Bd. 1-2. Medizinische Schriften.--Bd. 3. Philosophische Schriften.--Bd. 4. Theologische, religionsphilosophische und sozialpolitische Schriften.--Bd. 5. Pansophische, magische und gabalische Schriften.

A family heirloom. An endangered species. An ancient piece of pottery. A threatened language. These things differ in myriad ways, but they are tied together by a common thread: they are all examples of things that call out to be saved. The world is brimming with things worth saving, and we have limited time and resources. How do we decide what to save? Why do we make these choices? -/- Philosopher Erich Hatala Matthes explores these questions as they surface (...) in radically diverse contexts--from museums to TikTok, and from National Parks to the corner of your attic. Matthes illustrates the deep relationship between the things we might save and our sense of self. If our cares and concerns are a fundamental part of our identity, then what we care for and preserve will play a significant role in shaping and maintaining our understanding of who we are. In a world in which everything that we care about is subject to powerful forces of change--from climate disturbance and armed conflict, to social transformation and the wear and tear of time--the terms on which we confront change will be key to whether and how we can save the things we care about in the ways that really matter to us. Will change be foisted upon us? Or is there a role for us to play in rejecting, influencing, or managing change? As he explores these questions, Matthes tackles related themes such as authenticity, agency, and appropriation: Who exactly should be responsible for saving things, and on whose behalf should such efforts be pursued? These are all essential elements to a fuller understanding of what to save and why. (shrink)

Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein (the later Wittgenstein) are often seen as polar opposites with respect to their fundamental philosophical outlooks: Frege as a paradigmatic "realist", Wittgenstein as a paradigmatic "anti-realist". This opposition is supposed to find its clearest expression with respect to mathematics: Frege is seen as the "arch-platonist", Wittgenstein as some sort of "radical anti-platonist". Furthermore, seeing them as such fits nicely with a widely shared view about their relation: the later Wittgenstein is supposed to have developed his (...) ideas in direct opposition to Frege. The purpose of this paper is to challenge these standard assumptions. I will argue that Frege's and Wittgenstein's basic outlooks have something crucial in common; and I will argue that this is the result of the positive influence Frege had on Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Which theories of Leibniz are still valid after post-modern critique? Using various methods, this work considers a new interpretation and views Leibniz's work from a different perspective. As such, the authors reconstruct Leibniz's viewpoints on tolerance and truth in light of his position and the influence of church politics. Furthermore, his strategy of differentiation between animal and human will be analyzed on its usefulness to current debate. Leibniz's theory of perception will also be contrasted to comparable theories of (...) today. The usual interpretations of his metaphysics based on substance will here be contrasted by a nature-based interpretation. German text. (shrink)

Physicians accept fallibility in technical matters as a condition of medical practice. When it comes to moral considerations, physicians are often loathe to act without a good deal more certitude and seem less willing to accept error. This article argues that ethics is intrinsic to medical decision making, that error is the inevitable risk of any action and that inaction carries even greater risk of error. Whether in the moral or the technical sphere, error must be accepted by physicians as (...) part of the learning process which informs and enriches future decisions. Moral virtue, it is concluded, resides more in the making of a decision and in the agony of making it than it does in the potentially fallible decision itself. (shrink)

Gottlob Frege is often called a "platonist". In connection with his philosophy we can talk about platonism concerning three kinds of entities: numbers, or logical objects more generally; concepts, or functions more generally; thoughts, or senses more generally. I will only be concerned about the first of these three kinds here, in particular about the natural numbers. I will also focus mostly on Frege's corresponding remarks in The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), supplemented by a few asides on Basic (...) Laws of Arithmetic (1893/1903) and "Thoughts" (1918). My goal is to clarify in which sense the Frege of Foundations and Basic Laws is a platonist concerning the natural numbers.1.. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy and modern logic are intimately connected, both historically and systematically. Thinkers such as Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein were major contributors to the early development of both; and the fruitful use of modern logic in addressing philosophical problems was, and still is, definitive for large parts of the analytic tradition. More specifically, Frege's analysis of the concept of number, Russell's theory of descriptions, and Wittgenstein's notion of tautology have long been seen as paradigmatic pieces of philosophy in this tradition. (...) This close connection remained beyond what is now often called "early analytic philosophy", i.e., the tradition's first phase. In the present chapter I will consider three thinkers who played equally important and formative roles in analytic philosophy's second phase, the period from the 1920s to the 1950s: Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Gödel, and Alfred Tarski. (shrink)

Frege's main contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics are, on the one hand, his introduction of modern relational and quantificational logic and, on the other, his analysis of the concept of number. My focus in this paper will be on the latter, although the two are closely related, of course, in ways that will also play a role. More specifically, I will discuss Frege's logicist reconceptualization of the natural numbers with the goal of clarifying two (...) aspects: the motivations for its core ideas; the step-by-step development of these ideas, from Begriffsschrift through Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik and Grundgesetze der Arithmetik to Frege's very last writings, indeed even beyond those, to a number of recent "neo-Fregean" proposals for how to update them. One main development, or break, in Frege's views occurred after he was informed of Russell's antinomy. His attempt to come to terms with this antinomy has found some attention in the literature already. It has seldom been analyzed in connection with earlier changes in his views, however, partly because those changes themselves have been largely ignored. Nor has it been discussed much in connection with Frege's basic motivations, as formed in reaction to earlier positions. Doing both in this paper will not only shed new light on his response to Russell's antinomy, but also on other aspects of his views. In addition, it will provide us with a framework for comparing recent updates of these views, thus for assessing the remaining attraction of Frege's general approach. I will proceed as follows: In the first part of the paper (§1.1 and §1.2), I will consider the relationship of Frege's conception of the natural numbers to earlier conceptions, in particular to what I will call the "pluralities conception", thus bringing into sharper focus his core ideas and their motivations. In the next part (§2.1 and §2.2), I will trace the order in which these ideas come up in Frege's writings, as well as the ways in which his position gets modified along the way, both before and after Russell's antinomy.. (shrink)

For both Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, providing a philosophical account of the concept of number was a central goal, pursued along similar logicist lines. In the present paper, I want to focus on a particular aspect of their accounts: their definitions, or reconstructions, of the natural numbers as equivalence classes of equinumerous classes. In other words, I want to examine what is often called the "Frege-Russell conception of the natural numbers" or, more briefly, the Frege-Russell numbers. My main concern (...) will be to determine the precise sense in which this conception was, or could be, meant to constitute an analysis.1 I will be mostly concerned with Frege’s views on the matter; but Russell will come up along the way, for illustration and comparison, as will some recent neo-Fregean proposals and results. The structure of the paper is as follows: In the first section, I sketch Frege's general approach. Next, I differentiate several kinds, or modes, of analysis, as further background. In the third section, I zero in on the equivalence class construction, raising the question of why it might, from a Fregean point of view, be seen as 'the right' construction, thus as an analysis in a strong sense. In the fourth section, I provide a contrasting, more conventionalist view of the matter, often associated with the Carnapian notion of explication, and expressed in some remarks by Russell. I then discuss the motivation for the Frege-Russell numbers in more depth. In the sixth section, I introduce a neo-Fregean alternative, to be examined along similar lines. Finally, I reflect further on the significance of the kinds of arguments available in this connection. (shrink)

Von Schelling stammt die Warnung: »Das Gefühl ist herrlich, wenn es am Grunde bleibt; nicht aber, wenn es an den Tag tritt, sich zum Wesen machen und herrschen will.« Dieser Warnung zum Trotz war Ende der sechziger, Anfang der siebziger Jahre das Ausbreiten der eigenen Gefühle zu einer kontagiösen Modeerscheinung geworden: In zahllosen Formen der Selbsterfahrung, zumeist in Gruppen, wurden einem Offenbarungen über das eigene Zumutesein abverlangt, Offenbarungen, die eine frappante Ähnlichkeit mit pietistischen Erweckungserlebnissen und Sündenbekenntnissen an der Wende (...) zum 18. Jahrhundert hatten - mit dem Unterschied allerdings, daß jetzt diese Gefühlsoffenbarungen auch noch einem gigantischen Vermarktungsprozeß unterworfen wurden. Diese Mode scheint sich heute ihrem Ende zuzuneigen - oder doch zum mindesten sich auf einer niedrigeren Ebene zu stabilisieren. So fällt es auch wieder leichter, sich auf eine etwas nüchternere Weise dem ohnehin sehr schwierigen Feld der Gemütsbewegungen zuzuwenden. (shrink)

Von Schelling stammt die Warnung: »Das Gefühl ist herrlich, wenn es am Grunde bleibt; nicht aber, wenn es an den Tag tritt, sich zum Wesen machen und herrschen will.« Dieser Warnung zum Trotz war Ende der sechziger, Anfang der siebziger Jahre das Ausbreiten der eigenen Gefühle zu einer kontagiösen Modeerscheinung geworden: In zahllosen Formen der Selbsterfahrung, zumeist in Gruppen, wurden einem Offenbarungen über das eigene Zumutesein abverlangt, Offenbarungen, die eine frappante Ähnlichkeit mit pietistischen Erweckungserlebnissen und Sündenbekenntnissen an der Wende (...) zum 18. Jahrhundert hatten - mit dem Unterschied allerdings, daß jetzt diese Gefühlsoffenbarungen auch noch einem gigantischen Vermarktungsprozeß unterworfen wurden. Diese Mode scheint sich heute ihrem Ende zuzuneigen - oder doch zum mindesten sich auf einer niedrigeren Ebene zu stabilisieren. So fällt es auch wieder leichter, sich auf eine etwas nüchternere Weise dem ohnehin sehr schwierigen Feld der Gemütsbewegungen zuzuwenden. (shrink)

For both Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, providing a philosophical account of the concept of number was a central goal, pursued along similar logicist lines. In the present paper, I want to focus on a particular aspect of their accounts: their definitions, or re-constructions, of the natural numbers as equivalence classes of equinumerous classes. In other words, I want to examine what is often called the ‘Frege-Russell conception of the natural numbers’ or, more briefly, the Frege-Russell numbers. My main concern (...) will be to determine the precise sense in which this conception was, or could be, meant to constitute an analysis. I will be mostly concerned with Frege’s views on the matter; but Russell will come up along the way, for illustration and comparison, as will some recent neo-Fregean suggestions. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public (...) domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This book gives a comprehensive overview of central themes of finite model theory – expressive power, descriptive complexity, and zero-one laws – together with selected applications relating to database theory and artificial intelligence, especially constraint databases and constraint satisfaction problems. The final chapter provides a concise modern introduction to modal logic, emphasizing the continuity in spirit and technique with finite model theory. This underlying spirit involves the use of various fragments of and hierarchies within first-order, second-order, fixed-point, and infinitary logics (...) to gain insight into phenomena in complexity theory and combinatorics. The book emphasizes the use of combinatorial games, such as extensions and refinements of the Ehrenfeucht-Fraissé pebble game, as a powerful way to analyze the expressive power of such logics, and illustrates how deep notions from model theory and combinatorics, such as o-minimality and treewidth, arise naturally in the application of finite model theory to database theory and AI. Students of logic and computer science will find here the tools necessary to embark on research into finite model theory, and all readers will experience the excitement of a vibrant area of the application of logic to computer science. (shrink)

We now have good reason to worry that many coastal cities will be flooded by the end of the century. How should we confront this possibility (or inevitability)? What attitudes should we adopt to impending inundation of such magnitude? In the case of place-loss due to anthropogenic climate change, I argue that there may ultimately be something fitting about letting go, both thinking prospectively, when the likelihood of preservation is bleak, and retrospectively, when we reflect on our inability to (...) prevent destruction. I then explore some of the ethical complications of this response. (shrink)

We offer an overview of both the empirical literature on food waste and philosophical work on the concept of waste. We use this background to argue that an overemphasis on the reduction of individual food waste is misleading at best, and pernicious at worst, in combatting the substantial problems that global food waste creates. Rather, we argue that civic engagement and political activism aimed at institutional reform will be essential in addressing these problems.

In this paper, I want to try to put what has been termed the “care ethics” into a different perspective. While I will discuss primarily the use of that ethic or that term as it applies to the healthcare setting in general and to the deliberation of consultants or the function of committees more specifically, what I have to say is meant to be applicable to the problem of using a notion like “caring” as a fundamental precept in ethical (...) decision making. I will set out to examine the relationship between theoretical ethics, justice-based reasoning, and care-based reasoning and conclude by suggesting not only that all are part of a defensible solution when adjudicating individual cases, but that these three are linked and can, in fact, be mutually corrective. I will claim that using what has been called “the care ethic” alone is grossly insufficient for solving individual problems and that the term can be extremely dangerous. I will readily admit that while blindly using an approach based solely on theoretically derived principles is perhaps somewhat less dangerous, it is bound to be sterile, unsatisfying, and perhaps even cruel in individual situations. Care ethics, as I understand the concept, is basically a non- or truly an anti-intellectual kind of ethic in that it tries not only to value feeling over thought in deliberating problems of ethics, but indeed, would almost entirely substitute feeling for thought. Feeling when used to underwrite undisciplined and intuitive action without theory has no head and, therefore, no plan and no direction; theory eventuating in sterile rules and eventually resulting in action heedlessly based on such rules lacks humanity and heart. Neither one nor the other is complete in itself. There is no reason why we necessarily should be limited to choosing between these two extremes. (shrink)

This paper will discuss the role of compassion in ethics in general and in healthcare ethics in particular. My thesis is that compassion:1) as Rousseau pointed out, is a natural trait common to all higher animals ;2) can and does serve as one of the most important motivators and modulators of ethics in both theoretical and applied aspects;3) must be controlled by, and in turn control, reason if it is to serve its ethical as well as natural purposes; and4) (...) as a natural trait has survival value and, by virtue of being a natural trait, cannot be an obligation although there may very well be an obligation to do all that is necessary to nurture and not crush this sentiment. (shrink)

Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions.

This paper inaugurates a new section on education, the focus of which is on education in a broader sense. The purpose is to stimulate discussion not only about techniques of education but also to initiate a dialogue concerninig more fundamental questions and issues. What are the goals of education generally and of and for ethics committees specifically? What, for an ethics committee, is “education”? What do we mean by education in this field? To function efficiently on an ethics committee, does (...) a member need specific training? Should the educational efforts of an ethics committee extend beyond the medical and nursing staff? If so, should they extend beyond the hospital and into the community? Is educating patients a legitimate function of an ethics committee? These are but a few of the questions that I hope will be debated over the years in the pages of this journal. (shrink)

This paper introduces a series of papers dealing with the topic of euthanasia as an introduction to a variety of attitudes by health-care professionals and philosophers interested in this issue. The lead in paper—and really the lead in idea—stresses the fact that what we are discussing concerns only a minority of people lucky enough to live in conditions of acceptable sanitation and who have access to medical care. The topic of euthanasia and PAS really has three questions: (1) is killing (...) another ever ethically acceptable; (2) is the participation of health professionals ethically different and (3) is it wiser to permit and set criteria (being fully aware of some dangers that lurk in such a move) or to forbid (knowing that it will occur clandestinely and uncontrolled). This paper takes no definite stand although it is very troubled by useless suffering (not only pain) by many who would wish their life and with it their suffering ended. (shrink)

On many occasions, care givers are faced with problems in which “drastic” types of treatment seem clearly inappropriate but “lesser” interventions still appear to be advisable, if not indeed mandatory. In the hospital setting, examples are frequent: the demented elderly patient, still very much capable of brief social interactions and still able to enjoy at least limited life, who although clearly not a candidate for coronary bypass surgery is, nevertheless, a patient in whom an intercurrent pneumonia deserves treatment; the severely (...) retarded youngster in whom appendectomy seems clearly warranted but for whom long-term dialysis seems ill-advised. The examples are legion, and their variety defies an easy, stereotypical solution. Why, one may ask, is the treatment of intercurrent pneumonia or operating on an acute appendix “clearly indicated” while coronary bypass and long-term dialysis “clearly” are not? The reactions of care givers in the past have often consisted of attempts to give half-hearted treatment or to treat fully even against their better judgment. The lack of conceptual guidelines that might help sort out such problems has inevitably led either to an inflexible absolutism in which all possible treatment to sustain life or no treatment at all is given or has resulted in a pathetic attempt to act but act minimally with the hope that such actions will be ineffective. (shrink)

This paper briefly reviews the papers in this special section of HCA and makes the point—a point which should be obvious—that statistics are useful only as guidelines but tell one nothing about the individual patient in front of you. Chronological age merely shows what is true of most but decidedly not of all patients in a particular age group. To ration on the basis of age alone is unfair to the individual denied treatment and damaging to the community because it (...) disturbs the solidarity which comes about because most members of the community feel that the community has obligations beyond those of not directly harming them; indeed, what produces solidarity is the feeling that members of a community will do their best to come to each others help. Rationing on the basis of age alone denies people of equal treatment under the law and—when it comes to the elderly—is a type of age discrimination. It is pointed out that what matters is a patient’s disease and not his/her age. A permanently vegetative person 8 years of age is a much sadder occurrence than it would be at age 90—but the critical fact is that both are permanently vegetative. Age cuts both ways—it is irrational to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars, untold amounts of time, energy and devotion to the 520 gm infant with a gr IV diffuse haemorrhage whose chance of leading a sentient life is close to zero and to hesitate before using a diagnostic MRI on a patient who is 90 but fully alert and enjoying life. It is concluded that age as an independent variable in the allocation of resources is ethically highly problematic. (shrink)

An argument based on Kant for access to health-care for all is a most helpful addition to prior discussions. My paper argues that while such a point of view is helpful it fails to be persuasive. What is needed, in addition to a notion of the legislative will, is a viewpoint of community which sees justice as originating not merely from considerations of reason alone but from a notion of community and from a framework of common human experiences and (...) capabilities. (shrink)

Il y a trois défis pour la sécurité de l’Ouest. Le premier est que l’Ouest, comparé à l’Asie de l’Est, est en déclin. Dans vingt-cinq ans, la taille économique de la Chine continentale pourrait être supérieure à la taille du marché américain ; celle de l’Inde et de l’Indonesie être supérieure à la taille économique de l’Allemagne ; celle de la Corée du Sud excéder l’Angleterre ou la France ou l’Italie. Le second est la prolifération d’un savoir à doubleemploi et (...) le désastre économique de l’ex-Union Soviétique qui auront pour conséquence vraisemblable une prolifération du nucléaire. Le troisième concerne les changements de valeurs qui s’opèrent à l’Ouest et qui favorisent la formation de sociétés occidentales de moins en moins aptes à attaquer ou à se défendre. Mais la réduction du poids de l’Occident dans l’économie globale ne garantit plus que les efforts faciles l’emportent face aux défis du futur, qu’ils viennent des pouvoirs renforcés de l’Est asiatique ou des “desperados” islamiques. Ces défis ne seront vraisemblablement pas relevés au moyen de deux fausses prescriptions qui trouvent quelques faveurs en Europe Continentale. Premièrement, une grande partie de l’Europe de l’Ouest est lasse d’être confrontée à la “destruction créatrice” de ses emplois du fait de la concurrence de l’Asie de l’Est et désire ardemment le protectionnisme. Le remède protectionniste se bâtit sur un diagnostic grandement correct des problèmes occidentaux, mais il est tout de même dangereux si l’on met en perspective la morale, l’économie et la politique du pouvoir. Deuxièmement, certains Européens reconnaissent à juste titre que les grandes puissances historiques, comme la Grande- Bretagne ou la France ou l’Allemagne, n’ont plus une envergure suffisante pour être qualifiées de grandes puissances. Cependant, elles sousestiment la gravité et la vitesse du déclin de l’Occident. Une Europe définie par le noyau dur francoallemand deviendra trop étroite, avant même qu’elle ne soit établie dans cette structure. Vraisemblablement, même l’Union Européenne dans sa totalité sera trop petite avant qu’elle ne devienne une véritable communauté sur le plan sécuritaire. Au lieu de ces fausses prescriptions, cet article propose trois réponses aux dilemmes de l’Occident, ou encore trois façons de gérer le déclin de l’Occident. Premièrement, seule la coopération atlantique promet d’être une réponse efficace au dynamisme de l’Asie de l’Est et au déclin de l’Ouest. De plus, la coopération entre l’Amérique du Nord et l’Europe de l’Ouest a besoin d’être complétée par un nouvel engagement à l’égard d’une économie globale ouverte et d’une disposition à s’ajuster aux défis de celle-ci, afin de coopter l’Est asiatique dans une sphère globale de coprospérité. Cela doit vraisemblablement engendrer quelques coupes radicales dans l’Etat-providence. Deuxièmement, la prolifération nucléaire exige aussi une réponse. Il est concevable que la stratégie de défense contre la Chine soit encore plus difficile dans une vingtaine d’années qu’elle le fut contre l’Union Soviétique dans les années 1980. Mais cela ne devrait pas être une excuse pour ne pas construire des missiles de défense en réponse à ceux de l’Iran, de l’Irak, de la Lybie ou de l’Algerie. Troisièmement, les changements des valeurs en Occident semblent plus difficiles à traiter, mais ils renforcent la nécessité d’investir dans la coopération occidentale plutôt qu’uniquement européenne, la nécessité de coopter l’Asie de l’Est plutôt que de plonger dans une autre guerre froide, et la nécessité de contenir l’Etat-providence plutôt que de le développer. There are three challenges to Western security. First, compared to East Asia the West is in decline. In another twenty-five years, the economic size of Mainland China may exceed the size of the American market, India and Indonesia may exceed Germany, South Korea may exceed Britain or France or Italy. Second, the proliferation of dual use knowledge and the economic disaster in the former Soviet Union are likely to result in some nuclear proliferation. Third, value changes within the West will make Western societies ever less capable of deterrence and defense. But the reduced weight of the West in the global economy no longer guarantees that leisurely efforts succeed in meeting future challengers, whether from East Asian great powers or Islamic desperados. These challenges are unlikely to be met by two false prescriptions which enjoy some appeal in Continental Europe. First, much of Western Europe gets tired of observing the “creative destruction” of its jobs by East Asian competitors and longs for protectionism. The protectionist cure is built on a largely correct diagnosis of some Western problems, but nevertheless dangerous from an economic, moral, and power politics perspective. Second, some Europeans rightly recognize that historical great powers, like Britain or France or Germany, are no longer large enough to be great powers. But they underestimate the severity and speed of the decline of the West. A Franco- German core Europe will become too small, even before it is established. Conceivably, even the entire European Union will be too small before it becomes an effective security community. Instead of these false prescriptions this paper advocates three responses to Western dilemmas, or three modes of managing Western decline. First, only Atlantic cooperation promises to be an effective response to East Asian dynamism and Western decline. Moreover, cooperation between North America and Western Europe needs to be complemented with a renewed commitment to an open global economy and a readiness to adjust to its challenges, in order to coopt East Asia into a global co-prosperity sphere. This is likely to necessitate some radical cuts in the welfare state. Second, nuclear proliferation also needs some response. Conceivably, strategic defense is as difficult against China twenty years from now, as it was against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. But this should be no excuse for not building a missile and air defense against the likes of Iran, Iraq, Lybia, or Algeria. Third, the value changes within the West seem least tractable, but they reinforce the necessity of investing in Western rather than merely European cooperation, the necessity of coopting East Asia rather than stumbling into another Cold War, and the necessity for containing the welfare state rather than expanding it. (shrink)

In the tradition of Stalnaker there is a number of well-known problems that need to be addressed, because revision of iterated belief modalities is required in this case. These problems have already been investigated in detail in recent works on DDL Leitgeb/Segerberg 2007)and DEL see e.g. Ditmarsch et. Another strategy would be to maintain and revise assumptions independently of the beliefs of an agent.I will briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each of these views. In both views, assumptions (...) constitute the subjective context in which an agent interprets an utterance and encounters the world. The result of an interpretation is in turn checked against the agent’s original beliefs, and if the checking operation succeeds the agent revises his beliefs by the result in the normal way described by the AGM paradigm. The second of the above questions needs to be addressed on the basis of concrete examples. Considering utterance like David is ready’ or ‘John is tall’that from a contextualist viewpoint express semantically incomplete content in the sense of Bach is needed in order to obtain a useful model of the checking step, since fortunately not everybody believes everything that other people say. These requirements put the theory of interpretation based on assumptions in the frontline of ongoing research on the implementation of belief revision and update in dynamic logics. Such a theory might also be useful for contextualist accounts of strong knowledge, as it can be argued convincingly that when a knowledge ascription appears to be context-sensitive, this is so because the embedded proposition is context-sensitive and not because knowledge itself is context-sensitive. Hence,the context-sensitivity of embedded propositions in knowledge claims and how different agents in the same situation arrive at different assessments about them may be explained by an inferential theory of interpretation similar to the one outlined here but with another underlying concept of assumptions. Literature Alchourrón, C. E. ; Gärdenfors, P. & Makinson, D., 'On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions', Journal of Symbolic Logic, 510-530. Bach, K., 'Minimalism for Dummies: Reply to Cappelen and Lepore', Technical report, University of San Fransisco, Department of Philosophy. Bach, K., Context ex Machina, in án Gendler Szabó, ed.,'Semantics versus Pragmatics', Oxford UP, Oxford, pp. 16-44. Ditmarsch, H. v. ; Hoek, W. v. d. & Kooi, B., Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Kluwer. Gärdenfors, P., Knowledge in Flux, MIT Press. Leitgeb, H. & Segerberg, K., 'Dynamic doxastic logic: why, how, and where to? ', Synthese155, 167-190. Stalnaker, R., Assertion, in. Cole, ed.,'Pragmatics', Academic Press, New York, pp. 315-332. Stalnaker, R., 'Common Ground', Linguistics and Philosophy25, 701- -721. (shrink)

Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions.

Home and Beyond traces the development of Husserl’s thought, paying special attention to Husserl’s phenomenology in his late works. Steinbock demonstrates that each stage of Husserl’s extensive life work becomes a necessary condition for Husserl’s next finding in phenomenology. The work concludes with an interpretation of Husserl’s final definition of phenomenology that demands a phenomenology beyond Husserl. Also, Steinbock provides for an interpretation of the concepts of homeworld/alienworld that most likely will capture the interest of social philosophers.

The force of [Heinrich von] Kleist's story "On the Marionette Theatre" . . . derives from roots deeply sunk into the soil of the past. It is a novel variation on a theme the first author of which may well be Plato. For according to Plato the human mind has been in the dark ever since it lost its place in the community of Truth, in the realm, that is, of the Ideas, the eternal and eternally perfect forms, those now (...) unattainable models which man in his exile is able to see and recognize only as shadows or imperfect copies. And this Platonic parable of the damage suffered by man's soul and consciousness is not unlike the Fall as it is narrated in Genesis. The Fall was the consequence and punishment of man's free will that for the first time had asserted itself against the universal God and rejoiced in a consciousness and pleasure entirely its own—tragically its own; for man had to forsake the indwelling in the supreme Intelligence and thus the harmony between himself and Being as such. The reward for this betrayal was the embarrassment and shame of self-consciousness, the hard labor of maintaining himself in his state of separation, and, soon to follow, the murderous misdeeds of the self-will named Cain. Better to have no mind than a mind thus deprived and impoverished and cruel. Erich Heller, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Northwestern University, is the author of The Disinherited Mind: Essays in Modern German Literature and Thought; The Ironic Gentleman: Thomas Mann; The Artist's Journey into the Interior; and Franz Kafka. These books have also appeared in Germany in the author's own translations, and his Dir Wiederkehr der Unschuld [The return of innocence] was recently published there. See also: "Fiction, History, and Empirical Reality" by Murray Krieger in Vol. 1, No. 2; "Psychoanalysis and the Marionette Theater: Interpretation is Not Depreciation" by Margret Schaefer in Vol. 5, No. 1. (shrink)

Will man dem Lebenswerk Nietzsches gerecht werden, so ist es unerlässlich, vier Schwerpunkten in Nietzsches Leben besondere Beachtung zu schenken, da sie von außerordentlicher Bedeutung sind, nämlich seinem Elternhaus, d.h. seiner Kindheit und Jugend, seiner Beziehung zum griechischen Altertum im Rahmen seiner Bildung, seiner intensiven Beschäftigung mit dem Werk Schopenhauers und dem Einfluss der progressiven Paralyse als Spätstadium einer acquirierten syphilitischen Erkrankung auf sein Werk, was bisher leider zu wenig kompetente Berücksichtigung erfuhr. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche wurde in Röcken bei (...) Lützen als Sohn eines evangelischen Pfarrers geboren. Bereits 5 Jahre danach starb sein Vater. Der Rest der Familie, bestehend aus seiner noch sehr jungen Mutter, seiner um 2 Jahre jüngeren Schwester, zweier Tanten und der sehr dominanten Großmutter, zog nach Naumburg, wo Nietzsche zunächst die Bürgerschule besuchte. Dort wuchs er in fast ausschließlich weiblicher Umgebung ganz im Geiste tiefer evangelisch - christlicher Frömmigkeit auf Die Bibelkenntnisse des sensiblen, musikalisch und literarisch äußerst begabten Knaben waren mit der Zeit so umfangreich geworden, dass man i hn scherzhaft als den kleinen Pastor bezeichnete. In dieser Zeit sind sicherlich die Wurzeln für seinen späteren Antifeminismus zu suchen sowie seine Abneigung gegenüber dem Christentum, das er nahezu ausschließlich in der Form einer naiven, weiblich geprägten, weichlich-frömmelnden Religionsausübung kennen lernte, die ihm dekadent erscheinen musste. Er hatte so keine Gelegenheit, die eigentliche Stärke und Tiefe des Christentums zu erfahren. (shrink)

Will man dem Lebenswerk Nietzsches gerecht werden, so ist es unerlässlich, vier Schwerpunkten in Nietzsches Leben besondere Beachtung zu schenken, da sie von außerordentlicher Bedeutung sind, nämlich seinem Elternhaus, d.h. seiner Kindheit und Jugend, seiner Beziehung zum griechischen Altertum im Rahmen seiner Bildung, seiner intensiven Beschäftigung mit dem Werk Schopenhauers und dem Einfluss der progressiven Paralyse als Spätstadium einer acquirierten syphilitischen Erkrankung auf sein Werk, was bisher leider zu wenig kompetente Berücksichtigung erfuhr. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche wurde in Röcken bei (...) Lützen als Sohn eines evangelischen Pfarrers geboren. Bereits 5 Jahre danach starb sein Vater. Der Rest der Familie, bestehend aus seiner noch sehr jungen Mutter, seiner um 2 Jahre jüngeren Schwester, zweier Tanten und der sehr dominanten Großmutter, zog nach Naumburg, wo Nietzsche zunächst die Bürgerschule besuchte. Dort wuchs er in fast ausschließlich weiblicher Umgebung ganz im Geiste tiefer evangelisch - christlicher Frömmigkeit auf Die Bibelkenntnisse des sensiblen, musikalisch und literarisch äußerst begabten Knaben waren mit der Zeit so umfangreich geworden, dass man i hn scherzhaft als den kleinen Pastor bezeichnete. In dieser Zeit sind sicherlich die Wurzeln für seinen späteren Antifeminismus zu suchen sowie seine Abneigung gegenüber dem Christentum, das er nahezu ausschließlich in der Form einer naiven, weiblich geprägten, weichlich-frömmelnden Religionsausübung kennen lernte, die ihm dekadent erscheinen musste. Er hatte so keine Gelegenheit, die eigentliche Stärke und Tiefe des Christentums zu erfahren. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public (...) domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

At the end of the most violent century in human history, it is good to take stock of our commitments to human and other life forms, as well as to examine the rights and the duties that might flow from their biological makeup. Professor Thomasma and Professor Loewy have held a long-standing dialogue on whether there are moral differences between animals and humans. This dialogue was occasioned by a presentation Thomasma made some years ago at Loewy's invitation at the University (...) of Illinois, Peoria, Medical Center. During that presentation, Thomasma argued that human beings are sufficiently distinct from other animals genetically and otherwise to justify a moral difference in rights and obligations. In effect, he argued that there are species-specific rights. This essay will pick up the threads of that dialogue. (shrink)

The point of departure used in the article is the statement that in the bourgeois character there is embedded a feeling, not always conscious, of profound impotence. Psychoanalytic experiences are presented to illustrate such feelings. In extreme cases the content of such feeling may be described as follows : „There is nothing I can influence ; nothing I can move ; nothing I can change by my will in the external {World or in myself. I have no power, I (...) am not taken seriously, I am for other people like air which no one notices.“The feeling of being without power may be in relation to other people, to oneself, or to things. Its most important psychological consequences are a feeling of inferiority, fear, and anger. A series of examples are described in which an attempt was made to soften the intensity of the feeling of impotence, or to eliminate it entirely. In this sphere rationalizations explain the impotence as the result of certain non-psychological conditions, rationalizations which console because of their belief in sudden miracles or changes over long periods of time ; finally, a reaction which consists in an attempt to hide this feeling in activity and mere routine.The social conditions of the origin of this feeling of impotence are found in two fields : first in the fact that the child in the bourgeois family, even if treated very favorably, is not really taken seriously, and then in the place the adult has in modern society, his helplessness and dependence on powers he cannot comprehend and control, in particular his position of impotence in a process of production governed by the principle of division of labor.At the end the author attempts to show this feeling of impotence and the rationalizations which covered it up in the political behavior of the European masses during the post-war period.L'article constate tout d'abord qu'un sentiment d'impuissance profond, encore que d'ordinaire inconscient, marque la vie bourgeoise. L'article utilise l'expérience que livre la psychanalyse des individus pour décrire ce sentiment d'impuissance. Dans les cas extrêmes, la description aboutit aux traits suivants : je ne puis exercer d'influence sur rien, je ne puis rien mettre en mouvement, ma volonté est incapable de rien changer ni dans le monde extérieur ni en moi-même, je n'ai pas de force, je n'existe pas pour les autres, je suis comme l'air qu'ils respirent. Le sentiment d'impuissance peut se rapporter aussi bien à d'autres hommes qu'à la personne elle-même, ou à des choses. Les suites psychologiques les plus importantes de ce sentiment sont : complexe d'infériorité, angoisse, colère. L'article décrit une série de tentatives pour adoucir, ou même chasser de la conscience la souffrance qui naît de cette impuissance. A cette catégorie appartiennent des rationalisations explicatives qui ramènent l'impuissance à certaines circonstances extra-psychiques ; des rationalisations consolatrices qui font croire à la brusque irruption d'un miracle, ou bien à des changements progressifs, fruits d'une longue durée ; enfin une forme de réaction qui, à force d'activité, de routine affairée parvient à couvrir le sentiment d'impuissance, qui reste inconscient. Deux ordres de conditions sociales favorisent la formation du sentiment d'impuissance : d’abord le fait que l'enfant dans la société bourgeoise, si affectueusement qu'il puisse être traité, n'est pas — au fond — pris au sérieux ; d'autre part, le rôle de l'adulte dans la société bourgeoise, sa propre impuissance et sa dépendance à l'égard de forces qu'il est incapable de maîtriser ou même de reconnaître, plus particulièrement sa position dans le procès de production, qui, par suite de l'extrême division du travail, lui enlève autonomie et efficacité. Pour terminer, l'article tente de retrouver ce sentiment d'impuissance et les diverses formes de rationalisations qui le dissimulent, dans l'attitude des masses européennes durant l'époque de l'après-guerre. (shrink)

In an analysis of Fichte’s theoretical reflections read in the light of decisive biographical events, the present paper examines the following question: to what extent are we to assent to Fichte’s own assertion that his system is from the very outset a system of freedom? Kant’s philosophy provided the catalyst for the young Fichte because it promised a way out of the impasse of determinism. I will argue that the ultimate goal of Fichte’s lifelong struggle was to furnish a (...) foundation for genuine freedom. In reaction to both Jacobi and Schelling, Fichte’s philosophical and political investigations pursue at once the problem of grounding the “Absolute” and the relationship between individual freedom and reason as a whole.—These tensions are especially visible in Fichte’s path from the Addresses To the German Nation to the virtually unknown “Philosophical Diaries” of the final days of his life. (shrink)

In an analysis of Fichte’s theoretical reflections read in the light of decisive biographical events, the present paper examines the following question: to what extent are we to assent to Fichte’s own assertion that his system is from the very outset a system of freedom? Kant’s philosophy provided the catalyst for the young Fichte because it promised a way out of the impasse of determinism. I will argue that the ultimate goal of Fichte’s lifelong struggle was to furnish a (...) foundation for genuine freedom. In reaction to both Jacobi and Schelling, Fichte’s philosophical and political investigations pursue at once the problem of grounding the “Absolute” and the relationship between individual freedom and reason as a whole.—These tensions are especially visible in Fichte’s path from the Addresses To the German Nation to the virtually unknown “Philosophical Diaries” of the final days of his life. (shrink)

In an analysis of Fichte’s theoretical reflections read in the light of decisive biographical events, the present paper examines the following question: to what extent are we to assent to Fichte’s own assertion that his system is from the very outset a system of freedom? Kant’s philosophy provided the catalyst for the young Fichte because it promised a way out of the impasse of determinism. I will argue that the ultimate goal of Fichte’s lifelong struggle was to furnish a (...) foundation for genuine freedom. In reaction to both Jacobi and Schelling, Fichte’s philosophical and political investigations pursue at once the problem of grounding the “Absolute” and the relationship between individual freedom and reason as a whole.—These tensions are especially visible in Fichte’s path from the Addresses To the German Nation to the virtually unknown “Philosophical Diaries” of the final days of his life. (shrink)

The unity of thinking and acting will be assumed as a fundamental hypothesis for a biography of Fichte, allowing one to understand the different stages in J.G. Fichte’s life.Die Einheit von Denken und Handeln wird als Grundhypothese für eine Biographie Fichtes angenommen, aus der sich die Etappen des Lebens von J.G. Fichte verstehen lassen sollen.

Willing and Nothingness contains eight essays by eight scholars explaining and comparing aspects of Nietzsche’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The themes are summarized in Janaway’s introduction. Appended are a translation of Nietzsche’s notes called “On Schopenhauer” from 1868 as well as a list of Nietzsche references to Schopenhauer in Nietzsche’s works. The first essay, written by Janaway, provides for an account of the evaluation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in Nietzsche’s works. The other essays deal with both philosophers’ views on truth, on art, (...) moral philosophy, the will, optimism and pessimism, the self and materialism. (shrink)