L'exemple de Kant" s'emploie à montrer que l'examen de la fonction de l'exemple permet de situer les enjeux essentiels de la philosophie critique de Kant, aussi bien dans le domaine théorique que dans le domaine pratique. Nous examinons les rôles attribués par Kant aux exemples ("Darstellung" d'un objet, preuve de possibilité de la vertu, outil rhétorique ou encore œuvre de jugement politique), pour ensuite analyser les difficultés qu'il y a à justifier la possibilité de ces rôles dans les termes mêmes (...) de sa pensée. Cette étude est aussi un plaidoyer pour l'importance de la troisième "Critique" dans l'économie de l'œuvre kantienne puisqu'il s'agit de montrer d'une part, que c'est là que la méthode transcendantale fait l'épreuve de ses propres limites, et, d'autre part, que Kant y élabore une réponse originale au scepticisme - par le biais d'une théorie originale de l'exemple. (shrink)

Responding to Elizabeth Rottenberg's invitation to consider good signs, I first raise a question about “good” and “too good” signs by referring to a letter of Louis Althusser's that describes the risk that “too good” signs will be misread. I then turn to the distinction Rottenberg makes between deconstructive signs and Immanuel Kant's historical signs. Borrowing an image from Jacques Derrida's The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008), I suggest that we think of the task of abolition of the death (...) penalty as requiring a particular kind of strangulation of Kantian discourse, a strangulation that would reach the center of its nervous system and disarm its powers without putting it to death. Finally, I turn to a recent initiative by a Belgian nongovernmental organization (Groupe d'action dans l'interet des animaux or Global Action in the Interest of Animals [GAIA]) in their campaign to abolish the practice of castrating piglets without anesthetic, reading it as an example of a strategy that mobilizes the discourse of rights while at the same time undermining the sovereign power that sustains it. This provides an image of the sort of stranglehold with a certain lightness of touch that, I argue, Derrida's work on the death penalty prescribes as the task for unconditional abolition. (shrink)

How can one bring about virtuous behaviour? This question is all the more pressing for Kant as his definition of the virtuous act in terms of autonomy sets up a particularproblem. Indeed, it seems that any effort to provoke an act of autonomy is doomed: should it „succeed”, the act it provoked would no longer be autonomous but rather determined by something external. A possible solution to this logical conundrum is fleetingly adumbrated by Kant in §48 of the Metaphysics of (...) Morals. In this section, the parerga of virtue are credited with both leading to, and belonging to, virtue. Taken in conjunctionwith what the Critique of Judgement teaches us concerning the role of parerga, this suggests an indirect efficacy which is perhaps precisely that which is needed to provoke virtuous behaviour. Such at least is the hypothesis this paper develops. (shrink)

The author explains that there is indeed necessary that there be some reference to the unconditional, an unconditional without sovereignty, and thus without cruelty, which is no doubt a very difficult thing to think”. The two terms he uses to describe the object of affirmation further reinforce the understanding that Derrida is taking on metaphysics both in the sense of adopting it, and in the sense of challenging it. Thus, if doing “without sovereignty” is one of Derrida's imperatives, then that (...) is an imperative to do without the metaphysical fulcrum. The author purposes in what follows will be to articulate in very general terms the manner in which Derrida transformed the Kantian heritage. He will emphasize that the transformation involves both opening a different perspective on some of Kant's key concepts and developing a new relation to the methodology which critical philosophy inaugurated. (shrink)

Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction, by Olivia Custer, Penelope Deutscher, and Samir Haddad -- Part I: Openings -- 1. The Foucault-Derrida Debate on the Argument Concerning Madness and Dreams, by Pierre Macherey -- 2. Looking Back at History of Madness, by Lynne Huffer -- 3. Violence and Hyperbole: From "Cogito and the History of Madness" to The Death Penalty, by Michael Naas -- Part II: Surviving the Philosophical Problem: History Crosses Transcendental Analysis.

Marija Velinov, Foucault/Derrida Fifty Years later: The Futures of Genealogy, Deconstruction, and Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 2016).

Controlled Human Infection Model (CHIM) research involves the infection of otherwise healthy participants with disease often for the sake of vaccine development. The COVID-19 pandemic has emphasised the urgency of enhancing CHIM research capability and the importance of having clear ethical guidance for their conduct. The payment of CHIM participants is a controversial issue involving stakeholders across ethics, medicine and policymaking with allegations circulating suggesting exploitation, coercion and other violations of ethical principles. There are multiple approaches to payment: reimbursement, wage (...) payment and unlimited payment. We introduce a new Payment for Risk Model, which involves paying for time, pain and inconvenience and for risk associated with participation. We give philosophical arguments based on utility, fairness and avoidance of exploitation to support this. We also examine a cross-section of the UK public and CHIM experts. We found that CHIM participants are currently paid variable amounts. A representative sample of the UK public believes CHIM participants should be paid approximately triple the UK minimum wage and should be paid for the risk they endure throughout participation. CHIM experts believe CHIM participants should be paid more than double the UK minimum wage but are divided on the payment for risk. The Payment for Risk Model allows risk and pain to be accounted for in payment and could be used to determine ethically justifiable payment for CHIM participants.Although many research guidelines warn against paying large amounts or paying for risk, our empirical findings provide empirical support to the growing number of ethical arguments challenging this status quo. We close by suggesting two ways (value of statistical life or consistency with risk in other employment) by which payment for risk could be calculated. (shrink)

A sensibility is, on a rough first pass, an emotional orientation to the world. It shapes how things appear to us, evaluatively speaking. By transfiguring things’ evaluative appearances, a change in sensibility can profoundly alter one’s overall experience of the world. I argue that some forms of sensibility change entail (1) risking one’s knowledge of what experiences imbued with one’s prior sensibility were like, and (2) surrendering one’s grasp on the intelligibility of one’s prior emotional apprehensions. These costs have consequences (...) for Laurie Paul’s ‘problem of transformative experience.’ Paul has argued that when we are poised to become someone new, our inexperience generates problems for authentic choice about our own futures. By reckoning with the epistemic losses involved in sensibility change, I show that this problem must not be confined to novel transformations. Prior experience does not guarantee the knowledge or understanding necessary for choosing authentically (in Paul’s sense). If the problem Paul highlights is indeed a problem _at all,_ then, it is a still more pervasive and intractable one than it has been taken to be. (shrink)

Background:Nursing as an ethical practice requires courage to be moral, taking tough stands for what is right, and living by one’s moral values. Nurses need moral courage in all areas and at all levels of nursing. Along with new interest in virtue ethics in healthcare, interest in moral courage as a virtue and a valued element of human morality has increased. Nevertheless, what the concept of moral courage means in nursing contexts remains ambiguous.Objective:This article is an analysis of the concept (...) of moral courage in nursing.Design:Rodgers’ evolutionary method of concept analysis provided the framework to conduct the analysis.Data sources:The literature search was carried out in September 2015 in six databases: PubMed, CINAHL, Scopus, Web of Science, PsycINFO, and The Philosopher’s Index. The following key words were used: “moral” OR “ethical” AND “courage” OR “strength” AND “nurs*” with no time limit. After applying inclusion and exclusion criteria, 31 studies were included in the final analysis.Ethical considerations:This study was conducted according to good scientific guidelines.Results:Seven core attributes of moral courage were identified: true presence, moral integrity, responsibility, honesty, advocacy, commitment and perseverance, and personal risk. Antecedents were ethical sensitivity, conscience, and experience. Consequences included personal and professional development and empowerment.Discussion and conclusion:This preliminary clarification warrants further exploring through theoretical and philosophical literature, expert opinions, and empirical research to gain validity and reliability for its application in nursing practice. (shrink)

En este artículo nos proponemos revisar, sobre una base léxica y fraseológica, la traducción publicada al rumano de la novela de Guillermo Arriaga, Un dulce olor a muerte, a partir del análisis de las teorías de la traducción más relevantes en relación con el tratamiento de los elementos culturales. En esencia, mediante el uso de las funciones del lenguaje definido por Nord, respecto a las diferencias culturales en la traducción, nuestro objetivo es explorar las diversas prácticas culturales de transferencia, con (...) el fin de centrarse en los aspectos lingüístico-culturales, dentro de la novela mexicana y su traducción, que ambos constituyen nuestro corpus. Por otra parte, tratamos de identificar los principales métodos de traducción que se han aplicado, con el propósito de establecer su porcentaje de uso y debatir sobre su funcionalidad. (shrink)

Background:Moral courage is required at all levels of nursing. However, there is a need for development of instruments to measure nurses’ moral courage.Objectives:The objective of this study is to develop a scale to measure nurses’ self-assessed moral courage, to evaluate the scale’s psychometric properties, and to briefly describe the current level of nurses’ self-assessed moral courage and associated socio-demographic factors.Research design:In this methodological study, non-experimental, cross-sectional exploratory design was applied. The data were collected using Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale and analysed (...) statistically.Participants and research context:The data were collected from a convenience sample of 482 nurses from four different clinical fields in a major university hospital in Finland for the final testing of the scale. The pilot comprised a convenience sample of 129 nurses.Ethical considerations:The study followed good scientific inquiry guidelines. Ethical approval was obtained from the university ethics committee and permission to conduct the study from the participating hospital.Findings:Psychometric evaluation showed that the 4-sub-scale, 21-item Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale demonstrates good reliability and validity at its current state of development showing a good level of internal consistency for a new scale, the internal consistency values ranging from 0.73 to 0.82 for sub-scales and 0.93 for the total scale, thus well exceeding the recommended Cronbach’s alpha value of >0.7. Principal component analysis and confirmatory factor analysis supported the theoretical construct of Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale. Face validity and expert panel assessments markedly contributed to the relevance of items in establishing content validity.Discussion and conclusion:Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale provides a new generic instrument intended for measuring nurses’ self-assessed moral courage. Recognizing the importance of moral courage as a part of nurses’ moral competence and its assessment offers possibilities to develop interventions and educational programs for enhancement of moral courage. Research should focus on further validation measures of Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale in international contexts. (shrink)

The legal basis for processing personal data and some other types of Big Data is often the informed consent of the data subject involved. Many data controllers, such as social network sites, offer terms and conditions, privacy policies or similar documents to which a user can consent when registering as a user. There are many issues with such informed consent: people get too many consent requests to read everything, policy documents are often very long and difficult to understand and users (...) feel they do not have a real choice anyway. Furthermore, in the context of Big Data refusing consent may not prevent predicting missing data. Finally, consent is usually asked for when registering, but rarely is consent renewed. As a result, consenting once often implies consent forever. At the same time, given the rapid changes in Big Data and data analysis, consent may easily get outdated. This paper suggests expiry dates for consent, not to settle questions, but to put them on the table as a start for further discussion on this topic. Although such expiry dates may not solve all the issues of informed consent, they may be a useful tool in some situations. (shrink)

Empathy is a form of emotionally charged imaginative perspective‐taking. It is also the unique source of a particular form of understanding, which I will call humane understanding. Humane understanding consists in the direct apprehension of the intelligibility of others’ emotions. This apprehension is an epistemic good whose ethical significance is multifarious. In this paper, I focus on elaborating the sense in which humane understanding of others is non‐instrumentally valuable to its recipients. People have a complex but profound need to be (...) humanely understood. Because we respond to others’ very real need when we pursue this sort of understanding of their emotions, empathy is best understood as itself a way of caring, rather than just a means to promote other caring behavior. (shrink)

Are there limits to what it is morally okay to imagine? More particularly, is imaginatively inhabiting morally suspect perspectives something that is off-limits for truly virtuous people? In this paper, I investigate the surprisingly fraught relation between virtue and a familiar form of imaginative perspective taking I call empathy. I draw out a puzzle about the relation between empathy and virtuousness. First, I present an argument to the effect that empathy with vicious attitudes is not, in fact, something that the (...) fully virtuous person can indulge in. At least one prominent way of thinking about the psychology of the virtuous person excludes the possibility that the virtuous could emotionally apprehend the world in a less than virtuous way, and empathizing with vicious outlooks does seem to run afoul of that restriction. Then, I develop an argument that runs in the contrary direction: virtue in fact requires empathy with vicious outlooks, at least in some situations. There is reason to think that a crucial part of being virtuous is ministering effectively to others’ needs, and there is also reason to think that other people may need to be empathized with, even if their emotional outlooks are at least minorly vicious. Finally, I outline two different solutions to this puzzle. Both solutions hold some promise, but they also bring new challenges in their train. (shrink)

Three experiments examined whether the mere priming of potential action effects enhances people’s feeling of causing these effects when they occur. In a computer task, participants and the computer independently moved a rapidly moving square on a display. Participants had to press a key, thereby stopping the movement. However, the participant or the computer could have caused the square to stop on the observed position, and accordingly, the stopped position of the square could be conceived of as the potential effect (...) resulting from participants’ action of pressing the stop key. The location of this position was primed or not just before participants had to stop the movement. Results showed that priming of the position enhanced experienced authorship of stopping the square. Additional experimentation demonstrated that this priming of agency was not mediated by the goal or intention to produce the effect. (shrink)

In his treatment of the Wittgensteinian paradox about rule-following, Saul Kripke represents the non-reductionist approach, according to which meaning something by an expression is a sui generis state that cannot be elucidated in more basic terms, as brushing philosophical questions under the rug. This representation of non-reductionism captures the way in which some of its proponents conceive of it. Meaning is viewed by these philosophers as an explanatory primitive that provides the basic materials for philosophical inquiry, but whose nature cannot (...) serve as an object for that inquiry. There is, however, an alternative way of conceiving of non-reductionism, which makes it possible to tackle philosophical questions about the nature of meaning head-on. (shrink)

According to the sceptic Saul Kripke envisages in his celebrated book on Wittgenstein on rules and private language, there are no facts about an individual that determine what she means by any given expression. If there are no such facts, the question then is, what justifies the claim that she does use expressions meaningfully? Kripke’s answer, in a nutshell, is that she by and large uses her expressions in conformity with the linguistic standards of the community she belongs to. While (...) Kripke’s sceptical problem has gripped philosophers for over three decades, few, if any, have been satisfied by his proposed solution, and many have struggled to come up with one of their own. The purpose of this paper is to show that a more satisfactory answer to Kripke’s challenge can be developed on the basis of Donald Davidson’s writings on triangulation, the idea of two individuals interacting simultaneously with each other and the world they share. It follows from the triangulation argument that the facts that can be regarded as determining meaning are irreducible. Yet, contra Kripke, they are not mysterious, for the argument does spell out what is needed for an individual’s expressions to be meaningful. (shrink)

Blockchain’s language and terminology is confusing, contested, and rapidly changing. As a hype-driven technology, Blockchain is critical to an increasing number of projects that exist in a space of regulatory uncertainty. As communities of blockchain develop and evolve, the language they use to describe these functions changes. This causes concerns when attempting to have global regulatory certainty and clarity. Regulators and communities have different approaches to blockchain language, and this causes problems because of the translation between practical use in a (...) community, and the legal effects created by regulators. Of particular concern is the lack of clear expression amongst the broader community regarding the concept of blockchain-related assets as these ‘tokens’, ‘coins’, and ‘assets’ form a key part of financial regulation. This project uses semiotics to study the diverse language associated with blockchain. This analyzes a series of self-proclaimed ‘dictionaries of blockchain’ to assess key definitions, themes, perceptions, and misconceptions present in these communities. The study involved a case analysis of the terminology used in Australia’s proposed response to blockchain in comparison with that of wider communities. When comparing this to regulatory definitions and approaches, it becomes clear that this is an area that requires further attention. This project highlights the need for regulators to understand and use common terms in blockchain regulation. It is argued that this approach facilitates a better understanding of poorly understood concepts and clearly connects the law with those it intends to target. (shrink)

Professional codes of ethics are regarded as elements of nurses' ethical knowledge base and consequently part of their ethics education. However, research focusing on these codes from an educational viewpoint is scarce. This study explored the need and applicability of nursing codes of ethics in modern health care, their importance in the nursing ethics curriculum, and the need for development of their teaching. A total of 183 Finnish nurse educators and 212 nursing students answered three structured questions, with an opportunity (...) to justify their responses, and one open-ended question. Descriptive statistics and content analysis were used to analyse the data. The results suggest that the existence of the codes was seen as important and their applicability mainly as appropriate, despite new challenges posed by modern health care. The codes were regarded as an important part of nurses' ethics education, but current integrated teaching methods require development. (shrink)

This paper examines the meaningfulness of pointing in great apes. We appeal to Hannah Ginsborg’s conception of primitive normativity, which provides an adequate criterion for establishing whether a response is meaningful, and we attempt to make room for a conception according to which there is no fundamental difference between the responses of human infants and those of other great apes to pointing gestures. This conception is an alternative to Tomasello’s view that pointing gestures and reactions to them reveal a fundamental (...) difference between humans and other apes. (shrink)

Anne Conway (1631–1679) is often described as a vitalist. Scholars typically take this to mean that Conway considers life to be ubiquitous throughout the world. While Conway is indeed a vitalist in this sense, I argue that she is also committed to a stronger view: namely, the panpsychist view that mental capacities are ubiquitous and fundamental in creation. Reading Conway as a panpsychist highlights several aspects of her philosophy that deserve further attention, especially her accounts of emanative causation and universal (...) perfectibility. There are also historical benefits to interpreting Conway as a panpsychist. Through its history, ‘vitalism’ has often been used to describe philosophies that draw a sharp line between living and non-living nature; surely, Conway is not a vitalist in this way. Moreover, some of Conway’s contemporaries (for instance, Ralph Cudworth and Henry More) are sometimes regarded as vitalists, but were not panpsychists. It is important to distinguish between Conway’s vitalism and her version of panpsychism and to add a term like ‘panpsychism’ to the interpretive lexicon. Otherwise, we run the risk of undervaluing Conway’s originality within her own context and beyond. (shrink)

Although undergraduate engineering ethics courses often include the development of moral sensitivity as a learning objective and the use of active learning techniques, teaching centers on the transmission of cognitive knowledge. This article describes a complementary assignment asking students to perform an ethics “experiment” on themselves that has a potential to enhance affective learning and moral imagination. The article argues that the focus on cognitive learning may not promote, and may even impair, our efforts to foster moral sensitivity. In contrast, (...) the active learning assignments and exercises, like the ethics “experiment” discussed, offer great potential to expand the scope of instruction in engineering ethics to include ethical behavior as well as knowledge. Engineering ethics education needs to extend beyond the narrow range of human action associated with the technical work of the engineer and explore ways to draw on broader lifeworld experiences to enrich professional practice and identity. (shrink)

An important argument against removing donor anonymity is that such state-mandated policies might validate bionormative attitudes about the importance of genetic relatedness in families. Bionormative attitudes can be unjustly disparaging and harmful to a wide range of families including donor-conceived, adopted, and single-parent families. However, studies show that the majority of donor-conceived individuals want donor anonymity removed. This paper explores the question of how to weigh these desires for knowing the donor—which may be grounded in biased and bionormative assumptions—against the (...) competing concern that removing donor anonymity perpetuates attitudes that may be harmful. (shrink)

In this article it will be concluded that systematic menstrual tracking in women’s sport has the potential to cause harm to athletes. Since the ruling of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) in the United States, concerns regarding menstrual health tracking have arisen. Research suggests that the menstrual tracking of female athletes presents potential risks to “women’s autonomy, privacy, and safety in sport” (Casto 2022, 1725). At present, the repercussions of systematic menstrual tracking are particularly under-scrutinized, and this paper (...) seeks to combine novel research in the sport sciences with present ethical debates in the philosophy of sports. Utilizing Beauvoir’s feminist philosophy (2011), this paper argues that systematic menstrual tracking may contribute to the wider system of women’s oppression by exploiting female athletes, as well as enabling the internalization of submissive behaviour in cultures where athletes are expected to comply unquestioningly. Five policy recommendations are made concerning autonomy, informed consent, education, safeguarding and data access. The overall findings of this paper propose that a more in-depth understanding of the links between data, privacy, and the menstrual cycle are required by sports organizations and governing bodies if athletes are to be protected in a future where systematic menstrual tracking is inevitable. (shrink)

Through the exponential growth in digital devices and computational capabilities, big data technologies are putting pressure upon the boundaries of what can or cannot be considered acceptable from an ethical perspective. Much of the literature on ethical issues related to big data and big data technologies focuses on separate values such as privacy, human dignity, justice or autonomy. More holistic approaches, allowing a more comprehensive view and better balancing of values, usually focus on either a design-based approach, in which it (...) is tried to implement values into the design of new technologies, or an application-based approach, in which it is tried to address the ways in which new technologies are used. Some integrated approaches do exist, but typically are more general in nature. This offers a broad scope of application, but may not always be tailored to the specific nature of big data related ethical issues. In this paper we distil a comprehensive set of ethical values from existing design-based and application-based ethical approaches for new technologies and further focus these values to the context of emerging big data technologies. A total of four value lists were selected for this. The integrated list consists of a total of ten values: human welfare, autonomy, non-maleficence, justice, accountability, trustworthiness, privacy, dignity, solidarity and environmental welfare. Together, this set of values provides a comprehensive and in-depth overview of the values that are to be taken into account for emerging big data technologies. (shrink)

Against the background of a deeply uneven package of work–family reconciliation measures and an increasing focus on engaging men in unpaid care work, in this article I discuss the extension of the Irish discrimination law framework to provide protection against family status discrimination to workers who are engaged in certain care relationships. While this development of the law to recognize a relational understanding of inequality is welcome, its confined definition of family status fails to capture the range of workers’ caring (...) relationships and networks. Adopting a contextualized assessment of 12 years of litigation generated under the ‘family status’ ground, with reference to complainants’ gender and work status, the study considers the types of experiences being litigated as ‘family status’ discrimination. The study show how much of the nature and forms of inequality presented before the tribunals are beyond the conceptual boundaries of the principle of equal treatment that depends upon a sameness of treatment model with the ‘care-less’ comparator. Despite its potential to question the neutrality of workplace structures predicated upon the division between paid work and unpaid care, the principle of indirect family status discrimination has been under utilised as a litigation strategy. The most successful dimension of family status discrimination protection has been in respect of its ability to capture the negative stereotyping of worker–carers who continue to perform as ideal workers. I suggest that this extension of a limited negative rights framework, when considered alongside the state’s extremely poor support for workcare reconciliation more broadly, places negligible obligations on employers, and that the gender neutrality implicit in its provisions have yet to impact on gender equality as regards work–care reconciliation. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that storing predictive relations between two events in memory as bi-directional associations does not require conscious awareness of this relation, whereas the formation of unidirectional associations that capture the direction of the relation does. This study reports a set of experiments demonstrating that unidirectional associations can be formed even when awareness of the relation is actively prevented, if attention is “tuned” to process predictive relations. When participants engaged in predicting targets based on cues in an unrelated (...) task before the actual acquisition phase, unidirectional associations were formed during this acquisition phase even though E1 was presented subliminally. This suggests that although processing the relation between events may often be accompanied by awareness of this relation, awareness is not a prerequisite for the formation of unidirectional associations. (shrink)

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke articulates a form of scepticism about meaning. Even though there is considerable disagreement among critics about the reasoning in which the sceptic engages, there is little doubt that he seeks to offer constraints for an adequate account of the facts that constitute the meaningfulness of expressions. Many of the sceptic's remarks concern the nature of the guidance involved in a speaker's meaningful uses of expressions. I propose that we understand those remarks (...) as seeking to give shape to the idea that to use an expression under the guidance of one's understanding is to have a reason for that use, which one's understanding allows one to discern and act on. Any philosophical elucidation of meaning must adequately capture the rational nature of our linguistic acts. (shrink)

Technological developments increasingly enable monitoring and steering the behavior of individuals. Enforcement of the law by means of technology can be much more effective and pervasive than enforcement by humans, such as law enforcement officers. However, it can also bypass legislators and courts and minimize any room for civil disobedience. This significantly reduces the options to challenge legal rules. This, in turn, can impede the development of legal systems. In this paper, an analogy is made with evolutionary biology to illustrate (...) that the possibility to deviate from legal rules and existing norms is sometimes necessary for the further development of legal systems. Some room to break the law, for instance, through civil disobedience or imperfect enforcement of the law, will ensure sufficient variation. This allows for properly evolving legal systems that can continue to provide fair solutions, even when society and concepts of fairness further develop. (shrink)