This paper aims to deflate the idea that democracy would be in essence a privileged locus of civic trust. Three claims are defended: (1) there is nothing specific to democracy regarding the affirmation that trust is required for social cooperation; (2) democracy, when conceived discursively, depends on guarded epistemic trust and; (3) popular control may require, in some contexts, institutions that express and foster distrust towards a specific section of the population. The conclusion to be drawn is that the appropriateness (...) of trust for the achievement of popular control over government depends on a contextual and realist assessment. (shrink)

The politics of reconciliation, in Canada, finds its origin in judgements of the Supreme Court affirming the objective of reconciling the sui generis authority and continued distinct existence of I...

The politics of reconciliation, in Canada, finds its origin in judgements of the Supreme Court affirming the objective of reconciling the sui generis authority and continued distinct existence of I...

This paper presents a conception of corruption informed by epistemic democratic theory. I first explain the view of corruption as a disease of the political body. Following this view, we have to consider the type of actions that debase a political entity of its constitutive principal in order to assess corruption. Accordingly, we need to consider what the constitutive principle of democracy is. This is the task I undertake in the second section where I explicate democratic legitimacy. I present democracy (...) as a procedure of social inquiry about what ought to be done that includes epistemic and practical considerations. In the third section, I argue that the problem of corruption for a procedural conception of democracy is that the epistemic value of the procedure is diminished by corrupted agents’ lack of concern for truth. Corruption, according to this view, consists in two deformities of truth: lying and bullshit. These deformities corrupt since they conceal private interests under the guise of a concern for truth. In the fourth section, I discuss the difficulties a procedural account may face in formulating solutions to the problem of corruption. (shrink)

Yann Allard-Tremblay ,Aude Bandini | : Les théories épistémiques et délibératives de la démocratie soulignent l’importance du processus de la délibération quand l’objectif poursuivi est de parvenir à de bonnes décisions. Dans cet article, nous nous intéresserons aux différents mécanismes grâce auxquels une délibération publique à la fois ouverte, libre et inclusive, peut parvenir à de bonnes décisions, avant d’envisager ce que la délibération peut apporter en cas de désaccord. Nous nous concentrerons plus particulièrement ici sur la (...) fonction constructive de la démocratie, c’est-à-dire sur cette capacité qu’a la démocratie délibérative d’identifier et de formuler, de manière épistémiquement instructive, les problèmes de justice auxquels doit faire face le corps politique. Il faudra donc d’abord expliquer comment la démocratie permet de colliger l’information et de la mettre à disposition de chacun, afin d’expliquer ensuite comment la délibération peut permettre l’émergence d’accords entre les individus. Nous verrons alors que la délibération a des limites, et pourquoi elle se révèle incapable de surmonter certains désaccords. Nous tâcherons enfin d’expliquer le rôle qu’elle joue dans la formulation des désaccords politiques. Sur ce point, nous montrerons que la délibération permet d’éviter que ne surgissent des désaccords politiques insoutenables, qui mettraient en péril l’intégrité du corps politique. | : Deliberative epistemic theories of democracy highlight the importance of deliberation for the achievement of correct decisions. The aims of this paper are to discuss the mechanisms which allow an open, free and inclusive forum of deliberation to achieve correct decisions and to discuss the impact of deliberation on disagreement. I concentrate on the constructive function of democracy which designates the capacity of deliberative democracy to identify and frame the problems of justice faced by a polity in epistemically positive ways. I first explain how democracy can pool information. This is then used to explain how deliberation can enable agreement to emerge. This is followed by a discussion of the limits of deliberation and how it is unable to resolve some disagreements. The final element of my discussion is an explanation of the role of deliberation in framing political disagreements. I argue that deliberation helps in avoiding unsustainable political disagreements which could bring about political decay. (shrink)

The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, (...) I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure. (shrink)

This paper offers a revised political conception of human rights informed by legal pluralism and epistemic considerations. In the first part, I present the political conception of human rights. I then argue for four desiderata that such a conception should meet to be functionally applicable. In the rest of the first section and in the second section, I explain how abstract human rights norms and the practice of specification prevent the political conception from meeting these four desiderata. In the last (...) part of the paper, I argue that full-fledged tolerance in the international order – that is tolerance-as-non-intervention and tolerance-as-respect – should be attached to (1) compliance with jus cogens norms and to; (2a) a political community recognizably organized as a community of inquiry that is; (2b) committed to the specification and incorporation or expression of the idea of human rights within its local legal system. (shrink)

This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistemic democracy, illegitimate laws and judicial review. I first explain how there can be illegitimate laws within a procedural account of democracy. I argue that even if democratic legitimacy is conceived procedurally, it does not imply that democracy could legitimately undermine itself or adopt grossly unjust laws. I then turn to the legitimacy of judicial review with regard to these illegitimate laws. I maintain that courts do not (...) have a moral privilege on the overthrow of illegitimate laws; in this respect the refusal of royal assent has the same status. I also explain how the rule of the clear mistake fails to restrict the action of courts to only illegitimate laws. Finally, I argue for the positive epistemic inputs of weak judicial review. (shrink)

How should a political society be structured so as to legitimately distribute political power? One principle advanced to answer this question is the principle of subsidiarity. According to this principle, the default locus of political power is with the lowest competent political unit. This article argues that subsidiarity is a structural principle of a conception of political legitimacy informed by epistemic considerations. Broadly, the argument is that political societies organised according to the principle of subsidiarity can more effectively achieve political (...) decisions that can justifiably appear to be correct from the point of view of those subject to them. The article presents two considerations in order to establish a pro tanto case for acting separately before presenting five additional epistemic considerations that establish a prima facie case for acting separately. The article then shows that political legitimacy and the epistemic aim of decision-making can sometimes be served more effectively and efficiently by allowing higher-level political units to assist lower-level political units. (shrink)

I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting. This would provide support for majority voting as the appropriate decision mechanism for deliberative epistemic accounts of democracy. To argue my point, I first recall the usual arguments for majority voting: maximal decisiveness, fairness as anonymity, and minimal decisiveness. I then show how these arguments are over inclusive as they also support lottery voting. I then present a framework to measure accuracy so (...) as to compare the two decision mechanisms. I go over four arguments for lottery voting and three arguments for majority voting that support their respective accuracy. Lottery voting is then shown to have, compared to majority voting, a decreased probability of discrimination. That is, I argue that with lottery voting it is less probable under conditions of normal politics that if the procedure selects X, X is reasonable. I then provide two case scenarios for each voting mechanism that illustrate my point. (shrink)

Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about (...) a particular state of affairs, then it might be that no individual in the collective has an individual obligation to bring about that state of affairs. What follows from a collective obligation is that each member of the collective has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective fulfills its collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that our formal analysis supports collectivism. (shrink)

La vulnérabilité due à l’âge ou à la maladie conduit à mettre en place des dispositifs juridiques de protection. La famille et le juge et, dans une certaine mesure, le notaire, en sont les acteurs traditionnels. La protection du patrimoine est une des dimensions non négligeables de cette protection assurée prioritairement par la famille du protégé, conjoint et enfants qui sont aussi ses héritiers et ses débiteurs d’aliments. En réexaminant la place assignée à chacun – famille, juge, notaire, professionnel – (...) dans un nouveau texte réformant la loi plus que trentenaire qui régissait jusqu’alors la protection des majeurs, le législateur a semble-t-il pris acte de l’évolution de la famille et d’une nouvelle perception de son rôle par les différents acteurs de la protection. Comme toujours, l’argent est un puissant révélateur de la place assignée à chacun dans la famille. Les règles récemment modifiées qui régissent la protection, notamment patrimoniale, de la personne vulnérable et qui organisent sa représentation ne pouvaient donc être totalement neutres sur ce terrain. (shrink)

Despite the subjective experience of a continuous and coherent external world, we will argue that the perception and categorisation of visual space is constrained by the spatial resolution of the sensory systems but also and above all, by the pre-reflective representations of the body in action. Recent empirical data in cognitive neurosciences will be presented that suggest that multidimensional categorisation of perceptual space depends on body representations at both an experiential and a functional level. Results will also be resumed that (...) show that representations of the body in action are pre-reflective in nature as only some aspects of the pre-reflective states can be consciously experienced. Finally, a neuro-cognitive model based on the integration of afferent and efferent information will be described, which suggests that action simulation and associated predicted sensory consequences may represent the underlying principle that enables pre-reflective representations of the body for space categorisation and selection for action. (shrink)

A key argument of Dixon et al. in the target article is that prejudice reduction through intergroup contact and collective action work in opposite ways. We argue for a complementary approach focusing on extreme emotions to understand why people turn to non-normative collective action and to understand when and under what conditions extreme emotions may influence positive effects of contact on reconciliation.

Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using (...) Gärdenfors and Makinson's logic of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that the constitutive principles are *statements* within a holistic empiricist's theory of the world. Instead, we show that constitutive principles are best seen as *properties* of a holistic empiricist's theory of scientific inquiry and we submit that, without Katz's mistaken assumption, the paradox cannot be formulated. We argue that our perspective on the status of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quinean orthodoxy. In conclusion, we compare our findings with van Fraassen's [2002] argument that we should think of empiricism as a stance, rather than as a doctrine. (shrink)

As Paulo Freire’s education theory for social change and emancipation is being continually studied and disseminated in East Asia, it has faced skepticism as some educators are unfamiliar with its critical pedagogy or education for freedom concepts. In light of this, scholars have attempted to compare Freirean philosophies with concepts in Chinese philosophy of education as a way of bridging East and West. Diverging from previous studies that use popular Chinese philosophies (such as Confucianism) to connect with Freirean theory, this (...) paper introduces an understudied but compatible Chinese philosophical thought, Mohism, for comparison with Freirean theory. Mohism is a political philosophy for the working class that expanded into grassroots movements for people’s welfare in ancient China. The Mohist bottom-up approach echoes the grassroots emancipatory pedagogy that underlies Freirean philosophy. A comparative analysis of education concepts in both philosophies reveals that despite differences in the educational content of Freirean theory and Mohism, there are similarities in their conceptualization of education for anti-oppression and praxis for social change. Implications for utilizing Mohist philosophy to contemplate Freirean philosophy within the East Asian educational context are also explored. Ultimately this paper revives educational concepts of Mohism that aligns with Freirean philosophy to a broader audience of scholars and educators. (shrink)

We define a notion of reducibility for subsets of a second countable T 0 topological space based on relatively continuous relations and admissible representations. This notion of reducibility induces a hierarchy that refines the Baire classes and the Hausdorff–Kuratowski classes of differences. It coincides with Wadge reducibility on zero dimensional spaces. However in virtually every second countable T 0 space, it yields a hierarchy on Borel sets, namely it is well founded and antichains are of length at most 2. It (...) thus differs from the Wadge reducibility in many important cases, for example on the real line $${\mathbb{R}}$$ or the Scott Domain $${\mathcal{P}\omega}$$. (shrink)

Via a historical reconstruction, this paper primarily demonstrates how the societal debate on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) gradually extended in terms of actors involved and concerns reflected. It is argued that the implementation of recombinant DNA technology out of the laboratory and into civil society entailed a “complex of concerns.” In this complex, distinctions between environmental, agricultural, socio-economic, and ethical issues proved to be blurred. This fueled the confusion between the wider debate on genetic modification and the risk assessment of (...) transgenic crops in the European Union. In this paper, the lasting skeptical and/or ambivalent attitude of Europeans towards agro-food biotechnology is interpreted as signaling an ongoing social request – and even a quest – for an evaluation of biotechnology with Sense and Sensibility. In this (re)quest, a broader-than-scientific dimension is sought for that allows addressing the GMO debate in a more “sensible” way, whilst making “sense” of the different stances taken in it. Here, the restyling of the European regulatory frame on transgenic agro-food products and of science communication models are discussed and taken to be indicative of the (re)quest to move from a merely scientific evaluation and risk-based policy towards a socially more robust evaluation that takes the “non-scientific” concerns at stake in the GMO debate seriously. (shrink)

Le constat semble s'imposer du caractère éphémère de toute existence. La brièveté de la vie nous obligerait à nous dépêcher, à courir, à construire, à jeter les fondements de ce qui nous survivra, à produire cela même qui défiera le temps en un simulacre d'éternité : l'art, la culture... Mais une telle existence - gagner et dépenser, conquérir et perdre, jouir et déprimer - il faut bien avouer que ce n'est pas une vie! C'est qu'il y a autre chose que (...) le constat de l'éphémère. L'acte le plus léger est lesté d'éternité. L'oeuvre la plus fragile accueille l'absolu. Et c'est cela la culture. C'est peut-être là ce qu'on nomme « incarnation » : la Vie faite chair, sentiment, angoisse, action, épreuve... La Vie inscrite dans les sursauts du corps, dans ses tremblements, dans ses élans. Inscrite et non pas assignée. L'incarnation n'est pas une incarcération. Elle est la Vie qui informe la matière pour la faire chair, pour l'ouvrir au-delà d'elle-même, pour l'ourler d'un débord, pour lui donner de naître, infiniment. Elle est la Vie qu'accueille chacun de nos souffles, chacune de nos paroles, le moindre de nos gestes, la moindre de nos pensées. Alors, dans ce dessaisissement de soi qui est déjà accueil plénier de la Vie se laisse entendre une promesse, autant dire un envoi : rien ne nous sera repris de ce qui nous a été donné. Toute grâce est irrévocable. Donné, c'est donné. Pour la Vie! (shrink)

De manière étonnante, la philosophique occidentale a toujours eu du mal à penser la vie. Elle a toujours eu bien des choses à nous dire sur la vie heureuse, la vie politique, la vie animale, l’éthique de la vie, la vie des hommes illustres… il lui est même arrivé de se risquer plus avant pour nous parler du vivant, voire du vécu. Et pourtant, ce qu’il en est de la vie elle-même, non pas de la vie en certaines de ses (...) manifestations régionales, mais de la vie en tant que telle, voilà ce qui pou... (shrink)

The prominent Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky and his ex-student Nicolai Hartmann shared many metaphysical and epistemological views, and Lossky is likely to have influenced Hartmann in adopting several of them. But, in the case of axiological issues, it appears that Lossky also borrowed from the axiologies of Hartmann and the latter's Cologne colleague, Max Scheler. The links between the theories of values of Scheler and Hartmann have been studied abundantly, but never in relation to Lossky. In this paper, I examine (...) the manifold relationships – similarities, differences, borrowings, criticisms, and possible influences – between Lossky's axiology and those of Scheler and Hartmann on four key interweaving issues: (1) their ontological realism with regards to the objectivity of values, (2) their epistemological theories of the intuition of values, (3) their ontological definitions of "value", i.e., whether values are relations, qualities, essences, powers, meanings, etc., and (4) their theories of the stratification of values. (shrink)

In this article, I explain how and why different attempts to defend absolute divine simplicity fail. A proponent of absolute divine simplicity has to explain why different attributions do not suppose a metaphysical complexity in God but just one superproperty, why there is no difference between God and His super-property and finally how a absolute simple entity can be the truthmaker of different intrinsic predications. It does not necessarily lead to a rejection of divine simplicity but it shows that we (...) may consider another conception of divine simplicity compatible with some metaphysical complexity in God. (shrink)

This paper assesses James M. Buchanan's claim of following a positive approach in stark contrast to the normative approach to public finance of Richard A. Musgrave. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the foundations of modern American public finance by analysing one aspect of the methodology of its two most prominent fathers. I show (1) that it is difficult to distinguish Musgrave's and Buchanan's theories of public goods along the positive/normative dividing line and (2) that Buchanan's (...) theory can also be considered normative. In the first three parts, I follow the Weberian methodological tradition in looking for value judgements in the theories, and by reflecting on the nature of ideal types. In the last part, I propose a broader interpretation of Buchanan's methodological stance within the academic context of the 1960s. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.3 (2001) 245-259 [Access article in PDF] Virtue in Aristotle's Rhetoric: A Metaphysical and Ethical Capacity Susan K. Allard-Nelson It has been argued that Aristotle's description of excellence (aretê) as a capacity (dynamis) in Rhetoric 1.9 is inconsistent with his treatment of excellence in Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, where he specifically argues that aretê is not a dynamis, but a hexis (i.e., a state or condition). (...) 1 Certainly, the word that Aristotle uses throughout the Nicomachean Ethics to both describe and categorize aretê is hexis, and he uses this word at Rhetoric 1.6.1362b13, where he says that several of the virtues, and all other such states (kai hai allai hai toiautai hexeis), are excellences of the soul. However, as part of his discussion of the ethical aspects of oratory, Aristotle states that aretê is "a capacity (dynamis) of providing and preserving good things, and a capacity of conferring many great benefits (euergetikê)" (Rh. 1.9.1366a36-1366b1). 2 This discussion is set in language similar to that used to discuss excellence and goodness in Rhetoric 1362b2-4 and 1361a28-30; this suggests that Aristotle intentionally identifies aretê with dynamis in this text, and, to some degree at least, with the dynamis to benefit others. In the former passage, Aristotle claims that "the excellences, too, must be a good thing, for those who possess them are in a good condition, and they are productive of good things and good actions" (Rh. 1.6.1362b2-4). In the latter passage, Aristotle states that honor (timê) can be paid, not only to those who have already done good, but also to those who have the capacity to do good (dynamenos euergetein) in the future. Indeed, in the Rhetoric 1.9.1366b3-7, Aristotle further unites the concepts of excellence, capacity, and beneficence by stating, "If excellence is the capacity of conferring benefits (dynamis euergetikê), then the greatest virtues must be those which are the most useful to others, and, for this reason, justice and courage are the most honored; for the latter is useful to others in war, and the former both in war and in peace" (1366b3-7). [End Page 245]Based on an understanding of this apparent inconsistency in terminology as intentional on Aristotle's part, I intend to argue here that Aristotle's identification of aretê with dynamis in Rhetoric can be understood within the highly specific context of rhetoric as an art as more appropriate, both metaphysically and ethically, than would have been an identification of aretê with hexis. I also intend to argue that, while certain tensions and difficulties are created by the classification of aretê as a dynamis in the Rhetoric and as a hexis in the Nicomachean Ethics, 3 Aristotle can be defended against the charge of inconsistency.To this end, then, I begin by examining the implications of defining rhetoric as an art (technê) that has persuasion (pistis) as its end (telos) and function (ergon). 1. Rhetoric is an art, and, as we know from EN 6.4, art is identical to a state of reasoned capacity to make, and all art is concerned with the coming into being of something that is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker (1140a1-23). Art is a rational capacity, or a potency that moves according to, and involves, a rational formula (kai ta men kata logon dynatai kinein kai hai dynameis auton meta logou), and, as such, it is capable of producing contrary effects (Met. 9.5.1047b31-1048a24). For this reason, and to negate the impossibility of contrary effects being produced simultaneously, Aristotle states that a rational capacity involves not only the elements of agent and patient, but also a desire or choice on the part of the agent that moves her 4 to act (Met. 9.5.1048a10). This necessary desire or choice, in fact, explains why an inference in the case of the arts (or of any rational capacity) can be made in one direction... (shrink)

I apply Kooi and Tamminga's (2012) idea of correspondence analysis for many-valued logics to strong three-valued logic (K3). First, I characterize each possible single entry in the truth-table of a unary or a binary truth-functional operator that could be added to K3 by a basic inference scheme. Second, I define a class of natural deduction systems on the basis of these characterizing basic inference schemes and a natural deduction system for K3. Third, I show that each of the resulting natural (...) deduction systems is sound and complete with respect to its particular semantics. Among other things, I thus obtain a new proof system for Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic. (shrink)

This paper documents that business ethics has positive impacts upon the development of intellectual capital. Knowledge has become the most important asset of modern businesses, and this study argues that business ethics is associated with the development of intangible knowledge resources—intellectual capital. Businesses with ethical values at the core reinforce ethical conducts and successfully build trust with their various stakeholders, leading to the formation of an ethical and trustworthy corporate culture and a positive corporate environment. Thus, in this reasoning, an (...) ethical approach to business can encourage open communication, problems solving, knowledge sharing and creativity among employees to increase organisational capital; enhance interactions and relationships with suppliers, customers and other stakeholders to increase social capital; attract and retain good talent to increase human capital. Questionnaire survey is adopted as the research method with businesses in the electronic and information technology industries in Taiwan as sample. The results suggest that business ethics is associated with increased intellectual capital. Thus, this study demonstrates that the development of intellectual capital is in line with strengthened ethics. It contributes to the literature through combining research on business ethics with intellectual capital theories and extends the extant intellectual capital literature. (shrink)

Cette introduction au dossier de la Mineure donne le ton. Non, l’avenir de l’Europe n’est pas d’être un objet politique lâche, rancunier, nationaliste et fermé. Les auteurs déconstruisent une à une quelques idées fausses qui courent le long de la campagne électorale. Non, l’Europe n’est pas anti-démocratique. L’Europarlement est le seul à être élu directement par l’ensemble des citoyens du continent. Non, l’Europe n’est pas libérale, l’État-providence existe. Mais elle doit opérer des révolutions, dans le domaine du droit des femmes, (...) de l’écologie, des migrations, de la défense, de la garantie d’un revenu. Seul le saut fédéral et l’invention démocratique permettront l’aboutissement de ces grands chantiers. (shrink)

Ces dix perspectives possibles pour l’Europe ne concluent pas le dossier, elles ouvrent le débat. Elles se veulent proposer des visions marquées par la raison mais aussi par la passion fédérale. Il faut que naissent des « tribuns » européens qui donnent à l’Europarlement un rôle prépondérant sur le Conseil et la Commission. Il est nécessaire d’étendre ses compétences à des sujets de société (les violences sexuelles, l’écologie) et des sujets éminemment stratégiques comme la guerre. L’Europe doit s’ouvrir au lieu (...) d’organiser la fermeture de ses frontières extérieures sous le joug de discours racistes. Les migrations internationales lui sont vitales, pour des raisons économiques et démographiques. Et puis, elle connaît une mutation extraordinaire de l’emploi. Quand la question d’un revenu universel européen financé directement par l’Union comme puissant vecteur de rattrapage et de fédéralisation des politiques sociales sera-t-elle intégrée dans les programmes d’une gauche européenne pour reconquérir les couches populaires perdues? (shrink)

Résumé La Russie participe à la régionalisation du monde et à l’intégration régionale en Europe. Pendant des siècles, elle a construit une réalité territoriale impé-riale, tout en entretenant des relations fortes avec l’Europe. Dans cet article, on montre que la problématique de l’intégration régionale appliquée à la Russie renvoie ainsi à deux espaces de référence – l’Europe et l’empire – qui renvoient eux-mêmes à problématiques différentes. On montre égale-ment que l’histoire et la géographie, à l’instar d’autres disciplines, permet-tent d’explorer ces (...) problématiques. (shrink)

This is a translation of the obituary that Nicolai Hartmann wrote for his colleague and friend, Max Scheler, after the latter's premature death in 1928. In this eulogy, after emphasizing the unfortunate incompleteness of Scheler's lifework, his keeping abreast with the development of the various sciences, his power of intuition, and the fact that he was a philosopher of life without for that matter having a Lebensphilosophie, Hartmann chronologically recapitulates Scheler's life achievements, beginning with his career in Jena, his interest (...) for ethical principles, his relation to the phenomenological movement in Munich, his theory of values, wartime in Berlin, his work on the sociology of knowledge, he gives us glimpses into Scheler's unwritten and still fluctuating metaphysical views, his ever-growing interest in ontological questions, which was guided by his continued interest in the problem of man, his power of relearning, and the apparent contradictions in his thought, which, Hartmann says, was primarily the thought of a "problemthinker." The original German text was first published in Kant-Studien: Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft, vol. 33, n. 1/2, 1928, pp. ix‒xvi. The original pagination is indicated in angle brackets. (shrink)

Le théisme est la position métaphysique au cœur des religions monothéistes : il est l’affirmation qu’il existe un Dieu omniscient, omnipotent, parfaitement bon et créateur. Penser l’objet de ces croyances, à savoir Dieu, suppose donc une étude des catégories métaphysiques nécessaires à l’explicitation du théisme. Loin de tout rationalisme étroit et de toute exaltation mystique, le présent ouvrage mobilise les outils de la philosophie contemporaine afin de mettre au jour les choix théoriques qui sont requis pour concevoir un Dieu compris (...) comme l’être ayant toutes les perfections. Les questions du réalisme, de la vérité, du premier principe, du possible et du nécessaire sont étudiées aussi bien à partir du contenu des croyances religieuses que de la métaphysique analytique contemporaine, en réponse aux critiques de Kant et de Heidegger. Car avant même de s’interroger sur l’existence ou sur l’inexistence d’un tel Dieu, ou encore de discuter de la rationalité ou de l’irrationalité des croyances religieuses, ce sont les outils conceptuels pour penser un Dieu qu’il nous faut examiner philosophiquement. (shrink)

The peripersonal space is an adaptive and flexible interface between the body and the environment that fulfills a dual-motor function: preparing the body for voluntary object-oriented actions to interact with incentive stimuli and preparing the body for defensive responses when facing potentially harmful stimuli. In this position article, we provide arguments for the sensorimotor rooting of the peripersonal space representation and highlight the variables that contribute to its flexible and adaptive characteristics. We also demonstrate that peripersonal space represents a mediation (...) zone between the body and the environment contributing to not only the control of goal-directed actions but also the organization of social life. The whole of the data presented and discussed led us to the proposal of a new theoretical framework linking the peripersonal action space and the interpersonal social space and we highlight how this theoretical framework can account for social behaviors in populations with socio-emotional deficits. (shrink)

On doit à l’économiste américain d’origine allemande, Richard A. Musgrave, la formulation des critères d’Équité Horizontale (ÉH) et d’Équité Verticale (ÉV). Étant donnée une base fiscale, l’ÉH veut que les égaux soient traités également, alors que l’ÉV exige que les inégaux soient traités inégalement (par exemple que les plus riches payent proportionnellement plus d’impôts). Musgrave opère en 1959 une redescription créative de considérations d’équité qui ont une longue histoire de Hobbes à Buchanan, en passant notamment par la fameuse maxime de (...) Adam Smith. La reconstruction généalogique montre que l’ÉV et l’ÉH relèvent de la justice distributive au sens aristotélicien du terme. Un critère purement formel, l’équité en matière d’impôt signifie l’égalité proportionnelle dans la répartition des charges communes à tous les individus membres d’une communauté politique. À défaut d’un consensus théorique sur la manière de conceptualiser les contribuables, l’ÉH conserve tout de même une valeur de principe régulateur dans le cadre non idéal de débats de réforme fiscale.Codes JEL : H20, B11, B12, B20, B40, D63. (shrink)

If group members aim to fulfill a collective obligation, they must act in such a way that the composition of their individual actions amounts to a group action that fulfills the collective obligation. We study a strong sense of joint action in which the members of a group design and then publicly adopt a group plan that coordinates the individual actions of the group members. We characterize the conditions under which a group plan successfully coordinates the group members' individual actions, (...) and study how the public adoption of a plan changes the context in which individual agents make a decision about what to do. (shrink)

Not only is he lying, who speaks against his knowledge, but even more so he, who speaks against his ignorance [Nichtwissen].Augustine provided the first attempt to define lies in De Mendacio. It is central to his account that lying involves being dishonest. Many still follow Augustine in this. His definition shall serve as a background against which to contrast Nietzsche's notion of lying.2 The dishonesty definition of lying claims that telling a lie involves saying something the liar does not believe (...) to be true. Lying involves making a statement to someone else and trying to make it in such a way that the addressee does not realize the liar does not believe the statement to be true3—the liar tries to deceive the... (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks represents the frontier of research into how and why networks they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the contributors to this volume devote attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network formation, games played on networks, repeated games, and the interaction between linking and (...) behavior is synthesized. A number of chapters are devoted to studying social process mediated by networks. Topics here include opinion formation, diffusion of information and disease, and learning. There are also chapters devoted to financial contagion and systemic risk, motivated in part by the recent financial crises. Another section discusses communities, with applications including social trust, favor exchange, and social collateral; the importance of communities for migration patterns; and the role that networks and communities play in the labor market. A prominent role of networks, from an economic perspective, is that they mediate trade. Several chapters cover bilateral trade in networks, strategic intermediation, and the role of networks in international trade. Contributions discuss as well the role of networks for organizations. On the one hand, one chapter discusses the role of networks for the performance of organizations, while two other chapters discuss managing networks of consumers and pricing in the presence of network-based spillovers. Finally, the authors discuss the internet as a network with attention to the issue of net neutrality. (shrink)

In the inaugural issue of this journal, David Tyfield used some recent discussions about "meaning finitism" to conclude that the sociology of scientific knowledge is an intellectually hopeless basis on which to erect an intelligible study of science. In contrast, the authors show that Tyfield's argument rests on some profound misunderstandings of the SSK. They show that his mischaracterization of SSK is in fact systematic and is based on lines of argument that are at best incoherent.

Le théisme est la position métaphysique au cœur des religions monothéistes : il est l’affirmation qu’il existe un Dieu omniscient, omnipotent, parfaitement bon et créateur. Penser l’objet de ces croyances, à savoir Dieu, suppose donc une étude des catégories métaphysiques nécessaires à l’explicitation du théisme. Loin de tout rationalisme étroit et de toute exaltation mystique, le présent ouvrage mobilise les outils de la philosophie contemporaine afin de mettre au jour les choix théoriques qui sont requis pour concevoir un Dieu compris (...) comme l’être ayant toutes les perfections. Les questions du réalisme, de la vérité, du premier principe, du possible et du nécessaire sont étudiées aussi bien à partir du contenu des croyances religieuses que de la métaphysique analytique contemporaine, en réponse aux critiques de Kant et de Heidegger. Car avant même de s’interroger sur l’existence ou sur l’inexistence d’un tel Dieu, ou encore de discuter de la rationalité ou de l’irrationalité des croyances religieuses, ce sont les outils conceptuels pour penser un Dieu qu’il nous faut examiner philosophiquement. (shrink)