Investigates Aristotle's views on the ontological status of artifacts in the Metaphysics, with implications for a variety of metaphysical problems.

ArgumentThe aim of this paper is two-fold: to offer an interpretation that preserves the natural reading ofPhysicsII 1 – that Aristotle is drawing a stark distinction between what is natural and what is artificial; and to show how there is logical room for atertium quid– a category for things that are products of both nature and art. This aim is attained by highlighting two important qualifications Aristotle makes about the products of art in relation to an innate internal principle of (...) change and pointing out that the proper understanding of the significance of the essential-accidental distinction that Aristotle draws must be viewed in the context where he identifies two kinds of nature – form and matter. Based on these analyses, the following three logical categories are shown to be consistent with the passage: 1) purely natural things; 2) essentially artificial objects; and 3) essentially natural things with artificial aspects. (shrink)

In the contemporary discussion of artifacts, philosophers grapple with what is known as the continuum problem – the problem of drawing a clear distinction between what is and what is not artificial. They begin with the standard definition of artifacts (rooted in Aristotle’s distinction between what exists by nature and what exists by what he calls technē found in the opening passage of Physics II.1) as “objects made intentionally, in order to accomplish something”. But this definition turns out to be (...) rather vague and not as useful as it first appears. For example, does it include nonhuman animal products or a political community? The aim of this paper is to explicate how Aristotle would address the continuum problem by examining what he means by the crucial phrase, ‘from technē’ (apo technēs) which is found at Phys II.1.192b18 (casting doubt that the standard definition of artifacts does not really capture Aristotle’s view) and to explain what truly counts as “artificial products” for Aristotle. (shrink)

Is Aristotle committed, as a theoretical matter, to fixed species in biology? The answer seems to be a resounding no, if we were to infer his theoretical commitments from the actual practice found in his biological works. The answer, however, is far from clear, if we turn to the ‘philosophical discussion of biology’ found in Book 1 of Parts of Animals. In fact, I shall note that its context suggests that, contrary to some recent interpretations put forward, the phrase τὰ (...) ἔσχατα εἴδη at 644a23 is best translated and understood as ‘infima species’, and that such a reading implies that Aristotle favours the methodology that reflects his theoretical commitment to fixed species. (shrink)

By defending the following views – that Aristotle identifies the generator and perhaps the obstacle remover as an essential cause of the natural sublunary elemental motion in Physics VIII 4; that this view is consistent with the view of Physics II 1 that the sublunary simple bodies have a principle of internal motion; and that the sublunary and the celestial elements have a nature in the very same way – I shall offer what has so far eluded Aristotelian commentators: a (...) consistent interpretation of Aristotle's theory of the natural motions of the sublunary and also the celestial elements. (shrink)

Book Information Aristotle on Artifacts: A Metaphysical Puzzle. By Errol G. Katayama. State University of New York Press. Albany. 1999. Pp. xiii + 202. Paperback.

This essay explores the role of informal logicand its application in the context of currentdebates regarding evidence-based medicine. This aim is achieved through a discussion ofthe goals and objectives of evidence-basedmedicine and a review of the criticisms raisedagainst evidence-based medicine. Thecontributions to informal logic by StephenToulmin and Douglas Walton are explicated andtheir relevance for evidence-based medicine isdiscussed in relation to a common clinicalscenario: hypertension management. This essayconcludes with a discussion on the relationshipbetween clinical reasoning, rationality, andevidence. It is argued that (...) informal logic hasthe virtue of bringing explicitness to the roleof evidence in clinical reasoning, and bringssensitivity to understanding the role ofdialogical context in the need for evidence inclinical decision making. (shrink)

Immunity against SARS‐CoV‐2 that is acquired by convalescent COVID‐19 patients is examined in reference to (A) the Th17 cell generation system in psoriatic epidermis and (B) a recently discovered phenomenon in which Th17 cells are converted into tissue‐resident memory T (TRM) cells with Th1 phenotype. Neutrophils that are attracted to the site of infection secrete IL‐17A, which stimulates lung epithelial cells to express CCL20. Natural Th17 (nTh17) cells are recruited to the infection site by CCL20 and expand in the presence (...) of IL‐23. These nTh17 cells are converted to TRM cells upon encounter with SARS‐CoV‐2 and continue to exist as ex‐Th17 cells, which exert Th1‐like immunity during a memory response. G‐CSF can induce nTh17 cell accumulation at the infection site because it promotes neutrophil egress from the bone marrow. Hence, G‐CSF may be effective against COVID‐19. Administration of G‐CSF to patients infected with SARS‐CoV‐2 is worth a clinical trial. (shrink)

Rheumatoid arthritis (RA) may not be a multifactorial disease; it can be hypothesized that RA is developed through a series of events following a triggering event, which is the emergence of a chemokine for neutrophils in the synovium. IL‐17A, secreted by infiltrated neutrophils, stimulates synoviocytes to produce CCL20, which attracts various CCR6‐expressing cells, including Th17 cells. Monocytes (macrophages) appear after neutrophil infiltration according to the natural course of inflammation and secrete IL‐1β and TNFα. Then, IL‐17A, IL‐1β, and TNFα stimulate synoviocytes (...) to produce CCL20, amplifying the inflammation. Varieties of chemokines secreted by infiltrating cells accumulate in the synovium and induce synoviocyte proliferation by binding to the corresponding G protein‐coupled receptors, thus expanding the synovial tissue. CCL20 in this tissue attracts circulating monocytes that express both CCR6 and receptor activator of NF‐κB (RANK), which differentiate into osteoclasts in the presence of RANKL. In this way, pannus is formed, and bone destruction begins. (shrink)

The death of Geoffrey Mure is a greater loss to the world of scholarship than the present-day philosophical community is likely to recognize. He was one of the very few Oxford philosophers who had the courage and steadfastness to stick to his staunch belief in speculative Idealism when the explosion of Logical Positivism and the successive shock-waves of Empiricism and Ordinary Language Philosophy overwhelmed the Oxford schools. Mure’s philosophy was, therefore, not congenial to his colleagues. Nevertheless, throughout the hey-day of (...) the Rylian Empire, Mure remained at Oxford as the Warden of Merton, exerting what influence he could to keep alive the tradition of F.H. Bradley, Harold Joachim and R.G. Collingwood. Had he been appointed to the White’s Chair of Moral Philosophy or the Wykeham Professorship of Logic, the history of recent British philosophy would have been different, but that was hardly to be expected in the philosophical climate of the time. The force of the current against which Mure swam can be judged from the story told in the 1950s that as they walked down the High, students would point him out in incredulous wonder as the sole surviving Hegelian in Oxford. (shrink)

With the resurgence in recent years of Hegelian studies a veritable spate of new translations have appeared of that philosopher’s works. For a long time we have had Wallace’s inimitable version of the lesser Logic and the main text of the Philosophy of Mind. We have had also Johnson and Struther’s translation of the greater Logic, Baillie’s Phenomenology, the History of Philosophy done by E. S. Haldane and The Philosophy of History by Sibree, not to mention various fragmentary editions of (...) the Introduction. Besides these there have been Sir Malcolm Knox’s excellent translations of the Rechtsphilosophie and, more recently, of Lectures on Aesthetics. But in the last few years A. V. Miller has given us a new and much improved version of the Science of Logic and the hitherto untranslated Philosophy of Nature as well as a new and revised edition of Wallace’s Encyclopaedia Logic and his Philosophy of Mind with the addition now of the Zusätze in English. At the same time another translation of the Naturphilosophie by Petry appeared, with voluminous historical and explanatory notes. Now attention is being given to the earlier works, and new translations have appeared, under the imprint of the State University of New York Press, of Hegel’s Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophic and Glauben und Wissen, by Walter Cerf and Henry S. Harris, supplementing the Early Theological Writings earlier provided by Knox and Kroner. (shrink)

In this essay I try, first of all, to outline the development of Joachim's epistemology from his most significant book, The Nature of Truth (1906), to his posthumous Logical Studies (1948), which gathers together the lectures on Logic delivered by him at the University of Oxford in the years up to his death in 1938. The conception of truth as systematic coherence, upheld by him in his earlier work in a lively polemic against Bertrand Russell's empirical-realist 'correspondence theory of truth' (...) as well as against the intuitionist appeal to immediate self-evidence, shows the thorough- going influence of F.H. Bradley's epistemology in its declaredly idealistic orientation and its 'sceptical' outcome. I then criticise the arguments by which, in the final pages of The Nature of Truth, he supports his denial of truth's reality, pointing out that they are plainly self-refuting. Finally, I examine the further development of his conception of thought and truth in his Oxford lectures, where he subjects the above-mentioned arguments to a careful self-critique, which prompted his pupil Errol E. Harris to vindicate, against contemporary anti-metaphysical thought, the perennial theoretical value and moral significance of metaphysics in general, and of Hegel's Absolute Idealism in particular. (shrink)

‘One of the guilding thoughts throughout this work’, writes the author, ‘is that G.F.W. Hegel is the philosopher of the modern age’.

‘One of the guilding thoughts throughout this work’, writes the author, ‘is that G.F.W. Hegel is the philosopher of the modern age’.

In tribute to Peter A. Bertocci on his retirement from Boston University as Bowne Professor of Philosophy, 15 American and British scholars prepared essays on aspects of idealism, at the request of the editors. These essays, together with an introduction by the editors, a list of Bertocci’s writings, and an index, comprise the present volume. The British contributors are H. D. Lewis of London and W. M. Pittenger of Cambridge. Among the Americans are John N. Findlay, Errol E. Harris, (...) Charles Hartshorne, Richard Hocking, and John E. Smith. (shrink)

Celebrations of the second centenary of Hegel's birth have already begun, and more are planned. The Sixteenth Annual Wheaton College Philosophy Conference, "The Philosophy of Hegel on the 200th Anniversary of His Birth", was held November 6th and 7th at Wheaton, Illinois. Errol Harris of Northwestern delivered the Keynote lecture titled "The Importance of Hegel Today". Other papers read included "Hegel's Dialectic" by William Young of the University of Rhode Island; "Hegel and Contemporary Theology" by Merold Westphal of Yale; (...) "Hegel and the Existentialists on the Nature of the Self" by John C. Pageler of Wheaton College, and "Hegel, Marcuse, and the New Left" by Bernard Zylstra, Institute of Christian Studies, Toronto. * * * The Toronto Chapter of the Conference on Political Thought will sponsor a Symposium on "Hegel's Social and Political Thought" early next May. Interested persons are advised to contact Professor H.S. Harris, Department of Philosophy, Glendon College, York University, Toronto 12, Ontario, Canada. * * *Marquette University will conduct a major international symposium early in June, 1970, devoted to the intellectual legacy of Hegel. Preliminary plans call for a four day conference covering Hegel's influence in social and political philosophy and theory, his influence in philosophy of religion end theology, his influence in philosophy and theory of history, and current and projected efforts in editing and translating his writings. Principal participants include Shlomo Avineri of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Jean-Yves Calvez of L'Institut d'Etudes politiques de Paris; Emile Fackenheim of the University of Toronto; J.N. Findlay and Kenley Dove of Yale; Eric Well of L'Universite de Lille; Otto Pöggeler, Director of the Hegel-Archiv; James Doull of Dalhousie University ; Kenneth Schmitz of the Catholic University, and others. The unique format for the program is designed to permit maximum participation and discussion, and the Proceedings will be published. The Owl will give full details in the Winter or Spring issue. Interested persons should contact either Professor Joseph O'Malley or Professor Lee C. Rice, Co-Directors, Department of Philosophy. Marquette University, 62/north 13th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233, * * * A World Hegel Congress is to be held in Berlin in August, 1970, under the auspices of the Internationale Hegel Gesellschaft. More on this will also be provided in forthcoming issues of The 0wl of Minerva. (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

In spite of a powerful tradition, more than two thousand years old, that in a valid argument the premises must be relevant to the conclusion, twentieth-century logicians neglected the concept of relevance until the publication of Volume I of this monumental work. Since that time relevance logic has achieved an important place in the field of philosophy: Volume II of Entailment brings to a conclusion a powerful and authoritative presentation of the subject by most of the top people working in (...) the area. Originally the aim of Volume II was simply to cover certain topics not treated in the first volume--quantification, for example--or to extend the coverage of certain topics, such as semantics. However, because of the technical progress that has occurred since the publication of the first volume, Volume II now includes other material. The book contains the work of Alasdair Urquhart, who has shown that the principal sentential systems of relevance logic are undecidable, and of Kit Fine, who has demonstrated that, although the first-order systems are incomplete with respect to the conjectured constant domain semantics, they are still complete with respect to a semantics based on "arbitrary objects." Also presented is important work by the other contributing authors, who are Daniel Cohen, Steven Giambrone, Dorothy L. Grover, Anil Gupta, Glen Helman, Errol P. Martin, Michael A. McRobbie, and Stuart Shapiro. Robert G. Wolf's bibliography of 3000 items is a valuable addition to the volume. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

In spite of a powerful tradition, more than two thousand years old, that in a valid argument the premises must be relevant to the conclusion, twentieth-century logicians neglected the concept of relevance until the publication of Volume I of this monumental work. Since that time relevance logic has achieved an important place in the field of philosophy: Volume II of Entailment brings to a conclusion a powerful and authoritative presentation of the subject by most of the top people working in (...) the area. Originally the aim of Volume II was simply to cover certain topics not treated in the first volume--quantification, for example--or to extend the coverage of certain topics, such as semantics. However, because of the technical progress that has occurred since the publication of the first volume, Volume II now includes other material. The book contains the work of Alasdair Urquhart, who has shown that the principal sentential systems of relevance logic are undecidable, and of Kit Fine, who has demonstrated that, although the first-order systems are incomplete with respect to the conjectured constant domain semantics, they are still complete with respect to a semantics based on "arbitrary objects." Also presented is important work by the other contributing authors, who are Daniel Cohen, Steven Giambrone, Dorothy L. Grover, Anil Gupta, Glen Helman, Errol P. Martin, Michael A. McRobbie, and Stuart Shapiro. Robert G. Wolf's bibliography of 3000 items is a valuable addition to the volume. (shrink)

Once hematopoiesis is established in the bone marrow, a continuous egress of hematopoietic stem cells (HSCs) to the periphery occurs at a low frequency. It has been proposed that this phenomenon is part of a regenerative homeostatic mechanism that ensures the maintenance of hematopoiesis through the life of the individual. The administration of certain cytotoxic drugs or cytokines can enhance the mobilization of hematopoietic progenitors to the periphery. During the past 15 years, granulocyte‐colony stimulating factor (G‐CSF) has been used as (...) a standard cytokine for mobilization protocols in experimental models and in humans. Despite extensive efforts by multiple groups, a definitive mechanism explaining its role in mobilization has not been provided. In a recent paper, Katayama et al.,1 through a series of clever associations supported by well‐defined experimental systems, proposed that signals through the sympathetic nervous system modify the activity of the hematopoietic niche, acting as regulators of the mobilization of hematopoietic progenitors. This surprising finding adds a new level of complexity to the cellular milieu responsible for generation and maintenance of the hematopoietic niche. BioEssays 28: 687–691, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

This book presents G. A. Cohen's Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1996. Focusing on Marxism and Rawlsian liberalism, Cohen draws a connection between these thought systems and the choices that shape a person's life. In the case of Marxism, the relevant life is his own: a communist upbringing in the 1940s in Montreal, which induced a belief in a strongly socialist egalitarian doctrine. The narrative of Cohen's reckoning with that inheritance develops through a series of sophisticated (...) engagements with the central questions of social and political philosophy. In the case of Rawlsian doctrine, Cohen looks to people's lives in general. He argues that egalitarian justice is not only, as Rawlsian liberalism teaches, a matter of rules that define the structure of society, but also a matter of personal attitude and choice. Personal attitude and choice are, moreover, the stuff of which social structure itself is made. Those truths have not informed political philosophy as much as they should, and Cohen's focus on them brings political philosophy closer to moral philosophy, and to the Judeo-Christian ethical tradition, than it has recently been. (shrink)

James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro present a new edition of R. G. Collingwood's classic work of 1933, supplementing the original text with important related writings from Collingwood's manuscripts which appear here for the first time. The editors also contribute a substantial new introduction. The volume will be welcomed by all historians of twentieth-century philosophy.

In his article, a unified brain-based determination of death is described by James Bernat (2024) as a permanent cessation of systemic circulation causing a permanent cessation of brain circulation...

The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles of total success and existential, catastrophic failure. Consequently, attempts to solve AGI alignment should, all else equal, prefer false negatives (ignoring research programs that would have been successful) to false positives (pursuing research programs that will unexpectedly fail). Thus, we propose adopting a policy of responding to points of philosophical and practical uncertainty associated with the alignment problem by limiting and choosing necessary assumptions (...) to reduce the risk of false positives. Herein we explore in detail two relevant points of uncertainty that AGI alignment research hinges on---meta-ethical uncertainty and uncertainty about mental phenomena---and show how to reduce false positives in response to them. (shrink)

In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...) makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether. (shrink)

Resumen:Junto con Rebeldes académicos de Iván Jaksić (SUNY 1989; UDP 2013) y Una disciplina de la distancia de Cecilia Sánchez (CESOC 1992), este libro ya forma parte del canon bibliográfico selecto y escaso que propone investigaciones de largo aliento sobre la historia de la filosofía en el Chile republicano. No se trata de una reseña de nombres y obras, ni de una historia interna del desarrollo de problemas puros o escuelas. Más bien, su foco, en afinidad con las obras mencionadas, (...) son “las distintas relaciones históricas entre las fuerzas del poder y las razones de la filosofía […] las distintas inscripciones en los también múltiples quiasmos entre saberes y poderes” (14-15), asumiendo, de modo más sustantivo, que “el bloque histórico dominante en Chile rara vez ha logrado establecer un relato coherente de la dominación, justamente porque es poco lo que le importan las razones en nombre de las cuales ejerce la fuerza” (41). (shrink)