The article deals with a role of mass culture in term of the theory of the culture industry by M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno and the theory of communicative action by J. Habermas, who continues research of the Frankfurt school. It is known that Habermas says about two types of rationality — communicative and structural. The lifeworld and the system correspond them. Usually, culture correspond to lifeworld because it helps people`s socialization. Also it is a place for communication and (...) finding new meanings. However, a place of mass culture is very controver- sial. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between popular and mass culture, because these definitions have been used as interchangeable for a long time. Popular culture is still an area of meanings. Moreover, it has the potential for protest. From this point of view, it is clearly part of the life world. But mass culture as a «cultural industry» is not so unambiguous. It is worth considering its characteristics and role in people’s life more detail. Above all, one cannot help paying attention to masses. Already in the last century, H. Arendt characterized them as an atomized and isolated group of people, and they are not united by any common ideas. After all, even in the modern world it is possible to see that they do not have and do not want to search for any ideas or meanings. Masses are a direct consumers of mass culture. It is consumerism that the characteristic feature of modernity. Therefore, mass culture is inseparably connected with the market. On the one hand, it sells entertainments, and on the other hand, it generates new consumers, because it is related to advertising. In the same way, mass culture is connected with agitation and propaganda. Thus, it is possible to speak about its connection with politics. The market and politics correspond to the system and are guided by strategic rationality. This fact gives reason to talk about mass culture as a strategic tool. Such culture with no meanings leads to a crisis in society. (shrink)

This article explores the links between strategic goals, enterprise risk management, and ethics. We offer a typology of managerial attitudes toward strategic goals and rationality and explore the interaction between strategic and ethical decision making. In so doing, we offer a practical framework for managers to approach ethical dilemmas in the highly complex, volatile, and risky economy that we currently find ourselves in.

The paper argues that the standard decision theoretic account of strategies and their rationality or optimality is much too narrow, that strategies should rather condition future action to future decision situations (a point of view already developed in my Grundlagen der Entscheidungstheorie, sect. 4.4), that practical deliberation must therefore essentially rely on a relation of superiority and inferiority between possible future decision situations, that all this allows to substantially broaden the theory of practical rationality, that a long list (...) of points attended to in the literature can be subsumed under the broadened perspective (including a novel view on the iterated prisoner's dilemma and on iterated Newcomb's problem, which, however, is revised in Spohn (2003) "Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation"), and that the task to complete and systematize this list indeed forms a fruitful research programme. (shrink)

This book develops a framework for analysing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory, which is the formal study of the interaction of rational agents and which has proved extremely fruitful in economics, political theory and business management. The author argues that a logical paradox lies at the root of a number of persistent puzzles in game theory, in particular those concerning rational agents who seek to establish some kind of reputation. Building on the work of (...) Parsons, Burge, Gaifman and Barwise and Etchemendy, Robert Koons constructs a context-sensitive solution to the whole family of liar-like paradoxes including, for the first time, a detailed account of how the interpretation of paradoxical statements is fixed by context. This analysis provides an understanding of how the rational agent model can account for the emergence of rules, practices and institutions. (shrink)

There is a growing pro-emotional consensus in contemporary literature on the relationship between emotions and practical rationality. Its proponents argue that emotions exhibit the properties of strategically rational states, i.e. that they can positively influence the cognitive mechanism of rational deliberation and lead an individual to choose an action based on its practical utility. In this paper, we will analyse the main claims of this consensus and examine their plausibility in light of three critical objections to the strategic (...) rationality thesis. We will demonstrate that emotions, despite their tendency to trigger episodes of impulsivity and selfdeception, can rightly be described as strategically rational, with the caveat that proponents of the pro-emotional consensus must exercise caution when attempting to support their beliefs with the thesis of the modularity of emotions and the evolutionary explanations for their practical utility. (shrink)

The extent to which trust prevails can be measured by the subjective probability with which an agent expects another one to act in desired ways. An agent´s trust in other agents forms in repeated social interactions which typically have the structure of an elementary game of trust. The process of trust formation in such interactions may be described by a reputation function. It is argued that in view of real world processes of trust formation any adequate reputation function must satisfy (...) certain conditions. A simple model conforming to these conditions is presented. Analysing this example it is shown that there is a co-operative Nash equilibrium in a trust supergame which is in line with the basic conditions of trust formation. However, it is also proved that no process of trust formation can be reasonably similar to real world mechanisms and at the same time lead to subgame perfect equilibria in a trust supergame. (shrink)

In this paper, we present an ethical and strategic approach to managing organizational crises. The proposed crisis management model (1) offers a new approach to guide an organization’s strategic and ethical response to crisis, and (2) provides a two-by-two framework for classifying organizational crises. The ethically rational approach to crisis draws upon strategic rationality, crisis, and ethics literature to understand and address organizational crises. Recent examples of corporate crises are employed to illustrate the theoretical claims advanced. (...) Finally, the paper provides guidelines for a morally optimal outcome for the organization and its stakeholders. (shrink)

The ancient puzzle of the Liar was shown by Tarski to be a genuine paradox or antinomy. I show, analogously, that certain puzzles of contemporary game theory are genuinely paradoxical, i.e., certain very plausible principles of rationality, which are in fact presupposed by game theorists, are inconsistent as naively formulated. ;I use Godel theory to construct three versions of this new paradox, in which the role of 'true' in the Liar paradox is played, respectively, by 'provable', 'self-evident', and 'justifiable'. (...) I also construct in modal operator logic a paradox involving reflexive empirical reasoning. Unlike the paradox of the Liar, the paradox of reflexive reasoning does not depend on self-reference. ;I consider various solutions to the Liar paradox and evaluate how well these solutions cope with the paradox of reflexive reasoning. I then formalize the solution to the paradoxes which I favor: the indexical-hierarchical approach, first sketched out by Charles Parsons and Tyler Burge. In this solution, occurrences of the predicate 'true' in sentence-tokens are contextually relativized to levels of a hierarchy. Drawing also on some brief remarks of Bertrand Russell and Charles Parsons, I develop an account of the kind of schematic generality needed for this theory to be statable. ;Finally, I demonstrate that the principles shown to be paradoxical are in fact presupposed by contemporary game theorists in their reliance on the notion of common knowledge or, more precisely, mutual belief. I create novel analyses of and corresponding solutions to several recalcitrant puzzles within game theory, including the "chain-store paradox". (shrink)

Gupta has proposed a definition of strategic rationality cast in the framework of his revision theory of truth. His analysis, relative to a class of normal form games in which all players have a strict best reply to all other players’ strategy profiles, shows that game-theoretic concepts have revision-theoretic counterparts. We extend Gupta’s approach to deal with normal form games in which players’ may have weak best replies. We do so by adapting intuitions relative to Nash equilibrium refinements (...) to the revision-theoretic framework. We prove that there is a precise equivalence between trembling-hand perfect equilibria in two-player normal games and a revision-theoretic property. We then introduce lexicographic choice of action as a way to represent players’ expectations, which allows our analysis to reach full generality. Finally, we provide an example of the versatility of revision theory as applied to strategic interaction by formalizing a risk-and-compensation procedure of strategic choice in the revision-theoretic framework. (shrink)

This volume explores from multiple perspectives the subtle and interesting relationship between the theory of rational choice and Darwinian evolution. In rational choice theory, agents are assumed to make choices that maximize their utility; in evolution, natural selection 'chooses' between phenotypes according to the criterion of fitness maximization. So there is a parallel between utility in rational choice theory and fitness in Darwinian theory. This conceptual link between fitness and utility is mirrored by the interesting parallels between formal models of (...) evolution and rational choice. The essays in this volume, by leading philosophers, economists, biologists and psychologists, explore the connection between evolution and rational choice in a number of different contexts, including choice under uncertainty, strategic decision making and pro-social behaviour. They will be of interest to students and researchers in philosophy of science, evolutionary biology, economics and psychology. (shrink)

A puzzling finding from research on strategic decision making concerns the effect that predictions have on future actions. Simply stating a prediction about an opponent changes the total probability (pooled over predictions) of a player taking a future action as compared to not stating any prediction. These interference effects are difficult to explain using traditional economic models, and instead these results suggest turning to a quantum cognition approach to strategic decision making.

We propose a special look at new epistemological possibilities in constructing knowledge to fill the gap between theory development and its practical and societal applications. We turn our attention to the strategy field of studies, which is traditionally positivist, but that also accommodates some timid attempts to produce content from other onto-epistemological bases, such as strategy as practice. Then, we explore the possible interchange between strategy as practice and the Epistemologies of the South. Once strategy as practice is based on (...) practice rationality, which conceives social life as continuous production, it allows considering a wider diversity of social experiences surrounding strategic management. Likewise, the Epistemologies of the South represent a processual approach, which considers the social realities of developing countries and allows the inclusion of marginalized voices in social sciences' theorizing movements. We develop a conceptual-methodological guide for researchers to reflect on the possible ways to systematically rescue pieces of many social experiences forgotten by normal science, promoting cognitive and social justice in research, especially in the strategy field. Our proposal is a reflection about exploring what is not done, what is not practiced and make possible to expand the universe of social experiences considered for analysis in organizational and management studies. In doing so, we call the attention of scholars to start a paradigm shift from marginalization to the inclusion of multiple social realities toward cognitive and social democracy in research. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 492-507, July 2022.

This monograph is a collection of conference contributions chosen by the editors who led a three-year project on evolution, cooperation, and rationality. The collected works are held together by a six-page introduction identifying common strands and differences of positions in the different chapters. Since no two chapters have a common author, the chapters do not build on each other. Rather, they offer a variety of perspectives on a number of different aspects of rationality and evolution. The monograph thus (...) does not offer a unified account of evolution and rationality despite the possibly somewhat misleading title, nor is there a clearly identifiable overarching theme that runs through the entire book. (shrink)

I argue that altruistic behavior and its variation across cultures may be caused by mental cognitive mechanisms that induce cooperative behavior in contract-like situations and adapt that behavior to the kinds of contracts that exist in one's socio-cultural environment. I thus present a cognitive alternative to Henrich et al.'s motivation-based account. Rather than behaving in ways that reveal preferences, subjects interpret the experiment in ways that cue their social heuristics. In order to distinguish the respective roles of preferences and cognitive (...) processes that determine economic behavior, we need more ethnography of strategies “in the wild.”. (shrink)

Strategic Reliabilism is a framework that yields relative epistemic evaluations of belief-producing cognitive processes. It is a theory of cognitive excellence, or more colloquially, a theory of reasoning excellence (where 'reasoning' is understood very broadly as any sort of cognitive process for coming to judgments or beliefs). First introduced in our book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment (henceforth EPHJ), the basic idea behind SR is that epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads in a robustly reliable (...) fashion to significant, true beliefs. It differs from most contemporary epistemological theories in two ways. First, it is not a theory of justification or knowledge – a theory of epistemically worthy belief. Strategic Reliabilism is a theory of epistemically worthy ways of forming beliefs. And second, Strategic Reliabilism does not attempt to account for an epistemological property that is assumed to be faithfully reflected in the epistemic judgments and intuitions of philosophers. If SR makes recommendations that accord with our reflective epistemic judgments and intuitions, great. If not, then so much the worse for our reflective epistemic judgments and intuitions. (shrink)

Business and Society Review, Volume 127, Issue 1, Page 3-22, Spring 2022.

Business and Society Review, Volume 127, Issue 1, Page 3-22, Spring 2022.

The knowledge that organizations possess, produce, and acquire adds to their strategic competency and intelligence. Organizations develop intelligence from practice and learning by doing. There is a definite relationship that exists between organizational learning and productivity that contributes to the development of organizational intelligence. Organizational intelligence is of difference kinds, but almost all of them develop from organizational actions and learning that includes but are not restricted to gaining market information, consumer interactions, business communications, creating new products and services, (...) managing actions, solving emerging problems, etc. Intelligence is the ability to comprehend things or immediate situations and act rationally and according to what the situation demands. In this paper, we examine on what respect organizational intelligence positively relates to organizational competency, and how intelligence help develop strategic competency which adds to their advantage and makes them more robust. We find using a theoretical model that the development of organizational intelligence confers competitive strength to an organization, and contributes to the overall development of higher productivity and organizational competence. (shrink)

This paper brings two major research lines in current sociology together. Research on social networks has long focused primarily on network effects but meanwhile also addresses the emergence and dynamics of networks. Research on trust in social and economic relations shows that networks have effects on trust. Using game theory, we provide a simple model that allows for an integrated and simultaneous analysis of network effects on trust and for the endogenous emergence of the network. The model also allows for (...) characterizing the value of the network. We use standard assumptions on full strategic rationality. Testable implications of the model as well as model extensions are sketched. (shrink)

The author gives an analysis of the strategic manoeuvring in the justification of legal decisions from a pragma-dialectical perspective by showing how a judge tries to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical aims. On the basis of an analysis and evaluation of the argumentation given by the US Supreme Court in the famous Holy Trinity case, it is shown how in a case in which the judge wants to make an exception to a legal rule for the concrete case tries to (...) meet the dialectical reasonableness norm by seeing to it that his standpoint is sufficiently defended according to the requirements of the burden of proof of a judge in a rational critical discussion and how he tries at the same time to be rhetorically convincing for the legal audience by presenting the decision as a choice that is in line with the argumentation schemes and starting points that can be considered as accepted by the legal community in the US and by the US community as a whole. (shrink)

Grief is our emotional response to the deaths of intimates, and so like many other emotional conditions, it can be appraised in terms of its rationality. A philosophical account of grief's rationality should satisfy a contingency constraint, wherein grief is neither intrinsically rational nor intrinsically irrational. Here I provide an account of grief and its rationality that satisfies this constraint, while also being faithful to the phenomenology of grief experience. I begin by arguing against the best known (...) account of grief's rationality, Gustafson's strategic or forward-looking account, according to which the practical rationality of grief depends on the internal coherence of the component attitudes that explain the behaviors caused by grief, and more exactly, on how these attitudes enable the individual to realize states of affairs that she desires. While I do not deny that episodes of grief can be appraised in terms of their strategic rationality, I deny that strategic rationality is the essential or fundamental basis on which grief's rationality should be appraised. In contrast, the heart of grief's rationality is backward-looking. That is, what primarily makes an episode of grief rational qua grief is the fittingness of the attitudes individuals take toward the experience of a lost relationship, attitudes which in turn generate the desires and behaviors that constitute bereavement. Grief thus derives its essential rationality from the objects it responds to, not from the attitudes causally downstream from that response, and is necessarily irrational when the behaviors that constitute an individual's grieving are inappropriate to the object of that grief. So while the strategic rationality of an episode of grief contributes to whether it is on the whole rational, no episode of grief can be rational unless the actions that constitute grieving accurately gauge the change in a person's normative situation wrought by the loss of her relationship with the deceased. (shrink)

Strategic interactions have been studied extensively in the area of judgment and decision-making. However, so far no specific measure of a decision-maker's ability to be successful in strategic interactions has been proposed and tested. Our contribution is the development of a measure of strategic ability that borrows from both game theory and psychology. Such measure is aimed at providing an estimation of the likelihood of success in many social activities that involve strategic interaction among multiple decision-makers. (...) To construct a reliable measure of strategic ability, that we propose to call ``Strategic Quotient'' (SQ), we designed a test where each item is a game and where, therefore, the individual score obtained depends on the distribution of choices of other decision-makers taking the test. The test is designed to provide information on the abilities related to two dimensions, mentalization and rationality, that we argue are crucial to strategic success, with each dimension being characterized by two main factors. Principal component analysis on preliminary data shows that indeed four factors (two for rationality, two for mentalization) account for strategic success in most of the strategically simpler games of the test. Moreover, two more strategically sophisticated games are inserted in the test and are used to investigate if and to what extent the four factors obtained by simpler games can predict strategic success in more sophisticated strategic interactions. Overall, the collected empirical evidence points to the possibility of building a SQ measure using only simple games designed to capture information about the four identified factors. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to give an account and a rational reconstruction of the heuristic advice provided by Aristotle in the Topics and Prior Analytics in regard to the difficulty or ease of strategic planning in the context of a dialectical dialogue. The general idea is that a Questioner can foresee what his refutational syllogism would have to look like given the character of the thesis defended by the Answerer, and therefore plan accordingly. A rational reconstruction of (...) this advice will be attempted from three perspectives: strategic planning based on the acceptability of Answerer’s thesis, strategic planning based on the predicational form of the thesis, strategic planning based on the logical form of the thesis. In addition, we will provide an illustration of the potential of this heuristic advice as we apply it to the interpretation of a fragment from Plato, presuming that, in a similar way, a reading of this kind might be more generally applicable in the interpretation of the Platonic dialogues. (shrink)

The paper is essentially a short version Spohn "Strategic Rationality" which emphasizes in particular how the ideas developed there may be used to shed new light on the iterated prisoner's dilemma (and on iterated Newcomb's problem).

In the context of strategic interactions, individuals sometimes find themselves better off when they have fewer options. This mechanism is known under the name of ‘strategic commitment’, as it is usually the individuals themselves who ‘commit’ to following a certain course of action by restricting their options; but that is not necessary. I explain how a paternalistic intervention may be conceived where it is a third party who paternalistically restricts rational individuals’ choices to improve their welfare. This kind (...) of intervention, which I call ‘strategic paternalism’, contradicts the narrative according to which welfare economics is incompatible with paternalism because it assumes individual rationality, which would make paternalism irrelevant. To prove this point, I show why and in what sense this ‘strategic paternalism’ deserves to be called that way. (shrink)

How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the (...) lowest reasonable principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)

In this paper we compare two micro foundations for modelling human behaviour and decision making. We focus on perfect strategic rationality on the one hand and a simple reinforcement mechanism on the other hand. Iterated prisoner’s dilemmas serve as the play ground for the comparison. The main lesson of our analysis is that in the space of all possible 2 × 2 PDs different micro foundations do matter. This suggests that researchers can not safely rely on the assumption (...) that implementing simple models of decision making will yield the same results that may be obtained when more sophisticated decision rules are built into the agents. (shrink)

How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the (...) lowest reasonable principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)

The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that (...) an equilibrium will be attained. In particular, I analyze the case of multiple equilibria, since in this case there exists a whole set of rational beliefs, so that no player can ever be certain that the others believe he has certain beliefs. In this case it becomes necessary to explicitly model the process of belief formation. This model attributes to the players a theory of counterfactuals which they use in restricting the set of possible equilibria. If it were possible to attribute to the players the same theory of counterfactuals, then the players'' beliefs would eventually converge. (shrink)

The multiple commons is an important context in a world facing the eco-challenge. The platform for land use negotiation is a perspective concerning the good governance of the multiple commons. Platforms are devices or procedures for social learning and negotiation about effective collective action. They create collective decision making capacity at eco-system levels at which critical ecological services need to be managed. Taking platforms seriously as an option for designing a more sustainable society assumes a belief in the human capacity (...) to engage in collective action. Unfortunately, human thinking about humans is dominated by perspectives that emphasize either technical solutions to given human ends, or perspectives that emphasize the selfish nature of human ends. This article focuses especially on the latter: the strategic narratives that have become dominant as society increasingly becomes designed on economic principles. The paper seeks to explain the dominance of strategic narratives and provides social science evidence for alternative perspectives. It concludes with cornerstones for an alternative narrative. (shrink)

Evolution and Rationality marks the end of a three-year project, ‘Evolution, Cooperation, and Rationality’, directed at the University of Bristol by the book’s editors, Samir Okasha and Ken Binmore. The collection draws together the editors’ pick of the papers delivered at the conferences the project hosted, and covers a wide range of topics at the intersection of evolutionary theory and the social sciences. It is a splendid anthology: timely, interdisciplinary, thematically cohesive, and full of substantive and interesting disagreements (...) between the contributors. (shrink)

For more than twenty years, Peter Vanderschraaf’s work has combined rigorous game-theoretic analysis, innovative use of (social) scientific method, and normative analysis in the context of the social contract. Vanderschraaf’s work has influenced a significant interdisciplinary field of study and culminated in the publication of his book, Strategic Justice: Convention and Problems of Balancing Divergent Interests (OUP, 2019). Building upon his previous work, Vanderschraaf developed a new theory of justice (justice-as-convention) that, despite a mutual advantage approach, considers the most (...) vulnerable members of society and defends the egalitarian bargaining solution. To advance his theory, Vanderschraaf proposes an account of conventions that updates and systematizes David Lewis’s account of conventions, drawing on contemporary developments in game theory and economics. This topical collection brings together game theorists, philosophers, economists, and political scientists to discuss themes from Vanderschraaf’s work. The collection bridges a gap among disjoint but closely related literatures in game theory, bargaining theory, formal philosophy, rationality, equality, justice, and the social contract in order to advance dialogue among scholars in this rich and growing field of study. (shrink)

Although rational choice theory has enjoyed only modest predictive success, it provides a powerful explanatory mechanism for social processes involving strategic interaction among individuals and it stimulates interesting empirical inquiries. Rather than present competing theories to compare against rational choice, Don Green and Ian Shapiro have merely alluded to alternative explanatory variables such as culture, institutions, and social norms, without showing either how these factors can be incorporated into a more powerful theory, or how they are inconsistent with rational (...) choice theory. It is likely that any eventual theory of the origin and maintenance of social institutions, norms, and values will have to reserve a central place for rational action. (shrink)

Habermas's analysis of rational action is the fulcrum for his broader theoretical project. If that analysis is faulty his larger project is jeopardized. I explore the role Habermas assigns to strategic action in order to scrutinize his central concept of communicative action. Using basic game theoretic concepts as a counterpoint I argue that he both misconstrues stategic action and fails to adequately explain the mechanism underlying communicative action. I conclude by sketching several ways that Habermas might seek to rectify (...) deficiencies in his analysis of rational action. (shrink)

Two different types of functional dependencies are compared: dependencies that are functional due to the laws of nature and dependencies that are functional if all involved agents behave rationally. The first type of dependencies was axiomatized by Armstrong. This article gives a formal definition of the second type of functional dependencies in terms of strategic games and describes a sound and complete axiomatization of their properties. The axiomatization is significantly different from the Armstrong’s axioms.

This paper provides an account of the strategic control involved in skilled action. When I discuss strategic control, I have in mind the practical goals, plans, and strategies that skilled agents use in order to specify, structure, and organize their skilled actions, which they have learned through practice. The idea is that skilled agents are better than novices not only at implementing the intentions that they have but also at forming the right intentions. More specifically, skilled agents are (...) able formulate and modify, adjust and adapt their practical intentions in ways that are appropriate, effective, and flexible given their overall goals. Further, to specify the kind of action plans that are involved in strategic control, I’ll rely on empirical evidence concerning mental practice and mental imagery from sports psychology as well as evidence highlighting the systematic differences in the cognitive representations of skills between experts and non-experts. I’ll claim that, together, this evidence suggests that the intentions that structure skilled actions are practical and not theoretical, that is, that they are perceptual and motor and not abstract, amodal, or linguistic. Importantly, despite their grounded nature, these plans are still personal-level, deliberate, rational states. That is, the practical intentions used to specify and structure skilled actions are best conceived of as higher-order, motor-modal structures, which can be manipulated and used by the agent for the purpose of reasoning, deliberation, decision-making and, of course, the actual online structuring and organizing of action. (shrink)

The study aims to analyze the changes in the status of rationality in the field of the New Rhetoric – the most influential direction in the modern theory of argumentation, which appeared in the 1960s with the scientific works of C. Perelman – L. Olbrechts – Titeka and S. Toulmin. The thesis presented is that the practices of contemporary public discourse find their most logical and comprehensive theoretical explanation in the teachings of the New Rhetoric, which change the traditional (...) status of rationality and transform it into a logic of practical philosophy. The novelties are ascertained by tracking the dynamics in the understanding of the main categories of argumentation – evidence, argumentation, deductive validity, evaluation criteria, arguments, facts, assumptions, values, consent. Perelman’s model of rational argumentation outlines the transition from logical to communicative rationality, which introduces the factors of contextuality and functionality; affirms the validity of a communicative reasonableness in which the mechanisms of thought are synchronized with the processes of language; introduces practical reasoning, which functions as a strategic interaction between logical thinking, imagination, and language. (shrink)

We combine two recent probabilistic approaches to natural language understanding, exploring the formal pragmatics of communication on a noisy channel. We first extend a model of rational communication between a speaker and listener, to allow for the possibility that messages are corrupted by noise. In this model, common knowledge of a noisy channel leads to the use and correct understanding of sentence fragments. A further extension of the model, which allows the speaker to intentionally reduce the noise rate on a (...) word, is used to model prosodic emphasis. We show that the model derives several well-known changes in meaning associated with prosodic emphasis. Our results show that nominal amounts of actual noise can be leveraged for communicative purposes. (shrink)

For strategists working in and for firms, acquiring knowledge about the business world is dependent on a rational process of collecting, organizing, and interpreting information. As such, these individuals are best conceived not as knowers, but as self-directing learners who are motivated to acquire, create, and apply new knowledge. To facilitate these processes, in this paper an axiomatic foundation for strategic thinking is established regarding the nature of the object of strategic thinking, the nature of strategic thinking, (...) and the nature of knowledge. Next, four boundary references set by these axioms are used to establish a new conceptual frame of reference for strategic rationality. Interconnections between the boundary references are subsequently used to infer six canons for strategic rationality. It is concluded that strategic rationality may be found where all references overlap. Finally, to contribute towards greater rationality in strategic management practice, an actionable definition of strategic rationality is formulated that includes all references and canons. (shrink)

Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic models for a given game, such as mutual knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we propose a different perspective, analyzing solution algorithms as processes (...) of learning which change game models. Thus, strategic equilibrium gets linked to fixed-points of operations of repeated announcement of suitable epistemic statements. This dynamic stance provides a new look at the current interface of games, logic, and computation. (shrink)