The central project of the Critique of Pure Reason is to answer two sets of questions: What can we know and how can we know it? and What can't we know and why can't we know it? The essays in this collection are intended to help students read the Critique of Pure Reason with a greater understanding of its central themes and arguments, and with some awareness of important lines of criticism of those themes and arguments.

This paper gives a characterization of distributed cognition (d-cog) and explores ways that the framework might be applied in studies of science. I argue that a system can only be given a d-cog description if it is thought of as performing a task. Turning our attention to science, we can try to give a global d-cog account of science or local d-cog accounts of particular scientific projects. Several accounts of science can be seen as global d-cog accounts: Robert Merton's sociology (...) of scientific norms, Philip Kitcher's 20th-century account of cognitive labor, and Kitcher's 21st-century notion of well-ordered science. Problems that arise for them arise just because of the way that they attribute a function to science. The paper concludes by considering local d-cog accounts. Here, too, the task is the crux of the matter. (shrink)

A discussion and qualified defense of Philip Kitcher on scientific significance and ‘well-ordered science.’ (Qualified because I argue that Kitcher’s position is made unstable by his reliance on the largely unanalyzed notion of natural curiosity.).

1. A Historical Look at Unity 2. Field Guide to Modern Concepts of Reduction and Unity 3. Kitcher's Revisionist Account of Unification 4. Critics of Unity 5. Integration Instead of Unity 6. Reduction via Mechanisms 7. Case Studies in Reduction and Unification across the Disciplines.

The flight to reference is a widely-used strategy for resolving philosophical issues. The three steps in a flight to reference argument are: (1) offer a substantive account of the reference relation, (2) argue that a particular expression refers (or does not refer), and (3) draw a philosophical conclusion about something other than reference, like truth or ontology. It is our contention that whenever the flight to reference strategy is invoked, there is a crucial step that is left undefended, and that (...) without a defense of this step, the flight to reference is a fatally flawed strategy; it cannot succeed in resolving philosophical issues. In this paper we begin by setting out the flight to reference strategy and explaining what is wrong with arguments that invoke the strategy. We then illustrate the problem by considering arguments for and against eliminative materialism. In the final section we argue that much the same problem undermines Philip Kitcher's attempt to defend scientific realism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Science in a Democratic Society by Philip KitcherHenry S. RichardsonReview: Philip Kitcher, Science in a Democratic Society, Prometheus Books, 2011In examining the place of science in a democratic society, Philip Kitcher is ultimately asking what standards scientific activity is answerable to. Here, as in Science, Truth, and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2001), he rejects two extreme possibilities: first, the suggestion that science is autonomous, in the (...) sense that it is answerable only to its own standards; and, second, the suggestion that it is answerable to “vulgar democracy”—that is, to unconstrained majority rule by untutored citizens. In this book, as in the earlier book, he deploys the idea of “well-ordered science,” which he seeks to characterize in part by leaning on the idea of a hypothetical, ideal conversation. Crucially informing this newer book is a much fuller account of nonvulgar democracy. Underlying that account is a much broader picture of “the ethical project”—the title idea of another important Kitcher book from 2011 (Harvard University Press).In order to motivate the friends of science to turn to these broader ethical ideas, Kitcher persuasively rehearses the case against value neutrality in science. Much current distrust of science and scientists, he argues, derives from scientists falsely pretending—whether deludedly or cynically—that science can proceed in a value-neutral way. It cannot do so in resolving competitions among theories, let alone in setting the research agenda or weighing in on practical problems of public concern. By wearing a false mask of value neutrality, scientists succeed only in convincing the public that they are ideologically driven. This, in turn, gives an opening for dissenters motivated by religion or by their own ideologies to develop supposedly scientific counter-claims of their own, such as those that assert creationism or deny the reality of climate change. Better, then, for science and scientists to be frank about its lack of value neutrality. [End Page E-106]What values ought to inform science? To answer this question, Kitcher turns to his conception of the ethical project, of which Chapter 2 gives a summary. As he conceives of ethics, it arose pre-historically as a set of mechanisms helping us to deal with deficiencies in altruistic motivation. Although inspired by evolutionary theory, Kitcher spurns the sociobiologist’s identification of the good with the adaptive. Instead, while giving an elaborate reconstruction of how our ethical practices may actually have arisen, he gives pride of place to the idea of conversation. On his reconstruction, the “egalitarian plateau” touted by Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy [Oxford University Press, 1990], p. 5) and others as the great achievement of the Enlightenment was merely a delayed philosophical echo of the ethical project’s initial feature, one that would have been found in the ethical discussions of human hunter-gatherer bands of forty-thousand years ago. Being more focused on how life is lived than on philosophy, Kitcher, fairly enough, is unwilling to see the Enlightenment as an egalitarian age. Rather, most recent incarnations of the ethical project have been distorted by hierarchies and inequalities. Emphasizing the word, Kitcher writes, “I propose... that we undo the distortion,” and model the ethical project, going forward, as involving an egalitarian conversation. This frankness disarms any worry about the move from ‘was’ to ‘ought’ that might have arisen in the minds of those already puzzled by the current popularity of the cave-man diet; and in any case, since Kitcher’s account of the ethical project is defended at length in his contemporaneous book of that title, doubts about it would be better addressed in that context. Rhetorically, since the ideal of treating persons fundamentally as equals is even more popular than eating meat, he is on strong ground here.The book develops this core egalitarian proposal in three distinct ways, thereby gaining a rich evaluative basis for considering the place of science in society. The first is an account of the purposes to which science is answerable. Kitcher dismisses as unrealistically high-minded and ultimately elitist a conception of scientists as driven by a disinterested quest for truth and a simple love of knowledge for its own sake. Rather, his... (shrink)

Chapter Promising in Law and Morals Promissory and contractual obligations raise many issues of common interest to philosophers and lawyers. ...

United States of America demographic profiles illustrate a nation rich in cultural and racial diversity. Approximately 29% of the population are minorities and demographic projections indicate an increase to 50% by the year 2050. This creates a highly mobile and constantly changing environment, revealing the need for new levels of cultural awareness and sensitivity. These issues are particularly critical in the medical community where medical professionals must understand the impact cultural differences and barriers can have on evaluation, treatment, and rehabilitation. (...) During times of stress, such as when injury strikes, problems associated with lack of cultural sensitivity are intensified. Cultural diversity is of particular concern when standard measures for diagnosis and prognosis are derived from established norms for responding, because culture defines norms. This paper details a ten point checklist designed to facilitate cultural awareness and sensitivity in medical settings to ensure maximum successful recovery and outcomes for all patients. (shrink)

The flight to reference is a widely-used strategy for resolving philosophical issues. The three steps in a flight to reference argument are: (1) offer a substantive account of the reference relation, (2) argue that a particular expression refers (or does not refer), and (3) draw a philosophical conclusion about something other than reference, like truth or ontology. It is our contention that whenever the flight to reference strategy is invoked, there is a crucial step that is left undefended, and that (...) without a defense of this step, the flight to reference is a fatally flawed strategy; it cannot succeed in resolving philosophical issues. In this paper we begin by setting out the flight to reference strategy and explaining what is wrong with arguments that invoke the strategy. We then illustrate the problem by considering arguments for and against eliminative materialism. In the final section we argue that much the same problem undermines Philip Kitcher's attempt to defend scientific realism. (shrink)

The prospect of using cell-based interventions to treat neurological conditions raises several important ethical and policy questions. In this target article, we focus on issues related to the unique constellation of traits that characterize CBIs targeted at the central nervous system. In particular, there is at least a theoretical prospect that these cells will alter the recipients' cognition, mood, and behavior—brain functions that are central to our concept of the self. The potential for such changes, although perhaps remote, is cause (...) for concern and careful ethical analysis. Both to enable better informed consent in the future and as an end in itself, we argue that early human trials of CBIs for neurological conditions must monitor subjects for changes in cognition, mood, and behavior; further, we recommend concrete steps for that monitoring. Such steps will help better characterize the potential risks and benefits of CBIs as they are tested and potentially used for treatment. (shrink)

Archytas of Tarentum, a contemporary and associate of Plato, was a famous Pythagorean, mathematician, and statesman of Tarentum. Although his works are lost and most of the fragments attributed to him were composed in later eras, they nevertheless contain valuable information about his thought. In particular, the fragments of On Law and Justice are likely based on a work by the early Peripatetic biographer Aristoxenus of Tarentum. The fragments touch on key themes of early Greek ethics, including: written and unwritten (...) laws; freedom and self-sufficiency; moderation of the emotions and cultivation of virtues; equality and the competence of the majority to participate in government; criticism of “rule by an individual”; a theory of the ideal “mixed constitution”; distributive and corrective justice and punishment, and of the rule of law. The fragments also contain one of the only positive accounts of democracy in ancient Greek philosophy. (shrink)

Монография предназначена для студентов, аспирантов, преподавателей юридических и философских факультетов, а также для всех тех, кто интересуется философско-правовой проблематикой.

P S Wilson; Interests, Values and Educational Language, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 147–166, https://doi.org/10.1.

Owen Flanagan is a highly prolific writer and speaker whose work brings together results of research in several empirical disciplines overlapping with philosophy, particularly neuroscience and other areas of psychology. This book of thirteen essays, most of them revisions of work published elsewhere, exhibits both his intellectual and his stylistic range. Many of the essays are light and chatty, others analytical and slower-going.

Minorities who disagree with the “scientific consensus” must be allowed to air their viewsI will begin by discussing the example used in Schüklenk’s paper1 of the self proclaimed “HIV dissidents” and then discuss whether the recommendations made are useful and could be applied to other examples in science.Schüklenk’s primary concern according to his title is with the professional responsibilities of biomedical scientists engaging in public discourse. The example given is of the effect that self proclaimed HIV dissidents have had on (...) the provision of HIV related public health measures in South Africa. Fundamental to the example given is a distinction that both Schüklenk and indeed the general public often fail to make. It is important to recognise the difference between biomedical science and clinical practice. Science and medicine are two distinct fields, each with their own historically founded methods and purposes; they have had little in common with each other until relatively recently. Schüklenk confuses the two when he judges a scientific hypothesis by its clinical utility."It certainly seemed prudent to me at the time to give support to critics of a hypothesis, the pursuit of which had done little to bring those in need closer to life extending or life saving AIDS drugs."He later reconsiders his position on the basis of new clinical evidence."My own conversion to the mainstream view took place roughly when dissident predictions about AIDS deaths resulting from what they believed were highly poisonous drug cocktails—that is, triple therapy, did not occur, and when it became clear that actually the opposite was true; these drugs were at least life extending. I saw … ". (shrink)

Skene and Parker1 raise a number of concerns about religious doctrine unduly influencing law and public policy through amicus curiae contributions to civil litigations or direct lobbying of politicians. Oakley2 picks this up in the same issue with an emphasis on the Roman Catholic Church’s interest in preventing the destruction of embryos for embryonic stem cell research. Skene, Parker, and Oakley seem to be concerned mostly with religious views having undue influence on public policy. My concern is the negative effect (...) that such Church influenced public policy may have on the progress of the biomedical research that is itself foundational to the debate. Oakley seems to be particularly incensed that, as he puts it: “Those who support a total ban on embryonic stem cell research sometimes talk as if theirs are the only views based on moral principle”.2 What seems to be at issue here though are not the moral principles of the sanctity and dignity of human life, but the application of those moral principles to biomedical research.The Roman Catholic Church has historically defended the sanctity and dignity of human life to varying degrees at different times. Human life for much of the past 2000 years was defined by the Church as the presence of the soul, which was thought at different times to appear at various different stages during development. Only recently, with the advent of modern biology, has the Roman Catholic Church shifted its position to claim that the fertilised egg also qualifies as the right sort of human life.3 It should be noted that this doctrinal change was fundamentally driven by developments in our understanding of embryology and not the process of ensoulment.The Church’s current position on the embryo is thus based not solely on Church doctrine but also on …. (shrink)

First Criticism of the Theory.—This is of the nature of an argumentum ad hominem. In the first place, It is surprising that so clever a man as Protagoras did not see that he proved more than he intended, for according to his theory not only are all men, the wise and the foolish, reduced to the same level, but on the plane of sentient experience it is just as true to say that a pig or a tadpole is the measure (...) of all things. (shrink)

Ce travail pose la question des critères de la „progression biologique“ , d'après les documents fossiles, dans le monde des organismes, c'est-à-dire de ce perfectionnement qui ne s'arrête pas à l'intérieur du cadre d'un phylum donné, comme le „perfectionnement de l'adaptation“, mais qui conduit, au-de-là de phylums de rang différent, à des types supérieurs, par exemple, des Poissons pas les Amphibies et les Reptiles jusqu'aux Mammifères ou aux Oiseaux. Deux groupes de critères y sont recensés en détail, leur contenu est (...) exposé, et on les examine pour voir s'ils caractérisent sans ambiguïté la „progression biologique“. Le premier groupe comprend les critères de „différenciation croissante“ et „d'intégration harmonique”. Ils sont fondés sur la différenciation morphophysiologique ou plus exactement sur la „totalité” des organismes, c'est-à-dire leur multiplicité dans l'unité. Le second groupe de critères, à savoir „indépendance croissante du milieu” et „autonomie individuelle croissante”, part des relations de l'organisme au milieu et aux autres formes vivantes et souligne la „subsistence” des individus, c'est-à-dire leur plus ou moins grande indépendence ou leur stabilité interne. Comme „totalité” et „subsistence” sont les éléments décisifs d'une définition biologique de l'individu, on peut dire que la „progression biologique“ d'un organisme est d'autant plus élevée que sa totalité et subsistence et par là son être individuel sont plus accusés.Tous les critères mentionnés ne sont pas uniformes. Les motifs de leur imprécision sont divers. Tout d'abord, il n'y a pas encore de définition unique et complète de l'individu biologique, de sorte qu'on ne peut circonscrire d'une manière univoque ce qui confère à un organisme une individualité plus forte ou moins forte. Ensuite les lignées au-delà desquelles s'accomplissent des perfectionnements, et dont l'une reste intérieur au phylum , tandis que l'autre le transcende , sont entrelacées si intimement et d'une façon si particulière qu'elles ne se laissent pas séparer franchement et décrire rigoureusement selon leurs signes distinctifs. Tout représentant d'un phylum, peu importe son palier, est en effet nécessairement inséré dans un milieu et en quelque façon spécialisé. Il n'existe pas des types à caractères phylétiques purs, qui ne montrent dans aucune direction un „perfectionnement de l'adaptation”, mais seulement des marques caractéristiques de la „progression biologique”. Enfin nous ne connaissons pas les restes fossiles que le développement ou la formation des grands phylums du règne animal, à savoir du rameau des Vertébrés et des divers groupes des Invertébrés, mais non pas le plus intéressant et le plus important, leur „progression biologique” jusqu'au degré d'organisation qu'ils présentent déjà à l'époque du Silurien ou plutôt du Cambrien. C'est cela seulement qui permettrait une vue plus profonde sur la nature de la „progression biologique”.Die Arbeit stellt die Frage nach den Kriterien des fossil belegten Biologischen Aufstiegs” der Organismenwelt, d.h. derjenigen Vervollkommnung, die sich nicht innerhalb des Rahmens eines gegebenen Bauplans hält, wie die „Anpassungsvervollkommnung”, sondern über verschiedenrangige Baupläne hinweg zu höheren Typen führt, z.B. von den Fischen über die Amphibien und Reptilien zu den Säugern bzw. Vögeln. Ausführlich werden zwei Gruppen von Kriterien besprochen, ihr Inhalt dargelegt und ihre Eindeutigkeit zur Charakterisierung des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” untersucht. Die erste Gruppe umfasst die Kriterien der „zunehmenden Differenzierung” und „harmonischeren Integration”. Diese legen die morphologisch-physiologische Differenzierung oder genauer die „Ganzheit” der Organismen zugrunde, d.h. ihre Vielheit in der Einheit. Die zweite Kriteriengruppe, nämlich „zunehmende Umweltunabhängigkeit” und „zunehmende individuelle Autonomie”, geht von den Beziehungen des Organismus zur Umwelt und zu andern Lebensformen aus und betont die „Subsistenz” der Individuen, d.h. ihr grösseres oder geringeres Losgelöstsein oder ihre Selbständigkeit. Da nun „Ganzheit” und „Subsistenz” die entscheidenden Elemente einer biologischen Definition des Individuums sind, lässt sich sagen, dass der „Biologische Aufstieg” eines Organismus um so höher ist, je stärker seine Ganzheit und Subsistenz und damit sein Individuumsein ist.Eindeutigkeit kommt allen genannten Kriterien nicht zu. Die Gründe für ihre Unschärfe sind verschiedener Art. Zunächst gibt es noch keine eindeutige und vollständige Definition des biologischen Individuums, so dass sich nicht eindeutig umreissen lässt, was einem Organismus eine stärkere oder weniger starke Individualität verleiht. Dann sind die Linien, über die sich Vervollkommnungen vollziehen und von denen die eine innerhalb des Bauplans bleibt , die andere aber über ihn hinausführt so innig und in so eigenartiger Weise miteinander verflochten, dass sie sich nicht sauber scheiden und in ihren charakteristischen Merkmalen genau beschreiben lassen. Jeder Vertreter eines Bauplans, ganz gleich von welcher Ranghöhe, ist nämlich notwendig in eine Umwelt eingepasst und irgendwie spezialisiert. Es gibt keine Typen mit reinen Bauplanmerkmalen, die nach keiner Richtung hin eine „Anpassungsvervollkommnung”, sondern nur Merkmale des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” aufweisen. Schliesslich kennen wir fossil nur die Entfaltung oder Ausgestaltung der Grossbaupläne des Tierreichs, nämlich des Wirbeltierstammes und der verschiedenen Gruppen der Wirbellosen, nicht aber das Interessanteste und Wichtigste, nämlich ihren „Biologischen Aufstieg” zu der organisatorischen Höhe, mit der sie sich im Silur bzw. im Kabrium bereits vorstellen. Das erst würde einen tieferen Einblick in das Wesen des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” vermitteln.This article deals with the question of the criteria for the “biological ascent” of the organic world, resting on fossil evidence. That is, of that improvement which is not only restricted to the framework of a given “general structure” as is the “improvement of adaptation”, but which also leads beyond general structures of differentiated levels to a higher type,e.g. from the fishes through the amphibians and reptiles to the mammals or birds. Two groups of criteria are discussed at length, their content exposed and their univocity for the characterisation of this “biological ascent” is examined. The first group includes the criteria of “increasing differentiation” and “more harmonious integration”. The basis for these is the morphological-physiological differentiation, or more exactly, the “totality” of the organisms,i.e., their variety-in-unity. The second group of criteria, “increasing independence of environment” and “increasing individual autonomy”, is derived from the relationships of the organism to its environment and to other living forms, and stresses the “subsistence” of individuals,i.e., their greater or lesser degree of independence or self-sufficiency. Now since “totality” and “subsistence” are the decisive elements in a biological definition of the individual, it may be said that the “biological ascent” of an organism is higher, the more perfect its totality and subsistence and therefore its individuality is.The criteria mentioned are not univocal. The reasons for this lack of clarity are varied. First of all, there is no univocal and complete definition of the biological individual, so that it cannot be exactly stated just what gives an organism a more or less perfect individuality. Then the lines, along which improvements are made, and according to which the one remains within the general structure and the other goes beyond the general structure , are so intimately and singularly bound together, that they cannot be cleanly distinguished, and their characteristic notes exactly described. For each representative of a general structure, regardless of its level, is necessarily fitted into an environment and somehow or other specialised. There are no types with only notes of the general structure which show in no direction an “improvment of adaption”, but only the signs of “biological ascent”. Finally, we only have fossil evidence for the development or deployment of the “great general structures” of the animal world, namely that of the vertebrates and of the different groups of invertebrates, not for the most interesting and most important, that is, their “biological ascent” to the level of organisation with which they are found in the Silurian or Cambrian periods. Only that would give us a deeper insight into the essence of “biological ascent”. (shrink)