A linear order is -decidable if its universe is and the relations defined by formulas are uniformly computable. This means that there is a computable procedure which, when applied to a formula and a sequence of elements of the linear order, will determine whether or not is true in the structure. A linear order is decidable if the relations defined by all formulas are uniformly computable. These definitions suggest two questions. Are there, for each , -decidable linear orders that are (...) not -decidable? Are there linear orders that are -decidable for all but not decidable? The former was answered in the positive by Moses in 1993. Here we answer the latter, also positively. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Background Chisholm's Theory of Action Remaining Questions References.

Roderick Chisholm addressed the issue of the necessary a posteriori on at least three occasions and, characteristically, modified his views over time. He first advanced a three-stage argument that concluded that no necessary truths are known a posteriori. Without abandoning that argument, he later weakened its conclusion, claiming only that not all knowledge of necessary truths is a posteriori. In the main, this paper is a detailed critical exposition of Chisholm's arguments. However, it also picks up on some (...) suggestive remarks of Chisholm's, draws them out, and explores them. (shrink)

Stit, a sentence form first introduced in Belnap and Perloff (1988), encourages a modal approach to agency. Von Wright, Chisholm, Kenny, and Castañeda have all attempted modal treatments of agency, while Davidson has rejected such treatments. After a brief explanation of the syntax and semantics of stit and a restatement of several of the important claims of the earlier paper, I discuss the virtues of stit against the background of proposals made by these philososphers.

One merit claimed for john rawls's coherence method, Wide reflective equilibrium, Is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. The two tiered conception of philosophical method is not limited to ethics. The most detailed exposition of the conception can be found in r m chisholm's various discussions of the problem of the criterion. While chisholm's work has (...) played a major role in structuring the way epistemologists think about method, It has not similarly influenced the deliberations of moral theorists. But moral philosophers are not the only ones with myopia, For neither rawls's coherentist method nor classical moral intuitionism figure in chisholm's taxonomy. One aim is to correct the vision of both parties by expanding chisholm's taxonomy in order to make clear how intuitionism and rawls's coherentist method are related to the methods identified by chisholm. My other aim is to argue for coherentism of the sort defended by rawls against the other non-Skeptical methods I consider. (shrink)

Two theses are central to foundationalism. First, the foundationalist claims that there is a class of propositions, a class of empirical contingent beliefs, that are ‘immediately justified’. Alternatively, one can describe these beliefs as ‘self–evident’, ‘non–inferentially justified’, or ‘self–warranted’, though these are not always regarded as entailing one another. The justification or epistemic warrant for these beliefs is not derived from other justified beliefs through inductive evidential support or deductive methods of inference. These ‘basic beliefs’ constitute the foundations of empirical (...) knowledge. One can give a reason for the justification of a basic belief even though the justification for that belief is not based on other beliefs. Thus, according to Chisholm, if asked what one's justification was for thinking that one knew, presently, that one is thinking about a city one takes to be Albuquerque, one could simply say ‘what justifies me…is simply the fact that I am thinking about a city I take to be Albuquerque’. (shrink)

These replies to critical comments by Elijah Chudnoff, Noah Lemos, and Kevin McCain on my book Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition begin (after the Introduction) with Section 2, where I address a cluster of complaints from Chudnoff and McCain in connection with skepticism-supporting underdetermination principles. (These principles play a significant role in my portrayal of radical skepticism and in my Reidian response to it.) In Section 3, I reply to some objections from Lemos concerning a claim (from Radical Skepticism and (...) Epistemic Intuition) that I call ‘the Paradigm-case Thesis’. In Section 4, I respond to some concerns that McCain and Lemos raise in connection with my discussion of the rationality of seemings. Lastly, Section 5 covers a few remaining objections from McCain and Lemos having to do with Chisholm’s “Problem of the Criterion,” the comparative strength of seemings, and the challenge of identifying which seemings count as epistemic intuitions. (shrink)

This comprehensive anthology draws together classic and contemporary readings by leading philosophers on epistemology. Ideal for any philosophy student, it will prove essential reading for epistemology courses, and is designed to complement Robert Audi's textbook _Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction_. Themes covered include, perception, memory, inductive inference, reason and the a priori, the architecture of knowledge, skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, testimony. Each section begins with an introductory essay, guiding students into the topic. Includes articles by: Russell, Hume, Berkeley, Malcolm, Quine, (...) Carnap, J.L. Austin, Pollock, Nozick, Putnam, G.E. Moore, Huemer, Reid, Plato, BonJour, Coady, Carroll, Fumerton, Edwards, Foster, Howson, Urbach, Stove, Empiricus, Oakley, Alston, Gettier, Clark, Goldman, Lehrer, Paxson, DeRose, Dretske, Klein and Chisholm. (shrink)

Knowing as having the right to be sure, by A. J. Ayer.--Knowledge and belief, by N. Malcolm.--Is justified true belief knowledge? By E. L. Gettier.--The foundation of empirical statements, by R. M. Chisholm.--Knowledge, truth, and evidence, by K. Lehrer.--A causal theory of knowing, by A. I. Goldman.--The explication of 'X knows that p', by B. Skyrms.--An analysis of factual knowledge, by P. Unger.--Why I know so much more than you do, by W. W. Rozeboom.--Does knowing imply believing? By J. (...) Harrison.--Knowledge, by examples, by C. Radford.--The logic of knowing, by R. M. Chisholm.--Bibliography (p. 221-224). (shrink)

Abstract In Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa continues his detailed and intriguing defense of his two level account of knowledge that recognizes both animal and reflective knowledge. The latter more impressive type of knowledge requires a coherent positive epistemic perspective defending the reliability of a source of belief. Viewing Sosa's discussion from the through the lens provided by R.M. Chisholm's treatments of the problem of the criterion, I worry that Sosa's approach is too far in the methodist direction. As a (...) result, it is in danger of being unable to allow that paradigm examples of certain beliefs are indeed certain, e.g., the beliefs normal adults form in simple arithmetic truths under normal circumstances. I urge an approach closer to particularism that grants more weight to such paradigm particular cases. I also suggest that such an approach might actually align well with Sosa's coherentist sympathies. (shrink)

Herbert, Michael The World Health Organization and the UN reports indicate the need of an integrated approach to tackle the dependence on legal psychoactive substances, such as tobacco and alcohol, as well as illegal ones. The effective clinical and societal responses to the existence of substance misuse are discussed, suggesting that realistic, timely investment, influenced by the best scientific evidence indicating what works, for whom, under what circumstances, and an increased degree of collaboration within and between governments and their (...) agencies are essential. (shrink)

Herbert, Michael Several children are experiencing behavioural and psychological problems at a younger age, due to the harms inflicted by illicit drug use. Professor Patrick McGorry of Orygen Youth Health, an organisation helping teenagers with mental health problems, believes that many young people experiment with drugs recreationally and for fun, but the situation gets worse once it becomes necessary as a relief from their problems.

Herbert, Michael Indigenous health is everybody's responsibility. This is true from the national policy level, to state governments and clinics on the ground. Whichever way a particular health issue is approached, and new perspectives are certainly needed, the bottom line is that the determinants of health always reflect back to the living conditions, education, past injustices, and socioeconomic circumstances of the Aboriginal population.

Herbert, Michael Clinicians are beginning to understand the varied outcomes following severe brain injury, one of which is post-coma unresponsiveness (PCU). However, much still needs to be done to fully comprehend this elusive state. Current clinical knowledge is outlined below.

This is an ambitious and frustrating book. Among the many virtues which Moser claims for it are all of the following: it answers the need to counteract certain “epistemologically harmful muddles with careful distinctions and arguments” ; it provides the reader with a “forceful” reply to both justification scepticism and knowledge scepticism and argues that both can be “effectively challenged, if not refuted” ; it “solves” the Gettier problem ; and it not only removes the “normative mystery” from epistemic concepts (...) such as knowledge and justification, but provides a meta-justification which will allow us, the readers, to see why the theoretical account offered in its pages is preferable to its competitors. It is worth mentioning that the competitors over whom Moser claims his theory has a “dialectical edge” include accounts authored by Chisholm, Lehrer, Goldman, Alston, Bonjour, Rorty, Foley and Stroud. As I said, this is an ambitious book. (shrink)

Introduction to Philosophy, Fourth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Building on the exceptionally successful tradition of previous editions, this edition for the first time incorporates the insights of a new coeditor, John Martin Fischer, and has been updated and revised to make it more accessible. Ideal for introductory philosophy courses, the text includes sections on the meaning of life, God and evil, knowledge and reality, the philosophy of science, the mind/body problem, (...) freedom of will, consciousness, ethics, and philosophical puzzles and paradoxes. It presents seventy substantial--and in some cases complete--selections from the best and most influential works in philosophy, offering a unique balance between classical and contemporary material. An extensive glossary of philosophical terms is also included. The fourth edition features fifteen new readings, including work by Albert Camus, Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel Dennett, Harry G. Frankfurt, William Paley, Derek Parfit, John Perry, Richard Taylor, Peter Van Inwagen, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf. Part III, Knowledge and Reality, has been restructured and now includes Plato's Thaetetus, selections by Edmund L. Gettier and Robert Nozick, and an essay by Christopher Grau that explores the philosophical concepts presented in the popular film The Matrix. Two new ethics puzzles--"The Trolley Problem" and "Ducking Harm and Sacrificing Others"--are also included. This edition incorporates Study Questions after each reading and is accompanied by an Instructor's CD and a Student Companion Website, both containing helpful resources. (shrink)