v. 1. Olhar sociológico pós-moderno -- v. 2. Insolúvel busca de solução -- v. 3. Felicidade possível.

Disgust is an essential human emotion that has remained mostly neglected, even in modern, "emotional turn" scholarship.

Este informe se enmarca en el proyecto que desde hace dos años venimos desarrollando dentro del Departamento de Investigación de la Universidad Siglo 21, en Córdoba, Argentina. Hemos abordado a través de metodología cualitativa las representaciones que los jóvenes ingresantes a la Universidad tienen acerca de la misma y del estudio universitario. En el presente reporte exponemos una serie de ejes que, de acuerdo a nuestro análisis de los discursos relevados, dan cuenta de valoraciones emergentes al momento de evaluar la (...) universidad pública en relación a la privada y viceversa. Nuestra intención es comprender y describir cuáles son las nociones entramadas en el análisis que los ingresantes realizan de una y otra institución, las cuales se ponen en juego al momento de optar y evaluar aquéllas. (shrink)

A globalized world, some argue, needs a global democracy. But there is considerable disagreement about whether global democracy is an ideal worth pursuing. One of the main grounds for scepticism is captured by the slogan: “No global demos, no global democracy.” The fact that a key precondition of democracy—a demos—is absent at the global level, some argue, speaks against the pursuit of global democracy. The paper discusses four interpretations of the skeptical slogan—each based on a specific account of (...) the notion of “the demos”—and concludes that none of them establishes that the global democratic ideal must be abandoned. In so doing, the paper (i) systematizes different types of objections against global democracy, thus bringing some clarity to an otherwise intricate debate and (ii) offers a robust but qualified defense of the global democratic ideal. (shrink)

Despite growing interest in workplace democracy, the question whether nonworker stakeholders, like suppliers and local communities, warrant inclusion in the governance of democratic companies, as workers do, has been largely neglected. We inspect this question by leaning on the boundary problem in democratic theory. We first argue that the question of who warrants inclusion in democratic workplaces is best addressed by examining why workplace democracy is warranted in the first place, and offer a twofold normative benchmark—addressing objectionable corporate power and (...) upholding efficiency—to assess the principles of democratic inclusion on offer. Against this benchmark, we next argue that the All-Affected Principle is unfit due to its over- and underinclusive extensional results, and that the All-Subjected Principle, whose variants we examine alongside their extensional results, holds more promise when coupled with independent considerations of justice or a constrained variant of the All-Affected Principle. These combinations need not entirely preclude, but speak against, nonworker stakeholder inclusion. (shrink)

The meaning ofdēmokratiais widely agreed: ‘rule by the people’ (less often ‘people-power’), wheredēmos, ‘people’, implies ‘entire citizen body’, synonymous withpolis, ‘city-state’, or πάντες πολίται, ‘all citizens’.Dēmos, on this understanding, comprised rich and poor, leaders and followers, mass and elite alike. As such,dēmokratiais interpreted as constituting a sharp rupture from previous political regimes. Rule by one man or by a few had meant the domination of one part of the community over the rest, butdēmokratia, it is said, implied self-rule, and with (...) it the dissolution of the very distinction between ruler and ruled. Its governing principle was the formal political equality of all citizens. In the words of W.G. Forrest, between 750 and 450b.c.there had developed ‘the idea of individual human autonomy … the idea that all members of a political society are free and equal, that everyone had the right to an equal say in determining the structure and the activities of his society’. (shrink)

Cultural-nationalist and democratic theory both seek to legitimize political power via collective self-rule: their principle of legitimacy refers right back to the very persons over whom political power is exercised. But such self-referential theories are incapable of jointly solving the distinct problems of legitimacy and boundaries, which they necessarily combine, once it is assumed that the self-ruling collectivity must be a pre-political, in-principle bounded, ground of legitimacy. Cultural nationalism claims that political power is legitimate insofar as it expresses the nation’s (...) pre-political culture, but it cannot fix cultural-national boundaries pre-politically. Hence the collapse into ethnic nationalism. Traditional democratic theory claims that political power is legitimized pre-politically, but cannot itself legitimize the boundaries of the people. Hence the collapse into cultural nationalism. Only once we recognize that the demos is in principle unbounded, and abandon the quest for a pre-political ground of legitimacy, can democratic theory fully avoid this collapse of demos into nation into ethnos. But such a theory departs radically from traditional theory. (shrink)

Existing conceptualizations of the demos fail to treat issues of composition and performativity consistently. Recent literature suggests that both aspects are required in a satisfactory account of the demos. An analysis of this literature suggests several desiderata that such an account must meet. I approach the definition of demos with a conceptual framework derived from Margaret Gilbert’s plural subject theory of social groups. I propose an account of demos as a plural subject, constituted by joint commitment. (...) This account offers an improved and consistent understanding of normativity, composition, agency, and cohesion of demos. -/- . (shrink)

The prevailing view is that democratic procedures are unable to confer democratic legitimacy to decisions about democratic procedures. This paper examines this claim in detail and uses referendums on the inclusion of previously disenfranchised groups in the demos as a running example. The paper distinguishes between pure, imperfect and quasi-pure models of procedural democratic legitimacy and sub-versions of them. To various extents, each model does have the capacity to confer legitimacy to demos decisions under well-defined circumstances. The paper (...) argues that quasi-pure procedural legitimacy represents the most promising account of democratic legitimacy in cases where democratic procedures are the subject of collective decision-making. According to this model, the decision to revise the rules for membership in the demos is permissible by democratic standards if and only if the revision is not forbidden by democratic principles for inclusion. The point is that the range of alternatives that are not forbidden by democratic principles of inclusion are likely to be considerable due to vagueness of the principles themselves and/or them being subject to reasonable disagreement. The paper concludes with a discussion about the possibility of democratic legitimacy for democratic institutions not introduced as a result of democratic decision-making. (shrink)

The prevailing view is that democratic procedures are unable to confer democratic legitimacy to decisions about democratic procedures. This paper examines this claim in detail and uses referendums on the inclusion of previously disenfranchised groups in the demos as a running example. The paper distinguishes between pure, imperfect and quasi-pure models of procedural democratic legitimacy and sub-versions of them. To various extents, each model does have the capacity to confer legitimacy to demos decisions under well-defined circumstances. The paper (...) argues that quasi-pure procedural legitimacy represents the most promising account of democratic legitimacy in cases where democratic procedures are the subject of collective decision-making. According to this model, the decision to revise the rules for membership in the demos is permissible by democratic standards if and only if the revision is not forbidden by democratic principles for inclusion. The point is that the range of alternatives that are not forbidden by democratic principles of inclusion are likely to be considerable due to vagueness of the principles themselves and/or them being subject to reasonable disagreement. The paper concludes with a discussion about the possibility of democratic legitimacy for democratic institutions not introduced as a result of democratic decision-making. (shrink)

The “demos paradox” is the idea that the composition of a demos could never secure democratic legitimacy because the composition of a demos cannot itself be democratically decided. Those who view this problem as unsolvable argue that this insight allows them to adopt a critical perspective towards common ideas about who has legitimate standing to participate in democratic decision-making. We argue that the opposite is true and that endorsing the demos paradox actually undermines our ability to (...) critically engage with common ideas about legitimate standing. We challenge the conception of legitimacy that lurks behind the demos paradox and argue that the real impossibility is to endorse democracy without also being committed to significant procedure-independent standards for the legitimate composition of the demos. We show that trying to solve the problem of the demos by appeal to some normative conception of democratic legitimacy is a worthwhile project that is not undermined by paradox. (shrink)

1. Concerning the meaning of reality, Mr. Demos asserts that, according to me, "what we call real is wholly relative to our purposes" and then points out that this is not what "real" means when we ask about a story whether what it relates really happened.

Today democracy is both exalted as the "best means to realize human rights" and seen as weakened because of globalization and delegation of authority beyond the nation-state. In this provocative book, James Bohman argues that democracies face a period of renewal and transformation and that democracy itself needs redefinition according to a new transnational ideal. Democracy, he writes, should be rethought in the plural; it should no longer be understood as rule by the people, singular, with a specific territorial identification (...) and connotation, but as rule by peoples, across national boundaries. Bohman shows that this new conception of transnational democracy requires reexamination of such fundamental ideas as the people, the public, citizenship, human rights, and federalism, and he argues that it offers a feasible approach to realizing democracy in a globalized world.In his account, Bohman establishes the conceptual foundations of transnational democracy by examining in detail current theories of democracy beyond the nation-state and offers a deliberative alternative. He considers the importance of communicative freedom in the transnational public sphere, human rights as the normative basis of transnational democracy, and the European Union as a transnational polity. Finally, he examines the relationship between peace and democracy, concluding that peace requires democratization on interacting state and suprastate levels. (shrink)

The meaning ofdēmokratiais widely agreed: ‘rule by the people’ (less often ‘people-power’), wheredēmos, ‘people’, implies ‘entire citizen body’, synonymous withpolis, ‘city-state’, or πάντες πολίται, ‘all citizens’.Dēmos, on this understanding, comprised rich and poor, leaders and followers, mass and elite alike. As such,dēmokratiais interpreted as constituting a sharp rupture from previous political regimes. Rule by one man or by a few had meant the domination of one part of the community over the rest, butdēmokratia, it is said, implied self-rule, and with (...) it the dissolution of the very distinction between ruler and ruled. Its governing principle was the formal political equality of all citizens. In the words of W.G. Forrest, between 750 and 450b.c.there had developed ‘the idea of individual human autonomy … the idea that all members of a political society are free and equal, that everyone had the right to an equal say in determining the structure and the activities of his society’. (shrink)

Despite being fundamental to democracy, the normative concept of the people, i.e. the demos, is highly unclear. This article clarifies the legitimacy of the demos’ boundaries by structuring the debate into three strains of justification: first, normative membership principles; second, its democratic functionality and the necessity of cohesion for this essential function; and third, a procedural understanding of the demos. It will be shown that normative principles can only justify its expansion towards the ideal of an unbounded (...) demos. On the other hand, the democratic function of the demos can be understood as a criterion for its restriction. This, however, is only possible on the basis of an existing polity and not for the initial constitution of the demos. Consequently, a legitimate demos has to take both inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies into account. These tendencies need to be weighed against each other in the democratic process, which leads to a fundamentally procedural understanding of the legitimacy of the demos. (shrink)

Penser la démocratie sans demos implique de dénouer le lien solidement établi au XIXe siècle entre les concepts de démocratie et de souveraineté du peuple. A cela, la mondialisation contemporaine ne cesse de nous inciter. Le procès continu de démocratisation de l'Etat moderne a été rendu possible par l'individualisation du sujet de droit, elle-même résultat de la destruction des droits particuliers des sociétés d'Ancien Régime par l'action centralisatrice d'un pouvoir de type territorial. Mais, en s'imposant comme la seule instance (...) garante des droits, l'Etat moderne a aussi nationalisé la citoyenneté. Or, il est certain qu'aujourd'hui l'érosion du monopole juridique et judiciaire de l'Etat s'accompagne d'une multiplication et d'une hétérogénéité croissantes des pouvoirs auxquels les individus peuvent et doivent s'adresser pour obtenir la reconnaissance et la garantie des droits qu'ils revendiquent. Cette situation nous fait obligation de dénationaliser la citoyenneté sans sacrifier pour autant cette forme spécifique de subjectivité politique qu'est l'individu sujet de droits, sans renoncer par conséquent aux ressources émancipatrices dont cette figure du sujet politique a fait la preuve au cours des deux derniers siècles. (shrink)

. The paper discusses a needed double transformation of democracy, of its institutional form and its normative ideal, in three steps. First, the Author takes for granted that the empirical fact of the increasing scope and intensity of global interaction and interdependence are not sufficient to decide the issue between gradualists and transformationalists. Indeed, gradualists and transformationalists share an underlying conception that leads to a particular emphasis in modern theories on legal institutions. This same set of problems emerges in contemporary (...) conceptions of cosmopolitan democracy, especially those formulated by Held and Habermas. Second, he considers the more decentered alternatives, which make contestation through global networks the central feature of democracy beyond the state. Third, he develops an alternative, plural, and decentered conception based on an account of democratization outside the nation state, not on a particular version of the democratic ideal.*. (shrink)

This book is framed as a dialogue, between Hugo Letiche's iconoclastic appeals to demontrate (as in a demo) for pedagogy/philosophy/politics of (re-)territoralization (as in the demos), and Jacques Rancière's call for dissensus and a new sensibility (le partage du sensible) that may lead to critical democratization. Writing here are: Asmund Born, Damian O'Doherty, Joanna Latimer, Hugo letiche, Geoff Lightfoot, Simon Lilley, Alphonso Lingis, Stephen Linstead, Garance Maréchal, Jean-Luc Moriceau, Rolland Munro, Rukmini Bhaya Nair, Peter pelzer, Yvon Pesqueux, Burkard Sievers, (...) Isabelle Stengers, and Niels Thyge Thygesen. The authors explore learning and education, research and investigation, writing and practice, in the context of organization and of organizing. They champion, affect, hope, poetic narrative, slow science, justice, the commons, engagement and fairness. (shrink)

Existing conceptualizations of the demos fail to treat issues of composition and performativity consistently. Recent literature suggests that both aspects are required in a satisfactory account of the demos. An analysis of this literature suggests several desiderata that such an account must meet. I approach the definition of demos with a conceptual framework derived from Margaret Gilbert’s plural subject theory of social groups. I propose an account of demos as a plural subject, constituted by joint commitment. (...) This account offers an improved and consistent understanding of normativity, composition, agency, and cohesion of demos. (shrink)

Does the polis face the demos with hostility? Do citizens contest the city? Is a people in opposed separation from its political institutions? A multidisciplinary collection on people and the institutions they find themselves in and under, the essays here engage questions of the individual , communities, leadership, populism, citizenship, social media, and technology. The collection includes work by philosophers, political scientists, and political theorists using quantitative, historical, and hermeneutical methodologies to take on some of the most pressing issues (...) of our historical moment. (shrink)

Light version of DEMO for composing epistemic models, based on the code for the ESSLLI 2008 course on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (see http:// homepages.cwi.nl/~jve/courses/esslli08/) extended with vocabulary information [EWS10]. Factual change is also treated. The piece ends with some examples: the muddy children, and hat puzzles, dealing with the interaction of perception and change [Eijar].

Until relatively recently, few democrats had much to say about the constitution of the ‘demos' that ought to rule. A number of recent writers have, however, argued that all those whose interests are affected must be enfranchised if decision-making is to be fully democratic. This article criticizes this approach, arguing that it misunderstands democracy. Democratic procedures are about the agency of the people so only agents can be enfranchised, yet not all bearers of interests are also agents. If we (...) focus on agency, rather than who is affected, then this leads us to focus on the permissible limits of action, rather than who makes the decision. Just as individual sovereignty is ordinarily limited by the requirement not to injure others, we may apply similar restrictions to what a demos can permissibly do. Thus, any collection of individuals may choose to regulate their affairs collectively for mutual benefit, but should be prohibited from imposing negative externalities on outsiders. On this view, the constitution or definition of the demos is arbitrary, from the democratic point of view. Moreover, democracy does not require the expansion of the franchise, unless injuries cannot be avoided. (shrink)

Dans la Grèce ancienne comme dans l'Antiquité romaine, plusieurs mots sont utilisés pour désigner le peuple, mais leur signification, positive ou négative, peut varier en fonction du point de vue de l'utilisateur. Comme la nôtre, la culture gréco-romaine distingue le peuple comme masse capricieuse et le peuple en tant qu'entité souveraine à laquelle se réfèrent les orateurs et les hommes politiques. Dans tous les cas, il faut se garder d'extrapoler à partir d'un seul texte. La tendance à déprécier le peuple (...) est une réalité à toutes les époques comme la polarisation entre riches et pauvres , mais dans la Rome impériale, cette dernière prend des proportions inédites. Si, depuis l'époque de César, il n'a jamais été mauvais de se réclamer du peuple contre l'aristocratie, il y a lieu de s'interroger sur le pouvoir réel dont jouissait le populus.In Ancient Greece and Rome, several words were used to refer to the people, but their signification, positive or negative, might vary with the point of view of the user. As in our own culture, there was a distinction in the Greco-Roman culture between the capricious mass and the people as a sovereign entity to which the orators and the politicians always referred. In any case, care must be taken not to extrapolate from a single text. The tendency to depreciate the people is a reality during all the periods of polarization between the rich and the poor , but in Imperial Rome this trend grew unusually. While it has always been good to claim one’s identification and side with the people against the aristocracy since Caesar’s time, one has every reason to question the real power of the populus. (shrink)

In this paper I try to analyze the Aristotelian views about Athenian democracy. In order to understand it, I have to show the background of this thoughts. There is not a specifically democractic theory of democracy in the greek corpus: this fact needs to be explained. In first place, then, I display the background of the greek politics through Solon's political work and some passages of Herodotus. In second place, I connect this background with the Aristotelian analysis in order to (...) show the rejection of Athenian democracy. (shrink)

Ancient Greek elite theorists and ordinary democratic practitioners shared a distinctive account of the institutional features of democracy: democracy requires both institutions that empower ordinary citizens to decide matters and the widespread diffusion of agenda-setting powers. In the Politics, Aristotle makes agenda control central to his understanding of what it is to be kurios in the city, to his distinction between oligarchy and democracy, and to his analysis of the preconditions for democratic control of the polis. For democratic citizens, isēgoria (...) (the equal right to speak and make proposals in the assembly) was more than an expression of the democratic commitment to equality. It was also an institutional tool to resist oligarchic domination of the agenda. Institutionalizing isēgoria was part of the Athenian response to a crucial problem for democratic theory and practice: how to ensure that popular participation reliably translates into popular control. (shrink)

This is the Introduction to a collected volume.