Este artículo examina la fenomenología que desarrolló el filósofo chileno Jorge Eduardo Rivera (1927-2017). Primeramente, se destacan algunas características generales de la filosofía de Rivera. Luego, se enjuicia la propuesta heideggeriana de un giro hermenéutico de la fenomenología husserliana que formula Rivera, fijándose especialmente en la interpretación ofrecida de Husserl y en otras posibilidades que ofrece la misma fenomenología. En tercer término, se muestra la concepción universitaria de la filosofía de Rivera, y su identificación de los peligros que acechan a (...) las universidades, sugiriéndose luego otras formas de amenazas universitarias actuales y otras alternativas fenomenológicas para concebir a la universidad contemporáneamente. (shrink)

La teoría hegeliana de la propiedad según emerge en el derecho abstracto de la persona tal como es diseñado en la _Filosofía del Derecho_ afirma que la propiedad es la objetivación externa de la voluntad libre mediante la apropiación de cosas exteriores, que la propiedad no solamente mienta un mundo dado ya de antemano y al cual está referido el agente de praxis, sino también la diferencia absoluta entre personas y cosas y el problema protoeconómico del acceso de aquellas a (...) estas mediante actos, que la propiedad racionalmente necesaria para la libre personalidad supone el reconocimiento entre las autoconciencias, y que la propiedad, sin rechazar el formalismo típico del derecho privado, también exige la concreta universalidad del derecho público, un acceso a la misma por parte de todos y cada cual, y su organización y distri-bución universal a través de mecanismos institucionales y estatales. (shrink)

This article reconstructs Kant’s and Hegel’s moral, political, and legal treatment of tolerance in the larger context of their philosophies of religion and freedom. Kant and Hegel have similar initial remarks on tolerance, religion, and fanaticism, then seem to separate when they resort respectively to respect and recognition—they agree in the end when the former defines intersubjective respect as recognition and the latter defines legal and political recognition as including respect. All of this allows us to better understand, first, the (...) extent of their repulse of practical-religious dogmatism, and secondly, that tolerance, in contrast to violent and superstitious fanaticism, is nothing more than a peculiar facet of respect and recognition. (shrink)

El artículo presenta el razonamiento de Zubiri acerca de la plausible existencia de Dios que se deriva de la estructura del cosmos. Dicho razonamiento, que muestra una faceta poco conocida de la fi losofía de la religión de este autor, aborda una de las cuestiones más espinosas de la historia de la filosofía, recurriendo expresamente al modelo estándar del universo que se ha forjado la astrofísica y aplicando varias de las categorías características de la metafísica elaborada por el propio Zubiri. (...) We expound Zubiri's argument for the plausible existence of God, based on the structure of the universe. This argument, which displays a not very well known aspect of Zubiri's philosophy of religion, tackles one of the thorniest subjects in the history of philosophy. It resorts specifi cally to the standard model of the universe developed in 20th century astrophysics, while applying many of the categories which are characteristic of Zubiri's metaphysics. (shrink)

Antonio González has developed a philosophical and theological approach about the notions of acts and things, specially in regard to his moral, social and political dimensions. His phenomenological philosophy is elaborated through intellectual combat with phaenomena, problems and aporias, not that much by means of interpretation of other works. Thence he extracts an idea of religion and a theology whose core is the liberation of the retribution, of the condemnation of poor and sinners, of the ecclesiastical Constantinianism, of the state (...) violence. In these pages I try to identify and even to criticize the phenomenology of the author so much respect to the acts and what in them emerge, as regarding the possibilities that it opens to the philosophical conceptualization of religions and to the political-theological character of Christianity. (shrink)

Este trabajo muestra cómo es que Zubiri discutió a lo largo de su extensa obra —incorporando textos y cursos suyos recientemente editados— que exista una presunción intelectual en favor del ateísmo y en cambio sugirió que este está en idéntica posición intelectiva que el teísmo y el agnosticismo, para lo cual se reconstruyen en la filosofía madura de Zubiri sus análisis tanto del logos ateo como de la razón del ateísmo y se añaden finalmente algunas perspectivas especialmente práctico-políticas de prolongar (...) esta filosofía del ateísmo. (shrink)

RESUMEN Algunos textos de Abelardo, Tomás de Aquino, Llull y el Cusano, no solo muestran una forma específicamente medieval de encarar la diversidad interreligiosa, sino aun algo más, a saber, que las apreciables diferencias políticas y epistémicas que separan al medioevo de la modernidad no implican que la tolerancia sea una noción propiamente moderna, ni que su versión medieval resulte ajena a cierta admisión de la libertad religiosa y de la pluralidad en la verdad. ABSTRACT The examination of texts by (...) Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Llull, and Nicholas of Cusa shows that they do not merely reflect a specifically medieval way of addressing interreligious diversity. Rather, it shows that the significant political and epistemic differences separating the Middle Ages from Modernity do not imply that tolerance is a specifically modern concept, and that the medieval version of tolerance allows for a certain degree of religious freedom and pluralism regarding truth. RESUMO Alguns textos de Abelardo, Tomás de Aquino, Llull e Nicolau de Cusa não somente mostram uma forma especificamente medieval de encarar a diversidade inter-religiosa, mas também algo mais: as apreciáveis diferenças políticas e epistêmicas que separam a Idade Média da Modernidade não implicam que a tolerância seja uma noção propriamente moderna, nem que sua versão medieval acabe sendo alheia a certa admissão da liberdade religiosa e da pluralidade na verdade. (shrink)

El artículo, que supone una determinada interpretación de la filosofía de la religión de Zubiri, intenta reconstruir el hipotético diálogo de ella con la filosofía analítica de la religión. así, primeramente, expone las varias coincidencias de ambas en torno a la cuestión del significado del lenguaje religioso. Enseguida, muestra tanto sus acuerdos como sus divergencias en lo que toca a la racionalidad de las creencias religiosas. Y dentro de esto último, por fin, sugiere que para las dos la teología filosófica (...) y la teodicea constituyen un terreno imprescindible para cualquier filosofía de la religión que pretenda ser rigurosa y actual. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the relationship of (...) ethics to politics, from the priority of legitimacy over justice and from the nature of political judgement. Next, we ask to what extent realism is a methodological approach as opposed to a substantive political position and so discuss the relationship between realism and a few such positions. We close by pointing out the links between contemporary realism and the realist strand that runs through much of the history of Western political thought. (shrink)

Political realism is characterised by fidelity to the facts of politics and a refusal to derive political judgments from pre- political moral commitments. Even when they are not taken to make normative theorising impossible or futile, those characteristics are often thought to engender a conservative slant, or at least a tendency to prefer incremental reformism to radicalism. I resist those claims by distinguishing between three variants of realism—ordorealism, contextual realism, and radical realism—and contrasting them with both non-ideal theory and utopianism. (...) I then develop a version of radical realism as a form of debunking and vindicatory genealogy. Even though this new approach eschews both feasibility constraints (unlike non-ideal theory) and prescriptions about the ideal society (unlike utopianism), I show how it has more radical potential than morality-driven (and hence often ideological) political theory, and how it supports both open-ended, radical social critique and concrete forms of prefigurative political action. (shrink)

Could the notion of compromise help us overcoming – or at least negotiating – the frequent tension, in normative political theory, between the realistic desideratum of peaceful coexistence and the idealistic desideratum of justice? That is to say, an analysis of compromise may help us moving beyond the contrast between two widespread contrasting attitudes in contemporary political philosophy: ‘fiat iustitia, pereat mundus’ on the one side, ‘salus populi suprema lex’ on the other side. More specifically, compromise may provide the backbone (...) of a conception of legitimacy that mediates between idealistic (or moralistic) and realistic (or pragmatic) desiderata of political theory, i.e. between the aspiration to peace and the aspiration to justice. In other words, this paper considers whether an account of compromise could feature in a viable realistic conception of political legitimacy, in much the same way in which consensus features in more idealistic conceptions of legitimacy (a move that may be attributed to some realist theorists, especially Bernard Williams). My conclusions, however, are largely sceptical: I argue that grounding legitimacy in any kind of normatively salient agreement does require the trappings of idealistic political philosophy, for better or – in my view – worse. (shrink)

This is a response to Erman and Moller's response to our reply to their 'Political Legitimacy in the Real Normative World', both also in this journal.

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the Cold War but also the rise of a melancholic vision of history as a series of losses. For the political left, the cause lost was communism, and this trauma determined how leftists wrote the next chapter in their political struggle and how they have thought about their past since. Throughout the twentieth century, argues Left-Wing Melancholia, from classical Marxism to psychoanalysis to the advent of critical theory, a culture of (...) defeat and its emotional overlay of melancholy have characterized the leftist understanding of the political in history and in theoretical critique. Drawing on a vast and diverse archive in theory, testimony, and image and on such thinkers as Karl Marx, Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, and others, the intellectual historian Enzo Traverso explores the varying nature of left melancholy as it has manifested in a feeling of guilt for not sufficiently challenging authority, in a fear of surrendering in disarray and resignation, in mourning the human costs of the past, and in a sense of failure for not realizing utopian aspirations. Yet hidden within this melancholic tradition are the resources for a renewed challenge to prevailing regimes of historicity, a passion that has the power to reignite the dialectic of revolutionary thought. (shrink)

In November 2020, the world received the good news that some vaccine candidates were highly effective at preventing COVID-19. Yet, the demand for COVID-19 vaccines within the global free market has led wealthy nations to procure most of the vaccine supply, leaving low- and middle-income countries in dire circumstances. This article considers the morality of our global procurement strategies and argues that, although what we are witnessing may be adhering to the parameters set out in global business and global politics, (...) it nonetheless has moral deficiencies.RésuméEn novembre 2020, le monde a reçu la bonne nouvelle que certains vaccins candidats étaient très efficaces pour prévenir la COVID-19. Pourtant, la demande de vaccins COVID-19 sur le marché libre mondial a conduit les pays riches à se procurer la majeure partie de l'approvisionnement en vaccins, laissant les pays à revenus faible et intermédiaire dans des circonstances désastreuses. Cet article examine la moralité de nos stratégies d'approvisionnement mondiales et soutient que, bien que ce à quoi nous assistons puisse adhérer aux paramètres définis dans le commerce international et la politique mondiale, la situation présente néanmoins des lacunes morales. (shrink)

We integrate dualistic conceptions of the real with Peirce's perspectives about reality and abduction, emphasizing the concept of reason underlying Peirce's thoughts. Peirce's abduction is related to the notions of retrogression and grounding in Hegel, later re-encountered in Hansonian-abduction. Abduction in turn is considered in relation to abstraction acquiring its fullest sense as a stage in the process of producing a theory. The process is iterative and self improving, it incorporates ``turbid thinking'' making it increasingly ``clear'' at successive iterations that (...) incorporate the lessons taught by failed predictions, i.e., refutations. The cycle of thoughts promoted by doubts comes to rest when belief is reached. We discuss how this coming to rest depends on a criterion for cessation of doubts. The observation is illustrated with two different criteria, one proposed by Mach that only demands analogy and the criteria of dualists such as Goethe and Whewell that inspire the present work. Hence, it is possible to produce, and socially accept, imperfect theories unless we demand the highest level of rationality, avoiding any leftover of the turbid thoughts that have been used in the early developments. This work rests upon the existence of some objective form of reason. Influenced by a constructivist, Piagetian, perspective of science, we propose and discuss a small number of conditions that we identify as characteristics of rational abduction: rules for the rational construction of theories. We show how a classical example of belief that satisfies today's most common definition of abduction does not match the standards of rational retroduction. We further show how the same rules indicate the partial detachment of Special Relativity from the observable world, a fact actually known to Einstein. We close arguing that there is an urgent need to develop a critical epistemology incorporating dualistic perspectives. (shrink)

A large number of previous reports described an effect of the pituitary hormone prolactin (PRL) on steroid hormone production by the adrenal cortex. However, those studies remained anecdotal and were never converted into a conceptual and mechanistic framework, let alone being translated into clinical care. In the light of our recently published landmark study where we described PRL signalling as a pivotal regulator of the sexually dimorphic adrenal phenotype in mouse and of adrenal androgen production in humans, we present here (...) the overarching hypothesis that PRL signalling increases the activity of Steroidogenic Factor‐1 (SF‐1/NR5A1), a transcription factor that has an essential role in adrenal gland development and function, to regulate adrenal cortex growth and hormonal production in physiological and pathological conditions. PRL can then be considered as a bona fide adrenocorticotropic hormone synergizing with ACTH in the endocrine control of adrenal cortex function. (shrink)

Junto con Rebeldes académicos de Iván Jaksić (SUNY 1989; UDP 2013) y Una disciplina de la distancia de Cecilia Sánchez (CESOC 1992), este libro ya forma parte del canon bibliográfico selecto y escaso que propone investigaciones de largo aliento sobre la historia de la filosofía en el Chile republicano. No se trata de una reseña de nombres y obras, ni de una historia interna del desarrollo de problemas puros o escuelas. Más bien, su foco, en afinidad con las obras mencionadas, (...) son “las distintas relaciones históricas entre las fuerzas del poder y las razones de la filosofía […] las distintas inscripciones en los también múltiples quiasmos entre saberes y poderes” (14-15), asumiendo, de modo más sustantivo, que “el bloque histórico dominante en Chile rara vez ha logrado establecer un relato coherente de la dominación, justamente porque es poco lo que le importan las razones en nombre de las cuales ejerce la fuerza” (41). (shrink)

In the domain in which the definition of property energy is available, a rigorous and general proof of additivity is provided. Then, both the definition of energy and the proof of additivity are extended to broader domains.

One of the main challenges faced by realists in political philosophy is that of offering an account of authority that is genuinely normative and yet does not consist of a moralistic application of general, abstract ethical principles to the practice of politics. Political moralists typically start by devising a conception of justice based on their pre-political moral commitments; authority would then be legitimate only if political power is exercised in accordance with justice. As an alternative to that dominant approach I (...) put forward the idea that upturning the relationship between justice and legitimacy affords a normative notion of authority that does not depend on a pre-political account of morality, and thus avoids some serious problems faced by mainstream theories of justice. I then argue that the appropriate purpose of justice is simply to specify the implementation of an independently grounded conception of legitimacy, which in turn rests on a context- and practice-sensitive understanding of the purpose of political power. (shrink)

In *How Propaganda Works* Jason Stanley argues that democratic societies require substantial material equality because inequality causes ideologically flawed belief, which, in turn, make demagogic propaganda more effective. And that is problematic for the quality of democracy. In this brief paper I unpack that argument, in order to make two points: (a) the non-moral argument for equality is promising, but weakened by its reliance on a heavily moralised conception of democracy; (b) that problem may be remedied by whole-heartedly embracing a (...) more realistic conception of democracy. That conception is at least compatible with Stanley’s argument, if not implicit in parts of it. (shrink)

In this rejoinder to Erman and Möller’s reply to our “Political Norms and Moral Values” we clarify the sense in which there can be specifically political values, and expound the practice-dependent notion of legitimacy adopted by our preferred version of political realism.

In this paper I argue that equal respect-based accounts of the normative basis of tolerance are self-defeating, insofar as they are unable to specify the limits of tolerance in a way that is consistent with their own commitment to the equal treatment of all conceptions of the good. I show how this argument is a variant of the long-standing ‘conflict of freedoms’ objection to Kantian-inspired, freedom-based accounts of the justification of systems of norms. I criticize Thomas Scanlon’s defence of ‘pure (...) tolerance’, Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s work on the relationship between tolerance, equal respect and recognition, and Arthur Ripstein’s recent response to the ‘conflict of freedoms’ objection. The upshot of my argument is that, while valuing tolerance for its own sake may be an appealing ideal, it is not a feasible way of grounding a system of norms. I close with a thumbnail sketch of two alternative, instrumental (i.e. non-Kantian) approaches to the normative foundations of tolerance. (shrink)

Drawing on empirical evidence from history and anthropology, we aim to demonstrate that there is room for genealogical ideology critique within normative political theory. The test case is some libertarians’ use of folk notions of private property rights in defence of the legitimacy of capitalist states. Our genealogy of the notion of private property shows that asking whether a capitalist state can emerge without violations of self-ownership cannot help settling the question of its legitimacy, because the notion of private property (...) presupposed by that question is a product of the entity it is supposed to help legitimise: the state. We anchor our genealogical critique in recent work on ideology in epistemology and philosophy of language, and in current debates on the methodology of political theory. But, unlike more traditional approaches that aim to debunk whole concepts or even belief systems, we propose a more targeted, argument-specific form of ideology critique. (shrink)

Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate (...) normative political judgments. So political theorists have to choose between principles ostensibly unbiased by our current understanding of human motivation and political reality, or principles capable of reliably generating political judgments. I conclude with wider methodological observations in defence of the latter option, and so of a return to political philosophy’s traditional blend of normative and descriptive elements. (shrink)

This paper outlines an empirically-grounded account of normative political legitimacy. The main idea is to give a normative edge to empirical measures of sociological legitimacy through a non-moralised form of ideology critique. A power structure’s responsiveness to the values of those subjected to its authority can be measured empirically and may be explanatory or predictive insofar as it tracks belief in legitimacy, but by itself it lacks normative purchase: it merely describes a preference alignment, and so tells us nothing about (...) whether the ruled have reason to support the rulers. I argue that we can close this gap by filtering the preferences of the ruled through a form of non-moralised epistemic ideology critique, itself grounded in an empirical account of how belief in legitimacy is formed. (shrink)

In many countries, prenatal testing for certain fetal abnormalities is offered via publicly funded screening programs. The concept of reproductive autonomy is regarded as providing a justificatory basis for many such programs. The purpose of this study is to re‐examine the normative basis of public prenatal screening for fetal abnormalities by changing our perspective from that of autonomy to obligation. After clarifying the understanding of autonomy adopted in the justification for public prenatal screening programs, we identify two problems concerning this (...) justification: first, the extent to which the government is obliged to meet this demand is not evident; and, second, it is not clear whether the provision of public screening is the most appropriate way to promote autonomy. Next, to tackle these problems, we focus on Onora O’Neill’s argument of rights and obligations. Drawing on this argument, we show that, in addressing the problems above, it is important to change our normative perspective from rights or autonomy to obligation. Our argument will show that since the government does not have an incontrovertibly fundamental obligation to promote autonomy, this obligation needs to be constrained in terms of compatibility with other fundamental obligations. In addition, even if a government is obliged to promote autonomy to some degree, there could be more appropriate means to achieve it than providing public prenatal screening; therefore, it is not necessary for government obligations to extend to the provision of public prenatal screening. (shrink)

This paper provides an interpretation of the licensing provisions envisaged under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 as a model for a rule and exemption-based procedural strategy for the adjudication of potential ethical controversies, and it offers an account of the liberal-democratic legitimacy of the procedure’s outcomes as well as of the legal procedure itself. Drawing on a novel articulation of the distinction between exceptions and exemptions, the paper argues that such a rule and exemption mechanism, while not devoid (...) of attractions, is not immune from the criticisms often levied against procedural approaches to the management of pluralism: it either has to fall back on substantive justification in ways that are not helpful when trying to arbitrate a moral controversy, or it appears justificatorily groundless. (shrink)

Prevention and control of chronic conditions are global healthcare challenges. Patient self-management has been deemed essential for treating chronic conditions and improving the quality of patient life. However, the current Japanese system for supporting patient self-management of chronic conditions has received little ethical assessment. The first aim of this article is to provide an ethical analysis of current Japanese support for self-management of chronic conditions with reference to international discussions concerning self-management, developed mainly in western societies such as Europe, the (...) United States. The second aim is to clarify the challenges faced by Japanese biomedical ethics concerning selfmanagement support by focusing on the ethical concepts of quality of life and autonomy. This article identifies the following two challenges: [1] dispelling conceptual confusion concerning basic ethical concepts such as quality of life and autonomy, and [2] exploring the conceptual relationship between these ethical concepts, as they relate to providing support for chronically ill patients. By addressing these challenges and constructing a theoretical basis for radical change in support mechanisms, bioethics in Japan could contribute to efforts to construct a comprehensive support system for patients with chronic conditions, which organize variety kinds of supports, such as medical professional supports, supports from patient’s groups, local community supports, familial supports, support in patients’ workplace, and supports for patients’ family members as well. (shrink)

Como as definições de causa e causalidade são estabelecidas na Ciência Política? A explicação causal tornou-se fundamental para a constituição da disciplina como ciência capaz de produzir não só entendimentos, como também previsões acerca dos fenômenos políticos. Porém, a centralidade da causalidade tem sido reduzida à questão da inferência causal, elidindo discussões ontológicas, epistemológicas e metodológicas sobre o significado de causa. Nesse artigo, exploramos os modelos de explicação causal na Filosofia como forma de promover um diálogo entre as concepções de (...) causalidade na Ciência Política para além do problema da inferência causal. Argumentamos que a Ciência Política recorre a diferentes concepções de causalidade, mas seu engajamento com reflexões mais substantivas ainda é limitado. Propomos um canal de diálogo com a literatura do realismo filosófico e suas intervenções sobre poderes causais, capacidades e tendências, as quais oferecem uma base ontológica para as discussões de causalidade na Ciência Política. (shrink)

Do salient normative claims about politics require moral premises? Political moralists think they do, political realists think they do not. We defend the viability of realism in a two-pronged way. First, we show that a number of recent attacks on realism, as well as realist responses to those attacks, unduly conflate distinctively political normativity and non-moral political normativity. Second, we argue that Alex Worsnip and Jonathan Leader-Maynard’s recent attack on realist arguments for a distinctively political normativity depends on assuming moralism (...) as the default view, which places an excessive burden on the viability of realism, and so begs the question. Our discussion, though, does not address the relative merits of realism and moralism, so its upshot is relatively ecumenical: moralism need not be the view that all apt normative political judgments are moral judgments, and realism need not be the view that no apt normative political judgments are moral judgments. (shrink)

André Gorz (1923-2007), pionnier de l'écologie politique, est en voie de reconnaissance.

The global increase in patients with chronic conditions has led to increased interest in ethical issues regarding such conditions. A basic biomedical principle—respect for autonomy—is being reexamined more critically in its clinical implications. New accounts of this basic principle are being proposed. While new accounts of respect for autonomy do underpin the design of many public programs and policies worldwide, addressing both chronic disease management and health promotion, the risk of applying such new accounts to clinical setting remain understudied. However, (...) the application of new accounts of respect for autonomy to clinical settings could support disrespectful attitudes toward or undue interference with patients with chronic conditions. Reconsidering autonomy and respect using Kantian accounts, this paper proposes respect for persons as an alternative basic bioethical principle to respect for autonomy. Unlike the principle of respect for persons in the Belmont Report, our principle involves respecting any patient’s decisions, behaviors, emotions, or life-style regardless of his or her “autonomous” capabilities. Thus, attitudes toward patients should be no different irrespective of the assessment of their decisional or executive capabilities. (shrink)