We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining (...) that beliefs are entailed by intentions or are components of them. (shrink)

In his paper, ‘Twin pregnancy, fetal reduction and the ‘all or nothing problem’, Räsänen sets out to apply Horton’s ‘all or nothing’ problem to the ethics of multifetal pregnancy reduction from a twin to a singleton pregnancy. Horton’s problem involves the following scenario: imagine that two children are about to be crushed by a collapsing building. An observer would have three options: do nothing, save one child by allowing their arms to be crushed, or save both by allowing their arms (...) to be crushed. Horton offers two intuitively plausible claims: it is morally permissible not to save either child and it is morally impermissible to save only one of the children, which taken together lead to the problematic conclusion that if an observer does not save both children, then it is better to save neither than save only one. Räsänen applies this problem to the case of 2-to-1 MFPR, arguing ultimately that, in cases where there is no medical reason to reduce, the woman ought to bring both fetuses to term. We will argue that Räsänen does not provide adequate support for the claim, crucial to his argument, that aborting only one of the fetuses in a twin pregnancy is wrong, so the ‘all or nothing’ problem does not arise in this context. Furthermore, we argue that the scenario Räsänen presents is highly unrealistic because of the clinical realities of 2-to-1 MFPR, making his argument of limited use for real-life decision making in this area. (shrink)

Traditionally, two main rationales for the provision of prenatal testing and screening are identified: the expansion of women’s reproductive choices and the reduction of the burden of disease on society. With the number of prenatal tests available and the increasing potential for their widespread use, it is necessary to examine whether the reproductive autonomy model remains useful in upholding the autonomy of pregnant women or whether it allows public health considerations and even eugenic aims to be smuggled in under the (...) smokescreen of autonomy. In this article I argue that if we are serious about upholding women’s autonomy in the context of prenatal testing, what is needed is a model based on a more robust conception of reproductive autonomy, such as the one defended by Josephine Johnston and Rachel Zacharias as ‘reproductive autonomy worth having’. While Johnston and Zacharias put forward a basic outline of this conception, I apply it to the specific case of prenatal testing and show how it responds to objections levelled against the reproductive autonomy model. I argue that adopting this kind of conception is necessary to avoid fundamental challenges to women’s autonomy when it comes to prenatal screening and testing. (shrink)

Violence metaphors for cancer can have undesirable implications. The metaphorical expression “She lost her battle with cancer,” for instance, is deemed inappropriate by some because of the implicit...

Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the collective action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks' (2019) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic (...) Duty to Join Forces. Our theory provides an account of the responsibilities of scientists to prevent epistemic harms during inquiry. (shrink)

Locke seems to hold that we have knowledge of the existence of external objects through sensation. Two problems face Locke's account. The first problem concerns the logical form of knowledge of real existence. Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement between ideas. However, perceiving agreements between ideas seems to yield knowledge only of analytic truths, not propositions about existence. The second problem concerns the epistemic status of sensitive knowledge: How could the senses yield certain knowledge? This (...) essay argues that the key to solving both problems is Locke's claim that simple ideas are all real, adequate, and true. This explains why, on Locke's view, we have certain knowledge through the senses. It also explains how sensitive knowledge can consist in perceiving an agreement between ideas: perceived agreements among simple ideas of sensation are guaranteed to track relations that obtain among really existing things. (shrink)

Maternal–fetal surgery (MFS) encompasses a range of innovative procedures aiming to treat fetal illnesses and anomalies during pregnancy. Their development and gradual introduction into healthcare raise important ethical issues concerning respect for pregnant women’s bodily integrity and autonomy. This paper asks what kind of ethical framework should be employed to best regulate the practice of MFS without eroding the hard-won rights of pregnant women. I examine some existing models conceptualising the relationship between a pregnant woman and the fetus to determine (...) what kind of framework is the most adequate for MFS, and conclude that an ecosystem or maternal–fetal dyad model is best suited for upholding women’s autonomy. However, I suggest that an appropriate framework needs to incorporate some notion of fetal patienthood, albeit a very limited one, in order to be consistent with the views of healthcare providers and their pregnant patients. I argue that such an ethical framework is both theoretically sound and fundamentally respectful of women’s autonomy, and is thus best suited to protect women from coercion or undue paternalism when deciding whether to undergo MFS. (shrink)

In their report for the Swiss government onthe notion of the dignity of creatures, PhilippBalzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyzethe relationship between human dignity and the dignityof creatures, taking them as two categoricallydifferent concepts. Human dignity is defined as the``moral right not to be humiliated,'' whereas thedignity of creatures is taken to be ``the inherentvalue of nonhuman living beings.'' To my mind there isno need to draw a categorical distinction between thetwo concepts. Both notions could be brought togetherunder an (...) all-encompassing concept of the inherentvalue of living beings, humans and non-humans alike,a concept one could name ``the dignity of livingbeings.'' Indeed, this very notion underlies theposition taken in the report, although this is notmade explicit by the authors themselves.As the aim of the paper is only to clarify theconcepts used, I do not go beyond this ``internal''critique of their position, i.e., I don't assess howthe claims articulated via these concepts – theclaim that humans and/or creatures have an inherentvalue consisting in a supposed intrinsic good – areto be justified, although I myself would be ratherskeptical that this might be successfully done. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account paradigmatically on the basis of one of the influential systems of epistemic justification: Laurence Bonjour’s coherence theory of justification. The idea underlying our approach is to develop a set of criteria which indicate (...) that the pursued system is promising of contributing to the epistemic goal of robustness of scientific knowledge and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we will (a) adjust the scope of Bonjour’s standards—consistency, inferential density, and explanatory power, and (b) complement them by the requirement of a programmatic character. In this way we allow for the evaluation of the “potential coherence” of the given epistemic system. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the epistemic function of agent-based models of scientific inquiry, proposed in the recent philosophical literature. In view of Boero and Squazzoni’s classification of ABMs into case-based models, typifications and theoretical abstractions, I argue that proposed ABMs of scientific inquiry largely belong to the last category. While this means that their function is primarily exploratory, I suggest that they are epistemically valuable not only as a temporary stage in the development of ABMs of science, but by (...) providing insights into theoretical aspects of scientific rationality. I illustrate my point with two examples of highly idealized ABMs of science, which perform two exploratory functions: Zollman’s ABM which provides a proof-of-possibility in the realm of theoretical discussions on scientific rationality, and an argumentation-based ABM, which provides insights into potential mechanisms underlying the efficiency of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Throughout most of human history women have been defined by their biological role in reproduction, seen first and foremost as gestators, which has led to the reproductive system being subjected to outside interference. The womb was perceived as dangerous and an object which husbands, doctors and the state had a legitimate interest in controlling. In this article, we consider how notions of conflict surrounding the womb have endured over time. We demonstrate how concerns seemingly generated by the invisibility of reproduction (...) and the inaccessibility of the womb have translated into similar arguments for controlling women, as technology increases the accessibility of the female body and the womb. Developments in reproductive medicine, from in vitro fertilisation to surrogacy, have enabled women and men who would otherwise have been childless to become parents. Uterus transplants and ‘artificial wombs’ could provide additional alternatives to natural gestation. An era of ‘womb technology’ dawns. Some argue that such technology providing an alternative to ‘natural’ gestation could be a source of liberation for female persons because reproduction will no longer be something necessarily confined to the female body. ‘Womb technology’, however, also has the potential to exacerbate the labelling of the female body as a source of danger and an ‘imperfect’ site of gestation, thus replaying rudimentary and regressive arguments about controlling female behaviour. We argue that pernicious narratives about control, conflict and the womb must be addressed in the face of these technological developments. (shrink)

Dass die Würde des Menschen unantastbar sei, stellt eine der populärsten, aber auch eine der umstrittensten Aussagen des Grundgesetzes dar. Dabei wird eine sachorientierte Diskussion oft durch mehr oder minder unausgewiesene semantische und historische Annahmen blockiert. Aus dieser Beobachtung heraus wird zum einen überlegt, wie sich unterschiedliche Bedeutungen des Ausdrucks "Menschenwürde" unterscheiden und ethischen Fragestellungen resp. Positionen zuordnen ließen. Zum anderen wird die Einführung des Ausdrucks in das Verfassungsrecht nachgezeichnet. Das Hauptaugenmerk gilt dabei Art.1 Abs. 1 Grundgesetz, dessen Gehalt in (...) Auseinandersetzung mit der bisherigen Rechtsprechung rekonstruiert wird. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 7, July 2022.

The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn’s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn’s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether a theory is (...) worthy of further pursuit. These tools are persuasion, translation and interpretation. However, we argue that the perspective of epistemic semantic monism present in Kuhn’s work obstructs the full applicability of these tools. We show that dropping this perspective makes the notions of persuasion and interpretation more fruitful, and moreover, allows for a pluralism of scientific theories and practices that complements the pluralism based on disagreement among scientists, emphasized by Kuhn. (shrink)

argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung’s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting (...) arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework. (shrink)

The article presents an agent-based model of scientific interaction aimed at examining how different degrees of connectedness of scientists impact their efficiency in knowledge acquisition. The model is built on the basis of Zollman’s ABM by changing some of its idealizing assumptions that concern the representation of the central notions underlying the model: epistemic success of the rivalling scientific theories, scientific interaction and the assessment in view of which scientists choose theories to work on. Our results suggest that whether and (...) to what extent the degree of connectedness of a scientific community impacts its efficiency is a highly context-dependent matter since different conditions deem strikingly different results. More generally, we argue that simplicity of ABMs may come at a price: the requirement to run extensive robustness analysis before we can specify the adequate target phenomenon of the model.1 1Introduction2Zollman's 2010 Model3Static versus Dynamic Epistemic Success 3.1Introducing the notion of dynamic epistemic success3.2Implementation and results for the basic setup4Critical Interaction 4.1Introducing critique4.2Implementation and results5Inertia of Inquiry 5.1Introducing rational inertia5.2Implementation and results6Threshold Below Which Theories Are Equally Promising 6.1An inquiry that is even more difficult6.2Implementation and results7Discussion8Conclusion. (shrink)

This paper examines lessons obtained by means of simulations in the form of agent-based models about the norms that are to guide disagreeing scientists. I focus on two types of epistemic and methodological norms: norms that guide one’s attitude towards one’s own theory, and norms that guide one’s attitude towards the opponent’s theory. Concerning I look into ABMs that have been designed to examine the context of peer disagreement. Here I challenge the conclusion that the given ABMs provide a support (...) for the so-called Steadfast Norm, according to which one is epistemically justified in remaining steadfast in their beliefs in face of disagreeing peers. I argue that the proposed models at best provide evidence for a weaker norm, which concerns methodological steadfastness. Concerning I look into ABMs aimed at examining epistemic effects of scientific interaction. Here I argue that the models provide diverging suggestions and that the link between each ABM and the type of represented inquiry is still missing. Moreover, I examine alternative strategies of arguing in favor of the benefits of scientific interaction, relevant for contemporary discussions on scientific pluralism. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the epistemic value of highly idealized agent-based models of social aspects of scientific inquiry. On the one hand, we argue that taking the results of such simulations as informative of actual scientific inquiry is unwarranted, at least for the class of models proposed in recent literature. Moreover, we argue that a weaker approach, which takes these models as providing only “how-possibly” explanations, does not help to improve their epistemic value. On the other hand, we suggest (...) that if ABMs of science underwent two types of robustness analysis, they could indeed have a clear epistemic function, namely by providing evidence for philosophical and historical hypotheses. In this sense, ABMs can obtain evidential and explanatory properties and thus be a useful tool for integrated history and philosophy of science. We illustrate our point with an example of a model—building on the work by Kevin Zollman—which we apply to a concrete historical case study. (shrink)

This paper is a reaction to ‘Styles of Thought on the Continental Drift Debate’ by Pablo Pellegrini, published in this journal. The author argues that rationalist accounts of the continental drift debate fail because they overlook important issues. In this discussion we distinguish various forms of rationalism. Then we present a sophisticated rationalist account of the continental drift debate and argue that it is satisfactory because it explains all the central developments in that debate. Finally, we point to a problematic (...) tension in Pellegrini’s paper and unravel an underlying ambiguity. (shrink)

Formal models of scientific inquiry, aimed at capturing socio-epistemic aspects underlying the process of scientific research, have become an important method in formal social epistemology and philosophy of science. In this introduction to the special issue we provide a historical overview of the development of formal models of this kind and analyze their methodological contributions to discussions in philosophy of science. In particular, we show that their significance consists in different forms of ‘methodological iteration’ whereby the models initiate new lines (...) of inquiry, isolate and clarify problems with existing knowledge claims, and stimulate further research. (shrink)

To foster research integrity (RI), it is necessary to address the institutional and system-of-science factors that influence researchers’ behavior. Consequently, research performing and research funding organizations (RPOs and RFOs) could develop comprehensive RI policies outlining the concrete steps they will take to foster RI. So far, there is no consensus on which topics are important to address in RI policies. Therefore, we conducted a three round Delphi survey study to explore which RI topics to address in institutional RI policies by (...) seeking consensus from research policy experts and institutional leaders. A total of 68 RPO and 52 RFO experts, representing different disciplines, countries and genders, completed one, two or all rounds of the study. There was consensus among the experts on the importance of 12 RI topics for RPOs and 11 for RFOs. The topics that ranked highest for RPOs concerned education and training, supervision and mentoring, dealing with RI breaches, and supporting a responsible research process (e.g. through quality assurance). The highest ranked RFO topics concerned dealing with breaches of RI, conflicts of interest, and setting expectations on RPOs (e.g. about educating researchers about RI). Together with the research policy experts and institutional leaders, we developed a comprehensive overview of topics important for inclusion in the RI policies of RPOs and RFOs. The topics reflect preference for a preventative approach to RI, coupled with procedures for dealing with RI breaches. RPOs and RFOs should address each of these topics in order to support researchers in conducting responsible research. (shrink)

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the research on peptic ulcer disease focused on two rivaling hypothesis: the “acidity” and the “bacterial” one. According to the received view, the latter was dismissed during the 1950s only to be revived with Warren’s and Marshall’s discovery of Helicobacter pylori in the 1980s. In this paper we investigate why the bacterial hypothesis was largely abandoned in the 1950s, and whether there were good epistemic reasons for its dismissal. Of special interest for (...) our research question is Palmer’s 1954 large-scale study, which challenged the bacterial hypothesis with serious counter-evidence, and which by many scholars is considered as the shifting point in the research on PUD. However, we show that: The perceived refutatory impact of Palmer’s study was disproportionate to its methodological rigor. This undermines its perceived status as a crucial experiment against the bacterial hypothesis. In view of this and other considerations we argue that the bacterial hypothesis was worthy of pursuit in the 1950s. (shrink)

We take a tremendous interest in how other people think of us. We have certain expectations of others, concerning how we are to figure in their thought and judgment. And we often feel wronged if those are disappointed. But it is puzzling how others’ beliefs could wrong us. On the one hand, moral considerations don’t bear on the truth of a belief and so seem to be the wrong kind of reasons for belief. On the other hand, truth-directed considerations seem (...) to render moral considerations redundant. In this paper, we argue that to understand the possibility of doxastic wronging, we need to understand beliefs, no less than actions, as ways of relating to one another. In particular, how we take account of what others think and say will depend on whether we take up what P. F. Strawson calls the participant stance toward them. We show how this helps to make sense of an example Miranda Fricker identifies as a case of epistemic injustice. We then use the example to spell out the ethical significance of Tyler Burge’s idea that we have a default entitlement to accept at face value what we receive from a rational source. (shrink)

Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amidst times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this paper we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of ‘fast science’ should respond, and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientific controversies, we argue for the importance of ‘higher-order evidence’ (HOE) and we specify desiderata for scientifically relevant (...) HOE. We use our account to analyze the controversy about the aerosol transmission of COVID-19. (shrink)

Suppose we suffer a loss, such as the death of a loved one. In light of her death, we will typically feel grief, as it seems we should. After all, our loved one’s death is a reason for grief. Yet with the passage of time, our grief will typically diminish, and this seems somehow all right. However, our reason for grief ostensibly remains the same, since the passage of time does not undo our loss. How, then, could it not be (...) wrong for grief to diminish? Or how are we to make sense of the diminution of grief? Do reasons expire? —The paper clarifies the puzzle and then considers four responses. It argues that all of them are inadequate and that there are principled reasons why this should be so: In experiencing grief we are apprehending a loss. Yet in our effort to understand the diminution of grief, we must apprehend ourselves. But because grief is not about ourselves, our apprehension of the diminution of grief is at odds with our apprehension of the object of grief. This gives rise to a kind of double-vision, which is why the puzzle eludes a solution. (shrink)

In einer Zeitspanne von vier Jahren, von 1982 bis 1986, schrieb Louis Althusser eine Reihe kurzer Abhandlungen, die erst posthum veröffentlicht wurden. Kurze Abhandlungen sind für das Werk Althussers typisch, viel mehr als jede andere Art schriftlichen Schaffens, doch die Besonderheit seiner letzten Abhandlungen liegt weder in ihrer Form noch in der Methode, sie liegt vielmehr in einem radikal neuen Zugang zum Politischen. In den sechziger Jahren besteht Althusser auf einem Standpunkt nach welchem der dialektische Materialismus den philosophischen Kern des (...) Marxismus darstellt und der historische Materialismus seiner Wissenschaft entspricht. In den achtziger Jahren verändert er diesen Standpunkt zugunsten einer „Philosophie der Begegnung”, die ein nicht–teleologisches Prinzip des Materialismus seiner Ansicht nach viel genauer widerspiegelt als ein für ihn inzwischen logozentrisch und idealistisch gewordener dialektischer Materialismus. Jener wird gänzlich verworfen, und an seine Stelle tritt ein neuer Begriff: der aleatorische Materialismus. Ein Materialismus der Kontingenz und der Leere, der eine Vorrangigkeit des Sinns über die Erscheinungen radikal ablehnt. Dieser Text verfolgt diese Wende in seinem Verständnis der Philosophie und vor allem in ihrem Verhältnis zu Politik und Ideologie. (shrink)

Dans un intervalle de temps de quatre ans, de 1982 ŕ 1986, Louis Althusser a écrit un nombre d’essais philosophiques, qui étaient tous posthumes édités. Les essais philosophiques sont typiques pour le travail de Louis Althusser, beaucoup plus que toutes autres formes d’écritures, mais la caractéristique principale de son dernier śuvre ne se trouve pas, ni sous sa forme ni dans la méthode, elle ne se situe plutôt dans une approche radicalement nouvelle ŕ la politique. Pendant les années’ 60, Althusser (...) tient un point de vue selon lequel le matérialisme dialectique représente le noyau philosophique du marxisme et le matérialisme historique correspond ŕ sa science. Dans les années’ 80, il change cette approche théorique en faveur d’une « philosophie de la rencontre », qui ŕ son avis reflčte le principe non téléological du matérialisme d’une maničre bien plus exacte, que le matérialisme dialectal qui pour lui et devenu logocentrique et idéaliste. Le matérialisme dialectal sera complčtement rejeté, et une nouvelle notion fera un pas dans son endroit: le matérialisme aléatoire, un matérialisme de contingence et de vide, qui rejette radicalement n’importe quelle priorité du sens sur des phénomčnes. Le texte suivant poursuit ce tour de changement radical dans la pensée althussérienne de la philosophie, et surtout dans sa relation ŕ la politique et ŕ l’idéologie. (shrink)

In a time interval of four years, from 1982 to 1986, Louis Althusser wrote a number of short papers, which were all published posthumous. Short papers are typical for Althusser’s work, much more than every other art of writings, but the main characteristic of his last papers lies neither in their form nor in the method – it lies rather in a radically new approach to the politics. During the sixties, Althusser holds a point of view according to which the (...) dialectical materialism represents the philosophical core of the Marxism and the historical materialism corresponds to its science. In the eighties, he changes this theoretical approach in favour of a “philosophy of the encounter”, which in his opinion reflects the non-teleological principle of materialism in far more exact way, than the dialectical materialism which becomes logocentric and idealistic. Dialectical materialism will be completely rejected, and a new term will step into its place: the aleatoric materialism, a materialism of contingency and emptiness that radically rejects any precedence of the sense over the phenomena. The following text pursues this radical late turn in Althusserian understanding of philosophy, primarily in its relation to politics and ideology. (shrink)

Za pretpostaviti je da identitet, čak ukoliko ga se i provizorno fiksira, biva promatran kao nestabilna, socijalno uvjetovana kategorija, označena i prepoznata ovisno o preraspodijeljenosti moći i trenutnim diskurzivnim relacijama. Pretpostavka teksta jest da se problematika identiteta promišlja kroz konfliktan suodnos dominantno i marginalno pozicioniranih društvenih aktera. Kontekstualizirano unutar ovakve dualne distribucije moći, aplikativni dio teksta tematizira temu proučavanja problematike identiteta u dva različita društvena diskursa . Pritom, film se promatra kao medij popularne kulture, dok bitan segment znanstveno-teorijskog pristupa temi (...) koji omogućuje raspravu pripada domeni kulturne kritike.Inicijalno zadirući u sferu estetskog, tekst započinje primjerima iz teorije prakse. Tiče se inkorporiranosti filmskih sadržaja u osobne identifikacijske procese svakodnevnog života. Praktična pretpostavka jest: budući da se relevantnost kinematografije u velikoj mjeri očituje u dostupnosti plasiranih sadržaja, sam film se tako predstavlja kao privatni i kolektivni itinerar kulturnih znanja i putokaz življenom iskustvu.Teorijski se pak dio priče odnosi na prenošenje znanja specijaliziranim kodovima koje potvrđuje činjenicu disciplinarnog zatvaranja kao identifikacijskog procesa. Ukoliko pretpostavimo da je inicijalna tendencija prepoznavanja, uspostave i upisivanja identiteta u matricu svakodnevice oblik kritičkog djelovanja, utoliko se s pravom možemo pitati postoji li nešto što možemo zvati paradoksom uspostavljanja identiteta? I ukoliko postoji, sabotira li zapravo taj paradoks vlastitu inicijalnu tendenciju, a ta je, ponovimo to – djelovanje? Zaključak sugerira dijalektički i interdisciplinarni pristup problematici čiji su cilj etički i politički korektnije politike predstavljanja. Preciznije, umjesto danas razvidnih i dominirajućih perpetuiranih reprezentiranja manipuliranog znanja, ovaj rad nastoji otvoriti mogućnosti za samoartikulacije i samoprezentiranja različitih identifikacijskih pozicija.It is procurable to postulate that identity as such, even if tentatively fixed, is being beheld as an unstable, socially conditioned category, marked and recognized depending on the distribution of power and current discourse relations. The assumption of this text is the politics and the problematic of identity viewed through the conflict nature of the dominantly and marginally positioned relation of social actors. Contextualized throughout this binary distribution of power, the applicable part of this text introduces the subject of identity studies and the problematic it beholds within identity itself in two different social discourses . In this perspective, the film is seen as the media of popular culture, while the important part of scientifically-theoretical access to the subject which allows debate, is in the domain of cultural critique.Interfering initially in the domain of esthetics, the text begins with examples in theory of practice. It concerns embeddedness of the film epitome into personal identification processes of everyday life. The practical assumption is: given the fact the relevancy of cinematography is broadly shown in the availability of the placed substance, the film itself is presented as a private and a collective itinerary of cultural knowledge and a signpost for lived experience.The theoretical part of the story relates to the transfer of knowledge using specialized codes while confirming the fact of disciplinal closure as well as the identification process. If we were to assume that the initial tendency of recognition, establishment and inscription of identity into the matrix of everyday life is indeed a form of critical action, than it is right to ask if there is a thing that could be called the paradox of establishing identity. And, if there is indeed such a thing, is this paradox actually sabotaging its own initial tendency – that being – acting? Conclusion suggests dialectical and interdisciplinary approach to the problematic which aims to the more correct politics of representation, both in ethical and political sense. More precisely, this text tries to open the possibilities of self-articulation and self-representation of different identification positions instead of nowadays apparent and dominate representations of manipulated knowledge. (shrink)

The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori—the major cause of the disease. In this paper we examine the received view on this case, according to which the primary reason for the abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a prominent gastroenterologist Palmer, which suggested no bacteria could be found in (...) the human stomach. To this end, we employ the method of digital textual analysis and study the literature on the etiology of PUD published in the decade prior to Palmer’s article. Our findings suggest that the bacterial hypothesis had already been abandoned before the publication of Palmer’s paper, which challenges the widely held view that his study played a crucial role in the development of this episode. In view of this result, we argue that the PUD case does not illustrate harmful effects of a high degree of information flow, as it has frequently been claimed in the literature on network epistemology. Moreover, we argue that alternative examples of harmful effects of a high degree of information flow may be hard to find in the history of science. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the problem of inconsistency toleration in the context of scientific pluralism. I argue that, first of all, the notion of inconsistency toleration has to be qualified with respect to the evaluative attitude that one takes towards a given scientific theory or theories. Second, I show which types of inconsistency toleration are compatible with two major approaches to scientific pluralism, the so-called modest and the radical one. In view of this I suggest some points of demarcation (...) between these two approaches. (shrink)

The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison, nor to an abandonment of convergent realism. Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanen’s first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails. With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhn’s view (...) on inter-paradigm theory comparison allows only for ‘the weak notion of rationality’, and that Kuukkanen’s argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With regard to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as compatible with convergent realism since Kuhn’s argument against it is not ‘ultimately empirical’, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.Keywords: Thomas S. Kuhn; Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen; Coherentist epistemology; Rationality; Theory choice; Convergent realism. (shrink)

We often promise to ϕ despite having evidence that there is a significant chance that we won’t ϕ. This gives rise to a pressing philosophical problem: Are we irresponsible in making such promises since, it seems, we are insincere or irrational in making them? I argue that we needn’t be. When it’s up to us to ϕ, our practical reasons for ϕ-ing partly determine whether it is rational for us to believe that we will ϕ. That is why we can (...) sometimes rationally believe that we will ϕ even if our belief goes against the evidence. (shrink)

The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori – the major cause of the disease. In this paper we examine the received view on this case, according to which the primary reason for the abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a prominent gastroenterologist Palmer, which suggested no bacteria could be (...) found in the human stomach. To this end, we employ the methodof digital textual analysis and study the literature on the etiology of PUD published in the decade prior to Palmer’s article. Our findings suggest that the bacterial hypothesis had already been abandoned before the publication of Palmer’s paper, which challenges the widely held view that his study played a crucial role in the development of this episode. In view of this result, we argue that the PUD case does not illustrate harmful effects of a high degree of information flow, as it has frequently been claimed in the literature on network epistemology. Moreover, we argue that alternative examples of harmful effects of a high degree of information flow may be hard to find in the history of science. (shrink)

Philosophers have accused locke of holding a view about propositions that simply conflates the formation of a propositional thought with the judgment that a proposition is true, and charged that this has obviously absurd consequences.1 Worse, this account appears not to be unique to Locke: it bears a striking resemblance to one found in both the Port-Royal Logic (the Logic, for short) and the Port-Royal Grammar. In the Logic, this account forms part of the backbone of the traditional logic expounded (...) in the text. As a result, the account’s alleged faults seem to seriously threaten the coherence and value of the whole approach to logic. And to the extent that Locke’s core philosophical commitments, in particular his .. (shrink)