Journal of Mathematical Logic, Ahead of Print. Given a structure [math] and a stably embedded [math]-definable set [math], we prove tameness preservation results when enriching the induced structure on [math] by some further structure [math]. In particular, we show that if [math] and [math] are stable (respectively, superstable, [math]-stable), then so is the theory [math] of the enrichment of [math] by [math]. Assuming simplicity of [math], elimination of hyperimaginaries and a further condition on [math] related to the behavior of algebraic (...) closure, we also show that simplicity and NSOP1 pass from [math] to [math]. We then prove several applications for tame expansions of weakly minimal structures and, in particular, the group of integers. For example, we construct the first known examples of strictly stable expansions of [math]. More generally, we show that any stable (respectively, superstable, simple, NIP, NTP2, NSOP1) countable graph can be defined in a stable (respectively, superstable, simple, NIP, NTP2, NSOP1) expansion of [math] by some unary predicate [math]. (shrink)

Wiplinger, F. Metaphysik, Logik, Sprachkritik.--Mück, O. Wahrheit und Verifikation.--Strasser, S. Zur Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit.--Rivera de Ventosa, E. Dialektik und Dialog.--Schöndorfer, U. Ganzheitliche Erkenntnistheorie.--Lotz, J. B. Denken als Vollzug im Ganzen.--Benedikt, M. Orientierung und Architektonik.--Schaff, A. Ein Marxist liest die Integrale Logik.--Ricoeur, P. Wissenschaft und Ideologie.--Kohlenberger, H. Geschichtsprozess als Integration.--Huber, G. Zur Grundproblematik der philosophischen Anthropologie.--Wisser, R. Schöpfung und Schöpfertum in der Philosophie.--Verosta, S. Zum Verhältnis von Ordnung und Macht.--Schneider, H. Politische Ethik in der gegenwärtigen Normenkrise.

Dieser Band präsentiert, gemeinsam mit anderen Beiträgen, die anlässlich der Gedenkfeier zum 100. Geburtstag von Leo Gabriel gehaltenen Vorträge am Institut für Philosophie der Universität Wien. Lange vor den gegenwärtigen Bestrebungen zu einer europäischen Integration hat Gabriel die Entwicklung der geistigen Gestalten Europas und das Verhältnis von Einheit und Vielheit integrativ zu erfassen versucht. Die Autorinnen und Autoren erörtern die Quellen sowie die Aktualität des integralen Denkens und vergleichen es mit phänomenologisch-existentialistischen, hermeneutischen, strukturalistischen und postmodernen Theorien. Überdies beinhaltet (...) der Band Zeugnisse und unveröffentlichte Manuskripte von Leo Gabriel. Aus dem Inhalt: Peter Kampits: Vorwort - Yvanka B. Raynova: Einleitung: Verantwortung für das Ganze - Leo Gabriel: Gestalten und Strukturen des integrativen Denkens - Leo Gabriel: Wissenschaft und Wertordnung (Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript) - Leo Gabriel Jr.: Von der Suche nach dem Ganzen zur Sucht nach Veränderung - Augustinus Karl Wucherer-Huldenfeld: Zur Aktualität des integralen Denkens Leo Gabriels - Sigrid Pöllinger: Wladimir S. Solowjew und der Begriff der All-Einheit - Günther Pöltner: Radikale Pluralität. Zur Problematik eines postmodernen Paradigmas - Yvanka B. Raynova: Integrales Denken im europäischen Kontext: Gabriel - Heidegger - Ricoeur - Roland Faber: "Insistenz". Zum "Nicht-Sein" Gottes bei Levinas, Deleuze und Whitehead - Rolf Kühn: Sinnlichkeit als Offenbarung. Eine phänomenologische Analyse zum Denken Simone Weils - Karl Baier: Der Mensch als Person und Anatman. Überlegungen zu einer Grundfrage im buddhistisch-christlichen Dialog - Werner Gabriel: Philosophisches Denken als Weg der Erlösung. Ein interkultureller Vergleich - Arno Böhler: Über die Dummheit: Einblick in den Abgrund des Denkens - Jürgen Trinks: Das offene Feld der Phantasie und die Fallstricke der Einbildung - Laurie Calhoun: The Paradox of Love and the Paradox of Morality: Triangular Reflections in Carol Reed's "The Third Man" - Yvanka B. Raynova: Leo Gabriel: Eine ausgewählte Bibliographie. (shrink)

Continuous culture techniques were developed in the early twentieth century to replace cumbersome studies of cell growth in batch cultures. In contrast to batch cultures, they constituted an open concept, as cells are forced to proliferate by adding new medium while cell suspension is constantly removed. During the 1940s and 1950s new devices have been designed—called “automatic syringe mechanism,” “turbidostat,” “chemostat,” “bactogen,” and “microbial auxanometer”—which allowed increasingly accurate quantitative measurements of bacterial growth. With these devices cell growth came under the (...) external control of the experimenters and thus accessible for developing a mathematical theory of growth kinetics—developed mainly by Jacques Monod, Aron Novick and Leo Szilard in the early 1950s and still in use today. The paper explores the development of continuous culture devices and claims that these devices are simulators for standard cells following specific requirements, in particular involving mathematical constraints in the design and setting of the devices as well as experiments. These requirements have led to contemporary designs of continuous culture techniques realizing a specific event-based flow algorithm able to simulate directed evolution and produce artificial cells and microorganisms. This current development is seen as an alternative approach to today’s synthetic biology. (shrink)

Die nicht zuletzt im Zuge der Deklaration eines,,nachmetaphysischen Zeitalters" für überzogen gehaltenen epistemologischen Ansprüche der klassischen Metaphysik scheinen sich auch und vor allem in der Auseinandersetzung mit skeptischen Argumenten bzw. Paradoxien tatsächlich als unhaltbar herauszustellen. Wenn sich bereits alltägliche Wissensansprüche unter dem Seziermesser skeptischen Scharfsinns als insgesamt problematische Klasse entlarven lassen, wie sollte man dann noch sinnvoll Metaphysik betreiben können? Doch der Anschein trügt, wie die Beiträge des vorliegenden Sammelbandes ausführlich darlegen. Dieses Buch reagiert damit auf einen aktuellen internationalen Trend, (...) denn neueste Arbeiten auf dem Gebiet der theoretischen Diagnose des Ursprungs skeptischer Argumente bzw. Paradoxien zeigen deutlich, dass gerade den dominanten neuzeitlichen Formulierungen skeptischer Probleme metaphysische Voraussetzungen zugrunde liegen, die von den großen Projekten der Metaphysik, die im Buch zur Sprache kommen, nicht geteilt werden. MIT BEITRÄGEN VON: Jarnes Conant, Michael Forster, Paul Franks, Hans Friedrich Fulda, Markus Gabriel, Leo Groarke, Jens Halfwassen, Anton Friedrich Koch, Dominik Perler, Jens Rometsch, Klaus Vieweg, Jörg Volbers, Michael Williams und Stephan Zimmermann. (shrink)

Leo Strauss’s _The Political Philosophy of Hobbes_ deservedly ranks among his most widely acclaimed works. In it Strauss argues that the basis for Hobbes’s natural and political science is his interest in “self-knowledge of man as he really is.” The writings collected in this book, each written prior to that classic volume, complement that account. Thus at long last, this book allows us to have a complete picture of Strauss’s interpretation of Hobbes, the thinker pivotal to the fundamental theme of (...) his life’s work: the conflicting demands of philosophy and revelation, or as he termed it, “the theologico-political problem.” It is no exaggeration to say that Strauss’s work on Hobbes’s critique of religion is essential to his analysis of Hobbes’s political philosophy, and vice versa. This volume will spark new interest in Hobbes’s explication of the Bible and in his understanding of religion by revealing previously neglected dimensions and motives of Hobbes’s “theology.” At the same time, scholars interested in the intellectual development of Leo Strauss will find in these writings the missing link, as it were, between his two early books,_ __Spinoza’s Critique of Religion_ and _The Political Philosophy of Hobbes_. In addition, this volume makes available for the first time in English a letter, a book outline, an extended review, an engagement with legal positivism, and an account of Strauss’s work on Hobbes by Heinrich Meier, all of which shed light on Strauss’s concerns and his approach to Hobbes in particular, as well as to modern political thought and life. (shrink)

No decorrer do debate sobre o realismo científico, alguns antirrealistas, tal como Leo Tolstói e Larry Laudan, criaram um desafio cético para os realistas, questionando, com base na história da ciência, a crença realista de continuidade entre as teorias do passado, atuais e futuras. Stathis Psillos ofereceu uma réplica que ficou conhecida como realismo seletivo ou divide et impera, alegando que, através de um minucioso exame, podemos encontrar elementos teóricos de continuidade entre teorias passadas e atuais, assegurando, por analogia, que (...) as teorias futuras também possuirão elementos de continuidade com as atuais. A estratégia de Psillos, se bem empregada, pode evidenciar que a leitura realista de história da ciência também possui suas virtudes e deve ser considerada. Todavia, no presente artigo, argumentamos que mesmo que o realismo seletivo de Psillos se mostre aplicável, ele deve ser considerado como uma crítica a concepções descontinuístas em história da ciência e não necessariamente ao antirrealismo científico em geral, posto que o empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen, por exemplo, admite a continuidade teórica na ciência. (shrink)

Gottlob Frege lehrte 44 Jahre in Jena als Dozent der Mathematik, aber bisher ist sehr wenig über seine beruflichen, philosophischen und persönlichen Umstände in dieser Zeit bekannt. Dieser Band stellt den Stand der Forschung auf diesem Gebiet vor: Er beginnt mit der Frage, wie Frege aus seiner Heimatstadt Wismar in Mecklenburg überhaupt nach Jena kam (durch Vermittlung des Mathematiklehrers Leo Sachse, später ein Beispielname in Freges Schriften), und setzt sich mit der Frage fort, wie er sich dort im Umfeld der (...) Universität etablierte (mit seinem Mathematikerkollegen J. Thomae und im Umkreis seines Lehrers und Förderers Ernst Abbe, des Gründers der Zeiss-Stiftung). Beleuchtet wird Freges Stellung in der Mathematik seiner Zeit, aber auch sein Verhältnis zu seinem philosophischen Kollegen R. Eucken, das mit zwei erstmals gedruckten Grußkarten Freges dokumentiert wird. Erstmals dargestellt wird auch, wie Frege zu seinem Adoptivsohn (und späteren Erben) Alfred kam und was er für ihn getan hat. Weitere Themen sind Freges Rezeption des Mathematikers Hankel; einige Mißverständnisse des Neukantianers Natorp bezüglich Freges Definition der Zahl; der Gegenstand der "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik", sowie die ursprüngliche Absicht, die Frege mit seiner berühmten Unterscheidung von Sinn und Bedeutung verfolgte. Der Band enthält zahlreiche bisher unbekannte Dokumente zu Freges Leben und Werk, darunter amtliche Schreiben Freges, zwei Schreiben an Eucken, drei Briefe Thomaes, in denen dieser über Frege berichtet, sowie einen Klappentext von 1903, der drei Schriften Freges anzeigt. Eine umfassende, kommentierte Forschungsbibliographie zu Frege und seinem Jenaer Umfeld beschließt den Band. Die Herausgeber lehren Philosophie an der Universität Jena. (shrink)

Perhaps, as Professor Battaglia remarks in his Introduction, the German people has the philosophical vocation: Si può persino dire, con una certa enfasi, che il popolo tedesco ha ‘la’ vocazione filosofica. Certainly it was a happy idea to invite distinguished German and Austrian philosophers to explain each his philosophical standpoint. The project was successfully carried out by the Institute of Philosophy in the University of Bologna. The list of contributors speaks for itself: Theodor W Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Leo Gabriel, (...) Hans G Gadamer, Romano Guardini, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Helmut Kuhn, Ludwig Landgrebe, Johannes Baptista Lotz, Karl Löwith, Friedrich Max Müller, Josef Pieper, Helmut Plessner, Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, Amadeo Silva-Tarouca, Ernst Topitsch, and Carl F von Weizsäcker. The page or two of biography that precedes each essay is helpful; there are as many contrasts here as there are between the different philosophical perspectives outlined by the contributors; and there is one striking similarity in the interruption of the careers of so many of these men—all now in their sixties or older—by the Nazi period. Professor Felice Battaglia’s Introduzione deserves to stand with the other contributions; it is a summary that weaves together with considerable skill the strands of German philosophy represented by writers as various as Bloch and Guardini or Pieper and Plessner. German philosophy, he points out, has come a long way from the gnoseological problems of Kant or the absolutism of Hegel; it has unexpectedly found its way, via phenomenology and existentialism, back to a situation in which one can say: Teologia non spaventa molti pensatori tedeschi. (shrink)

Perhaps, as Professor Battaglia remarks in his Introduction, the German people has the philosophical vocation: Si può persino dire, con una certa enfasi, che il popolo tedesco ha ‘la’ vocazione filosofica. Certainly it was a happy idea to invite distinguished German and Austrian philosophers to explain each his philosophical standpoint. The project was successfully carried out by the Institute of Philosophy in the University of Bologna. The list of contributors speaks for itself: Theodor W Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Leo Gabriel, (...) Hans G Gadamer, Romano Guardini, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Helmut Kuhn, Ludwig Landgrebe, Johannes Baptista Lotz, Karl Löwith, Friedrich Max Müller, Josef Pieper, Helmut Plessner, Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, Amadeo Silva-Tarouca, Ernst Topitsch, and Carl F von Weizsäcker. The page or two of biography that precedes each essay is helpful; there are as many contrasts here as there are between the different philosophical perspectives outlined by the contributors; and there is one striking similarity in the interruption of the careers of so many of these men—all now in their sixties or older—by the Nazi period. Professor Felice Battaglia’s Introduzione deserves to stand with the other contributions; it is a summary that weaves together with considerable skill the strands of German philosophy represented by writers as various as Bloch and Guardini or Pieper and Plessner. German philosophy, he points out, has come a long way from the gnoseological problems of Kant or the absolutism of Hegel; it has unexpectedly found its way, via phenomenology and existentialism, back to a situation in which one can say: Teologia non spaventa molti pensatori tedeschi. (shrink)

Although stakeholder theory is widely accepted in environmental disclosure research, empirical evidence about the role of stakeholders in firms’ disclosure is still scarce. The authors address this issue for a setting of carbon disclosure. Our international sample comprises the Carbon Disclosure Project Global 500, S&P 500, and FTSE 350 reports from 2008 to 2011, resulting in a total of 1,120 firms with 3,631 firm-year observations. The authors apply Tobit regressions to analyze the relationship between carbon disclosure and the relevance of (...) the following stakeholder groups: government, general public, media, employees, and customers. Our results confirm that in addition to carbon performance, all stakeholders are associated with carbon disclosure. Only one stakeholder group acts as a moderator for the relationship between carbon performance and carbon disclosure. Furthermore, the authors find that carbon performance but not the affiliation to a carbon-intensive industry acts as a moderator between stakeholder relevance and carbon disclosure. (shrink)

Aristotle claims that the virtuous person acts for the sake of to kalon. To understand this idea, I examine the analogy he draws between craft and virtue. I argue that the kalon is a formal feature of well-ordered wholeness and that the virtuous person takes intellectual pleasure in perceiving (or remembering or imagining) the kalon-in-action, akin to pleasure in observing artworks or works of nature. However, the virtuous person’s pleasure in kalon action is primarily a pleasure of practical reason. In (...) these ways, Aristotle’s concept of the kalon is and is not like the modern aesthetic concept of the beautiful. (shrink)

Michael Walzer’s article ‘Political action: the problem of dirty hands’ initiated a new wave of discussion over a persistent problem in moral philosophy: are there situations in which ethical rules must be relaxed so as to bring about a greater good? In this article, we consider whether this ‘dirty hands’ approach may be applied to our current climate crisis. One proposed solution to the problem of global warming is the administration of moral enhancements to the population. Assuming that the administration (...) of moral enhancements is a necessary condition in the prevention of a climate crisis, Parker Crutchfield argues that this procedure ought to be covert. This implies lying to the public, and such dishonesty amounts to immoral behavior. We conclude that despite the severity of global warming, there is no justification for a dirty hands approach. Lying to the public in order to save the planet would probably create bigger problems, and it would ultimately be very counterproductive in trying to save the planet. (shrink)

While some countries are moving toward legalization, euthanasia is still criticized on various fronts. Most importantly, it is considered a violation of the medical ethics principle of non-maleficence, because it actively seeks a patient’s death. But, medical ethicists should consider an ethical alternative to euthanasia. In this article, we defend cryocide as one such alternative. Under this procedure, with the consent of terminally-ill patients, their clinical death is induced, in order to prevent the further advance of their brain’s deterioration. Their (...) body is then cryogenically preserved, in the hope that in the future, there will be a technology to reanimate it. This prospect is ethically distinct from euthanasia if a different criterion of death is assumed. In the information-theoretic criterion of death, a person is not considered dead when brain and cardiopulmonary functions cease, but rather, when information constituting psychology and memory is lost. (shrink)

Some philosophers of religion have argued that moral anti-theodicy begs the question. This paper evaluates the arguments from two such philosophers, writing a decade apart—Robert Mark Simpson, and Lauri Snellman. Simpson argues that any global argument against theodicy must allow for the possibility of there existing a plausible theodicy, and that anti-theodical arguments (the argument from insensitivity, the argument from detachment, and the argument from harmful consequences) all implicitly discount this possibility, thus ending up begging the question. Snellman argues that (...) moral anti-theodicies presuppose that some evils cannot be justified, which would presuppose that theodicy is false from the start, which in turn would beg the question against theodicy. The author of the paper argues that Simpson’s arguments rest on an erroneous assumption regarding the nature of anti-theodicy, and that one of Simpson’s arguments sets a problematic standard for argumentation that the author argues we should not accept. It is also argued that Snellman’s argument relies on an unsupported claim from Toby Betenson. Therefore, the author concludes that Simpson and Snellman have not managed to show that moral anti-theodicies beg the question. (shrink)

In international law and the ethics of war, there are a variety of actions which are seen as particularly problematic and presumed to be always or inherently wrong, or in need of some overwhelmingly strong justification to override the presumption against them. One of these actions is assassination, in particular, assassination of heads of state. In this essay I argue that the presumption against assassination is incorrect. In particular, I argue that if in a given scenario war is justified, then (...) assassination of the enemy state's leader is also justified, and in fact ought to be pursued as a means short of war. I defend this position on both consequential and deontic grounds, arguing that assassination is both more discriminate than war and serves to harm only those most responsible for the situation which justifies war in the first place. I conclude by arguing that a norm of assassination, far from being a destabilizing force, as some have argued, would in fact serve to reinforce international norms of rights and respect for persons by making clear that tyrants and would-be oppressors cannot hide behind military forces or notions of sovereignty to protect themselves from judgment and retribution. (shrink)

Multiple studies show that periodic reanalysis of genomic test results held by clinical laboratories delivers significant increases in overall diagnostic yield. However, while there is a widespread consensus that implementing routine reanalysis procedures is highly desirable, there is an equally widespread understanding that routine reanalysis of individual patient results is not presently feasible to perform for all patients. Instead, researchers, geneticists and ethicists are beginning to turn their attention to one part of reanalysis—reinterpretation of previously classified variants—as a means of (...) achieving similar ends to large-scale individual reanalysis but in a more sustainable manner. This has led some to ask whether the responsible implementation of genomics in healthcare requires that diagnostic laboratories routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. In this paper, we set out the nature and scope of any such obligation, and analyse some of the main ethical considerations pertaining to a putative duty to reinterpret. We discern and assess three potential outcomes of reinterpretation—upgrades, downgrades and regrades—in light of ongoing duties of care, systemic error risks and diagnostic equity. We argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications, yet we contend that a suitably restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised, and that the responsible implementation of genomics into healthcare must take this into account. (shrink)

In this paper, I first explore Hegel’s own distinctions between various types of idealism, most of which he explicitly rejects. I discuss his notions of subjective, transcendental and absolute idealism and present the outlines of his criticisms of the first two as well as the motivation behind his commitment to a version of absolute idealism. In particular, I argue that the latter does not share the defining features of what is now commonly called ‘idealism’, as Hegel neither denies the existence (...) of an external world nor even holds that we can only somehow indirectly infer the truth of propositions about the external world from the structure of some given mental material. I give a basic account of what Hegel’s concept of ‘the absolute idea’ is about, which lies behind his absolute idealism. In this context, I maintain that it is crucial for our understanding of Hegel and of his potential relevance for contemporary metaphysics and epistemology that the absolute idea is precisely not a mental or ‘spiritual’ (geistig) entity. Rather, it amounts to a set of methodological assumptions designed to guarantee the overall intelligibility of what there is, regardless of its actual natural, social or more broadly normative structure. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become nearly ubiquitous in modern society, from components of mobile applications to medical support systems, and everything in between. In societally impactful systems imbued with AI, there has been increasing concern related to opaque AI, that is, artificial intelligence where it is unclear how or why certain decisions are reached. This has led to a recent boom in research on “explainable AI” (XAI), or approaches to making AI more explainable and understandable to human users. In the (...) military domain, numerous bodies have argued that autonomous and AI-enabled weapon systems ought not incorporate unexplainable AI, with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United States Department of Defense both explicitly including explainability as a relevant factor in the development and use of such systems. In this article, I present a cautiously critical assessment of this view, arguing that explainability will be irrelevant for many current and near-future autonomous systems in the military (which do not incorporate any AI), that it will be trivially incorporated into most military systems which do possess AI (as these generally possess simpler AI systems), and that for those systems with genuinely opaque AI, explainability will prove to be of more limited value than one might imagine. In particular, I argue that explainability, while indeed a virtue in design, is a virtue aimed primarily at designers and troubleshooters of AI-enabled systems, but is far less relevant for users and handlers actually deploying these systems. I further argue that human–machine teaming is a far more important element of responsibly using AI for military purposes, adding that explainability may undermine efforts to improve human–machine teamings by creating a prima facie sense that the AI, due to its explainability, may be utilized with little (or less) potential for mistakes. I conclude by clarifying that the arguments are not against XAI in the military, but are instead intended as a caution against over-inflating the value of XAI in this domain, or ignoring the limitations and potential pitfalls of this approach. (shrink)

The use of genomic testing in pregnancy is increasing, giving rise to questions over how the information that is generated should be offered and returned in clinical practice. While these tests provide important information for prenatal decision-making, they can also generate information of uncertain significance. This paper critically examines three models for approaching the disclosure of variants of uncertain significance (VUS), which can arise from forms of genomic testing such as prenatal chromosomal microarray analysis (CMA). Contrary to prevailing arguments, we (...) argue that respect for reproductive autonomy does not justify adopting a model on which an offer to disclose VUS is a routine part of genetic counselling. Instead, we contend that a commitment both to solidarity between healthcare providers and pregnant women and to the acceptance of a novel principle of caution under normative uncertainty means that we should instead adopt a model of VUS disclosure that imposes a strong presumption against offering to disclose VUS. The upshot of this is that it should be standard practice to only offer to disclose VUS when this is requested by the woman undergoing CMA. We defend our position against claims that arise from an alleged right to such information and that a presumption against an offer will lead to inequity. (shrink)

Carnap’s seminal ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ makes important use of the notion of a framework and the related distinction between internal and external questions. But what exactly is a framework? And what role does the internal/external distinction play in Carnap’s metaontology? In an influential series of papers, Matti Eklund has recently defended a bracingly straightforward interpretation: A Carnapian framework, Eklund says, is just a natural language. To ask an internal question, then, is just to ask a question in, say, English. (...) To try to ask an external question is to try, absurdly, to ask a question in no language at all. Finding that so trivial an I/e distinction can’t help to explain Carnap’s deflationary metaontology, Eklund is led to attribute to Carnap a view he calls ontological pluralism. In this paper, I show that Eklund misreads Carnap, and I argue that this misreading obscures fundamental features of Carnap’s philosophy. I then defend an account of frameworks as what Carnap called semantical systems, and I place this account in the context of Carnap’s philosophical program of explication. Finally, I discuss the role that frameworks and the I/e distinction play in ESO, showing that ESO provides no reason to attribute the doctrine of ontological pluralism to Carnap. (shrink)

For much of the first fifty years of its existence, analytic philosophy shunned discussions of normativity and ethics. Ethical statements were considered as pseudo-propositions, or as expressions of pro- or con-attitudes of minor theoretical significance. Nowadays, in contrast, prominent analytic philosophers pay close attention to normative problems. Here we focus our attention on the work of Searle, at the same time drawing out an important connection between Searle’s work and that of two other seminal figures in this development: H.L.A. Hart (...) and John Rawls. We show that all three thinkers tend to assume that there is but one type of normativity within the realm of social institutions – roughly, the sort of normativity that is involved in following the results of chess – and that they thereby neglect features that are of crucial significance for an adequate understanding of social reality. (shrink)

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 347-371, November 2022. We sometimes have to choose between options that are seemingly incomparable insofar as they seem to be neither better than, worse than, nor equal to each other. This often happens when the available options are quite different from one another. For instance, consider a choice between prioritizing either criminal justice reform or healthcare reform as a public policy goal. Even after the relevant details of the goals and possible (...) reforms are filled in, it is plausible that neither goal is better than, worse than, nor equal to the other. Such seemingly incomparable options present a problem for rational choice since it is unclear how an agent might rationally choose between them. What we need are some principles to help govern rational choice when faced with seemingly incomparable options. I here present three such principles. While each principle is individually compelling, I show that they are jointly incompatible. I then argue that the correct response to this inconsistent triad is to reject the principle that rationally censures performing a sequence of choices one knows will result in a suboptimal outcome. The upshot is that when seeming incomparability is involved, an agent can money pump themselves without being less rational for it. (shrink)

In recent years, it has been acknowledged increasingly that the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy is one of complementarity rather than opposition, as previously often assumed. In this essay I will argue that, in fact, early analytic philosophy has its roots in the tradition of continental philosophy. The essay will focus on Hermann Lotze's influence on Frege and on Frege's relationship to the Neo‐Kantians Otto Liebmann and Wilhelm Windelband. It will provide new evidence for the claim that Frege's philosophy (...) should be seen as belonging to the tradition of Neo‐Kantianism and, along the way, exhibit the continental roots of Frege's context principle. (shrink)

As we have discussed elsewhere, Franz Boas and John Dewey were intellectual and political allies at Columbia University for over thirty years.1 Dewey advocated for an increased role of anthropology for philosophical insight, and he often used anthropological knowledge as a starting point for his ethics and politics, including such knowledge as learned from Boas. We hold that Boas and Dewey shared a common core understanding of human global and evolutionary diversity, and that this shared understanding itself forms a core (...) component of their progressive projects.However, with regard to the problem of racism in the United States, Boas and Dewey had different engagements. Boas made the questioning... (shrink)

The article considers the philosophical potential of Heraclitean ambiguity and implications for how one might engage philosophically with Heraclitus. While works on Heraclitus most commonly offer new interpretations or dispute or add nuance to established interpretations, this work somewhat sidesteps interpretive disputes to consider the philosophical value and relevance of Heraclitus’s fragments themselves. Specifically, a hermeneutical tool proposed by William Desmond called a “companioning approach,” is supported. Desmond’s companioning approach is considered in the context of Pierre Hadot’s account of the (...) history of hermeneutical practices to show that it merely defines and legitimizes a longstanding hermeneutical activity. Further, a recent work by A. V. Halapsis shows that Heraclitus’s ambiguity may have been a consequence of his anthropological commitments and that he may have intended to allow for something like a companioning engagement. (shrink)

Studying evidence law as part of naturalized epistemology means using the tools and results of the sciences to evaluate evidence rules based on the accuracy of the verdicts they are likely to produce. In this chapter, we introduce the approach and address skeptical concerns about the value of systematic empirical research for evidence scholarship, focusing, in particular, on worries about the external validity of jury simulation studies. Finally, turning to applications, we consider possible reforms regarding eyewitness identifications and character evidence.

O presente texto tem por objetivo compreender a pintura de Wassily Kandinsky a partir da metafísica do belo de Arthur Schopenhauer, especialmente a partir da relação entre pintura e música estabelecida pelo pintor.

In this paper I investigate affinities between Nietzsche’s early philosophy and some aspects of Kant’s moral theory. In so doing, I develop further my reading of Nietzschean wholeness as an ideal that consists in the achievement of cultural—not psychic—integration by pursuing the ennoblement of humanity in oneself and in all. This cultural achievement is equivalent to the procreation of the genius or the perfection of nature. For Nietzsche, the process by means of which we come to realize the genius in (...) ourselves is one in which our true content comes to necessarily govern or guide the shaping of our outer form (or our outward activities). Since this true content turns out to be our autonomy or free agency, I argue that this Nietzschean idea of necessitation parallels in important ways Kant’s notion of normative necessity. In particular, I claim that for Nietzsche the agent’s form becomes necessitated by his content as a result of the agent’s recognition of the duties that befall those who aspire to belong to a genuine culture and his resolve to guide his actions in accordance to them. These duties spring from the idea of humanity, from the image we have of ourselves as endowed with the capacity to be the helmsmen of our lives or to be more than mere animals or automata. The person who takes up this ideal of humanity turns his life into a living unity of content and form by organizing it around an aspect of his being that belongs necessarily, hence more truthfully, to him. He also participates in a collective project (that of the ennoblement of the human being) that can lend a certain coherence and imperishability to his individual life and through which he becomes necessarily connected to everyone else for all eternity. (shrink)

Ce volume contient les contributions au colloque « Lire Althusser aujourd'hui » organisé les 16 et 17 octobre 1995 à l'Ecole normale supérieure, par l'Institut Mémoires de l'Edition Contemporaine. La publication de l'Avenir dure longtemps, puis de nombreux autres inédits, ont donné à la pensée de Louis Althusser un regain d'actualité, indissociable d'une profonde modification de la lecture qui peut être faite de son oeuvre. On ne peut pas lire Althusser aujourd'hui comme on le faisait de son vivant. A leur (...) manière, chacun de ces exposés tournent ainsi autour d'une même question : qu'est-ce que lire Althusser aujourd'hui? (shrink)

During the last few decades, the historical turn within the tradition of the analytic tradition has experienced growing enthusiasm concerning the procedure of rational reconstruction, whose validity or importance, despite its paradigmatic examples in Frege and Russell, has not always enjoyed a consensus. Among the analytic philosophers who are the frontrunners of this movement, Robert Brandom is one of a kind: his work on Hegel as well as on German Idealism has been increasing interest in, as well as awareness of, (...) Hegel´s possible contributions to some current problems in that tradition, and connecting Hegel scholars to current questions. Thus, this work aims to explore Brandom´s methodology of rational reconstruction, as well as his dialogue with history of Philosophy, mainly exposed in his Tales of the mighty dead (2002). As we will see, Brandom´s distinction between a de dicto and a de re approach intends to present a way of identifying and analyzing a given philosopher´s theoretical (hidden) commitments that can be useful to improve the quality of the dialogue with past philosophers. From such methodological exposition, I to turn to Kierkegaard in order to make explicit some of his ontological commitments and presenting Brandom’s approach as a valuable tool for doing history of philosophy. (shrink)