Normative Ethics

This thesis examines Mahatma Gandhi's ethical views on nonviolence from the perspective of contemporary philosophical ethics. Gandhian nonviolence is situated in the field of contemporary ethics by using the concepts and terminology from Shelly Kagan's work, Normative Ethics. Three questions are asked that classify and clarify Gandhian nonviolence. First, is nonviolence primarily instrumentally or intrinsically significant? This question is closely tied to the second, does Gandhian nonviolence belong to which type of ethical theory, consequentialism or deontology? And third, is nonviolence (...) an absolutist constraint or a high threshold that allows for exceptions? Gandhi views nonviolence as both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable; however, of the two, Gandhi considers nonviolence to be primarily intrinsically significant. As such, Gandhian nonviolence is properly considered a deontological constraint. Even though he admits that nonviolence is often an impossible mandate, Gandhi considers the moral law of nonviolence to be absolute. This work concludes that Gandhian nonviolence should properly be considered as an absolutist deontological principle. (shrink)

Today it is commonly believed that capitalism is driven by greed. However, greed is condemned by various religious traditions. In this paper we compare how Mahatma Gandhi, a Hindu, and Michael Novak, a Catholic, see the possibilities of engaging in competitive business practice without the motive of greed. This discussion suggests a need to distinguish greed from self-interest. We therefore analyze whether it makes a difference in moral evaluation to claim that the real driving force of capitalism is self-interest but (...) not greed. Our analysis makes use of the rational-care theory of self-interest developed by Stephen Darwall, the discussion of which has been absent in the business ethics literature. Our conclusion is that there is a quantitative but not qualitative difference between the two. (shrink)

I contend existing international law frameworks are inadequate for explaining why certain foreign information-based influence campaigns are impermissible or troublesome. Moreover, I posits the warfare paradigm is both limiting and potentially dangerous. I then propose reframing the conversation about foreign information and influence campaigns to focus not on the nationality of the speaker or the source of the idea but rather on whether there is deception or mis/disinformation involved. It is factors like these that arguably render influence impermissible and corrosive (...) to democracy. (shrink)

Dialogamos con Cintia Rodríguez Garat, quien obtuvo el Primer Premio Bioética 2023 de la Fundación Jaime Roca por su trabajo “Resiliencia y salud pública de las mujeres mapuce ante el cambio climático. Un análisis desde una perspectiva intercultural, participativa y de derechos humanos”.

Nel dibattito filosofico recente si è iniziato a guardare con sempre più interesse al potenziale giustificatorio delle spiegazioni genealogiche. Se la tradizione continentale da ha infatti messo l’accento sulle implicazioni critiche e destabilizzanti del metodo genealogico, la tradizione analitica ha mostrato che esso può anche offrire supporto ai propri oggetti d’indagine: norme di comportamento, pratiche, concetti e via dicendo.2 Secondo Matthieu Queloz, un resoconto genealogico ha un carattere giustificatorio quando riesce a identificare un rapporto strumentale necessario tra il concetto o (...) la pratica presa in oggetto e bisogni umani abbastanza fondamentali da poter essere riconosciuti come tali da tutti. Si pensi, ad esempio, al resoconto funzionalista con cui Williams spiega la virtù della veridicità in quanto indispensabile al soddisfacimento del basilare bisogno umano di raccolta e messa in comune di informazioni attendibili. La domanda che voglio affrontare riguarda le supposte capacità giustificatorie di questo tipo di spiegazioni. Fino a che punto esse modificano davvero – per usare un’espressione di Sellars – lo spazio delle ragioni? Sono del parere che la loro portata normativa e valutativa sia variabile e che prendere in esame alcuni casi limite aiuti a dimostrarlo. Più nello specifico, ritengo che in alcuni casi le ragioni offerte attraverso queste spiegazioni siano ragioni non tanto per giustificare il ricorso a certi concetti o pratiche, ma ragioni per scusare coloro che vi ricorrono. (shrink)

This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs in direct conflict with epistemic norms. Weak views hold that friendship may place normative expectations on belief formation but in a manner that does not violate these norms. It is argued that neither view succeeds in explaining the relationship between epistemic norms and friendship norms. Weak views inadvertently endorse a form of (...) motivated reasoning, failing to resolve the normative clash they seek to avoid. Strong views turn out to be incoherent once we consider the question of whether the requirement to form an epistemically partial belief is independent of whether the belief in question would be true. It is then argued that an epistemology of friendship should recognise the special role that understanding plays in friendship. On this view, friendship normatively requires understanding the truth about our friends. This entails that epistemic partiality, far from being a requirement, is in fact at odds with good friendship. (shrink)

Nozick argues, in “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”, correctly I think, that we can go from an equal distribution of wealth to an unequal one through just means. Nozick then asks: If people voluntarily move from a just distribution of wealth, D1, to a different distribution, D2, “isn’t D2 also just?” While Nozick thinks the new distribution of wealth, D2, is just, I think that it is at least possible to go from a just state of affairs to an un-just state (...) of affairs by just means. I then argue that any unequal distribution of wealth can not maximize the good derived from wealth. Therefore, on the basis of plausible utilitarian ideas, any distribution of wealth that isn’t at least roughly equal is un-just, even it was arrived at by just means from aa equal and just distribution of wealth. (shrink)

Large Language Models (LLMs) are generative AI systems capable of producing original texts based on inputs about topic and style provided in the form of prompts or questions. The introduction of the outputs of these systems into human discursive practices poses unprecedented moral and political questions. The article articulates an analysis of the moral status of these systems and their interactions with human interlocutors based on the Habermasian theory of communicative action. The analysis explores, among other things, Habermas's inquiries into (...) the analogy between human minds and computers, and into the status of atypical participants in the linguistic community such as genetically modified subjects and animals. Major conclusions are the LLMs seem to qualify as authors that originally participate in discursive practices but do display only a structurally derivative form of communicative competence and fail to meet the status of communicative agents. In this sense, while the contribution of AI writing systems in public discourse and deliberation can support the process of mutual understanding within the community of speakers, the human actors involved in the development, use, and diffusion of these systems share a collective responsibility for the disclosure of AI authorship and verification and adjudication of validity claims. (shrink)

The proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has sparked an overwhelming number of AI ethics guidelines, boards and codes of conduct. These outputs primarily analyse competing theories, principles and values for AI development and deployment. However, as a series of recent problematic incidents about AI ethics/ethicists demonstrate, this orientation is insufficient. Before proceeding to evaluate other professions, AI ethicists should critically evaluate their own; yet, such an evaluation should be more explicitly and systematically undertaken in the literature. I argue that these (...) insufficiencies could be mitigated by developing a research agenda for a feminist metaethics of AI. Contrary to traditional metaethics, which reflects on the nature of morality and moral judgements in a non-normative way, feminist metaethics expands its scope to ask not only what ethics is but also what our engagement with it should be like. Applying this perspective to the context of AI, I suggest that a feminist metaethics of AI would examine: (i) the continuity between theory and action in AI ethics; (ii) the real-life effects of AI ethics; (iii) the role and profile of those involved in AI ethics; and (iv) the effects of AI on power relations through methods that pay attention to context, emotions and narrative. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to show the relevance that Aquinas's theory of natural inclinations can play in the contemporary debate for the inquiry on human flourishing, which consists in the realisation of the proper end that human beings have as human beings. We will engage in dialogue with several authors, belonging to the analytic tradition (Elizabeth Anscombe, John Finnis, Ralph McInerny, Anthony Lisska) or, nevertheless, culturally close to it (Alasdair MacIntyre), who have reconsidered the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (...) in the contemporary debate in order to inquire what enables human flourishing. We will argue that the proper consideration of natural inclinations leads, on the one hand, to overcome the problems posed by Hume's law by identifying human nature as a normative criterion common to all human beings, and, on the other hand, to recognise the role of the first-person perspective in identifying what enables the human flourishing of each agent. Natural inclinations do not express agents' psychological preferences, but consist in the fact that human beings naturally tend towards the realisation of their nature as a good to be realised. In order to flourish, human beings are required to act in accordance with their natural inclinations, since natural inclinations are tendencies that human beings have towards a set of goods that are grounded in human nature. Revisiting a recent proposal put forward by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum in the field of analytic metaphysics, we will argue that agents develop a virtuous conduct if and only if they act in accordance with their natural inclinations; in doing so, they flourish as human beings, that is, they actualise the powers they have by virtue of their nature. However, human beings are not strictly necessitated to act in accordance with their natural inclinations. Indeed, in order to flourish, agents should also recognise, by virtue of their rational capacities, that acting in accordance with their natural inclinations is a reason for acting for them and they should act in accordance with these reasons. Furthermore, we will argue that there is no single way to flourish for all human beings, because, although flourishing requires that human beings act in accordance with their nature, nevertheless, the way in which agents can flourish varies according to their individual characteristics and according to the circumstances and contexts in which they act, that is, according to the practices in which they participate in their lived experience. In the last part of this thesis, we will test the theoretical proposal developed in the previous parts through a critical analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre's thought. (shrink)

The desire-satisfactionist defense of the existence of posthumous harm faces the problem of changing desires. The problem is that, in some cases where desires change before the time of their objects, the principle underlying the desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm yields implausible results. In his prominent desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm, David Boonin proposes a solution to this problem. First, I argue that there are two relevantly different versions of the problem of changing desires, and that Boonin's proposed solution addresses (...) only one of them. Second, I argue that modifying the underlying principle is a better approach to overcoming the problem of changing desires since it addresses both versions of the problem. I defend this approach against objections by showing that the problems raised are problems for the principle as a general theory of harm, not for the principle as part of the desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm. (shrink)

Can we formulate a moral theory that captures the moral significance of patterns of group behaviour we cannot affect through our own action while at the same time avoiding the so-called ‘Ideal Worlds’ objection? In a recent article, Caleb Perl has argued that we can. Specifically, Perl claims that one view that does so is his Patterned View: roughly, you ought to act only in accordance with that set of sufficiently general rules that has optimal moral value (Perl 2021: 98). (...) The Patterned View undoubtedly constitutes a welcome contribution to our existing set of moral theories. However, does it avoid the Ideal Worlds objection? In this article, I argue ‘no’. (shrink)

Rønnow-Rasmussen’s book explores the distinction between two kinds of value: good, and good-for. Rønnow-Rasmussen provides a reductive theory of both kinds of goodness: a fitting attitude account of goodness, on which facts about value reduce to facts about the norms governing agents’ attitudes. But Rønnow-Rasmussen argues that they conflict in an especially sharp way, so that we have a kind of choice about which to prioritise, and no obvious grounds on which to choose one over the other. I articulate some (...) virtues of the book but also doubts about the central thesis. (shrink)

Die Abschaffung der Sklaverei, die Einführung sozialer Sicherungssysteme, die Sanktionierung von Vergewaltigung in der Ehe gelten gemeinhin als gesellschaftlicher Fortschritt – als ein Wandel zum Besseren. Dennoch hat die Idee einer generellen Fortschrittsbewegung ihren alten Glanz verloren, ja, sie ruft sogar Skepsis hervor. In aller Munde ist hingegen die Diagnose der Regression. Sie wird diversen Zeiterscheinungen gestellt, vom rechtsautoritären Populismus bis zur Demokratiemüdigkeit. -/- Rahel Jaeggi verteidigt in ihrem Buch das Begriffspaar Fortschritt und Regression als unverzichtbares sozialphilosophisches Werkzeug für die (...) Kritik unserer Zeit. Als fortschrittlich oder regressiv versteht sie nicht nur das Resultat, sondern vor allem die Gestalt gesellschaftlicher Transformationen selbst. Indem sie nach den Erfahrungsblockaden fragt, die regressiven Tendenzen Vorschub leisten, entwickelt sie einen Begriff des Fortschritts, der eurozentrische Verzerrungen ebenso vermeidet wie die Vorstellung einer zwangsläufigen Entwicklungstendenz. Fortschritt, so zeigt sie, ist nicht der Vorlauf zu einem bereits bekannten Ziel, sondern der nie abgeschlossene Prozess der Emanzipation. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that we can get surprisingly far in vindicating common intuitions about population ethics without assuming that the well-being of those we could create gives us moral reasons for or against creating them. According to the account I sketch, rather than generating procreative reasons, facts about our potential offspring’s well-being serve as normative background conditions—they enable, disable, or modify the strength of independent reasons we might have to procreate. It is unclear whether the account can capture (...) everything many of us want to say about population ethics. But whatever the answer, the point remains that background conditions are a powerful and underappreciated tool in population ethics. (shrink)

In the context of digitalization and artificial intelligence (AI), data protection and digital ethics are trending topics. However, they are rarely considered in conjunction even though they are inextricably linked. This volume sets out to close this gap. Informational self-determination is an expression of a European understanding of values, particularly with regard to smart technologies and AI applications. In addition to socially relevant dimensions of data protection and digital ethics, the authors of this edited collection point out and analyze the (...) influences of networked technologies on the experience and manipulation of modern reality and its rootedness in the everyday. (shrink)

Two problems about rights have received so far little attention. One is the problem of identifying a general value in the practice of rights. The second is to see when, if at all, rights violations wrong the right-holder, in a morally significant sense. In the present essay, I address the first question by investigating the second. I first show that if we commit to the two ideas, common in the contemporary philosophy of rights, that claim-rights always correlate with directed duties (...) and that rights aspire to protect interests of the right-holder, we make it hard to explain why rights violations, in general, wrong right-holders. In the final section, I present what I see as a promising solution to the puzzle. I describe a particular social environment (the society of equals) where interacting with others through rights is indeed valuable because respecting rights communicates that one takes seriously others’ equal moral status. In such a society and only in such a society, I conclude, moral agents are required to treat all rights violations as wrongs perpetrated against the right-holder. (shrink)

The problem with how we mythologise reality is arguably at the core of humanity’s ecological/existential crisis. While others have pointed to this, F. W. Schelling produced a philosophy of art which both confirms it and lays the foundations for how it can be addressed. This involves reversing the polarities of the ‘modern mythology’, related directly to Art-and-Humanity’s joint meaning crisis which Schelling claimed originates in our alienation from Nature and the rise of ‘revealed religion’. Despite his resurgence (inspiring Complexity Science), (...) the relevance of Schelling’s aesthetics to resolving humanity’s long-standing ethical problems has been neglected. In this paper, I begin by framing Schelling’s view on religion, contextualising his ontological, cosmological approach to art. I then argue why his ‘dialectical aesthetics’, grounded in ‘process metaphysics’, presents a radical advance on Kant’s and Hegel’s ‘reflective’ standpoint featured in our dominant theoretical aesthetic paradigm (causing art’s sharpest decline via the evolving ‘modern’ suppression of metaphoric thinking by ‘symbolic idealism’, at the heart of our ‘worlding’ problems). Then, showing how Schelling’s Principle of Art leads us archetypally back to the normative sciences, I argue redirecting the self-destructive modern mythology means reorienting ‘final cause’ in our narratology. And why this firstly requires distinguishing proper metaphor from the symbolic constructions common in ‘conceptual art’. (In a subsequent paper, Schelling’s Art ‘in the Particular’ will be revealed to offer the practical application of his Principle to any artforms/works ‘for all time’ in praxis, advancing my argument here for why his system offers a suitable framework for collectively re-worlding the world). (shrink)

Deleuze’ün Spinozacı yaşam tahayyülünde ‘ne yapmalıyız?’ sorusuna normatif, ahlaki ya da siyasi bir yanıt bulamıyoruz ama varoluşu düşünmenin içkin bir olanağını keşfediyoruz. Düşünmeye 'dışarıdan' yani dünyadan başlamak insani (kurgusal) bir dünyaya değil, içinde yaşadığımız gerçek dünyaya inanmak demektir. İçkinliğin politik anlamı düşünceyi dünyaya getirmektir.

This dissertation offers a critical discussion of the prioritisation of ‘the right’ in John Rawls’s theory of justice. Rawls’s theory of justice – ‘justice as fairness’ – is arguably one of the best illustrations of the prioritisation of ‘the right’ in current political literature. However, his theory has been criticised by a diversity of thinkers for its implied structural relation between ‘the right’ and ‘the good’. Some theorists argue that conceptually ‘the good’ can never be derived from ‘the right’; others (...) argue that, even if it were possible, the social implications of such a conceptualisation would devastating as it would result in a so-called “community of strangers” (Rorty 1988, 273). In this dissertation, I argue that be on the one hand, theories that prioritise ‘the right’– such as ‘justice as fairness’ – enable the attractive possibility of the multiple coexistence of ‘comprehensive goods’. This is attractive as it upholds the liberating ethos: ‘I have the freedom to determine my own ends’. This possibility is attributed to the fact of neutrality, which characterises the priority of ‘the right’. The claim of neutrality is embedded in the ideal that political principles can be developed prior to and independently of any content of ‘the good’. This is then supposed to justify the claim that political principles are non-reliant on comprehensive moral ideals. In this way, the prioritisation of ‘the right’, as evident in ‘justice as fairness’, supposedly enables citizens to construct impartial universal principles that govern their society. Yet, on the other hand, I question the degree of neutrality present in ‘justice as fairness’. I argue that ‘justice as fairness’, although its justification is independent of a singular moral truth, is not neutral concerning ‘the good’. In fact, the moral values encapsulated in the priority of ‘the right’, I argue, set the conditions of justification of all doctrines of ‘the good’ because any idea of ‘the good’ that embodies contradictory values to those encapsulated in the priority of ‘the right’ would necessarily be excluded from a Rawlsian society. Therefore, I argue that Rawls’s theory of justice cannot be said to take into account “a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls 2001, 34); as moral values are already implied in the prioritising of ‘the right’. In light of how Rawls’s theory of justice is simultaneously neutral and prescriptive regarding ‘the good’, I suggest a re-problematisation of the debate on the relationship between ‘the right’ and ‘the good’. The literature on theories that prioritise ‘the right’ or ‘the good’ seems to imply such theories either embody the one or the other methodological approach. I argue that this debate has been presented as a false dichotomy and, as such, the debate itself seems to be exhausted, because it creates a kind of natural impasse. Therefore, I suggest recasting the debate in terms of representing ‘the right’ and ‘the good’ as two methodological positions on a continuum, that are at the same time both more or less gradually similar and divergent from one another. The purpose of this continuum is to demonstrate that notions such as neutrality, objectivity and comprehensiveness are not clear-cut. (shrink)

Palestinian rock climbers in the West Bank ascend towering limestone cliffs despite being forcibly dispossessed and targeted by Israeli military and violent settlers. This paper examines their actions from the perspective of Quiet Resistance – a form of resistance where one is motivated by personal reasons to pursue activities that are obstructed by oppression. I explain what Quiet Resistance is, how it differs from political protest, and what makes it distinctively valuable. Then, I explain how Quiet Resistance allows the Palestinian (...) climbers to maintain sources of meaning in life under oppressive circumstances. Further, as a form of symbolic action, it allows the climbers to forge a profound connection to their rightful land. (shrink)

Almost everyone believes that freedom from deprivation should have significant weight in specifying what justice between generations requires. Some theorists hold that it should always trump other distributive concerns. Other theorists hold that it should have some but not lexical priority. I argue instead that freedom from deprivation should have lexical priority in some cases, yet weighted priority in others. More specifically, I defend semi-strong sufficientarianism. This view posits a deprivation threshold at which people are free from deprivation, and an (...) affluence threshold at which people can live an affluent life, even though their lives may be even further improved beyond that point. I argue that freedom from deprivation in one generation lexically outweighs providing affluence in another generation; in all other cases, freedom from deprivation does not have lexical priority. (shrink)

In Inferno’s XXVII Canto, Dante meets Guido da Montefeltro. His story is related to a crucial dilemma. Asked by Boniface VIIIth to give a fraudulent advice for conquering Palestrina, with the promise of a pre-emptively forgiveness of his sin, Guido faces a conflict between two acts of the will: to want x (to give the advice) and to repent wanting x, one of which (repentance) will be not produced by Guido’s will but rather imposed by an external source. So Guido (...) wants to do and not to do x at the same time, even if he knows that the best choice is not doing x: a logical contradiction that defines what seems to be a particular case of weakness of will (akrasia). The paper analyzes this case within the framework of akrasia as reading key, making use, for his conceptual definition, of the tools employed in Saarinen’s, Davidson’s and Elster’s studies. (shrink)

What makes cases of pure risking sometimes wrong? There is a strong intuition that the wrongness of pure risking stands in an explanatory relationship with the wrongness of the non-risky act, other things being equal. Yet, we cannot simply take this for granted insofar as in cases of wrongful pure risking, the risked outcome fails to materialize. To this end, I motivate and develop an underexplored approach in the literature that I call Unificationism. According to the Unificationist account that I (...) defend, the fact that pure risking φ is pro tanto wrong is grounded by a general moral fact that φ-ing is pro tanto or all-things-considered wrong, other things being equal. This relationship holds even if and when an agent’s risky conduct fails to transpire or culminate into φ-ing ex post. I argue that this Unificationist account captures our explanatory intuition, avoids problems of extensional and explanatory inadequacy that existing alternative faces, and most importantly, renders Unificationism as a plausible view within the ethics of pure risking. (shrink)

What makes discrimination morally bad? In this paper, we discuss the putative badness of a case of consensual discrimination to show that prominent accounts of the badness of discrimination—appealing, inter alia, to harm, disrespect and inequality—fail to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. In view of this, we present a more promising account.

Xenotransplantation is often deemed morally objectionable because of the costs it imposes on the organ donor and the risks it imposes on the recipient. For some, involving human–pig chimeras as donors makes the practice more objectionable or even abhorrent from the start. For others, by contrast, using such chimeras weakens recipient-based objections because it reduces the risk of organ rejection and malfunctioning, and cancels donor-based objections because the practice does not harm chimeras but instead gives them valuable lives they would (...) not otherwise have. The paper examines and eventually rejects the latter defense. It also discusses the additional risks of chimeric xenotourism in countries with less demanding procedural guidelines and reflects on two very different futures for humanity that may emerge from supporting or rejecting chimeric xenotransplantation. (shrink)

The current chapter provides an overview of research on responses in moral dilemmas where maximization of outcomes for the greater good (utilitarianism) conflicts with adherence to moral norms (deontology). Expanding on a description of the traditional paradigm to study moral-dilemma judgments (i.e., the trolley problem), the chapter reviews the most prominent dual-process account of moral-dilemma judgments, normative conclusions that have been derived from this account, and criticisms raised against this line of work. The following sections review advances in the development (...) of alternative approaches that aim to address shortcomings of the traditional dilemma paradigm as well as the implications of this work for psychological theories of moral-dilemma judgments and philosophical inferences about the normative implications of moral-dilemma research. The chapter concludes with a review of research on the links between moral-dilemma judgments and social impressions. (shrink)

Since its proposal in 1984, Derek Parfit’s ‘Non-Identity Problem’ has significantly influenced how social choice theorists understand existential harms and benefits. The ‘problem’ raises the question of whether parents act wrongly when they choose to create a child with a life barely worth living. It suggests that if the alternatives would have either resulted in a life not worth living or non-existence, then the parents are not liable for moral criticism. This article challenges Parfit’s premise by advocating for a Minimal (...) Concern Clause that is generated through the parental relation. The Clause operates under the assumption that non-existence is not a valanced experiential state and is thus not comparable to any positive state of existence. The argument unfolds in two main steps: firstly, it disputes the premise in Same-Number Cases by proposing an alternative semantic distinction between objects of reference, particularly, the status of a merely possible person. Secondly, it contends that in Different-Number Cases, parents are obligated to exercise minimal prudence under conditions of uncertainty, and that the moral weight of the Minimal Concern Clause must be compounded to reflect the replicable nature of procreation. (shrink)

Several important questions in applied ethics – like whether to switch to a plant-based diet, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, or vote in elections – seem to share the following structure: if enough people ‘cooperate’ and become vegan for example, we bring about a better outcome; but what you do as an individual seems to make no difference whatsoever. Such collective action problems are often thought to pose a serious challenge to consequentialism. In response, I defend the Reactive Attitude Approach: rather (...) than focus only on the deontic status of (non-)cooperative acts – as existing consequentialist responses mostly do – consequentialists should also focus on when to praise or blame individuals. For example, even if your veganism does not change the overall outcome, consequentialists might still recommend praising you for your cooperative behavior. I make a consequentialist case for including praise and blame in our ethical practices around collective action and argue that doing so helps us capture important intuitions. I develop and defend these arguments by drawing on recent instrumentalist theories of blame and responsibility. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give an account of what it is to internalize a rule. I claim that internalization is the process of redistributing the burden of instruction from the teacher to the student. The process is complete when instruction is no longer needed, and the rule has reshaped perceptual classification of the circumstances in which it applies. Teaching a rule is the initiation of this process. We internalize rules by simulating instruction coming from someone else. Running (...) these simulations enables us to toggle between the perspective of the instructor and our own perspective. By doing this we coordinate our perspectives with that of the teacher. The account given here provides a deeper explanation of why internalizing a rule involves the dispositions and reactive attitudes proponents of Rule Consequentialism often say it does, why moral reflection is variably demanding, how intergenerational moral progress is made possible by our cognitive architectures, and why the adoption of a rule should be understood in terms of teaching that rule. (shrink)