Philologus, founded in 1846, is one of the oldest and most respected periodicals in the field of Classics. It publishes articles on Greek and Latin literature, historiography, philosophy, history of religion, linguistics, reception, and the history of scholarship. The journal aims to contribute to our understanding of Greco-Roman culture and its lasting influence on European civilization. The journal Philologus, conceived as a forum for discussion among different methodological approaches to the study of ancient texts and their reception, publishes original scholarly (...) contributions with a strong international focus. Publications languages are: German, English, Italian, French. As of 2014 the publication of supplementary volumes will be resumed. The series Philologus. Supplemente / Philologus. Supplementary Volumes will publish monographs and edited volumes pertaining to all aspects of the study of ancient literature and its reception, with a special focus on topics concerning literary theory, philosophy and the history of scholarship from an interdisciplinary perspective. (shrink)

In this article, I consider the standard interpretation of the superiority theory of humor attributed to Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, according to which the theory allegedly places feelings of superiority at the center of humor and comic amusement. The view that feelings of superiority are at the heart of all comic amusement is wildly implausible. Therefore textual evidence for the interpretation of Plato, Aristotle, or Hobbes as offering the superiority theory as an essentialist (...) theory of humor is worth careful consideration. Through textual analysis I argue that not one of these three philosophers defends an essentialist theory of comic amusement. I also discuss the way various theories of humor relate to one another and the proper place of a superiority theory in humor theory in light of my analysis. (shrink)

A quick look at what is happening in the corporate world makes it clear that the stakeholder idea is alive, well, and flourishing; and the question now is not “if ” but “how” stakeholder theory will meet the challenges of its success. Does stakeholder theory’s “arrival” mean continued dynamism, refinement, and relevance, or stasis? How will superior stakeholder theory continue to develop? In light of these and related questions, the authors of these essays conducted an ongoing dialogue (...) on the current state and future of stakeholder thinking. Beginning with a review of research and theory that has developed since the major stakeholder theorizing efforts of the 1990s, the authors individually offer their perspectives on the key issues relevant today to stakeholder thinking, and to suggest possible approaches that might lead toward and enable the continuing development of superior stakeholder theory. (shrink)

A quick look at what is happening in the corporate world makes it clear that the stakeholder idea is alive, well, and flourishing; and the question now is not “if ” but “how” stakeholder theory will meet the challenges of its success. Does stakeholder theory’s “arrival” mean continued dynamism, refinement, and relevance, or stasis? How will superior stakeholder theory continue to develop? In light of these and related questions, the authors of these essays conducted an ongoing dialogue (...) on the current state and future of stakeholder thinking. Beginning with a review of research and theory that has developed since the major stakeholder theorizing efforts of the 1990s, the authors individually offer their perspectives on the key issues relevant today to stakeholder thinking, and to suggest possible approaches that might lead toward and enable the continuing development of superior stakeholder theory. (shrink)

Johannes Althusius, a German legal theorist and political thinker in the early 1600s, attempts in his Politica to create a chain of increasingly large communal associations that could constitute a universally applicable political order. He founds this system on a natural law theory of behavioral guidelines. Many elements of his body of work, from its federalist structure to the granting of a right of sovereignty to the people, bear marks of an early connection to modern Western thought meriting further (...) exploration. Upon close inspection, the natural law theory at play in Politica also contains oddities and inconsistencies worthy of note. His Theory of Justice, a work on law and ethics, contains a similar theory with slight yet significant variations at the core level. Ultimately owed to weaknesses in the derivation of duties to self and a lack of evidence for the reasoning of the hierarchy of duties to others in Politica, the Theory of Justice model, though not without its own internal inconsistencies in the moral authority of positive law, is found to present a more philosophically sound model. (shrink)

The view that human law can be analyzed in terms of commands was subjected to devastating criticism by H. L. A. Hart in his 1961 The Concept of Law. Two objections that Hart levels against the command theory of law also make serious trouble for divine command theory. Divine command theorists would do well to jettison command as the central concept of their moral theory and, following Hart’s lead, instead appeal to the concept of a rule. Such (...) a successor view—divine legislation theory—has the attractions of divine command theory without the unacceptable limitations of command theories that Hart identifies. (shrink)

The meshed control theory assumes that cognitive control and automatic processes work together in the natural attention of experts for superior performance. However, the methods adopted by previous studies limit their capacity to provide in-depth information on the neuromotor processes. This experiment tested the theory with an alternative approach. Twelve skilled golfers were recruited to perform a putting task under three conditions: (1) normal condition, with no focus instruction (NC), (2) external focus of attention condition (EC), and (3) (...) internal focus of attention condition (IC). Four blocks of 10 putts each were performed under each condition. The putting success rate and accuracy were measured and electroencephalographies (EEGs) were recorded. The behavioral results showed that the NC produced a higher putting success rate and accuracy than the EC and IC. The EEG data showed that the skilled golfers’ attentional processes in the NC initially resembled those in the EC and then moved toward those in the IC just before putting. This indicates a switch from more automatic processes to cognitive control processes while preparing to putt. The findings offer support for the meshed control theory and indicate the dynamic nature of neuromotor processes for the superior performance of athletes in challenging situations. (shrink)

Suppose that A and B are two kinds of goods such that more of each is better than less. A is strongly superior to B if any amount of A is better than any amount of B. It is weakly superior to B if some amount of A is better than any amount of B. There are many examples of these relations in the literature, sometimes under the labels “higher goods” and “discontinuity.” The chapter gives a precise and generalized statement (...) of Strong and Weak Superiority and discusses different ways in which these relations can be relevant to the aggregation of welfare. It also proves a number of general results. One of the results gives rise to a dilemma: It can be used as an argument against the existence of value superiority or, alternatively, as an argument against the view that superiority entails a radical difference in value. (shrink)

Theories of superior collicular and hippocampal function have remarkable similarities. Both structures have been repeatedly implicated in spatial and attentional behaviour and in inhibitory control of locomotion. Moreover, they share certain electrophysiological properties in their single unit responses and in the synchronous appearance and disappearance of slow wave activity. Both are phylogenetically old and the colliculus projects strongly to brainstem nuclei instrumental in the generation of theta rhythm in the hippocampal EECOn the other hand, close inspection of behavioural and electrophysiological (...) data reveals disparities. In particular, hippocampal processing mainly concerns stimulus ambiguity, contextual significance, and spatial relations or other subtle, higher order characteristics. This requires the use of largely preprocessed sensory information and mediation of poststimulus investigation. Although collicular activity must also be integrated with that of “higher” centres, its primary role in attention is more “peripheral” and specific in controlling orienting/localisation via eye and body movements toward egocentrically labelled spatial positions. In addition, the colliculus may exert a nonspecific influence in alerting higher centres to the imminence of information potentially worthy of focal attention. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that collicular and hippocampal lesions produce deficits on similar tasks, although the type of deficit is usually different in each case. Functional overlap between hippocampus and colliculus is virtually certain vis-à-vis stimulus sampling, for example in the acquisition of information via vibrissal movements and visual scanning. In addition, insofar as stimulus significance is a factor in collicular orienting mechanisms, the hippocampus — cingulate – cortex — colliculus pathway may play a significant role, modulating collicular responsiveness and thus ensuring an attentional strategy appropriate to current requirements. A tentative “reciprocal loop” model is proposed which bridges physiological and behavioural levels of analysis and which would account for the observed degree and nature of functional overlap between the superior colliculus and hippocampus. (shrink)

If we were to name the two greatest mathematicians of antiquity, we would probably choose Archimedes and Euclid. The first excelled in research, the second in synthesis or system. The synthesis or system is closely associated with the theory or philosophy of that subject; and Euclid's Elements, which has been characterized as “one of the noblest monuments of antiquity”, is the best concrete instance of the theory of mathematics according to the ancient Greeks. Now Aristotle had a (...) class='Hi'>theory of mathematics, although he was not a practicing mathematician. It is the purpose of this article to show that the mathematical method according to Aristotle is superior to and more modern than that according to Euclid. For references to Aristotle's works we shall use pages and lines according to the standard Bekker's edition. By “a number” we shall mean a positive integer or a whole number. We proceed to a brief outline of Euclid's Elements. (shrink)

ArgumentThe article takes as its starting point the relationship of academic economists and the wider society. First, various bodies of literature that deal empirically with this matter are discussed: epistemologically, they range from a bold structuralism via a form of symbolic interactionism to a form of radical constructivism. A Bourdieusian approach is recommended to complement these perspectives with a comprehensive perspective that is sensible to the cultural differences between social groups. Starting from the established notions of field, capital and habitus, (...) the article then attempts to go the initial steps towards formulating a theory of the specificity of academic economics, taking Germany as its example. For that it uses and compares in-depth interviews of recognized and non-recognized German economics students. It shows the thorough interweaving of specific normative and positive dispositions into a conviction of objectivity and disinterestedness. This exploratory empirical induction furthers follow-up questions, the empirical answering of which may help to gain a more complete understanding of the actions and thoughts of economists in their specific contexts. (shrink)

We present a general theory of scope and binding in which both crossover and superiority violations are ruled out by one key assumption: that natural language expressions are normally evaluated (processed) from left to right. Our theory is an extension of Shan’s (2002) account of multiple-wh questions, combining continuations (Barker, 2002) and dynamic type-shifting. Like other continuation-based analyses, but unlike most other treatments of crossover or superiority, our analysis is directly compositional (in the sense of, e.g., (...) Jacobson, 1999). In particular, it does not postulate a level of Logical Form or any other representation distinct from surface syntax. One advantage of using continuations is that they are the standard tool for modeling order-of-evaluation in programming languages. This provides us with a natural and independently motivated characterization of what it means to evaluate expressions from left to right. We give a combinatory categorial grammar that models the syntax and the semantics of quantifier scope and wh-question formation. It allows quantificational binding but not crossover, in-situ wh but not superiority violations. In addition, the analysis automatically accounts for a variety of sentence types involving binding in the presence of pied piping, including reconstruction cases such as Whose criticism of hisi mother did each personi resent? (shrink)

This paper examines the claim of G.W.F. Hegel that chemical thinking-the method of thinking employed in chemistry-marks a significant advance upon meCHANistic thinking-the method of thinking characteristic of physics. This is done in the context of Mancur Olson's theory of collective action and public goods. The analogy between the efficiency of a catalyst in bringing about chemical transformation and the function of leaders in free human society in developing latent groups to provide public goods is explored.

Frans H. van Eemeren : Maniobras estratégicas en el discurso argumentativo. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas & Editorial Plaza y Valdés . Spanish translation, by Cristián Santibáñez and María Elena Molina, of: Frans H. van Eemeren : Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse: Extending the Pragma-Dialectical Theory of Argumentation, John Benjamins, Amsterdam.

This article presents psychophysical evidence that the Kanizsa Square does not produce an 'object superiority effect' previously reported in similar Gestalt configurations. Implications of the findings for Gestalt theory are addressed.

Each one of the five books authored or co-authored by Frans van Eemeren which have so far been translated into Spanish clearly fulfills a different role. Following the chronological order, we first have Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984; Spanish translation 2013), a book that contains the theoretical spadework in the field of pragmatics on which the whole edifice of pragma-dialectics is erected. Then follows Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992; Spanish translation 2002, (...) 22007), which is the first full presentation of the Standard Theory of Pragma-Dialectics complete with its explanation of fallacies as violations of the rules of critical discussion. In the third place comes my favourite book—Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans 2002; Spanish translation, 2006)—a rare combination of sophisticated theory (again, the Standard Theory) tersely an. (shrink)

It is obvious that the use of these various terms does not result in a miscellany of ideas such as it occurs in many New Age theories. In perennialists’ writings we have come to realize that this is not an attempt to mix traditions together, but is instead an attempt to utilize existing terminology when it is appropriate. The paper has focused at studying the anthropology of perfection in perennial philosophy. It has addressed issues such as the nature of ‘self (...) and the states of self-realization’, selfessness and selfi shness’, ‘the categories of man’, ‘the process of exaltation’, ‘attributes’, ‘qualities’, ‘rights and obligations of the superior man in traditional worldview. In various places of the paper we have resorted to artworks belonging to various traditions and different times to communicate the ideas and worldviews. They show how essential the role of artists and the art they produce is in keeping alive the reverence for perfection and continuity of tradition through their inspired imagination. The superior qualities are not necessarily those of rulers and conquerors. They are rather to be found in mythical heroes, prophets of God and sages of various traditions; those who, in Ghazali’s words, “possess inner vision”. Such individuals hold attributes of perfection; their bodies die, yet their characters live beyond time and space inspiring generations after generations. After all, to be a superior being means starting a never-ending journey of becoming. (shrink)

Israel Kirzner cautions us that, because commodity price arbitrage as such does not operate outside commodity markets, the logic of Pareto-improving entrepreneurship does not provide a “copybook example” for explaining the evolution of social institutions in general. He characterizes Menger’s theory of the emergence of money as non-entrepreneurial; by implication, while it assures us that some monetary standard will emerge, it does not assure us that a superior monetary standard will spontaneously emerge. I argue that entrepreneurial opportunities for private (...) gain do in fact drive the Mengerian evolution from barter to money, and systematically promote the emergence of superior monetary standards, though not necessarily the best conceivable standards. In choosing among potential exchange media to accept and offer, a pre-monetary trader has a private incentive to choose commodities that have whatever properties other traders prefer in their exchange media.Israel Kirzner nous met en garde sur le fait que parce que l’arbitrage des prix des marchandises en soi n’opère pas hors des marchés des produits, la logique de l’amélioration de l’esprit d’entreprise ne procure pas un “exemple classique” pour expliquer l’évolution des institutions sociales en général. Il caractérise la théorie mengerienne de l’émergence de la monnaie comme étant non entrepreneuriale; l’implication en est que si cette théorie nous assure qu’un certain étalon monétaire va émerger, elle ne peut affirmer avec certitude que cet étalon monétaire spontané sera supérieur.L’article suggère que des opportunités entrepreneuriales de gains privés orientent en effet l’évoluti- on décrite par Menger d’une situation de troc vers une économie monétaire et promeuvent systéma- tiquement l’émergence d’étalons monétaires supérieurs, bien que pas nécessairement les meilleurs étalons concevables. En choisissant parmi les intermédiaires d’échange potentiels lequel accepter ou offrir, un négociant d’avant l’ère monétaire a une insitation privée à choisir les marchandises dotées de propriétés que les autres négociants préfèrent dans le cadre de leurs échanges. (shrink)

Standard language, which follows rules of dictionary and grammar, undergoes various changes when it is the subject of literature, especially poetry. These changes, called linguistic deviation, are due to the poet’s expression of his feelings and thoughts by forcing the possibilities of language. In this direction, language deviations can be defined as the dispositions where the author goes out of the standard language, as in the examples of changes in the pronunciation (ṣavt), form (ṣarf) or spelling (kitābet) of the words, (...) the derivation of new words that are not used in the language (irticāl) and the deterioration of the syntax (naḥv). According to many literary critics such as Ibn Hishām al-Ansārī (d. 761/1360) and ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Baghdādī (d. 1093/1682), this language used by Arab poets who were not influenced by foreign languages, namely the Cāhilī, Muḥaḍram and Islāmī poets (ḳudemâ), was acceptable and it is considered as ḍarūrātuş-şiʿriyye (poetry necessities). In this context, deviations that do not comply with the standard language are tried to be explained with dialect differences, different variants of the couplet or various interpretations. However, some scholars such as Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004) and Abū al-Ḥasan al-Jurjānī (d. 392/1001-1002) argue that these usages are laḥn (linguistic mistakes). According to these names, it is not correct to explain the poets’ use, which are contrary to the standard language rules, with excessive interpretations (takalluf). Assuming that linguistic deviations are laḥn, they cannot represent a superiority in terms of literary value, but when considered as a necessity, they represent a superiority within the framework of certain criteria. But any specific criteria have been determined before about which linguistic deviations represent the superiority. Therefore, in our study, the theories put forward about the accuracy of linguistic deviations that exceed the standard language rules will be examined and the necessary criteria for them to represent a superiority will be determined. In this direction, the difference in meaning and form that this deviation adds to the expression becomes important. If the language deviation, which is contrary to the standard sentence structure, does not comply with the language rules in any aspect and does not add any superiority to the poem in terms of meaning and form, it does not seem possible for such uses to represent a more fluent and persuasive language (al-Balāgha). However, the language deviation reveals a new meaning or form that is not found in the standard expression, and if this usage complies with the standard language rules, it represents a more eloquently language. The degree of violation of the purity and perfection of language (faṣāḥa) of a statement is related to the violation of qiyās (analogy?) and grammatical incongruity mentioned in the rhetoric books. The contravention of common language rules of these uses, which are not considered faṣīḥ, varies. As a matter of fact, some of these were seen as minor mistakes that could be ignored, while others were considered as major mistakes. For this purpose, a conceptual framework about linguistic deviations is drawn at the introduction of the article, and the literary theories on the subject are examined in the first chapter. In the second part, it is argued that linguistic deviations represent a superiority depending on certain criteria by giving examples from the poems of the period of Jāhilīyah. (shrink)

Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine conferring liability from one party onto another because the latter stands in some relationship of authority over the former. Though originally a doctrine of tort law, for the past century it has been used within the criminal law, especially to the end of securing criminal liability for corporations. Here, I argue that on at least one prominent conception of criminal responsibility, we are not justified in using this doctrine in this way. Firms are not (...) answerable for the crimes committed by their employees, because firms cannot answer as to why the crime was committed; they lack the authority to offer the employee’s reasons for action. Though this rules out respondeat superior as a general principle, I show contexts in which vicarious liability is still appropriate in the criminal law, and I respond to a number of other concerns raised by this picture. (shrink)

The high predictive accuracy of contemporary machine learning-based AI systems has led some scholars to argue that, in certain cases, we should grant them epistemic expertise and authority over humans. This approach suggests that humans would have the epistemic obligation of relying on the predictions of a highly accurate AI system. Contrary to this view, in this work we claim that it is not possible to endow AI systems with a genuine account of epistemic expertise. In fact, relying on accounts (...) of expertise and authority from virtue epistemology, we show that epistemic expertise requires a relation with understanding that AI systems do not satisfy and intellectual abilities that these systems do not manifest. However, recent developments of large language models make us argue that in the future AI systems may endowed with a form of epistemic authority. Further, following the Distributed Cognition theory and adapting an account by Croce on the virtues of collective epistemic agents to the case of human-AI interactions we show that, if an AI system is successfully appropriated by a human agent, a hybrid epistemic agent emerges, which can become both an epistemic expert and an authority. Consequently, we claim that the aforementioned hybrid agent is the appropriate object of a discourse around trust in AI and the epistemic obligations that stem from its epistemic superiority. (shrink)

There has been a significant interest in the recent literature in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which is both normative and descriptive, but agent-based rather than rule-based, originating from Pierre Duhem’s notion of ‘good sense’. In this paper we present the properties Duhem attributes to good sense in different contexts, before examining its current reconstructions advanced in the literature and their limitations. We propose an alternative account of good sense, seen as promoting social consensus in (...) science, and show that it is superior to its rivals in two respects: it is more faithful to Duhemian good sense, and it cashes out the effect that virtues have on scientific progress. We then defend the social consensus account against objections that highlight the positive role of diversity and division of labour in science. (shrink)

The property theory of musical works says that each musical work is a property that is instantiated by its occurrences, that is, the work's performances and playings. The property theory provides ontological explanations very similar to those given by its popular cousin, the type/token theory of musical works, but it is both simpler and stronger. However, type/token theorists often dismiss the property theory. In this essay, I formulate a version of the property theory that identifies (...) each type (thus, each musical work) with a unique property. I then scrutinize the arguments offered for thinking that types, including musical works, are distinct from properties. I respond that no such argument is forceful and conclude that the property theory of musical works is superior to the type/token theory. (shrink)

Theory of mind” consists in the ability to use concepts of intentional mental states, such as beliefs, emotions, intentions, goals, and perceptual states, in order to predict and interpret behavior. Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have revealed a distinctive network of neural regions that is active during theory-of-mind tasks, including the temporal-parietal junction, the posterior superior temporal sulcus, the medial prefrontal cortex, the precuneus, and the temporal poles (Van Overwalle 2009). Deficits in theory-of-mind abilities, which are common (...) in autism spectrum disorder (Tager-Flusberg 2007), typically correlate with broader difficulties in social understanding. -/- Many scholars have suggested that theory of mind is an innate adaptation for social cognition, emerging very early in development and playing a crucial role in social learning and the acquisition of language (Baron-Cohen 1997). However, others have argued that theory of mind is the product of largely domain-general learning processes and is acquired gradually over the course development through social experience (Wellman 2014). A third view argues that humans possess two systems for theory of mind: an innate, domain-specific “implicit” system and a learned, domain-general “explicit” system (Apperly and Butterfill 2009). (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the relation of Kant's theory of biology to epigenetic accounts of organic generation and development. In the literature, a dispute about similarities between Blumenbach's epigenetic account and Kant dominated the debate for many years (see Lenoir 1980, 1981, and 1982, 17–34, Richards 2000; 2002, 207–37; Look 2006, and van den Berg 2009). Some more recent interpreters claim that Wolff's, more than Blumenbach's account plays the pivotal role in the development of a vitalistic conception of (...) epigenesis in Kant (see Dupont 2007 and Huneman 2007). Although I myself hold the view that Kant's position contains preformistic and epigenetic characteristics, in the current paper I focus solely on an investigation of epigenetic elements in Kant's account and compare them to the corresponding epigenetic elements in Wolff's theory. Section I of the paper is devoted to an analysis of Wolff's most important epigenetic theorems: the notion of the essential power (vis essentialis) and the conception of the part-whole composition of organized matter. Although Wolff describes the essential power vitalisticly, as a principle of life, he understands it as the cause of mechanical motions explaining the generation, nourishment, and the growth of an organism. Wolff's model of the part-whole composition of organic matter is subtle, but committed to fundamental mechanistic assumptions, such as that the organism as a whole is composed of inorganic parts. In section II, I analyze the corresponding elements in Kant's theory: the notion of the formative power and the conception of the whole-part composition of organized materials. Kant describes the formative power as a principle that causes the purposive form of an organized being such that matter and mechanism are the means to the purpose of the being as their end. The purpose of the whole is a functional unit which is in principle superior to the form and matter of the subordinate parts. The parts are combined into such a whole in being mutually cause and effect of each other and in being related to the superior whole. In section III, I respond to the debate in the literature. Against Dupont (2007) and Huneman (2007) I argue that, according to Wolff, the vis essentialis accounts for mechanic effects in matter, whereas, according to Kant, the formative power explains the intentional order (form, end, purpose) of an individual organized being, its parts, and its species. Since this view is closer to Blumenbach than to Wolff, the ongoing comparison between Kant and Blumenbach in the literature is justified. However, the emphasis on the specific part-whole composition that Kant considers to be the determining feature of an organized being can be found only in Wolff and not in Blumenbach—though Wolff and Kant describe it in opposing ways. This increases the systematic importance of Wolff for Kant. Thus, a fresh look on the historical debate is required. (shrink)

I defend counterfactual decision theory, which says that you should evaluate an action in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from, and superior to, causal decision theory, properly so called. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases (...) of overdetermination, an action can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution, an action can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. And in cases of determinism, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your action, even though your action cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict, and for the right reasons. (shrink)

Part I of this article advances a new theory of humor, the Enlightenment Theory, while contrasting it with other main theories, including the Incongruity, Repression/Relief/Release, and Superiority Theories. The Enlightenment Theory does not contradict these other theories but rather subsumes them. As argued, each of the other theories cannot account for all the aspects of humor explained by the Enlightenment Theory. The discussion is illustrated with examples of humor and explores the acts and circumstances of (...) humor, its literary and artistic expressions, and its physical reactions. Part II shows how the Enlightenment Theory meets challenging issues in humor theory where other theories sometimes falter, including issues such as failed humor, motivation for humor, tickling, laughing gas, and sadistic humor. Also mentioned are literary and musical humor and the relationship of wit to humor. (shrink)

Part I of this article advanced a new theory of humor, the Enlightenment Theory, while contrasting it with other main theories, including the Incongruity, Repression/Relief/Release, and Superiority Theories. The Enlightenment Theory does not contradict these other theories but rather subsumes them. As argued, each of the other theories cannot account for all the aspects of humor explained by the Enlightenment Theory. Part II shows how the Enlightenment Theory meets challenging issues in humor theory (...) where other theories falter, including failed humor, motivation for humor, tickling, laughing gas, and sadistic humor. Also mentioned are the Enlightenment Theory's application to literary and musical humor and the relationship of wit to humor. -/- . (shrink)

Some mathematical theories in physics justify their explanatory superiority over earlier formalisms by the clarity of their postulates. In particular, axiomatic reconstructions drive home the importance of the composition rule and the continuity assumption as two pillars of quantum theory. Our approach sits on these pillars and combines new mathematics with a testable prediction. If the observer is defined by a limit on string complexity, information dynamics leads to an emergent continuous model in the critical regime. Restricting it (...) to a family of binary codes describing ‘bipartite systems,’ we find strong evidence of an upper bound on bipartite correlations equal to 2.82537. This is measurably different from the Tsirelson bound. The Hilbert space formalism emerges from this mathematical investigation as an effective description of a fundamental discrete theory in the critical regime. (shrink)

In the last few decades game theory has emerged as a powerful tool for examining a broad range of philosophical issues. It is unsurprising, then, that game theory has been taken up as a tool to examine issues in the philosophy of religion. Economist Steven Brams (1982), (1983) and (2007), for example, has given a game theoretic analysis of belief in God, his main argument first published in this journal and then again in both editions of his book, (...) Superior Beings. I have two main aims in this paper, one specific and one general. My specific aim is to show that Brams’ application of game theory to examine belief in God is, in particular, deeply flawed in two respects. My general aim is to show that any game-theoretic model in which a human being and God are players can only succeed at the cost of abandoning the assumption that God is omnibenevolent. (shrink)

A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire (...) satisfactionism. In the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone experiences an attitudinal pleasure, his welfare is (other things equal) higher during the pleasure. Finally, I argue that any subjectivist about welfare should find disjunctive desire satisfactionism highly attractive. (shrink)

What is the nature of scientific progress and what makes it possible? When we look back at the scientific theories of the past and compare them to the state of science today, there seems little doubt that we have made progress. But is it a continuous process which gradually incorporates past successes into present theories, or are entrenched theories overthrown by superior competitors in a revolutionary manner? _Theories of Scientific Progress _is the ideal introduction to this topic. It is clearly (...) organized, with suggestions for further reading that point the way to both primary texts and secondary literature. It will be essential reading for students of the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This dissertation is a response to the skeptical threats and challenges leveled by disagreement. Any plausible response to skepticism should explain what knowledge is and explain why the skeptic’s assumptions about what’s required for knowledge are false. In this dissertation I assume a virtue theoretic account of knowledge, which is a species of an externalist theory of knowledge. I defend this account of knowledge in the face of two problems I argue any externalist must address. The first problem (...) is whether or not externalists can account for the kind of defeating evidence brought about by disagreement. Put differently: reliabilists need to explain how counterevidence from epistemic superior disagreement fits into a reliabilist scheme given what matters for reliabilists is that a true belief is sourced in a reliable process. The second problem is explaining what is wrong with what I take to be one of the strongest skeptical arguments from disagreement. The scope of this skeptical argument is modest in that one needs to recognize and be aware of an epistemic superior who disagrees with you over the veracity of some proposition. Nevertheless, it’s a skeptical argument that avoids what many think are pre-theoretically irrelevant scenarios such as cases involving malevolent demons, brains in vats, Matrixian pods, etc. The pre-theoretical obviousness that one is not in a vat of chemicals doesn’t generalize to the more modest claim that one needs to rule out an epistemic superior’s belief in theory t, which entails the denial of one’s belief that p. Chapter One explicates how peer disagreement provides arguments for modest versions of skepticism. This chapter appeals to some of the leading proponents of this version of skepticism in order to draw together the common threads their skeptical arguments share. Once I identity the common threads shared by proponents of skepticism from disagreement, I put forth the argument for skepticism from disagreement. Chapters Two and Three argue why the problem of moderate skepticism in Chapter One is a pseudo-problem by arguing why internalism is not the only game in town when it comes to making normative evaluations. Chapter Three continues to explain why the argument for moderate skepticism is a pseudo-problem by arguing how unlikely it is to satisfy the conditions needed for the argument to go through. Chapter Four propounds what I take to be the strongest skeptical argument from disagreement. This chapter shifts the problem of disagreement from internalist’s concerns to externalist’s ones. The result is a skeptical argument that avoids the problems plaguing the original argument presented in Chapter One. Chapter Five provides Greco’s virtue theoretic account of knowledge. This chapter provides the theoretical resources needed to provide a Grecoian response to the challenges leveled against externalists in Chapter Four. Chapter Six explains the role defeaters play in epistemology and what a Grecoian account of defeater looks like. Once an account of defeating evidence is provided, an answer to the question “How can externalism provide an account of defeating evidence that comes from disagreement?” emerges. Chapter Seven provides a response to the new skeptical argument from disagreement laid out in Chapter Four. This chapter appeals to the theoretical resources provided in Chapter Five so as to complete this dissertation’s purpose of providing a Grecoian response to skepticism from disagreement. (shrink)

Appendage theory seeks to identify the property of consciousness that makes conscious mental-occurrence instances conscious. For some years, Rosenthal has been proposing such a theory according to which "state consciousness" is due to a thought that accompanies, without apparent inference, each conscious mental state and affirms its occurrence. Every higher-order thought has reference to oneself as such, as well as to the target mental state. This is necessary, according to Rosenthal; otherwise, the higher-order thought would not find its (...) target, would not be about the specific mental state it qualifies as conscious. The present article consists of arguments from Rosenthal's writings in support of his theory, and arguments that I formulate against his theory or arguments. I am specifically concerned with whether Rosenthal's account is, as he claims, superior to intrinsic theory, which holds that state consciousness is not an accompaniment, but is intrinsic to every conscious mental state. Rosenthal's theory needs to be improved in the following respects among others: explaining why we do not seem able to distinguish firsthand our state consciousness from the mental-occurrence instance that is its object; explaining how higher-order thoughts find their target without any reference to themselves; and explaining, not by means of a perceptionlike process, how higher-order thoughts give state consciousness of sensory qualities. (shrink)

Since the early 20th century, advocates of public relations professionalism have mandated that practitioners serve the public interest making it an ethical standard for evaluating the morality of public relations practice. However, the field has devoted little research to determining just what it means for practitioners to serve the public interest. Most research suggests practice-oriented solutions. This article focuses what practitioners must do to serve the public interest. It reviews theories of the social contract and the public interest to identify (...) an approach to serving the public interest that will help practitioners reconcile moral obligations to themselves, their client organizations, and the public. It concludes that combining superior individual interests with John Dewey's public philosophy will contribute to the moral development and improvement of practitioners and the public. (shrink)

O sentido ontológico do trabalho e o desenvolvimento das funções psicológicas superiores: considerações preliminares Resumo: O presente estudo tem por objetivo demonstrar de que forma o trabalho auxilia no processo de hominização do homem. Trata-se de um estudo de natureza teórica, realizado mediante pesquisa bibliográfica, sendo dividido em três momentos principais. No primeiro, apresenta-se como o trabalho é concebido por Marx e apropriado por Lukács e os representantes da Escola de Vigotski. No segundo, trata-se das tensões entre a importância conferida (...) aos aspectos biológicos e aos aspectos sociais para o processo de desenvolvimento do gênero humano, demonstrando de que maneira a produção de instrumentos gesta o progressivo afastamento da barreira natural, ao passo que propicia o desenvolvimento cada vez mais social do homem. Tal reflexão servirá de base para sinalizar como a teoria de Vigotski destaca em seu edifício categorial a relação entre os instrumentos e as funções psicológicas superiores no processo de humanização do homem. Palavras Chave: Trabalho. Instrumento. Funções psicológicas superiores. The ontological meaning of work and the development of higher mental functions: preliminary considerations: This study we aim to demonstrate how the work supports in the humanization process of the individuals. This is a theoretical study conducted by bibliographic research and divided into three main sessions. In the first moment, we present how the work is conceived by Marx and appropriated by Lukács and the representatives from Vygotsky’s school. In the second, we bring the tensions between the importance attached to the biological aspects and social aspects in the humankind’s development process, demonstrating how the tools’ production manage the progressive separation from the natural barrier, whereas it provides the increasingly social development of individuals. Further consideration will serve as a basis to indicate how Vygotsky’s theory underscore in its categorical building the relationship between the tools and the higher mental functions in the humanizing process of the individuals. Keywords: Work. Tools. Higher.mental functions. El sentido ontológico del trabajo y el desarrollo de las funciones psicológicas superiores: consideraciones preliminares Resumen: El presente estudio tiene por objetivo demostrar de qué forma el trabajo auxilia en el proceso de hominización del hombre. Se trata de un estudio de naturaleza teórica, realizado mediante investigación bibliográfica, siendo dividido en tres momentos principales. En el primero, presentamos cómo el trabajo es concebido por Marx y apropiado por Lukács y los representantes de la escuela de Vigotski. En el segundo, traemos las tensiones entre la importancia conferida a los aspectos biológicos ya los aspectos sociales para el proceso de desarrollo del género humano, demostrando de qué manera la producción de instrumentos gesta el progresivo alejamiento de la barrera natural, mientras que propicia el desarrollo cada vez más social del hombre. Tal reflexión servirá de base para señalar cómo la teoría de Vigotski destaca en su edificio categorial la relación entre los instrumentos y las funciones psicológicas superiores en el proceso de humanización del hombre. Financiamento: CNPq Palabras clave: Trabajo. Instrumento. Funciones psicológicas superiores. Data de registro: 09/01/2019 Data de aceite: 25/10/2019. (shrink)

I offer a theory of advice. The theory has two parts: an account of the nature of advice, and an account of the quality of advice. In Sect. 2 I defend this definition: Advice: P advises R to X iff P communicates about X-ing to R in a manner that intentionally presents X-ing as worth reasoning to by R. In Sect. 4, I defend a tripartite account of the quality of advice: the standards relevant to whether advice is (...) good concern rational agency in general, the advisee’s particular situation, and the topic of the advice. These accounts of the nature and quality of advice are superior to extant alternatives on the basis of both descriptive adequacy and absurdity. (shrink)

The central merit of the Theory of the Complexity as a Method is the "relational thought". This is one of the distinctive characteristics in the work of Morin. The method consists of the learning of that relational thought. But the same method is not simply thought, but a general attitude tow..

En este artículo, examino algunas características importantes de las teorías de conciencia y autoconciencia de Brentano y Rosenthal. En particular, analizo la distinción entre estados mentales y estados conscientes, y la cuestión relacionada con de determinar si todos los estados mentales pueden convertirse en estados conscientes. Interpreto la teoría de Brentano como una teoría de la mente de un nivel que está de acuerdo con la fusión cartesiana entre los estados mentales y la conciencia. Argumento que los problemas que surgen (...) de la posición de Brentano son, hasta cierto punto, superados por una teoría de orden superior, de modo que la posición de Rosenthal es más precisa. Sin embargo, estoy en desacuerdo con ambos en la interpretación de la consciencia de un estado mental como autoconciencia. Desarrollo los fundamentos de una teoría basada en la primacía del organismo y su mundo vital, y de la experiencia consciente como la forma superior de la vida mental, que tiene, sin embargo, sus raíces en la compleja red de estados mentales que son no estados conscientes.In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and conscious-ness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states. (shrink)

The article critically reviews the Incongruity Theory of Humor reaching the conclusion that it has to be essentially restructured. Leaving aside the question of scope, it is shown that the theory is inadequate even for those cases for which it is thought to be especially well suited – that it cannot account either for the pleasurable effect of jokes or for aesthetic pleasure. I argue that it is the resolution of the incongruity rather than its mere apprehension, which (...) is that source of the amusement or aesthetic delight. Once the theory is thus restructured, the Superiority Theory of Humor and the Relief Theory can be seen as supplementary to it. (shrink)

This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice for decision-makers with incomplete preferences due to partial ignorance, whose beliefs are representable as sets of acceptable priors. We focus on the limiting case of `Complete Ignorance' which can be viewed as reduced form of the general case of partial ignorance. Rationality is conceptualized in terms of a `Principle of Preference-Basedness', according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new choice-rule called (...) `Simultaneous Expected Utility Maximization'. It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment. An essential but non-standard feature of Simultaneous Expected Utility choices is their dependence on the entire choice set. This is justified by the conception of optimality as compromise rather than as superiority in pairwise comparisons. (shrink)

In this paper I claim that Quinean naturalist accounts of science, that deny that there are any a priori statements in scientific frameworks, cannot account for the foundational role of certain classes of statements in scientific practice. In this I follow Michael Friedman who claims that certain a priori statements must be presupposed in order to formulate empirical hypotheses. I also show that Friedman's account, in spite of his claims to the contrary, is compatible with a type of non-Quinean naturalism (...) that I sketch. Finally I also show that Friedman's account needs amending because it cannot provide a rational account of theory change. I accomplish this by arguing for a structural realist view of theory change. I show how this view fits well with an account like Friedman's and helps it deal with the problem of theory change and in retaining its superiority over Quinean naturalism. (shrink)