I present a problem for theories of explanation, concerning explanations involving disjunctive properties. The problem is particular acute for the explanatory non-fundamentalist, according to whom non-fundamental scientific explanations are sometimes superior to fundamental physical explanations. I criticise solutions to the problem due to Woodward, Strevens and Sober, and Lewis, and then defend a solution inspired by an account of non-fundamental laws recently defended by Callender and Cohen.

I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...) comparing a test of success of our theories to medical tests with low rates of false positives and false negatives. But, contrary to what Lewis claims, I argue that it is not enough for the realist to undercut the claim that success is not a reliable indicator of truth. Rather, the realist must show that our current best theories are likely true. Further, I argue that tests in science are unlike medical tests in a number of important ways. (shrink)

It might be appropriate to begin my commentary by disclosing the fact that Brad Lewis and I are good friends. “Oh, no,” you might think, “this will be one of those cozy, mutual back-patting, insider sessions that so often take place in the American Philosophical Association group meetings.” But never fear. For one thing, I’m no insider to the intellectual circles represented in Dr. Lewis’ bibliog- raphy. Indeed, I’ve read only two of the 32 works listed there. (Depending on (...) how you look at it, that may make me either completely unqualified to comment on this paper or exceptionally well-qualified for reasons of critical distance.) Also, friendship and constructive criticism are entirely compatible in my book. And, to paraphrase a philosopher of some importance, “Brad is dear, but the truth is dearer.” I will begin my commentary by identifying some of Brad’s theses that I find interesting, important, and well-supported. The second part of my commentary will elaborate my major concerns about the paper. This part will be longer, not because my overall reaction is more critical than favorable, but because exploring different viewpoints generally takes more space and time than noting points of agreement. In my conclusion, I will suggest that many of the paper’s insights are likely to sail better if some of the baggage from postmodernism and cultural studies is thrown overboard. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Philosophy of George Engel and the Philosophy of MedicineJeffrey P. Spike (bio)KeywordsGeorge Engel, psychosocial medicine, medical education, medical humanities, interviewing skills, philosophy of medicine, scientific methodDoctor Brad Lewis has encouraged us to consider George Engel’s philosophy with his excellent essay on Engel and Pragmatism. As a philosopher teaching full time in a medical school, it is refreshing to have an opportunity to analyze the work of two (...) physicians at this level of reflection and abstraction. It is even more of a pleasure because I knew Dr. Engel personally while I was teaching at the University of Rochester School of Medicine. I will make some observations of the philosophy behind Dr. Engel’s work, both published and practical, that is, as reflected in his writing but also in his influence in the medical curriculum at the institution that he called home for some thirty years (as seems appropriate when considering someone’s bona fides as a pragmatist).Engel’s Philosophy and Medicine’s PhilosophyGeorge Engel’s primary philosophical concern was to fight the powerful belief (or perhaps delusion) that medicine was evolving into a pure physical science, an extension of biochemistry and cell biology, or as we would now call them, proteomics and genomics. There is little evidence that he espoused any one methodology for basic science, so much as he opposed any one methodology for medicine. So to say he was a pragmatist seems underdetermined by his words, if that is taken to mean he advocated for changing the methodological model for scientific research. Rather the question is whether his preferred medical methodology is best characterized as pragmatic, or by some other description. On that score I agree with Lewis wholeheartedly.Of course, it might be that the claim of pragmatism is not meant to suggest a change in method for basic science, but to advocate for retaining an appreciation for the whole range of approaches to knowledge, from experimental science to epidemiology, and from epidemiology to acculturation. By that definition of pragmatism, Engel was indeed a pragmatist. Interpreted this way, he wanted medicine to stop worshipping the scientific method and appreciate that there are many paths to knowledge besides through the wet lab.It might be said that there are different scientific methods for different sciences, and Engel wanted us to appreciate that the reductionist methods [End Page 315] appropriate to the sciences of the small are not necessarily methods that can be applied to all sizes of objects we study, or all levels of reality (like the psychological and social). This is the truth about the world, although I am not sure that this is what Engel meant. As Lewis notes, Engel’s writing does sometimes sound as if he worshipped at the alter of science, as if all subjects of importance can be studied scientifically. But if he believed that, he was not correct. It might be, if all the subjects of the university that Lewis mentions are important, that some will turn out to be able to be studied in academically rigorous methods that are not scientific in any of the usual meanings of the word. Consider philosophy itself, for example.To the degree that it may stretch the evidence to say that Engel would have advocated for a pragmatic scientific method, it is still the case that pragmatism as outlined by Lewis and Engel’s biopsychosocial model can both be used to help medicine understand itself and overcome the temptation to idolize science. Medicine is not a science, or at least it is not just a science; in fact, I would suggest that it never was a science, and it will never be a science. Medicine is about health and illness, and uses whatever science it can to promote health and to treat (ameliorate or cure) illness.None of this should necessarily lead us to idolize pragmatism either. If each subject has its own ideal methodology for study, then it may be that pragmatism is the preferred method for, say, clinical judgment, whereas the scientific method is the best for the ‘hard’ sciences, and logic for philosophy. Or perhaps pragmatism and inductive logic are competing models for clinical... (shrink)

In this book K. Brad Wray provides a comprehensive survey of the arguments against scientific realism. In addition to presenting logical considerations that undermine the realists' inferences to the likely truth or approximate truth of our theories, he provides a thorough assessment of the evidence from the history of science. He also examines grounds for a defence of anti-realism, including an anti-realist explanation for the success of our current theories, an account of why false theories can be empirically successful, (...) and an explanation for why we should expect radical changes of theory in the future. His arguments are supported and illustrated by cases from the history of science, including a sustained study of the Copernican Revolution, and a study of the revolution in early twentieth century chemistry, when chemists came to classify elements by their atomic number rather than by their atomic weight. (shrink)

A table of contents, in lieu of abstract -/- Foreword by Aaron Ehasz -/- Introduction: “We are all one people, but we live as if divided” Helen De Cruz and Johan De Smedt -/- Part I The Universe of Avatar: The Last Airbender -/- 1 Native Philosophies and Relationality in ATLA: It’s (Lion) Turtles All the Way Down Miranda Belarde-Lewis and Clementine Bordeaux 2 Getting Elemental: How Many Elements Are There in Avatar: The Last Airbender? Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa 3 The Personalities (...) of Martial Arts in Avatar: The Last Airbender Zachary Isrow 4 The End of the World: Nationhood and Abolition in Avatar: The Last Airbender Nicholas Whittaker 5 The Bending World, a Bent World: Supernatural Power and Its Political Implications Yao Lin -/- Part II Water 6 Avatar: The Last Airbender and Anishinaabe Philosophy Brad Cloud 7 “Lemur!” – “Dinner!”: Human–Animal Relations in Avatar: The Last Airbender Daniel Wawrzyniak 8 On the Moral Neutrality of Bloodbending Johnathan Flowers 9 On the Ethics of Bloodbending: Why Is It So Wrong and Can It Ever Be Good? Mike Gregory 10 Mystical Rationality Isaac Wilhelm 11 “I will never, ever turn my back on people who need me”: Repairing the World Through Care Nicole Fice 12 Spirits, Visions, and Dreams: Native American Epistemology and the Aang Gang Justin Skirry and Samuel Skirry -/- Part III Earth 13 Time Is an Illusion: Time and Space in the Swamp Natalia Strok 14 There Is No Truth in Ba Sing Se: Bald-faced Lies and the Nature of Lying Nathan Kellen 15 The Rocky Terrain of Disability Gain in ATLA: Is Toph a Supercrip Stereotype or a Disability Pride Icon? Joseph A. Stramondo 16 The Earth King, Ignorance, and Responsibility Saba Fatima 17 The Middle Way and the Many Faces of Earth Thomas Arnold -/- Part IV Fire 18 The Battle Within: Confucianism and Legalism in the Nation, the Family, and the Soul Kody W. Cooper 19 Not Giving Up on Zuko: Relational Identity and the Stories We Tell Barrett Emerick and Audrey Yap 20 Uncle Iroh, from Fool to Sage – or Sage All Along? Eric Schwitzgebel and David Schwitzgebel 21 Being Bad at Being Good: Zuko’s Transformation and Residual Practical Identities Justin F. White 22 Compassion and Moral Responsibility in Avatar: The Last Airbender: “I was never angry; I was afraid that you had lost your way” Robert H. Wallace -/- Part V Air 23 The Fire Nation and the United States: Genocide as the Foundation for Empire Building Kerri J. Malloy 24 Anarchist Airbenders: On Anarchist Philosophy in ATLA Savriël Dillingh 25 A Buddhist Perspective on Energy Bending, Strength, and the Power of Aang's Spirit Nicholaos Jones and Holly Jones 26 Ahimsa and Aang’s Dilemma: “Everyone … [has] to be treated like they're worth giving a chance” James William Lincoln 27 The Avatar Meets the Karmapa: Interconnections, Friendship, and Moral Training Brett Patterson . (shrink)

Evolutionary theory is a paradigmatic example of a well-supported scientific theory. In this chapter we consider a number of objections to evolutionary theory, and show how responding to these objections reveals aspects of the way in which scientific theories are supported by evidence. Teaching these objections can therefore serve two pedagogical aims: students can learn the right way to respond to some popular arguments against evolutionary theory, and they can learn some basic features of the structure of scientific theories and (...) evidence. (shrink)

In this undergraduate textbook Lewis R. Gordon offers the first comprehensive treatment of Africana philosophy, beginning with the emergence of an Africana consciousness in the Afro-Arabic world of the Middle Ages. He argues that much of modern thought emerged out of early conflicts between Islam and Christianity that culminated in the expulsion of the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula, and from the subsequent expansion of racism, enslavement, and colonialism which in their turn stimulated reflections on reason, liberation, and the meaning (...) of being human. His book takes the student reader on a journey from Africa through Europe, North and South America, the Caribbean, and back to Africa, as he explores the challenges posed to our understanding of knowledge and freedom today, and the response to them which can be found within Africana philosophy. (shrink)

This article explores five ways in which philosophy could be colonized: (1) racial and ethnic origins, (2) coloniality of its norms, (3) market commodification, (4) disciplinary decadence, (5) solipsism—and what the author calls a teleological suspension of philosophy as consideration among other practices of thought.

First published in 1997. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The eminent scholar Lewis R. Gordon offers a probing meditation on freedom, justice, and decolonization. What is there to be understood and done when it is evident that the search for justice, which dominates social and political philosophy of the North, is an insufficient approach for the achievements of dignity, freedom, liberation, and revolution? Gordon takes the reader on a journey as he interrogates a trail from colonized philosophy to re-imagining liberation and revolution to critical challenges raised by Afropessimism, theodicy, (...) and looming catastrophe. He offers not forecast and foreclosure but instead an urgent call for dignifying and urgent acts of political commitment. Such movements take the form of examining what philosophy means in Africana philosophy, liberation in decolonial thought, the unshackling of political philosophy from the liberal moral theory setting the stage for the decolonization of justice and normative life, unleashing the obstacles to cultivating emancipatory politics, challenging reductionist forms of thought that proffer harm and suffering as conditions of political appearance and the valorization of nonhuman being. He asserts instead emancipatory considerations for occluded forms of life and the irreplaceability of existence in the face of catastrophe and ruin, and he concludes, through a discussion with the Circassian philosopher and decolonial theorist, Madina Tlostanova, with the project of shifting the geography of reason. (shrink)

Alongside concerns for animal welfare, concerns for land, water, and climate are undermining established food identities in many parts of the world. In Aotearoa New Zealand, agrifood relations are bound tightly into national identities and the materialities of export dependence on dairying and agriculture more widely. Dairy/ing identities have been central to national development projects and the politics that underpin them for much of New Zealand’s history. They are central to an intransigent agrifood political ontology. For the last decade, however, (...) they have been challenged by the identity politics of ethical food consumption. This paper explores the ensuing contests and asks how they are reshaping agrifood identities. We draw on interviews with 15 participants in Aotearoa New Zealand who have made dietary transitions that reduce or exclude dairy products. Our aim is not to identify a new post-dairying identity or claim a reconfigured national identity, but to examine the collision of production-consumption values in the context of a dominant place-based food identity. We ask how participants navigate contradictory commitments to becoming ‘good environmental citizens’ whilst remaining ‘good national citizens’. The paper offers insights for examining similar struggles elsewhere and the potential to shift agrifood relations and undermine entrenched political ontologies through ethical food consumption values. (shrink)

In this article we analyze the social memories of the Vietnam War afforded by tourism at the Cu Chi battlefield. Specifically, we explore the experiences of tourists at the site in order to address the under-theorized relationship between carnivalesque and dialogical discourses. Drawing on field interviews and ethnographic engagement with young adult Western tourists who took tours led by Vietnamese guides, we document how the tourists’ playful engagement with the past at Cu Chi facilitates the development of new dialogical memories (...) of the war. Our interviews reveal a strong concern with the suffering of both occupying forces and the Vietnamese communist forces, a finding that points to the need for scholars to better appreciate the multiplicity of ways that social performances function in shaping social memory. Ultimately, we challenge social performance theories whose explanations reduce shifts in social memory to audience interpretations of authenticity. (shrink)

Originally delivered to mark the fiftieth anniversary of both Frantz Fanon’s death and the publication of his seminal discourse on decolonization, The Wretched of the Earth, these remarks seek to offer a preliminary outline of Fanon’s continuing relevance to the present. Conceptually spanning such touchstone elements of Fanon’s thought as sociogeny, race, violence, the human, and the relation between decolonial ethics and decolonial politics, the authors turn our attention to diagnosing the neoliberal face of contemporary coloniality/modernity and contributing to movements (...) from the Arab (or North African) Spring to the Occupy movement, from Philadelphia’s “flash mobs” to the new Latin American Left. (shrink)

David Oldroyd died in Sydney on 7 November 2014. Many readers of this journal would know of David’s impressive career as an historian of science and many would have also had the pleasure of knowing David personally. His academic career spanned across England, New Zealand and Australia, and his expertise in history of geology took him to several parts of the world for conferences and research, archival as well as geological, including Europe, China, Turkey, Russia and North America. His experiences (...) and research led to numerous books, edited volumes, journal articles and book chapters.He was also a prolific book reviewer. As those associated with Metascience over the past 30 years would know, he made countless contributions to this journal, all of outstanding quality and showcasing his extensive expertise. Aside from his many reviews, David’s most outstanding published contributions to Metascience include his 1989 analysis of Paul Feyerabend’s critique of empiricism, “The Art-Science Ana .. (shrink)

The wide range of disciplines represented here enables the volume to stand as a contextualizing work in Fanon studies. It contains new original essays on Africana philosophy, the human sciences, dialectical humanism, women of color studies, neocolonial and postcolonial studies, violence, and tragedy.

This introduction outlines why the author assembled a community of scholars with the task not of commenting on Jane Anna Gordon’s work on creolizing political theory but instead placing it in dialogue with their own. The idea is that the value of theory depends also on the extent to which it could be engaged as a communicative practice with other theories dedicated to a shared concern. In this case, it is scholars committed to thought devoted to concerns of dignity, freedom, (...) and liberation as well as the critical question of the ultimate value of doing theoretical work. (shrink)

The present study provides evidence that the activation strength produced by emotional stimuli must pass a threshold level in order to be consciously perceived, contrary to the assumption of continuous quality of representation. An analysis of receiver operating characteristics for attentional blink performance was used to distinguish between two models of emotion perception by inspecting two different ROC’s shapes. Across all conditions, the results showed that performance in the attentional blink task was better described by the two-limbs ROC predicted by (...) the Krantz threshold model than by the curvilinear ROC implied by the signal-detection theory. (shrink)