This article reconstructs and defends the judicial doctrine variously called ‘rationality review’, ‘formal equality’, ‘discrimination’, or ‘arbitrariness’. The doctrine is renamed underinclusivenes...

Review of Dawid, Twining & Vasileki 'Evidence, Inference and Inquiry' (2011).

An influential critique of anger holds that anger comes at an important epistemic cost. In particular, feeling angry typically makes risk less visible to us. This is anger’s ‘red mist.’ These epistemic costs, critics suggest, arguably outweigh the epistemic benefits commonly ascribed to anger. This essay argues that the epistemic critique of anger is importantly misleading. This is not because it underestimates anger’s epistemic benefits, but rather because it overlooks the fact that anger’s red mist performs a crucial moral function. (...) By concealing risk, the red mist helps protect the dignity and self-respect of those who live under severe and unchosen risk. This function is vitally important in non-ideal circumstances, where many are unjustly subjected to dignity-impairing risk. And it is irreplaceable, in that it cannot readily be performed by other political emotions, such as hope. Beyond providing a novel defence of anger, this argument has a broader upshot. Anger’s red mist reveals that ignorance is not always problematic in politics. Accordingly, it should not be treated—as has standardly been the case—as an unmitigated political evil. In the first instance, our efforts are better spent ascertaining when ignorance is a problem, and when, instead, it performs a felicitous function. (shrink)

Ignorant speech, which spreads falsehoods about people and policies, is pervasive in public discourse. A popular response to this problem recommends countering ignorant speech with more speech, rather than legal regulations. However, Mary Kate McGowan has influentially argued that this ‘counterspeech’ response is flawed, as it overlooks the asymmetric pliability of conversational norms: the phenomenon whereby some conversational norms are easier to enact than subsequently to reverse. After demonstrating that this conversational ‘stickiness’ is an even broader concern for counterspeech than (...) McGowan suggests—it applies not just to oppressive or hateful speech, but also to ordinary policy-related misinformation—I argue that a more sophisticated account of counterspeech can nevertheless overcome it. First, the stickiness objection overlooks the distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ counterspeech. Instead of directly negating a distorted proposition, positive counterspeech affirms a correct proposition that is inconsistent with the falsehoods at hand. This, I contend, allows it to counter ignorant speech without triggering the properties that render it sticky. Second, the stickiness objection presupposes an unrefined conception of counterspeech’s temporality. Counterspeech should be understood as a diachronic process, which not only follows, but also pre-empts, ignorant utterances. Drawing on speech-act theories of silencing, I argue that pre-emptive counterspeech can condition the conversational context so as to prevent subsequent ignorant utterances from enacting sticky conversational norms. Thus, this theoretically-refined conception of counterspeech helps appreciate how verbal responses might overcome the stickiness of conversational norms; and, in doing so, it reveals that this stickiness need not provide reasons to prefer legal remedies to counterspeech. (shrink)

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains that “The world is all that is the case.” Some philosophers have seen an advantage in introducing into a formal language either a constant which will represent the world, or an operator, e.g., ‘Max’, such that indicates that p gives a complete description of the actual world, of the world at some instant of time, or of a possible world. Such propositions are called world propositions, possible world propositions, or maximal propositions. For us, a maximal (...) proposition is a possible world proposition; it gives a complete description of one way the world might be. A maximal proposition p is not logically false, and for any proposition q, either p entails q or p entails not-q. (shrink)

By the standards presented in the Introduction, CMFC2 is deficient on at least one ontological ground: ‘∀’ is a syncategorematic expression and so CMFC2 is not an ideal language. To some there may be an additional difficulty: any two wffs provably equivalent in the classical sense are provably identical. We hope in sequel to present systems free of these difficulties, free either of one or the other, or perhaps both.This work was done with the aid of Canada Council Grant S74-0551-S1.

Cet article vise à présenter une dimension peu connue de la pensée de Berkeley à travers une étude minutieuse des polémiques entretenues par ce dernier tout au long de la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle. Ces polémiques, dont le contenu est généralement politique, moral ou économique, reposent sur trois thèses récurrentes et complémentaires, rarement pensées de concert: une philosophie cyclique de l’histoire; une distinction ontologique entre activité et passivité appliquée à d’autres domaines que celui de la métaphysique; une analogie entre (...) monde physique et monde moral qui fonctionne au niveau du rapport entre macrocosme et microcosme. La mise en valeur de ces trois thèses permet d’envisager la philosophie berkeleyenne sous un autre angle, notamment en donnant à son immatérialisme une saveur plus stratégique qu’on ne le fait habituellement. (shrink)

This article concerns the prescriptive function of decision analysis. Consider an agent who must choose an action yielding welfare that varies with an unknown state of nature. It is often asserted that such an agent should adhere to consistency axioms which imply that behavior can be represented as maximization of expected utility. However, our agent is not concerned the consistency of his behavior across hypothetical choice sets. He only wants to make a reasonable choice from the choice set that he (...) actually faces. Hence, I reason that prescriptions for decision making should respect actuality. That is, they should promote welfare maximization in the choice problem the agent actually faces. Any choice respecting weak and stochastic dominance is rational from the actualist perspective. (shrink)

Research and engineering in the quantum domain involve long chains of activity involving theory development, hypothesis formation, experimentation, device prototyping, device testing, and many more. At each stage multiple paths become possible, and of the paths pursued, the majority will lead nowhere. Our quantum metascience approach provides a strategy which enables all stakeholders to gain an overview of those developments along these tracks, that are relevant to their specific concerns. It provides a controlled vocabulary, built out of terms that are (...) designed to be maximally comprehensible to all groups of stakeholders and across all the sub-fields of the quantum domain. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, transhumanism is a movement seeking to advance the cause of post-humanity. It advocates using science and technology for a reconstruction of the human condition sufficiently radical to call into question the appropriateness of calling it “human” anymore. While there is not universal agreement among transhumanists as to the best path to this goal, the general outline is clear enough. Advances in genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, robotics and nanotechnology will make possible the achievement of the Baconian vision of “the (...) relief of man’s estate,” as they allow us to conquer disease, eliminate unhappiness, end scarcity and postpone, perhaps indefinitely, death itself. But fulfilling such long-standing dreams is only the beginning of what our new powers will make possible. Left to itself, the present trajectory of technological development necessarily aims at a future incomprehensible to beings such as we are – at no distant date an evolutionary leap in the way intelligence is embodied, and what it can accomplish. Transhumanism seeks to make sure no atavistic scruple obstructs this momentum, and to maximize its benefits and minimize its admitted risks. While there is no lack of illuminating print works advocating transhumanism, that its public face should be on the World Wide Web is as much a matter of course as once would have been the use by similar movements of the printed broadside or the public lecture. On the websites of the World Transhumanist Association (www. transhumanism.org) and the Extropy Institute (www.extropy. org) – premier among transhumanism’s many organizations – one finds authoritative statements explaining and justifying the transhumanist project. If transhumanism were primarily an academic school or a professional association, it would not be entirely fair to turn to these admittedly popular presentations for a critical look at the transhumanist vision. But as these are the documents by which transhumanism presents itself to the public as a movement, and through which it hopes to gain adherents, it is legitimate to make.... (shrink)

The terms “patriotism” and “nationalism” are distinguished historically, conceptually, and geographically. Historically, patriotism is shown to have roots in the classical republican tradition of political thought, according to which citizens should give priority to the common good of their political or civic, as distinct from national, community. Conceptually, it is argued that patriotism is best understood as a political philosophy, an account of the form or forms of dialogue that citizens should engage in when responding to their conflicts, whereas nationalism (...) is a political ideology, an account of the kinds of things that citizens should be saying within those dialogues, in particular, when they take the form of negotiation. Patriotism, then, is that political philosophy which endorses the maxim “conversation first, negotiation second, force third,” since conversation between citizens has the best prospects for realizing and developing the common good. Nationalism, by contrast, is the ideology of those who, when it comes to political negotiations, give the greatest weight to the needs of their national community. Finally, regarding geography, patriotism is shown to be concerned with the jurisdiction of the state, whereas nationalism emphasizes the permanent and sharply demarcated territory where the national community is located. The chapter then concludes with the recommendation that we all need to affirm a global patriotism, alongside the more local forms. (shrink)

The crito takes no stand on the question of whether violating the law is ever morally justified, despite modern attempts to derive a civil disobedience doctrine from it. The argument is largely ad hoc and ad hominem and resistant to generalization as political theory. The central claim is that socrates' escape would be unjust because escape would be an act whose maxim is incompatible with the principle of effective legality. A new construal of the crito's argument is offered and several (...) problems with the argument are discussed. (shrink)

Looking at the moral law from Polanyi’s post-critical epistemology and emergent ontology reveals two interconnected roles for the letter of the law and two ways in which it can oppose the spirit of the law. For the moral student the law is a procedural method, for the moral virtuoso the law is an incomplete explicit expression of a tacit way of being. The two are connected in that procedural rules and practices set the basis for understanding and experiencing an emergent (...) reality. This reality is embodied in the exemplars of a moraltradition and expressed in its principles and maxims. (shrink)

Econometric analysis of discrete choice has made considerable use of random utility models to interpret observed choice behavior. Much empirical research concerns choice problems in which persons act with partial knowledge of the utilities of the feasible actions. Economists use random expected utility models to analyze such choice problems. A common practice is to specify fully the expectations that persons hold, in which case choice analysis reduces to inference on preferences alone. However, the expectations assumptions made in empirical research rarely (...) have much foundation. To enable more credible research, this paper considers inference when one specifies a set of expectations that decision makers may plausibly hold. I first pose the idea in abstraction and then specialize to binary response with linear utilities, where the analysis is particularly straightforward. I initially assume that decision makers possess unique subjective probability distributions on the states of nature and make choices that maximize expected utility. I later consider the possibility that persons place only partial probabilistic structure on the states of nature and make undominated choices. (shrink)

M. Nordmann has presented Einstein's principle in words which lift the average reader over many of the difficulties he must encounter in trying to take it in. Remembering Goethe's maxim that he who would accomplish anything must limit himself, he has not aimed at covering the full field to which Einstein's teaching is directed. But he succeeds in making many abstruse things intelligible to the layman. Perhaps the most brilliant of his efforts in this direction are Chapters V and VI, (...) in which he explains with extra- ordinary lucidity the new theory of gravitation and of its relation to inertia. (shrink)

Landesman criticizes the act utilitarianism presented in j j c. Smart's "an outline of a system of utilitarian ethics". A system which eschews rules and proposes the maximization of happiness as the "only" reason for preferring one action over another, He charges, Cannot justify fairness and impartiality in ethics. (staff).

The protagonist of the wildly popular recent video game, The Last of Us, makes a difficult decision at the end of the game by refusing to sacrifice his surrogate daughter so that scientists could try to find a cure for a disease that has devastated humanity for decades. I will take seriously The Last of Us as a piece of moral philosophy and argue that Joel has been interpreted as a villain primarily because many understand morality in terms of a (...) consequentialist or deontological framework. On those frameworks, Joel could be interpreted as a villain because he is not acting in a way that maximizes the good on the one hand or not acting in a way consistent with the universal moral law on the other. Against this interpretation, I argue that Joel’s actions are morally justified based on a view articulated here called teleological particularism. On this view, an agent is morally justified in their actions if and only if the action is in conformity with a role they occupy. It is teleological because it demands that we consider the roles, goals, and purposes of each individual, and it is particularist because it recognizes that those very roles, goals, and purposes can change from subject to subject, time to time, and culture to culture. The role of “father” demands that he protect and provide for the child, and that the father helps the child become autonomous. Joel’s role then demands that he put his child’s interests even above the interests of the rest of humanity, even if those interests are absolutely dire. According to teleological particularism then, Joel is not a villain and his actions in defense of Ellie are permissible. (shrink)

The use of quality of life (QOL) outcomes in clinical trials is increasing as a number of practical, ethical, methodological, and regulatory reasons for their use have become apparent. It is important, then, that QOL measurements and differences between QOL scores be readily interpretable. We study interpretation in two contexts: when determining QOL and when basing decisions on QOL differences. We consider both clinical situations involving individual patients and research contexts, e.g., randomized clinical trials, involving groups of patients. We note (...) the ethical importance of such understanding: proper interpretation and communication facilitate health care decision making. Communication that facilitates interpretation is of moral significance since better communication can attenuate ethical problems and inform choices. Much of what is communication worthy about QOL assessments is determined by the particular QOL instrument used in the assessment and how it is administered. In practice, these choices will be driven by the purpose of the assessment, but, it is argued, to maximize understanding, we should combine the information garnered from traditional standardized QOL instruments, from individualized QOL assessments, and from a recently proposed dialogic paradigm, where QOL is determined by shared conversation regarding the interpretation of texts. And, while some studies can surely succeed using abbreviated methods of administration (e.g., postal surveys may suffice for certain purposes), we will focus on methods of administration involving interviewer–respondent interaction. We suggest that during the QOL elicitation process, interviewer and respondent should engage in a two-way conversation in order to achieve a shared understanding of the “answers” to QOL “questions” and, finally, to reach a shared interpretation of the individual’s QOL. (shrink)

Data Safety and Monitoring Boards were introduced in the 1960s to monitor data in clinical trials to ensure subject safety. It was thought important that DSMB members be experts in the field of interest, but not otherwise involved in the study in order to maximize objectivity. Since then, the use of DSMBs has increased dramatically, and their scope has expanded to include scientific issues — in particular, to avoid bias that can result when trials are stopped early because of evidence (...) that one treatment has greater efficacy or causes greater harm than another; or that no treatment is likely to do better than any other. (shrink)

We develop an approach to the longstanding conjecture of Kierstead concerning the character of strongly nontrivial automorphisms of computable linear orderings. Our main result is that for any η-like computable linear ordering, such that has no interval of order type η, and such that the order type of is determined by a -limitwise monotonic maximal block function, there exists computable such that has no nontrivial automorphism.

Prior to European influence, predation by Native Americans was the major factor limiting the numbers and distribution of ungulates in the Intermountain West. This hypothesis is based on analyses of (1) the efficiency of Native American predation, including cooperative hunting, use of dogs, food storage, use of nonungulate foods, and hunting methods; (2) optimal-foraging studies; (3) tribal territory boundary zones as prey reservoirs; (4) species ratios, and sex and age of aboriginal ungulate kills; (5) impact of European diseases on aboriginal (...) populations; and (6) synergism between aboriginal and carnivore predation. Native Americans had no effective conservation practices, and the manner in which they harvested ungulates was the exact opposite of any predicted conservation strategy. Native Americans acted in ways that maximized their individual fitness regardless of the impact on the environment. For humans, conservation is seldom an evolutionarily stable strategy. By limiting ungulate numbers and purposefully modifying the vegetation with fire, Native Americans structured entire plant and animal communities. Because ecosystems with native peoples are entirely different than those lacking aboriginal populations, a “hands-off” or “natural regulation” approach by today’s land managers will not duplicate the ecological conditions under which those ecosystems developed. The modern concept of wilderness as areas without human influence is a myth. North America was not a “wilderness” waiting to be discovered, instead it was home to tens of millions of aboriginal peoples before European-introduced diseases decimated their numbers. (shrink)

The framework presented by Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus (henceforth SFD) centres on a new view of entrepreneurship. This sees the entrepreneur not simply as the instrumentally rational agent of economic maximization, but as someone committed to new modes of practice. This rescues the entrepreneur from the misleading stereotype which both right and left have conspired to accredit in our society. It allows us to see that there is more than one type of entrepreneur, and it defines one which is potentially (...) very benign in democratic society (and also social?democratic societies). SFD propose to see political initiative?taking in democratic societies as analogous to this kind of entrepreneurship, and they extend their analysis to deal with the maintenance and fostering of solidarity. The framework is very illuminating for the first case, and partially, although less so, for the second. (shrink)

I wish to show that living is composed of events that are defined by memories, that memories are inclusive of what we might call animality, that memories are definitive of the occurrence of time, and that experiences of light and of animality are inseparably associated. Our ability to communicate With animals, our projections onto them, and our own experiences of animality show memories of something that is intrinsic to our lives and to events of appearance as well as something that (...) Heidegger leaves out of his thought. Time belongs to memory in the sense that time happens with and in memories. Without memory time does not occur. Without time memory does not occur. The phrase, the memory of time, when one maximizes the ambiguity of the ''of'', means that each belongs to the other and although we might find time passing through memory, we will also find memory marking time. The account suggests that the ''light'' of appearing happens in a fleshly way that requires considerable modification of Heidegger''s descriptive accounts of dasein and being. (shrink)

Issues: We present key aspects of our paper, commissioned by UNAIDS in 2005, entitled, “Revisiting the ethics of HIV prevention research in developing countries.” In 2004 and 2005 we witnessed the closure or suspension of three international clinical trials testing tenofovir in the prevention of HIV infection in high risk groups due to the failure to provide free treatment to those who seroconvert during the conduct of the study. We examine critically moral claims for the provision of treatment to those (...) who seroconvert in HIV prevention trials and ask whether it is a matter of moral obligation or moral negotiation?Description: Using the tools of philosophical and regulatory analysis we examine the moral foundations of research ethics, international regulation, and the contemporary literature in search of valid arguments in support of a moral obligation to treat. Arguments supporting the obligation to provide such treatment are found in a wide variety of documents. These claims are variously rooted in the demand to compensate for research-related injury, maximization of research benefit, justice as reciprocity, and justice as equality.Lessons learned: Our analysis reveals that there is as of yet no robust moral argument supporting a moral obligation to provide treatment to participants in HIV prevention trials who seroconvert. We argue that moral negotiation offers distinct advantages over moral obligation. Moral negotiation finds support in the principle of respect for communities that holds researchers responsible to respect communal values, protect and empower social institutions and abide by the decisions of accepted communal authorities.Recommendations: Moral negotiation, rather than moral obligation, reduces the chance of polarization of positions by inviting trial participants, sponsors, researchers and all other involved parties to the table for discussion. Moral negotiation favors middle ground solutions that fit the specific health needs and priorities of the community in question. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Arguments for Divine Incorporeality Arguments Against Divine Incorporeality The Immanence of God Works cited.

Prior to European influence, predation by Native Americans was the major factor limiting the numbers and distribution of ungulates in the Intermountain West. This hypothesis is based on analyses of (1) the efficiency of Native American predation, including cooperative hunting, use of dogs, food storage, use of nonungulate foods, and hunting methods; (2) optimal-foraging studies; (3) tribal territory boundary zones as prey reservoirs; (4) species ratios, and sex and age of aboriginal ungulate kills; (5) impact of European diseases on aboriginal (...) populations; and (6) synergism between aboriginal and carnivore predation. Native Americans had no effective conservation practices, and the manner in which they harvested ungulates was the exact opposite of any predicted conservation strategy. Native Americans acted in ways that maximized their individual fitness regardless of the impact on the environment. For humans, conservation is seldom an evolutionarily stable strategy. By limiting ungulate numbers and purposefully modifying the vegetation with fire, Native Americans structured entire plant and animal communities. Because ecosystems with native peoples are entirely different than those lacking aboriginal populations, a “hands-off” or “natural regulation” approach by today’s land managers will not duplicate the ecological conditions under which those ecosystems developed. The modern concept of wilderness as areas without human influence is a myth. North America was not a “wilderness” waiting to be discovered, instead it was home to tens of millions of aboriginal peoples before European-introduced diseases decimated their numbers. (shrink)

In their article, ‘That is not dead which can eternal lie: the aestivation hypothesis for resolving Fermi’s paradox’, Sandberg et al. try to explain the Fermi paradox by claiming that Landauer’s principle implies that a civilization can in principle perform far more times more) irreversible logical operations if it conserves its resources until the distant future when the cosmic background temperature is very low. So perhaps aliens are out there, but quietly waiting. Sandberg et al. implicitly assume, however, that computer-generated (...) entropy can only be disposed of by transferring it to the cosmological background. In fact, while this assumption may apply in the distant future, our universe today contains vast reservoirs and other physical systems in non-maximal entropy states, and computer-generated entropy can be transferred to them at the adiabatic conversion rate of one bit of negentropy to erase one bit of error. This can be done at any time, and is not improved by waiting for a low cosmic background temperature. Thus aliens need not wait to be active. As Sandberg et al. do not provide a concrete model of the effect they assert, we construct one and show where their informal argument goes wrong. (shrink)

This chapter opens with a discussion on Kevin Smith, Star Wars and terrorism. Terrorism means something only within a specific way of thinking about right and wrong, or, more generally, an ethical theory or framework. One very popular and powerful ethical framework is utilitarianism, which views the moral life as about producing the greatest good for the greatest number, maximizing pleasure over pain or happiness over unhappiness. The chapter describes many terrorist attacks and highlights that workers building Death Star II (...) are different from the innocents of Gaza, Hiroshima, Alderaan, and Madrid in that these workers were actively contributing to the evil intention and military goals of the enemy. The chapter further points out that the ability to challenge the dominant cultural lens through which most of us look at the world and ask critical questions of our own “side” is as rare today as it is important. (shrink)

Many philosophers and some economists value economic equality on the ground that transfers from the relatively rich to the relatively poor increase the utility of the poor more than they reduce the utility of the rich. These philosophers and economists are assuming the ethical principle that a pattern of economic distribution is justified by maximizing aggregate utility. They are also assuming the truth of an empirical generalization proposed in the eighteenth century by Daniel Bernoulli–that successive equal increments of income produce (...) ever-diminishing increments in an individual's level of utility. In the first part of this essay I will argue against Bernoulli's hypothesis, and suggest an alternative view of the relation between income and utility. (shrink)

In this article we explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven that this is empirically (...) true: i.e. that a given function allows us to predict the choices of that particular class of agents. We show how expected utility functions were introduced and contested in accordance with this pattern in the 18th century and how it recurred in the 1950s when Allais made his case against the neo-Bernoullians. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of Frege's maxim that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. Quine reads the maxim as saying that the sentence is the fundamental unit of significance. Dummett rejects this as a truism. But it is not a truism since it stands in opposition to a conception of meaning held by John Locke and others. The maxim denies that a word has a sense independently of any sentence in (...) which it occurs. Dummett says this denial is inconsistent with the fact that people understand sentences they have never heard before. The maxim is defended against this attack. (shrink)

Health care professionals assigned to critical care are confronted on a daily basis with particularly trying situations. Their hard work conditions can become anxiety-provoking, affect their physical and/or psychological condition, decrease their performance and increase their absenteeism rate at work. To face this particularly stressful and sometimes depressing context, some professionals fall back on “gallows humour”, a sort of black humour with a morbid overtone, which is likely to shock certain people. Although gallows humour is very widespread, its use in (...) critical care is extremely controversial and most of the time reprimanded by professional orders. Based on the codes of ethics that govern them, professional orders assume that gallows humour violates the duties and responsibilities of their members towards their patients, rejecting its use straightaway. In this article, we contest the categorical rejection of gallows humour in critical care. We adopt a consequentialist perspective based on the study of scientific literature on the benefits of using humour in the workplace, to defend its ethical acceptability. By enabling us to be better prepared to provide care despite the tragic events experienced by professionals, we will see how the use of gallows humour can ultimately have a positive effect on patients. A consequentialist ethics is not only interested in maximizing the benefits of gallows humour but also in reducing the risk of harm to others related to its use. This important criterion will therefore lead us to define the terms and suggest certain conditions that must be respected for an ethical use of this important defense mechanism by health care professionals in critical care. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on Nietzsche’s critique of genius in Human, all too human (1878) and on the redetermination of his approach to artistic phenomena in Mixed opinions and maxims (1879) in order to highlight the unique perspective Nietzsche develops in these texts on the relationship between work and author. By criticizing the excessive place given to the artist in the «superstition of genius», and then by formulating a conception of art on the basis of the rejection of the (...) primacy of works of art, Nietzsche avoids breaking the bond tying the author to his work in order to make the bond itself the object of his reflection, in a view of art as transfiguration applied to one’s own existence. In this study I propose a new reading of his critique of genius, which places it within the continuity of his reflection on art and which highlights the transformations undergone by the two functions, cognitive and palliative, that Nietzsche first attributes to art and genius in keeping with Schopenhauer and Wagner. (shrink)

A patient-physician relationship provides a milieu for a patient to achieve healing, solace, and reintegration of personhood. A patient's primary physician assumes a leadership role in that regard, coordinating and facilitating a regimen of analysis and therapy. The quality, quantity, and rapidity of technological advancements in the delivery of medical care, render any individual physician incomplete in terms of his ability to provide total care. Consequently, a succession of professional and paraprofessional personnel must be involved to maximize the care rendered. (...) Nevertheless, a patient's primary physician must fulfill a leadership role as he coordinates consultations and interprets the data they provide, placing it in the appropriate situational context for his patient as part of a collective and mutual decision-making process. A patient's primary physician must be acknowledged to possess the power and authority to effect the care provided, as he must also accept the accountability, duty, obligation, and responsibility for the result of that care. By these means ambiguity and uncertainty are mitigated. (shrink)

A methodology of argumentation and a perspective of incredulity are essential ingredients of all intellectual endeavor, including that associated with the art and science of medical care.Traditio argumentum respectus (tradition of respectful argumentation) as a principled system of assessing the validity of beliefs, opinions, perceptions, data, and knowledge, is worthy of practice and perpetuation, because assessments of validity are susceptible to incompleteness, incorrectness, and misinterpretation. Since the latter may lead to ambiguity, uncertainty, anxiety, and animosity among the individuals (patients and (...) physicians) involved in such dialogue, objective analyses and criteria are desirable. A tradition of respectful argumentation is a means to this end—to maximize objectivity and minimize subjectivity as part of decision-making processes and to preserve the integrity of the participants in a patient-physician relationship. During such discourse one must always be cognizant of fallacious arguments—material, verbal, and formal fallacies—since they compromise the validity of assertions. This essay summarizes a classification of fallacious arguments, by definition and by example, predicated upon the intellectual tradition of Occidental Society; and advocates a tradition of respectful argumentation to nullify them. (shrink)

We present a quantitative model of sex allocation to investigate whether the simple “rules of thumb” suggested by Trivers and Willard (1973) would really maximize numbers of grandchildren in human populations. Using demographic data from the !Kung of southern Africa and the basic assumptions of the Trivers-Willard hypothesis, we calculate expected numbers of grandchildren based on age- and sex-specific reproductive value. Patterns of parental investment that would maximize numbers of expected grandchildren often differ from the Trivers-Willard rules. In particular, the (...) optimum parental behavior is sensitive to population dynamics, type of parental investment, and, most important, relative ages of sons and daughters. It is doubtful whether a parent blindly following the simple Trivers-Willard rules would maximize numbers of expected grandchildren, on average. In addition, we show that sex-specific infanticide will almost never achieve the goal of maximizing expected numbers of grandchildren. (shrink)

Health care professionals assigned to critical care are confronted on a daily basis with particularly trying situations. Their hard work conditions can become anxiety-provoking, affect their physical and/or psychological condition, decrease their performance and increase their absenteeism rate at work. To face this particularly stressful and sometimes depressing context, some professionals fall back on “gallows humour”, a sort of black humour with a morbid overtone, which is likely to shock certain people. Although gallows humour is very widespread, its use in (...) critical care is extremely controversial and most of the time reprimanded by professional orders. Based on the codes of ethics that govern them, professional orders assume that gallows humour violates the duties and responsibilities of their members towards their patients, rejecting its use straightaway. In this article, we contest the categorical rejection of gallows humour in critical care. We adopt a consequentialist perspective based on the study of scientific literature on the benefits of using humour in the workplace, to defend its ethical acceptability. By enabling us to be better prepared to provide care despite the tragic events experienced by professionals, we will see how the use of gallows humour can ultimately have a positive effect on patients. A consequentialist ethics is not only interested in maximizing the benefits of gallows humour but also in reducing the risk of harm to others related to its use. This important criterion will therefore lead us to define the terms and suggest certain conditions that must be respected for an ethical use of this important defense mechanism by health care professionals in critical care. (shrink)

Corruption involves greed, money, and risky decision-making. We explore the love of money, pay satisfaction, probability of risk, and dishonesty across cultures. Avaricious monetary aspiration breeds unethicality. Prospect theory frames decisions in the gains-losses domain and high-low probability. Pay dissatisfaction (in the losses domain) incites dishonesty in the name of justice at the individual level. The Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI, signals a high-low probability of getting caught for dishonesty at the country level. We theorize that decision-makers adopt avaricious love-of-money aspiration (...) as a lens and frame dishonesty in the gains-losses domain (pay satisfaction-dissatisfaction, Level 1) and high-low probability (CPI, Level 2) to maximize expected utility and ultimate serenity. We challenge the myth: Pay satisfaction mitigates dishonesty across nations consistently. Based on 6500 managers in 32 countries, our cross-level three-dimensional visualization offers the following discoveries. Under high aspiration conditions, pay dissatisfaction excites the highest- (third-highest) avaricious justice-seeking dishonesty in high (medium) CPI nations, supporting the certainty effect. However, pay satisfaction provokes the second-highest avaricious opportunity-seizing dishonesty in low CPI entities, sustaining the possibility effect—maximizing expected utility. Under low aspiration conditions, high pay satisfaction consistently leads to low dishonesty, demonstrating risk aversion—achieving ultimate serenity. We expand prospect theory from a micro and individual-level theory to a cross-level theory of monetary wisdom across 32 nations. We enhance the S-shaped Curve to three 3-D corruption surfaces across three levels of the global economic pyramid, providing novel insights into behavioral economics, business ethics, the environment, and responsibility. (shrink)

Peirce is best known as the founder of pragmatism, but his dissatisfaction with how others understood and appropriated it prompted him to rename his own doctrine “pragmaticism” and to compose several variants of his original maxim defining it, as well as numerous restatements and elaborations. This paper presents an extensive selection of such formulations, followed by analysis and commentary demonstrating that for Peirce the ultimate meaning of an intellectual concept is properly expressed as a conditional proposition about the deliberate, self-controlled (...) conduct of its interpreters, not the law-governed behavior of its object. (shrink)

This remarkable expression of radical republican thought has never before been published. Algernon Sidney was among the most unrelenting partisans of the parliamentary party during the Commonwealth, and died on the scaffold in 1683 for his opposition to Charles II. Sidney's voluminous Discourses Concerning Government was published after his death, but the earlier and more vivid Court Maxims was only recently rediscovered in a manuscript in Warwick Castle. Written during Sidney's continental exile, Court Maxims reveals the international character of (...) republican thought. Its dialogue structure presents a lively discussion about the principles of government and the practice of politics, articulating a vital tradition of republicanism in an age of absolutism. These characteristics make Court Maxims a unique text, essential reading for anyone interested in republicanism or Early Modern political thought. (shrink)

Charles Peirce had significant interests in economics. He reworked the mathematical economic models of Cournot and Jevons in the 1870s. He conceived of the transitive axiom of consumer preferences in 1874. Peirce also developed a thesis of the cognitive efficiency of the human mind, abduction. He criticized Newcomb's economic writings. These forays into economics affected the six essays on pragmatism. These interests in economics are integrated with the meaning of the pragmatic maxim in Peirce's 1903 Harvard Lectures.

Christopher Hookway presents a series of essays on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1913), the 'founder of pragmatism' and one of the most important and original American philosophers.

SummaryIn this paper, I aim to retrieve insights from the philosophy of the polymath Charles Sanders Peirce, which he referred to as pragmaticism. What Peirce is perhaps best known as is being the father of pragmatism. In order to differentiate his project from other thinkers such as William James and John Dewey, who likewise referred to their projects as pragmatism, he renamed his pragmatism to pragmaticism.Peirce’s pragmaticism has much to offer theologians, especially concerning theological method. I demonstrate this claim (...) by showing the usefulness of three of Peirce’s pragmaticist concepts. The first section of this paper briefly explicates the foundational concepts of pragmaticism, which are the pragmatic maxim, the semiotic nature of understanding, and fallibilism. The second section of this paper provides a sketch of the benefits these three concepts have for theological method. (shrink)

Abstract:In Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics and the Normative Sciences, I argue that Peirce was motivated to develop a normative science of ethics because of his growing concern with the corruption of science in the Gilded Age, and the recognition that the pragmatic maxim entailed an amoral instrumentalism. Rather than taking a Kantian approach to resolve the latter issue, he adopts an Aristotelian one, engaging in a search for an ultimate end that could order all other ends. What is (...) right is what would be conducive to that end. As such he sees the necessity of a science of esthetics which would study such an end. However, rather than eudaimonia as the highest end, Peirce sees reasonableness as the summum bonum. Although barely sketched by Peirce, I argue that its principal sense is that of an ongoing process of self-correction away from error. In regard to this end, what is most important is the design of practices and the establishment of habits of conduct and sentiment most conducive to self-correction. For this reason, a proper community of inquiry with these features ought to be established, armed with the general methodology of science to assess the norms that guide the experiments of living together. Assurance that communities of inquiries are moving away from error and toward improvement is based on a convergence theory of truth. (shrink)

One of the crucial debates within pragmatism concerns the import of Charles S. Peirce’s “pragmatic maxim.” The aim of this article is to show that Peirce maintains a twofold attitude toward his maxim. I would call this twofold approach ‘problematical,’ not because it is the origin of inconsistencies within Peirce’s thought, but because the collocation and use of the pragmatic maxim constitutes a genuine problem upon which Peirce continued to reflect throughout his life.1 This problem concerns the relationship among (...) semantics, metaphysics, and what Peirce called the “Normative Sciences,” i.e., the inquiry into the correct normative criteria for human self-control.On the one hand, Peirce stresses repeatedly that his.. (shrink)

In their recent debate, Hubert Dreyfus rejects John McDowell’s claim that perception is permeated with "mindedness" and argues instead that ordinary embodied coping is largely "nonconceptual." This argument has important, yet largely unacknowledged consequences for normative social theory, which this article demonstrates through a critique of Charles Taylor’s Verstehen thesis. If Dreyfus is right that "the enemy of expertise is thought," then Taylor is denied his defense against charges of relativism, which is that maximizing the interpretive clarity of social (...) practices unequivocally makes for better practices. Verstehen social theory, I argue, must consider both the gains and losses of the attempt to make the meaning of our practices explicit. (shrink)

Much has been written on the pragmatic maxim introduced in the 1878 essay 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear'. It was not there so named, but a quarter century later, at the outset of his Lectures on Pragmatism delivered at Harvard in 1903, Peirce quoted it and named it.1 At the conclusion of those lectures occurs another statement named a 'maxim' and implied to be pragmatism's. This 1903 maxim is almost as well-known as the 1878 maxim but has received little (...) comment.2 Was it only a figurative expression of the original maxim? That view cannot survive a careful reading of it and of the lectures which it concludes.3Neither maxim states a theory of meaning, but each implies... (shrink)