In much ofthe first section of this paper I am indebted to Ken Kraft's introduction to his volume. 3 The metaphor ofturning the wheel refers to the historical Buddha's teaching ofthe Dharma and the later propagation of it by others. Dharma and Deconstruction153 Buddhists have lifted up Indian king Ashoka (c. 272-236) as an instantiation of this ideal. The early Buddhist doctrine of ahimsa should not, however, be construed as compassionate altruism. Luis Gómez and other scholars have delineated how ahimsa at first did not express some sort of underlying altruistic concern for the well-being of others. Vegetarianism and other ways of avoiding himsa, harming or violence, derived from ancient Indian ritual taboos againstblood and otherbodily liquids (Gómez 36). Buddhists ethicized and psychologized earlier notions of physical pollution, and advocated abstention fromviolenceprimarily as ameans ofself-cultivation, as a way to keep the mind pure, like an unstained cloth (36). (Scholars have even argued that the positive expression oíahimsa, the practice ofdirecting metta (loving-kindness) to others, originally had as much or more to do with the spiritual benefits accrued by the person directing the metta as it did with the well-being of the person receiving it. Only later was ahimsa furtherreinterpreted as positive regard forothers, as seen in the bodhisattva ideal of Mahayana Buddhism. Violence in Buddhist History At numerous times over... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Violence and Religion:Walter Burkert and René Girard in ComparisonWolfgang Palaver (bio)Translated by Gabriel Borrud1Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the relationship between violence and religion has been the center of focus of ever more discussions and examinations. Often, however, these inquiries lack a profound theory that will enable a real understanding of how the two phenomena are related. Walter Burkert and René Girard are two thinkers (...) who grasp the connection between religion and violence, and the present essay will take a closer look at how the two understand this connection. There are similarities and differences between the two thinkers, and these will be highlighted in three sections. In the first, attention will be turned to Burkert and Girard's interpretation of how religion and violence are related—and how this understanding can offer an evolutionary explanation of religion. The second section will examine Girard's thoughts on the mimetic roots of violence, which will serve as a frame of comparison between the two thinkers. A final section will contrast Burkert and Girard with regard to the biblical religions of Judaism and Christianity. [End Page 121]1. Two "Seismographs" for the Relationship Between Religion and ViolenceThe art historian and scholar Aby Warburg once called Jakob Burkhardt and Friedrich Nietzsche "sensitive seismographs," referring to their ability to register the ramifications of the past with uncanny precision.2 Warburg's characterization is appropriate for Burkert and Girard as well, as each shows a hypersensitive understanding of the role religion and violence play in the origins and stability of human culture. It is no coincidence that Burkert and Girard arrived at their respective theories almost simultaneously—both mentioned the significance of violence and religion for the foundation of civilization in works published in 1972. Just years after World War II, the atrocities in the Nazi concentration camps, and the United States's dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Girard and Burkert revealed in explicit terms just how central violence and religion were in the formation of human culture.The significance of Girard and Burkert's ideas only grows in the context of contemporary critiques of religion, especially those coming from Darwinian circles. The virulent critique of the evolutionary biologist, Richard Dawkins, for instance, comes to mind. In all of Dawkins's prolific work, however, he fails to offer a convincing explanation of the evolutionary nature of religion: in a word, he doesn't adequately answer the question of why religion is a universal cultural phenomenon.3 Dawkins asserts that religion is a mere by-product of certain psychological dispositions—for instance, a by-product of the naïve readiness to place one's trust in a superior, or a by-product of an instinctive dualism. However, by implementing a mere cognitive construct in his explanation of how religious rituals have shaped human culture over thousands of years, he only broaches the subject matter. One of the main reasons why Dawkins falls short of explaining the omnipresence of religion in human civilization is his rather one-sided and rash explication of violence, which in his opinion stems solely from religion.4 Dawkins proposes that humans are peaceful, quasi-Rousseauian beings that inherit their violent streak only through religious agitation. Following Dawkins's line of thought, the abolition of religion would mean the creation of a world of peace; however, even those who support his very legitimate critique of religious fundamentalism will find these thoughts rather naïve.Burkert and Girard, meanwhile, are able to delve into the essence of religion by explaining both its ritualistic nature and its importance for human evolution. In the case of Burkert, one sees his interest in evolutionary theory from the outset, as his book Homo Necans (first published 1972)5 contains passages [End Page 122] that refer directly to the work of the behavioral scientist Konrad Lorenz. In the "Gifford Lectures" of 1989, Burkert even speaks of the "tracks of biology in early religion."6 In an article published in 2000, Burkert shows that religion is an indispensable part of the process of humanization—and fundamental to the evolution of human culture.7The concrete examples that Burkert employs to... (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe growing reliance on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in armed conflict raises important questions regarding our conception of both war and the warrior’s place within it. This includes the question of whether the degree to which UAVs mitigate physical risk has imperilled the ethical status of the operator. For those that view this tension as resolvable, reference is frequently made to the eventual acceptance of previous categories of “unfair” weaponry. This article engages with this historical context, identifying the role of physical (...) risk within the historical and contemporary warrior ethos. It first outlines that exposure to personal, physical risk has long been regarded as a crucial element in the ethos-based conception of legitimate violence in war. As will be further shown, however, the warrior ethos is an evolving framework, one that increasingly considers factors such as restraint and professionalism in determining ethical status. The adaptive quality of this ethos is a key explanatory fa... (shrink)

Within barely a year, two school shootings shook Finland. The school shootings shocked Finnish society, forcing media, academics and experts, police and politicians alike to search for reasons behind the violent incidents. Focusing their analysis on the two main Finnish newspapers, Helsingin Sanomat and Hufvudstadsbladet, authoritative sources of information for Finland’s two language communities, the authors maintain that the Finnish case contributes to research on school shootings by evidencing the intimate linkages between the state, gender and violence. The authors (...) argue that violence is to be understood through different discourses about the Finnish state. In particular, they discern three discourses about the state that produce gendered discourses of violence: the welfare state, the realist state and the neoliberal state. The authors conclude that these discourses produce different notions of rational and irrational violence thereby providing different legitimizations for male-embodied/masculine violence. (shrink)

This study establishes the influence of sex-based grammatical gender on gendered violence. We demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between gendered language and the incidence of intimate partner violence in a cross-section of countries. Motivated by this evidence, we conduct an individual-level analysis exploiting the differences in the language structures spoken by individuals with a shared religious and ethnic background residing in the same country. We show that speaking a gendered language is associated with the belief that intimate partner (...) violence is justifiable. Our results are consistent with the theoretical possibility that gendered language activates gender schemata in the minds of speakers, increasing the salience of gender distinctions and existing gender norms which legitimize gendered violence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:VIOLENCE, ANARCHY, AND SCRIPTURE: JACQUES ELLUL AND RENÉ GIRARD Matthew Patullo Princeton Theological Seminary This essay will examine the personal and social consequences ofsin, Biblically defined, and will contend that Christian faith necessitates a rejection of the secular political order. Exploring and contrasting the thought of René Girard and Jacques Ellul, we will demonstrate that Girard's mimetic theory supplies crucial theoretical underpinnings for Ellul's theology. Ellul, in turn, (...) sequencing the Biblical narrative somewhat differently, provides Girard the more biblically consistent content of the life of faith. The ethical content ofthe life of faith is a continuation ofthe salvation narrative inaugurated in Genesis 1-2, incarnated and perpetuated in Israel and later, the Church, the universalized community of the Abrahamic blessing. The historical content of this faith demonstrates the incompatibility of political power with freedom in Christ. The Church's ill-fated attempts to maintain an authentic practice of faith while legitimizing the secular order are exposed by the Biblical critique of power. While the growth of the global state has made a total withdrawal from the political order inconceivable, it is precisely its utter domination today that makes critical continued defiance by the Body of Christ. Original Sin Girard observes that when the snake first appears in the Genesis account of the Fall, it is already in conflict with God, opposing him as a jealous rival. Eve is enticed by it to covet divinity, to covet what belongs to God—the knowledge of good and evil—and to herself become God's rival (Girard 1 965, 1 82). Her imitation ofthe serpent's covetousness forms "an alliance of two against one" (Girard 2000, 171-185), and God is 26Matthew Patullo expelled from the relationship. The contagion of metaphysical desire, or mimesis, soon claims Adam and what began as a relationship ofobedience without conflict between God and human beings is forever changed. An acquisitive mimesis turns antagonistic and rivalrous (Girard 1978a, 95). When called to account for her disobedience, Eve blames the snake. Adam in turn blames Eve, implying that God is himselfat least partially culpable: "The woman whom You gave to be with me, she gave me ofthe tree, and I ate" (Gen 3:12, emphasis mine). In the Biblical account of human origins then, rivalry with God produces rivalry between people. Girard argues that although conflict must inevitably lead to violence, here "God takes the violence upon himselfand founds humanity by driving Adam and Eve far away from him" (Girard 1978a, 142). God's banishment of the first humans only mirrors the expulsion implied by human collusion with the snake. "Now we know that covetousness is the crux ofthe whole affair," Ellul writes, "since sin always depends on it. 'You shall not covet' (Ex 20: 1 7) is the last of the commandments because it summarizes everything—all the other sins" (Ellul 1985, 101; see also Girard 1999, 7-12). Prior to the Fall, Adam and Eve are not required to choose between good and evil. "AU that counted was the relation to God and its expression in action" (Ellul 1976, 51). Here Ellul understands freedom as obedience to God's commandments within the context ofa relationship with God. Independence from God is mere slavery: "Adam seeks to liberate himself from the limits which God has set for him and in so doing he enters into rivalry with other forces and becomes subject to sin" (Ellul 1976, 49). The knowledge that Adam and Eve covet and usurp from God is "the power to decide on one's own what is gooáanawhat is evil" (Ellul 1985,96?, emphasis Ellul's). Consequently, human morality is ofthe order ofthe Fall, and Girard concurs: the ethical always derives from victimary unanimity (Girard 1978a, 236), in this case the rejection of God. For Ellul "covetousness is equivalent to the spirit of power or domination" (Ellul 1985, 101)' and "no society is possible among people 1 "Sin is a break with God and all that this entails. When I say that people are not good, I am not adopting a Christian or a moral standpoint. I am saying that theirtwo great characteristics, no matterwhattheir society or education, are covetousness and the desire... (shrink)

In these early years of the new millennium the world finds itself in a new age of violence and terror. Acts of terrorism, the war in Iraq, and the ongoing post-colonial struggles have created a climate of unprecedented state legitimated and terrorist-based violence, where the emergence of new forms of national insecurity and vulnerability have impacted on every nation and distant corner of the plane. One looks at the world situation and despairs: it is almost impossible to feel (...) safe in the face of such unpredictability. Patriarchy in its various guises, intent on domination and destruction, seems all encompassing and powerful. The questions we ask are enormous: how do we respond and what can we do? Where will genuine moral leadership come from? Where are the signs of hope—true hope—hope born from realism not romanticism? And in particular, as feminists and religionists and theologians, what should our particular contribution be? It is more important than ever to understand hope, and how it generates change. I believe that there are two aspects to global violence that we as feminist religionists and theologians need to tackle in particular. The first is to continue to offer analysis around understanding what hope is, where it derives from, and how it can be transformed into action and motivation. Second, we are experts in two of the principal characteristics of the current global power arrangements—gender and religion—so we have a special responsibility to provide analysis and visionary thinking to our communities. I would like to suggest that the particular contributions that we can make could be firmly placed in the realm of an emerging feminist religious imaginary, because this is the site where our political action and ideas are sustained, nurtured, challenged and where hope is born via imaginative and visionary thinking, where biophillic rationalities and responses are possible. This paper reads global violence and locates hope within a feminist religious imaginary. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Weird John Brown: Divine Violence and the Limits of Ethics by Ted A. Smith, and: Bodies of Peace: Ecclesiology, Nonviolence, and Witness by Myles WerntzRyan Andrew NewsonWeird John Brown: Divine Violence and the Limits of Ethics Ted A. Smith Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015. 224pp. $22.95Bodies of Peace: Ecclesiology, Nonviolence, and Witness Myles Werntz Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014. 272pp. $44.00Arguments about the morality of (...) class='Hi'>violence are currently being reinvigorated by a diverse group of theologians who are considering these questions for a world in which the nation-state no longer provides the sole context for political reflection. Both Ted Smith and Myles Werntz have contributed to this budding conversation by reframing the way theological ethicists might approach questions of violence and war.In Weird John Brown, Ted Smith provides an engaging account of the violent abolitionist, examining the theological significance of John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Smith uses Brown to question the capacity of ethics as a discipline to assess the significance of every phenomenon. By “ethics,” Smith means those forms of moral reasoning that assume reality to be composed of a closed network of cause and effect. Ethics thus understood exerts a “strong gravitational pull” on the contemporary mind, privileging “universalizable moral obligations” that take precedence over goods like beauty or piety and resisting the suggestion that any act’s significance may lie beyond this-worldly relationships (4–5). In fighting for a just cause by violent, treasonous means, Brown problematizes the sufficiency of such ethical habits of description. [End Page 223]Neither crazed fundamentalist nor freedom fighter, Brown’s significance for Smith lies beyond ordinary ethical considerations. He is a “portent,” following W.E.B. Du Bois—a sign questioning the state’s presumed monopoly on legitimate violence (17), pronouncing judgment over a nation built on chattel slavery, and (perhaps) issuing hope for a new society to emerge in his wake (175). Only as “a flawed prophet who is caught up in a story of redemption that he cannot quite imagine” (88) does Brown’s significance come into view.For Smith, the state executing him is clearly not “less violent” than Brown. Indeed, Brown reveals the particular form of violence to which the “neutral” rule of law gives rise: violence reinforcing the legitimacy of state rule. Following Walter Benjamin, Smith describes a “mythic” cycle whereby an original violence that establishes a state, and the law that later legitimates that founding, reinforce one another (56, 70–71). Justice becomes equated with “law,” with no place for exceptions to law that might contribute to the overall health of the state (57). This cycle cannot be broken by moral imperatives articulated within the system; it is broken only by what Benjamin calls “divine violence”—necessarily exceptional interruptions to the cycle that challenge the system as such (73).Recognizing the possibility of such interruptions to the ethical does not eliminate the need for phronesis. Instead, it transposes practical wisdom to a key “marked by freedom and the love that freedom makes possible” (82); it stresses the importance of cultivating “the capacity for reasoning together about the form of a higher law” (109) that thereby relieves the law from being all in all. And while many fear that phrases like “higher law” only incite irrational, unchecked violence, Smith rightly sees that “mundane” politics can manifest a violence that is equally devastating, while concepts like “higher law” have checked violence as often as inspired it. To respond to violence done in the name of a higher law, we need better and deeper religious reasoning, “the kind that can imagine the higher law as something other than a code to be enforced and history as something more than an endless succession of homogeneous moments to be wrenched into conformity with the law” (88).Smith does not directly address the question of justified violence. His task is more difficult: to reset the parameters of such discussions so that they might continue without being restricted by “intramundane accounts of the good” (35). Smith thus challenges just warriors and pacifists alike not to argue on prudential grounds alone but to risk reasoning beyond the state’s... (shrink)

A study of Hindu engagements with violence which have been structured by scriptural themes reveals that violence has been regulated, enacted, resisted, negated or denied in complex ways. Disputes based on Vedic orthodoxy were channeled, in classical India, through the mythical frameworks of gods clashing with demons, and later in the medieval centuries this template was extended to the Muslim foreigners who threatened the Brahmanical socio-religious orders. In the modern period, the electoral mechanisms of colonial modernity spurred Hindu (...) anxieties about a weakened nation which would die out in the face of Muslim solidarity, and various Hindu organizations began to increasingly draw on motifs from the Vedas, Bhagavad-gītā, and other texts to speak of a martial Hindu nation. These two moments—the articulation of the boundaries of the robust Hindu nation and the projection of the Muslim as the enemy lurking at the gates—have been integral to the shaping of Hindu cultural nationalism by several key thinkers and political activists. Thus, the forms of violence associated with Hindu universes should be placed within their dynamic socio-historical contexts where Hindus have interpreted, engaged with, and acted on a range of scriptural texts both to generate violent solidarities and to speak of peace. A study of these phenomena alongside some Christian theological attempts to legitimize, valorize or transcend violence from within scriptural horizons points to the complex conceptual terrain encompassed by the conjunction in “religion and violence.”. (shrink)

How do we know what violence is? And how do we acquire knowledge of violence? The key to these questions can be found in the epistemology of testimony. Testimonies of violence are first-person narratives of violence, therefore unless first-person narratives are recognized and legitimized as philosophically and epistemologically valuable, our knowledge of violence would be seriously compromised. The value of testimonies of violence lies in part in the transmission of truth-claims, but also crucially in (...) the speech-act of giving a testimony. It is the latter that is the focus of this article. I will argue that the act of giving a testimony of violence, being listed to and believed, is essential for the survivor of violence in the process of rebuilding the sense of self and personhood in the aftermath of the violence endured.By looking at the work of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions worldwide, and highlighting in particular the role of trust within the dynamics of testimonies, I will argue that first-person testimonies of violence are also indispensable for another reason; namely, they prevent acts of violence from turning into instruments of epistemic injustice.Survivors of violence often find themselves being the victims of two forms of violence: apart from enduring the violence being afflicted on them, they also often suffer the epistemic injustice of being marginalized as credible sources of knowledge. Recognizing the validity of testimonies of violence in the form of first-person narratives of violence not only enables us to acquire knowledge of violence, but acknowledging the credibility of the narrator acts as a strong antidote to epistemic injustice. (shrink)

The articles intention is to construct a possible minimal response to violence, that is, to describe what would be justified противонасилие. This argument is built on reviving several important philosophical texts in Russian of the first half of the twentieth century as well as on going beyond that historical moment. Starting with the reconstruction of Tolstoys criticism of any use of violence, it is then shown that, paradoxically, resistance to Tolstoys or pseudo-Tolstoys teachings ends up incorporating Tolstoys thematization (...) of counter-violence into various theories, which sought to legitimate the use of force. In particular, Tolstoys discovery of a force, which, on the one hand, is not grounded in violence and, on the other hand, which is capable of countering violence, becomes fundamental in reasoning about the just use of force. The connection is made between Tolstoy and Petar II Petrović Njego, who also thematizes the use of force in Christian perspective. In his view, justice, blessed by the Creators hand, has the capacity to protect from violent force. Any living thing defends itself from what endangers it by means Creator bestowed it with. Living force and protective use of force are conceptually linked in Njegos reasoning. Thus, only protective force can defeat aggressive force. This is shown to be Njegos contribution to the Orthodox Christian discourse on violence. If a force can be counter-violent, the next step in our argument would be to search for a protocol that should have universal validity, that is, it has to be valid for all conflicting sides, The protocol of counter-violence requires that, firstly, it is a response to violence; secondly, it interrupts violence and forestalls any possible future violence ; thirdly, it is subject to verification, it addresses those who are a priori against any response to violence. Finally, it is shown that state power does not create law, but it is being right that makes law or gives life to social order, and thereby can authorize the use of force. This is the innovation in the histories of justification of force, absent in the West. Aggressive violence can necessarily be opposed only in the way that implies the possibility of constituting law and order. (shrink)

While some scholars have addressed the common cultural tropes about trans people, the way media might sometimes legitimate violence against trans people, and even take part in forms of violence, has not been analysed. This is what this article sets out to do, through an examination of how a verbal and physical attack against black trans women, videotaped and uploaded on a platform for user-generated entertainment, was framed in a way which repeated the symbolic violence already (...) at play in the physical encounter. The article addresses the way this depiction of real violence, framed as entertainment, and coupled with identity invalidation both legitimizes physical violence and delegitimizes black trans feminine people as victims of violence. (shrink)

The analysis of TV violence cannot be limited to the quantification of its incidence, but should also take into account the type of violence broadcast and its context (what is depicted and how). Thus, normative models of violence (legitimized violence with positive consequences for the aggressor, or vice versa) could be understood as positive, while contra-normative models of violence (rewarding illegitimate violence and punishing legitimate violence) should be of far greater concern. This (...) paper analyzes the normative contexts of TV violence through a content analysis of randomly selected fragments of TV programming (147 recorded hours). The results show that news programs and TV series/soaps delegitimized violence to a higher extent, while films tend to show legitimized or ambivalent violence. Positive consequences of violence predominate in fictional programs, except for TV series/soaps. Normative presentation of violence is more frequent, especially in nonfiction genres, as fiction has more freedom to depict the socially undesirable. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungSeit Jahren steigt in Indien die Anzahl der spezifisch gegenüber Frauen, hierarchisch tieferstehenden Geburts- (varṇa) und Berufsgruppen (jāti) sowie Kastenlosen (dalits;scheduled castes) und indigenen Gemeinschaften (ādivāsī;scheduled tribes) angezeigten Gewalttaten kontinuierlich an. Diese Gewaltakte und Tötungsdelikte sind aufgrund ihrer Qualität und vor allem aufgrund ihrer quantitativen Größenordnung als systemisch anzusehen. Dass sie in dieser Form noch immer ein akutes Gegenwartsproblem von allerhöchster sozialer und politischer Brisanz im vordergründig säkularisierten Indien darstellen, legt einen gesamtgesellschaftlichen Konsens über deren grundsätzliche Rechtmäßigkeit nahe, der sich (...) anhand tradierter Normen- und Wertvorstellungen sowie prämoderner Denk- und Handlungsmuster legitimiert, die auf traditionell hinduistischen Ideen basieren. Dabei kann der politische Aufstieg der nationalreligiös argumentierenden und agitierenden „Indischen Volkspartei“ (BJP:Bhāratīya Janatā Pārṭī) sowie ihr politisch forcierter Rückgriff auf den Hinduismus als einzelner, aber dennoch entscheidender Einflussfaktor gesehen werden, der die anhaltende Verschärfung innergesellschaftlicher Gegensätze und die kontinuierliche Intensivierung der Gewaltdynamiken ursächlich zu erklären vermag. Um diese Zusammenhänge zu beleuchten, vollzieht der Beitrag die ideengeschichtlichen Grundlagen religiös legitimierter Entmenschlichung und Gewalt sowie latenter wie offener Misogynie im Hinduismus von seinen vedischen Ursprüngen im 2. vorchristlichen Jahrtausend bis zur Gegenwart nach. (shrink)

Looking back at the "War on Terror" and its policies, actions, and the violence that followed, this book analyzes the resulting changes in international power structures and the relationship between citizens and their representatives. It defines our shortcomings in opposing this type of violence by demonstrating how the notion of legitimate violence has been broadened. -/- The impact of the "War on Terror" on the public view of Liberalism is explored, as well as its effects on (...) the role of state authorities in our lives. Thus, this book names the lessons we ought to learn from the actions taken against terrorist organizations. (shrink)

This article examines the concept of violence in contemporary political theory focusing in particular on the possibility of rethinking the relationship between violence and democracy. Rather than seeing democracy and violence as contrasting concepts, it argues that democratic societies have always been founded on the basis of violent engagement at some level. And, of course, the modern state has always claimed the legitimate use of force as a key ingredient in its authority. The article contends that (...) many contemporary democratic discourses have lost sight of the integral relationship between democracy and violence. Indeed it is frequently the case that discourses of democracy are couched in ethical terms as the obverse of violence. Ironically, this trend is often most apparent where societies are either making a transition to democracy or where a process of conflict transformation is taking place. The limitations of these approaches for our understanding of violence and democracy will be outlined in this article through an examination of contemporary political developments in Northern Ireland. (shrink)

En 1685, le Code noir défendait « aux esclaves de porter aucunes armes offensives ni de gros bâtons » sous peine de fouet. Au xixe siècle, en Algérie, l'État colonial français interdisait les armes aux indigènes, tout en accordant aux colons le droit de s'armer. Aujourd'hui, certaines vies comptent si peu que l'on peut tirer dans le dos d'un adolescent tout en prétendant qu'il était agressif, armé et menaçant. Une ligne de partage oppose historiquement les corps « dignes d'être défendus (...) » et ceux qui, désarmés ou rendus indéfendables, sont laissés sans défense. Ce « désarmement » organisé des subalternes et des opprimés au profit d'une minorité jouissant d'un droit permanent à porter des armes et à en user impunément pose directement, pour tout élan de libération, la question du recours à la violence pour sa propre défense. Du jiu-jitsu des suffragettes aux pratiques insurrectionnelles du ghetto de Varsovie, des fusils des Black Panthers aux patrouilles queer, Elsa Dorlin retrace une généalogie philosophique de l'autodéfense politique. Derrière l'histoire officielle de la légitime défense, il est ici question du récit des « éthiques martiales de soi », ces histoires ensevelies où le Sujet ne préexiste pas à sa propre défense, où le fait de se défendre en attaquant apparaît à la fois comme la condition de possibilité d'un soi et la matière des mythologies politiques. Cette histoire – une histoire de la violence – conditionne la définition même de la subjectivité moderne. Elle s'écrit à la lumière d'une relecture critique de l'histoire de la philosophie politique, où Hobbes et Locke sont à confronter avec Franz Fanon, Michel Foucault ou Judith Butler. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est construit autour d'un chapitre (texte original) de Judith Butler sur l'éthique de la non-violence. En réponse se construisent quatre réflexions philosophiques. Mylène Botbol-Baum présente le collectif à partir de sa traduction du texte de Judith Butler, et aborde la question du sujet et de la norme à partir de la lecture butlerienne de Levinas et Arendt, sur la question des limites de la légitimité de la violence pour une éthique de la relationalité. Jean de Munck (...) traite une lecture croisée de Benjamin et Butler sur la violence. Romildo Pineiro et Jose Erraruz off rent une lecture historique et politique du concept de violence et y confrontent l'interprétation de la non violence dans le texte de Butler. Trois textes plus sociologiques suivent sur l'impact de la non-violence, dans une perspective qui vise à " défaire le genre " dans le cadre sociopolitique critique des vulnérabilités, dans le cadre du travail des femmes migrantes (Ghaliya Dejelloul) ou du travail domestique non rémunéré (Anna Safuta), à partir d'une enquête sur la mobilité spatiale des femmes dans les zones pré-urbaines d'Alger ou de Bruxelles, off rant une analyse sur l'hostilité masculine et le rôle du discours religieux dans la légitimation de cette violence. Matthieu de Nanteuil conclut le volume sur la question de la violence et de la sensibilité politique en mettant à jour la théorie de la démocratie radicale chez Judith Butler. Il sera donc question dans ce volume de penser la non-violence à partir d'une approche fondée sur la normalisation des corps, en réintroduisant le sujet de la vie comme interlocuteur critique du sujet de la norme en démocratie. (shrink)

School anti-violence programs are united in their radical condemnation of aggression, generally equated with violence. The programs advocate its elimination by priming children's emotional and cognitive controls. What goes unrecognized is the embeddedness of aggression in human beings, as well as its positive psychological and moral functions. In attempting to eradicate aggression, schools increase the risk of student disaffection while stifling the goods associated with it: status, power, dominance, agency, mastery, pride, social-affiliation, social-approval, loyalty, self-respect, and self-confidence. It (...) is argued that the distribution of power and authority to students as plausible substitutes for aggression, would enable them to express aggression in a legitimate manner and simultaneously encourage their attachment to school. A vibrant anti-violence program that attracts children will find a way for caring, amiability, sympathy, and kindness to live in tandem with competition, power, assertiveness, and anger tamed by institutional constraints. (shrink)