ABSTRACTThree experiments examined how people reason about what is possible or necessary when a conditional is true. Participants were asked to indicate whether it was necessary, possible or impossible for a specific instance to conform to one of the truth-table cases, given the truth of the conditional. It was found that most participants, inconsistently, judged the pq case as necessary but the ¬pq or ¬p¬q cases as possible. Logically, these two kinds of judgments are contradictory. Moreover, a true conditional doesn’t (...) imply that a specific instance under the conditional must be pq. Therefore, people demonstrate a necessity illusion for pq cases which contradicts their commitment to the possibility of ¬pq or ¬p¬q cases. Existing accounts of conditionals are unable to explain the contradiction and the necessity illusion. We propose an inference dissociation account and explore the theoretical implications of this necessity illusion. (shrink)

This book is the first systematic treatment of the philosophy of science underlying evolutionary economics. It does not advocate an evolutionary approach towards economics, but rather assesses the epistemic value of appealing to evolutionary biology in economics more generally. The author divides work in evolutionary economics into three distinct, albeit related, forms: a structural form, an evidential form, and a heuristic form. He then analyzes five examples of work in evolutionary economics falling under these three forms. For the structural (...) form, he examines the parallelism between natural selection and economic decision making, and the parallelism between natural selection and market competition. For the evidential form, he looks at the relationship between animal and human economic decision making, and the evolutionary explanation of diversity in human economic decision making. Finally, for the heuristic form, he focuses on the plausibility of equilibrium modeling in evolutionary ecology and economics. In this way, he shows that linking evolutionary biology and economics can make for a powerful methodological tool that can enable progress in our understanding of various economics questions. Structure, Evidence, and Heuristic will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of science, philosophy of social science, evolutionary biology, and economics. (shrink)

This paper aims to bridge philosophical and psychological research on causation, counterfactual thought, and the problem of backtracking. Counterfactual approaches to causation such as that by Lewis have ruled out backtracking, while on prominent models of causal inference interventionist counterfactuals do not backtrack. However, on various formal models, certain backtracking counterfactuals end up being true, and psychological evidence shows that people do sometimes backtrack when answering counterfactual questions in causal contexts. On the basis of psychological research, I argue that (...) while ordinarily both kinds of counterfactuals may be employed, non-backtracking counterfactuals are more easily used in causal inference because they are consistent with temporal order information embedded in the mental simulation heuristic, and they match reasoners’ experience of causation. While this approach is incompatible with the ambitions of counterfactual theories that seek to establish the non-backtracking interpretation as the only legitimate one, it can provide support for perspectival views on causation and open further inquiry on the functions of causal and counterfactual thought in the context of causal models. (shrink)

This book represents the first major attempt by any author to provide an integrated account of the evidence for bias in human reasoning across a wide range of disparate psychological literatures. The topics discussed involve both deductive and inductive reasoning as well as statistical judgement and inference. In addition, the author proposes a general theoretical approach to the explanations of bias and considers the practical implications for real world decision making. The theoretical stance of the book is based on (...) a distinction between preconscious heuristic processes which determine the mental representation of 'relevant' features of the problem content, and subsequent analytic reasoning processes which generate inferences and judgements. Phenomena discussed and interpreted within this framework include feature matching biases in propositional reasoning, confirmation bias, biasing and debiasing effects of knowledge on reasoning, and biases in statistical judgement normally attributed to 'availability' and 'representativeness' heuristics. In the final chapter, the practical consequences of bias for real life decision making are considered, together with various issues concerning the problem of 'debiasing'. The major approaches discussed are those involving education and training on the one hand, and the development of intelligent software and interactive decision aids on the other. (shrink)

If A confirms H and B confirms H, it seems reasonable to infer that A&B confirms H. However, this inference is not valid; it is only a heuristic. I show that the level of confirmation A and B each give to H by itself implies nothing about the level of confirmation that A&B gives to H. Any combination of values is possible for P(H), P(H|A), P(H|B) and P(H|AB) is possible. Still, I show the heuristic leads from true premises (...) to true conclusions whenever A and B are statistically independent or correlated,which includes most situations where we evaluate evidence. There is risk, though, when one does not consider how A and B interact; one can miss anti-correlations that lead the heuristic to fail. The problem is exacerbated when groups of people are motivated to support a favored hypothesis. Each person finds evidence that confirms the hypothesis and contributes that evidence to the group’s discourse (e.g. through a climate change denial website). The temptation to focus solely on the number of individual pieces of evidence can lead people to ignore whether the evidence fits together. In combination with cognitive biases, this can lead to serious errors. (shrink)

Previous studies have shown that people often use heuristics in making inferences and that subjective memory experiences, such as recognition or familiarity of objects, can be valid cues for inferences. So far, many researchers have used the binary choice task in which two objects are presented as alternatives (e.g., “Which city has the larger population, city A or city B?”). However, objects can be presented not only as alternatives but also in a question (e.g., “Which country is city X in, (...) country A or country B?”). In such a situation, people can make inferences based on the relationship between the object in the question and each object given as an alternative. In the present study, we call this type of task a “relationships‐comparison task.” We modeled the three inference strategies that people could apply to solve it (familiarity‐matching [FM; a new heuristic we propose in this study], familiarity heuristic [FH], and knowledge‐based inference [KI]) to examine people's inference processes. Through Studies 1, 2, and 3, we found that (a) people tended to rely on heuristics, and that FM (inferences based on similarity in familiarity between objects) well explained participants' inference patterns; (b) FM could work as an ecologically rational strategy for the relationships–comparison task since it could effectively reflect environmental structures, and that the use of FM could be highly replicable and robust; and (c) people could sometimes use a decision strategy like FM, even in their daily lives (consumer behaviors). The nature of the relationships–comparison task and human cognitive processes is discussed. (shrink)

Green consumption values have been shown to motivate consumers to engage in green consumption practices. However, surprisingly little research has examined how green consumption values develop in young people. In the current study, we employed ecological socialization theory as a framework to investigate the process by which parents’ green consumption values shape similar values in their young adolescents. In Study 1, data from 722 Chinese families that included an early adolescent showed that both mothers’ and fathers’ green consumption values were (...) positively associated with early adolescents’ green consumption values, and this association was mediated by each parent’s environmentally responsible consumption behavior. Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1 using two waves of matched parent-adolescent data collected a month apart from another group of 477 Chinese families. Furthermore, Study 2 showed that the mediation process identified in Study 1 was evident only when there was a close parent–child relationship. These findings have implications for cultivating the green consumption values of today’s youth. The results also have heuristic value for future research on the ecological socialization and inter-generational transmission of pro-environmental values. (shrink)

In fantasy sports, the goal is to gain as many points as possible. To get there, users have to choose players with the optimal price-to-performance ratio. However, finding these optimal players requires a great amount of time and effort, in which the users might not be willing to invest. Instead, they can use heuristic strategies. This paper investigates one such strategy for choosing squads based on the assumption that athletes starting for the favourite team of the match would bring (...) users more points—in line with the representativeness heuristic. The data come from the Czech fantasy league according to the Premier League in the season 2015–16. The econometric model examines the percentage of squads a player was chosen into. The Ordinary Least Squares method used here uses control variables indicating performance, price, Czech nationality, and the game position of the athletes. The results show that users choose their squads primarily based on players’ past performances, but also take the favourite team into account. By applying the latter heuristic users aim to simplify the process decision-making but they overestimate the impact of belonging to a favourite team. (shrink)

Many species rely on the three-dimensional surface layout of an environment to find a desired goal following disorientation. They generally do so to the exclusion of other important spatial cues. Two influential frameworks for explaining that phenomenon are provided by geometric-module theories and view-matching theories of reorientation respectively. The former posit a module that operates only on representations of the global geo- metry of three-dimensional surfaces to guide behavior. The latter place snapshots, stored representations of the subject’s two-dimensional retinal (...) stimulation at specific locations, at the heart of their accounts. In this paper, I take a fresh look at the debate between them. I begin by making a case that the empirical evidence we currently have does not clearly favor one framework over the other, and that the debate has reached something of an impasse. Then, I present a new explanatory problem—the representation selection problem—that offers the pro- spect of breaking the impasse by introducing a new type of explanatory consideration that both frameworks must address. The representation selection problem requires explaining how subjects can reliably select the relevant representation with which they initiate the reorientation process. I argue that the view-matching framework does not have the resources to address this problem, while a certain type of theory within the geometric-module framework can provide a natural response to it. In showing this, I develop a new geometric-module theory. (shrink)

It is well known that Bayes’ theorem (with likelihood ratios) can be used to calculate the impact of evidence, such as a ‘match’ of some feature of a person. Typically the feature of interest is the DNA profile, but the method applies in principle to any feature of a person or object, including not just DNA, fingerprints, or footprints, but also more basic features such as skin colour, height, hair colour or even name. Notwithstanding concerns about the extensiveness of (...) databases of such features, a serious challenge to the use of Bayes in such legal contexts is that its standard formulaic representations are not readily understandable to non-statisticians. Attempts to get round this problem usually involve representations based around some variation of an event tree. While this approach works well in explaining the most trivial instance of Bayes’ theorem (involving a single hypothesis and a single piece of evidence) it does not scale up to realistic situations. In particular, even with a single piece of match evidence, if we wish to incorporate the possibility that there are potential errors (both false positives and false negatives) introduced at any stage in the investigative process, matters become very complex. As a result we have observed expert witnesses (in different areas of speciality) routinely ignore the possibility of errors when presenting their evidence. To counter this, we produce what we believe is the first full probabilistic solution of the simple case of generic match evidence incorporating both classes of testing errors. Unfortunately, the resultant event tree solution is too complex for intuitive comprehension. And, crucially, the event tree also fails to represent the causal information that underpins the argument. In contrast, we also present a simple-to-construct graphical Bayesian Network (BN) solution that automatically performs the calculations and may also be intuitively simpler to understand. Although there have been multiple previous applications of BNs for analysing forensic evidence—including very detailed models for the DNA matching problem, these models have not widely penetrated the expert witness community. Nor have they addressed the basic generic match problem incorporating the two types of testing error. Hence we believe our basic BN solution provides an important mechanism for convincing experts—and eventually the legal community—that it is possible to rigorously analyse and communicate the full impact of match evidence on a case, in the presence of possible errors. (shrink)

Subject relative clauses (SRCs) are typically processed more easily than object relative clauses (ORCs), but this difference is diminished by an inanimate head‐noun in semantically non‐reversible ORCs (“The book that the boy is reading”). In two eye‐tracking experiments, we investigated the influence of animacy on online processing of semantically reversible SRCs and ORCs using lexically inanimate items that were perceptually animate due to motion (e.g., “Where is the tractor that the cow is chasing”). In Experiment 1, 48 children (aged 4;5–6;4) (...) and 32 adults listened to sentences that varied in the lexical animacy of the NP1 head‐noun (Animate/Inanimate) and relative clause (RC) type (SRC/ORC) with an animate NP2 while viewing two images depicting opposite actions. As expected, inanimate head‐nouns facilitated the correct interpretation of ORCs in children; however, online data revealed children were more likely to anticipate an SRC as the RC unfolded when an inanimate head‐noun was used, suggesting processing was sensitive to perceptual animacy. In Experiment 2, we repeated our design with inanimate (rather than animate) NP2s (e.g., “where is the tractor that the car is following”) to investigate whether our online findings were due to increased visual surprisal at an inanimate as agent, or to similarity‐based interference. We again found greater anticipation for an SRC in the inanimate condition, supporting our surprisal hypothesis. Across the experiments, offline measures show that lexical animacy influenced children's interpretation of ORCs, whereas online measures reveal that as RCs unfolded, children were sensitive to the perceptual animacy of lexically inanimate NPs, which was not reflected in the offline data. Overall measures of syntactic comprehension, inhibitory control, and verbal short‐term memory and working memory were not predictive of children's accuracy in RC interpretation, with the exception of a positive correlation with a standardized measure of syntactic comprehension in Experiment 1. (shrink)

We tested the hypothesis that choices determined by Type 1 processes are compelling because they are fluent, and for this reason they are less subject to analytic thinking than other answers. A total of 104 participants completed a modified version of Wason's selection task wherein they made decisions about one card at a time using a two-response paradigm. In this paradigm participants gave a fast, intuitive response, rated their feeling of rightness for that response, and were then allowed free time (...) to reconsider their answers. As we predicted, answers consistent with a matching heuristic were made more quickly than other answers, were given higher FOR ratings, and received less subsequent analysis as measured by rethinking time and the probability of changing answers. These data suggest that reasoning biases may be compelling because they are fluently generated; this is turn creates a strong FOR, which acts as a signal that further analysis is not necessary. (shrink)

Overconfidence is typically damaging to one’s reputation as a trustworthy source of information. Previous research shows that the reputational cost associated with conveying a piece of false information is higher for confident than unconfident speakers. When judging speaker trustworthiness, individuals do not exclusively rely on past accuracy but consider the extent to which speakers expressed a degree of confidence that matched the accuracy of their claims (their “confidence-accuracy calibration”). The present study experimentally examines the interplay between confidence, accuracy and a (...) third factor, namely evidence, in the assessment of speaker trustworthiness. Experiment 1 probes the hypothesis that overconfidence does not backfire when a confident but inaccurate claim is justified: the trustworthiness of a confident speaker who turns out to be wrong is restored if the confidence expressed is based on strong evidence (good confidence-evidence calibration). Experiment 2 investigates the hypothesis that confidence can backfire if a confident and accurate claim is not justified: the trustworthiness of a confident speaker who turns out to be right is damaged if the confidence expressed is based on weak evidence (bad confidence-evidence calibration). Our results support both hypotheses and thus suggest that “confidence-evidence calibration” plays a crucial role in the assessment of speaker trustworthiness. (shrink)

This paper proposes an epistemic logical framework for demanding knowing why in the natural sciences. Our focus is on the phenomena and their respective causal factors revealed by experiments. Two novel modalities \(\textsf{E}(\psi,\varphi )\) and \(\textsf {W}((\psi _1,\varphi _1)\bullet (\psi _2,\varphi _2)\bullet \cdots \bullet (\psi _n,\varphi _n))\) are introduced over models that deviate from the usual epistemic models by having both experimental evidence and the scientific theories, which is inspired by scientific practices. The modality \(\textsf{E}\) expresses scientists’ have (conclusive) (...) experimental evidence indicating a dependence relation between the causal factor \(\psi \) and \(\varphi \). Based on the evidence, scientists often package some (perhaps seemingly unrelated) phenomena together, and the modality \(\textsf{W}\) captures scientists’ knowing why in their entirety, or having systematic knowledge-why of them, which amounts to having a _unified_ scientific theory of all these dependences. A sound and complete axiomatization is given, followed by a decidability result. Many notions of much philosophical interest are embodied in the present framework. We also draw several comparisons and connections with some existing relevant logical work. (shrink)

Heuristics are often invoked in the philosophical, psychological, and cognitive science literatures to describe or explain methodological techniques or "shortcut" mental operations that help in inference, decision-making, and problem-solving. Yet there has been surprisingly little philosophical work done on the nature of heuristics and heuristic reasoning, and a close inspection of the way(s) in which "heuristic" is used throughout the literature reveals a vagueness and uncertainty with respect to what heuristics are and their role in cognition. This dissertation (...) seeks to remedy this situation by motivating philosophical inquiry into heuristics and heuristic reasoning, and then advancing a theory of how heuristics operate in cognition. I develop a positive working characterization of heuristics that is coherent and robust enough to account for a broad range of phenomena in reasoning and inference, and makes sense of empirical data in a systematic way. I then illustrate the work this characterization does by considering the sorts of problems that many philosophers believe heuristics solve, namely those resulting from the so-called frame problem. Considering the frame problem motivates the need to gain a better understanding of how heuristics work and the cognitive structures over which they operate. I develop a general theory of cognition which I argue underwrites the heuristic operations that concern this dissertation. I argue that heuristics operate over highly organized systems of knowledge, and I offer a cognitive architecture to accommodate this view. I then provide an account of the systems of knowledge that heuristics are supposed to operate over, in which I suggest that such systems of knowledge are concepts. The upshot, then, is that heuristics operate over concepts. I argue, however, that heuristics do not operate over conceptual content, but over metainformational relations between activated and primed concepts and their contents. Finally, to show that my thesis is empirically adequate, I consider empirical evidence on heuristic reasoning and argue that my account of heuristics explains the data. (shrink)

Sensitivity-type principles are prominent in epistemology. They have the promise to explain our intuitive and considered reactions to a wide range of important cases in everyday life, science and philosophy. Despite this promise, philosophers have raised a number of very serious objections to the principles. Accordingly, I propose a different type of sensitivity account which, I believe, gets around these serious objections. An important feature of the new approach is that the principle I propose need not be true. Rather, it (...) should be understood as a cognitive heuristic that tells us when something is not known—a type of doubt. A second feature is that the principle does not care about what one’s belief would be like in counter-factual situations. Instead, it cares about what the bases or causes for the belief would be like in those situations. (shrink)

Teacher quality, its effect on students’ outcomes, and the association of these with economic growth, is the core of recent discussions in Latin America given the region’s weak results in international learning assessments. This paper investigates whether there is an effect of philosophy on the outcomes of critical reading for students in B.Ed. programs in Colombia. Relying on exact matching combined with propensity score matching with regression adjustment, we use national data from Colombia to show that students in (...) B.Ed. in philosophy outperformed students in other B.Ed. in critical reading test (0.401–0.124 SD), and, importantly, with higher effects observed for students with lower prior academic achievement (0.44 SD). This suggests that philosophy can help to narrow educational outcomes of students whose socioeconomic conditions are disadvantageous, contributing to social justice in education. (shrink)

In humans, conscious perception and cognition depends upon the thalamocortical complex, which supports perception, explicit cognition, memory, language, planning, and strategic control. When parts of the T-C system are damaged or stimulated, corresponding effects are found on conscious contents and state, as assessed by reliable reports. In contrast, large regions like cerebellum and basal ganglia can be damaged without affecting conscious cognition directly. Functional brain recordings also show robust activity differences in cortex between experimentally matched conscious and unconscious events. This (...) basic anatomy and physiology is highly conserved in mammals and perhaps ancestral reptiles. While language is absent in other species, homologies in perception, memory, and motor cortex suggest that consciousness of one kind or another may be biologically fundamental and phylogenetically ancient. In humans we infer subjective experiences from behavioral and brain evidence. This evidence is quite similar in other mammals and perhaps some non-mammalian species. On the weight of the biological evidence, therefore, subjectivity may be conserved in species with human-like brains and behavior. (shrink)

Legal scholarship exploring the nature of evidence and the process of juridical proof has had a complex relationship with formal modeling. As evident in so many fields of knowledge, algorithmic approaches to evidence have the theoretical potential to increase the accuracy of fact finding, a tremendously important goal of the legal system. The hope that knowledge could be formalized within the evidentiary realm generated a spate of articles attempting to put probability theory to this purpose. This literature was (...) both insightful and frustrating. Much light was shed on the legal system, but it also quickly became evident that the tools of probability theory were in many ways ill-constructed for the task. Fundamental incompatibilities between the structure of legal decision making and the extant formal tools were identified, and it became evident that many of the purported explanations of legal phenomena were internally inconsistent. As a consequence, interest in this type of formal modeling declined, and attention was directed toward different kinds of explanations of the phenomena. Perhaps under the influence of a recent trend toward various types of formal modeling in legal scholarship, a recent burst of articles, rather than attempting to explain the macro structure of trials, which was the previous object of interest, attempts to quantify the probative value of various items of evidence in ways consistent with the formal features of various probability theories, and then to study decision making from that perspective. For example, the value of evidence is often purported to be its likelihood ratio, that is, the probability of discovering or receiving the evidence given a hypothesis (e.g., the defendant did it) divided by the probability of discovering or receiving the evidence given the negation of the hypothesis (the defendant didn't do it). Alternatively, the value of evidence is purported (more contextually) to be the information gain it provides, defined as the increase in probability it provides for a hypothesis above the probability of the hypothesis based on the other available evidence. Both conceptions then assume that all of the various probability assessments conform or ought to conform to the dictates of Bayes' theorem (that maintains consistency among such assessments); empirical studies are then done testing the extent to which this is so and proposing how the law can increase the probability that it is so. The general criticisms of using Bayes' theorem as a formal model of juridical proof are well known and were integral to the last wave of interest in formal modeling of the evidentiary process. This paper thus for the most part puts aside that more general issue, and focuses specifically on mathematical modeling of the value of particular items of evidence. The paper demonstrates that formal modeling has only limited value in explaining the value of legal evidence, much more limited than those constructing and discussing the models assume, and thus that the conclusions they draw about the value of evidence are unwarranted. This is done through a discussion of four recent examples that attempt to quantify evidence relating to, respectively, carpet fibers, infidelity, DNA random-match evidence, and character evidence used to impeach a witness. This article thus makes two contributions. First, and most importantly, it is another demonstration of the complex relationship between algorithmic tools and legal decision making. Second, at a minimum it points out serious pitfalls for analytical or empirical studies of juridical proof. (shrink)

A variety of theoretical frameworks predict the resemblance of behaviors between two people engaged in communication, in the form of coordination, mimicry, or alignment. However, little is known about the time course of the behavior matching, even though there is evidence that dyads synchronize oscillatory motions (e.g., postural sway). This study examined the temporal structure of nonoscillatory actions—language, facial, and gestural behaviors—produced during a route communication task. The focus was the temporal relationship between matching behaviors in the (...) interlocutors (e.g., facial behavior in one interlocutor vs. the same facial behavior in the other interlocutor). Cross-recurrence analysis revealed that within each category tested (language, facial, gestural), interlocutors synchronized matching behaviors, at temporal lags short enough to provide imitation of one interlocutor by the other, from one conversational turn to the next. Both social and cognitive variables predicted the degree of temporal organization. These findings suggest that the temporal structure of matching behaviors provides low-level and low-cost resources for human interaction. (shrink)

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the research on peptic ulcer disease focused on two rivaling hypothesis: the “acidity” and the “bacterial” one. According to the received view, the latter was dismissed during the 1950s only to be revived with Warren’s and Marshall’s discovery of Helicobacter pylori in the 1980s. In this paper we investigate why the bacterial hypothesis was largely abandoned in the 1950s, and whether there were good epistemic reasons for its dismissal. Of special interest for (...) our research question is Palmer’s 1954 large-scale study, which challenged the bacterial hypothesis with serious counter-evidence, and which by many scholars is considered as the shifting point in the research on PUD. However, we show that: The perceived refutatory impact of Palmer’s study was disproportionate to its methodological rigor. This undermines its perceived status as a crucial experiment against the bacterial hypothesis. In view of this and other considerations we argue that the bacterial hypothesis was worthy of pursuit in the 1950s. (shrink)

Using the matching bias example, the aim of the present studies was to show that adults' reasoning biases are due to faulty executive inhibition programming. In the first study, the subjects were trained on Wason's classical card selection task; half were given training in how to inhibit the perceptual matching bias (experimental group) and half in logic without the inhibition component (control group). On the pre- and post-tests, their performance was assessed on the Evans conditional rule falsification task (...) (with a negation in the antecedent of the rule), a task that also involves matching bias. In addition, subjects were tested for perceptual field dependence/independence using the Embedded Figures Test. The results brought out a specific inhibition training effect, as well as a clear-cut relationship in the experimental group between receptiveness to training and perceptual field independence. In the second study, the training paradigm was the same except that on the pre- and post-tests, the negation was in the consequent of the conditional rule (in this case, the perceptual matching response corresponds to the logical response). The subjects succeeded on the pre-test, and the matching-bias inhibition training had a negative effect on post-test performance. This specific negative priming effect confirms the inhibitory impact of our experimental training and outlines the dissociation of inhibition and logical components. (shrink)

Functionalists in philosophy of mind traditionally raise two major arguments against the type identity theory: (1) psychological states are _multiply realizable_ so that there are no one-to-one mappings of psychological states onto neural states and (2) the most that evidence could ever establish is the _correlation_ of psychological and neural states, not their identity. We defend a variant on the traditional type identity theory which we call _heuristic identity theory_ (HIT) against both of these objections. Drawing its inspiration from (...) scientific practice, heuristic identity theory construes identity claims as hypotheses that guide subsequent inquiry, not as conclusions of the research. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the impact of digitalization and marketing automation on the “scope” of the heuristics adopted in the marketers’ decision-making processes. The “scope” refers to the decision-making contexts in which the use of the heuristic rules is diffuse and is effective. More precisely, “scope" is (the extension of) the field in which a heuristic can be applied (successfully). The article is based on evidence collected through ethnographic interviews with twenty-three experienced marketers to discuss the impact (...) of marketing automation on the scope of heuristic rules in decision-making. The marketers interviewed make extensive use of heuristics to manage their tasks as emerged from previous exploratory research. The paper discusses how the field of application of marketing experts' heuristics evolves as result of the digitalization and in particular of the use of automatic marketing systems. The adoption of the new automatic marketing tools modifies the task environment and the field of use of the traditional heuristic rules, but heuristics remain fundamental in the definition phase of the inputs for the automatic marketing systems, or for the interpretation of the output and therefore for the control of the marketing automation. The paper clarifies the concept of scope of heuristics and offers a rich description of the impact of marketing automation on scope. (shrink)

Accurately predicting other people's actions may involve two processes: internal real-time simulation (dynamic updating) and matching recently perceived action images (static matching). Using a priming of body parts, this study aimed to differentiate the two processes. Specifically, participants played a motion-controlled video game with either their arms or legs. They then observed arm movements of a point-light actor, which were briefly occluded from view, followed by a static test pose. Participants judged whether this test pose depicted a coherent (...) continuation of the previously seen action (i.e., “action prediction task”). Evidence of dynamic updating was obtained after compatible effector priming (i.e., arms), whereas incompatible effector priming (i.e., legs) indicated static matching. Together, the results support action prediction as engaging two distinct processes, dynamic simulation and static matching, and indicate that their relative contributions depend on contextual factors like compatibility of body parts involved in performed and observed action. (shrink)

The HeartMath system refers to various methods, tools and techniques developed by the HeartMath Institute, a global research and educational organization. Working from an interdisciplinary, scientific foundation, the institute has adopted a coherence model to promote its vision and mission of education and health. This model is based on empirical, predominantly natural scientific foundations. Although many, rigorous studies have provided a substantial evidence base of the science and praxis of personal, social and global coherence, the actual coherence experience has (...) not yet been investigated. To address this gap in the HeartMath research evidence, this heuristic phenomenological investigation was organized into three phases, with the goal of eliciting the essential structure of the coherence experience. The first phase consisted of a quantitatively orientated review of the author’s personal HeartMath practice records, with special focus on examples of highest coherence levels and achievement scores, as measured on HeartMath instruments, and as available on Heart Cloud records. In the second qualitatively orientated phase, ten selected descriptions, perceived to be good examples of coherence experiences, were synthesized into an essential review summary. The third, pilot study, phase explored the actual coherence experience of ten consecutive HeartMath sessions, varying with regard to context, duration, time, place and manner of practice. Essential summary findings of the coherence experience are discussed with regard to personal, social and global implications for research, education and health promotion. (shrink)

Misophonia is a disorder generally characterised by a decreased tolerance to everyday sounds. Although research is increasing in misophonia, a cross-cultural validation of a psychometric tool for measuring misophonia has not been evaluated. This study investigated the validity of the S-Five multidimensional model of the misophonic experience in a sample of Chinese participants. The S-Five was translated in a forward-backward method to Mandarin to establish a satisfactory translation. The translation was also independently back translated to English, with no significant differences (...) when compared to the original S-Five. Through exploratory factor analysis, using responses from 256 Chinese individuals, the five dimensions were replicated, indicating the cross-cultural uniformity of the experience of misophonia as captured by the S-Five. That is, current results point to the stability of the manifestation of misophonia across cultures, seen here for the first time in the literature. By design, the S-Five items were developed to reflect sound sensitivities in a manner that is not specific or matching to individuals of a certain age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, socio-economic status, and educational level. Testimonial to this fact is not only the replication of the five factors, but also the replication of the evidence towards satisfactory psychometric properties of the scale. Based on the results of this study, the S-Five is a psychometrically robust tool to be used within the Chinese population. (shrink)

This paper presents an axiomatic framework for the priority heuristic, a model of bounded rationality in Selten’s (in: Gigerenzer and Selten (eds.) Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox, 2001) spirit of using empirical evidence on heuristics. The priority heuristic predicts actual human choices between risky gambles well. It implies violations of expected utility theory such as common consequence effects, common ratio effects, the fourfold pattern of risk taking and the reflection effect. We present an axiomatization of a parameterized (...) version of the heuristic which generalizes the heuristic in order to account for individual differences and inconsistencies. The axiomatization uses semiorders (Luce, Econometrica 24:178–191, 1956), which have an intransitive indifference part and a transitive strict preference component. The axiomatization suggests new testable predictions of the priority heuristic and makes it easier for theorists to study the relation between heuristics and other axiomatic theories such as cumulative prospect theory. (shrink)

Public health communication makes extensive use of a linguistic formulation that will be called the “no evidence” statement. This is a written or spoken statement of the form “There is no evidence that P” where P stands for a proposition that typically describes a human health risk. Danger lurks in these expressions for the hearer or reader who is not logically perspicacious, as arguments that use them are only warranted under certain conditions. The extent to which members of (...) the public are able to determine what those conditions are will be considered by examining data obtained from 879 subjects. The role of “no evidence” statements as cognitive heuristics in public health reasoning is considered. (shrink)

Space and time have been explained not in terms of physical entities but in terms of practice, that is, based on communication, which includes spacetime code in the A-series, B-series, and E-series. Each code has a unique grammar, and it progresses through boundary operation, i.e., setting the limit and transgressing it, but in each distinct way. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the notion of event matching to elucidate the mechanism of meaning-making through boundary operations. Biological spacetime (...) production is an incessant effort after meaning in the adaptive process, where the dia-metric scale in the E-series necessitates anticipatory (retrocausal) actions in the steps of interaction. This paper suggests that the three terms — event matching, meaning making, and spacetime production — are synonymous with each other in biological worlds. Evidence-based examples are provided to support the arguments. (shrink)

Finding the factors driving enterprise innovation behavior from multiple dimensions is of great significance for promoting enterprise innovation. Open innovation based on overseas mergers and acquisitions has become one of the main ways for enterprises to obtain knowledge and technology. However, there is still no agreement on whether open innovation based on overseas M&A can promote innovation behavior of enterprises. Based on data from M&A transaction and enterprise patent of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2018, (...) this study constructs a propensity score matching and difference-in-difference model from the perspective of innovation performance and innovation investment empirically studies the influence of open innovation mode based on overseas M&A on the innovation behavior of enterprises and finds that open innovation based on overseas M&A can significantly promote the innovation performance and innovation investment. Meanwhile dynamic effects test shows this promotion effect is sustainable; it reaches the maximum in the year of overseas M&A and decreases in the next two years. In addition, the impacts are heterogeneous due to enterprise ownership and enterprise technology intensity. The findings extends the scope of understanding innovation behavior of enterprises from overseas M&A and provide solid evidence of significant business implications for the promotion of entrepreneurial innovation. (shrink)

In this article, we first describe our general inhibitory-control theory and, then, we describe how we have tested its specific hypotheses on reasoning with brain imaging techniques in adults and children. The innovative part of this perspective lies in its attempt to come up with a brain-based synthesis of Jean Piaget’s theory on logical algorithms and Daniel Kahneman’s theory on intuitive heuristics.

Bayesian confirmation theory, as traditionally interpreted, treats the temporal relationship between the formulation of a hypothesis and the confirmation (or recognition) of evidence entailed by that hypothesis merely as a component of the psychology of discovery and acceptance of a hypothesis. The temporal order of these events is irrelevant to the logic of rational theory choice. A few years ago Richmond Campbell and Thomas Vinci offered a reinterpretation of Bayes' Theorem in defense of the view that the temporal relationship (...) between hypothesis and evidence really does matter. More specifically, they advocated the thesis that successful predictions implied by scientific hypothesis H will increase the degree of confirmation of H only if they are novel predictions in the following sense; Evidence E is heuristically novel with respect to hypothesis H if and only if H was not deliberately designed to explain E (if E has already been corroborated) or in anticipation of E (if E is regarded as likely to be corroborated at some future date). Campbell and Vinci argue that the traditional interpretation of Bayes' Theorem misconstrues the significance of predictive novelty by ignoring heuristic novelty. In this paper I review the formal component of their preferred interpretation and demonstrate that it fails to establish that heuristic novelty has any special effect on theory confirmation. That is, even on their revisionist interpretation, regardless of whether H was deliberately designed to explain known evidence E (or in anticipation of suspected E), or whether H was designed without any awareness of the entailment relationship between H and E, Bayes' Theorem will generate the same epistemic probability for hypothesis H. Cases where new evidence was not foreseen at the time a hypothesis first emerged do not carry any more epistemic weight than they would have if such evidence had been foreseen. * Research on this paper was supported by an NEH summer grant. My thanks also to Richmond Campbell and Thomas Vinci for their reply to my initial evaluation of their position (in private correspondence), which compelled me to reconsider their arguments more carefully. (shrink)

How important is the ability to freely control eye movements for reading comprehension? And how does the parser make use of this freedom? We investigated these questions using coregistration of eye movements and event‐related brain potentials (ERPs) while participants read either freely or in a computer‐controlled word‐by‐word format (also known as RSVP). Word‐by‐word presentation and natural reading both elicited qualitatively similar ERP effects in response to syntactic and semantic violations (N400 and P600 effects). Comprehension was better in free reading but (...) only in trials in which the eyes regressed to previous material upon encountering the anomaly. A more fine‐grained ERP analysis revealed that these regressions were strongly associated with the well‐known P600 effect. In trials without regressions, we instead found sustained centro‐parietal negativities starting at around 320 ms post‐onset; however, these negativities were only found when the violation occurred in sentence‐final position. Taken together, these results suggest that the sentence processing system engages in strategic choices: In response to words that don't match built‐up expectations, it can either explore alternative interpretations (reflected by regressions, P600 effects, and good comprehension) or pursue a “good‐enough” processing strategy that tolerates a deficient interpretation (reflected by progressive saccades, sustained negativities, and relatively poor comprehension). (shrink)

A mental heuristic is a shortcut (means) to a desired end. In the moral (as opposed to factual) realm, the means/end distinction is not self-evident: How do we decide whether a given moral intuition is a mere heuristic to achieve some freestanding moral principle, or instead a freestanding moral principle in its own right? I discuss Sunstein's solution to that threshold difficulty in translating “heuristics” to the moral realm.

In this paper the arguments for optimal data selection and the contrast class account of negations in the selection task and the conditional inference task are summarised, and contrasted with the matching bias approach. It is argued that the probabilistic contrast class account provides a unified, rational explanation for effects across these tasks. Moreover, there are results that are only explained by the contrast class account that are also discussed. The only major anomaly is the explicit negations effect in (...) the selection task (Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1996), which it is argued may not be the result of normal interpretative processes. It is concluded that the effects of negation on human reasoning provide good evidence for the view that human reasoning processes may be rational according to a probabilistic standard. (shrink)

Influential work on reasoning and decision-making has popularised the idea that sound reasoning requires correction of fast, intuitive thought processes by slower and more demanding deliberation. We present seven studies that question this corrective view of human thinking. We focused on the very problem that has been widely featured as the paradigmatic illustration of the corrective view, the well-known bat-and-ball problem. A two-response paradigm in which people were required to give an initial response under time pressure and cognitive load allowed (...) us to identify the presumed intuitive response that preceded the final response given after deliberation. Across our studies, we observe that correct final responses are often non-corrective in nature. Many reasoners who manage to answer the bat-and-ball problem correctly after deliberation already solved it correctly when they reasoned under conditions that minimised deliberation in the initial response phase. This suggests that sound bat-and-ball reasoners do not necessarily need to deliberate to correct their intuitions; their intuitions are often already correct. Pace the corrective view, findings suggest that in these cases, they deliberate to verify correct intuitive insights. (shrink)

Much of the evidence for quantum mechanics is statistical in nature. The Everett interpretation, if it is to be a candidate for serious consideration, must be capable of doing justice to reasoning on which statistical evidence in which observed relative frequencies that closely match calculated probabilities counts as evidence in favour of a theory from which the probabilities are calculated. Since, on the Everett interpretation, all outcomes with nonzero amplitude are actualized on different branches, it is not (...) obvious that sense can be made of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments, and this poses a prima facie problem for statistical inference. It is incumbent on the Everettian either to make sense of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments in the Everett interpretation, or to find a substitute on which the usual statistical analysis of experimental results continues to count as evidence for quantum mechanics, and, since it is the very evidence for quantum mechanics that is at stake, this must be done in a way that does not presuppose the correctness of Everettian quantum mechanics. This requires an account of theory confirmation that applies to branching-universe theories but does not presuppose the correctness of any such theory. In this paper, we supply and defend such an account. The account has the consequence that statistical evidence can confirm a branching-universe theory such as Everettian quantum mechanics in the same way in which it can confirm a probabilistic theory. (shrink)

Payoff dominance, a criterion for choosing between equilibrium points in games, is intuitively compelling, especially in matching games and other games of common interests, but it has not been justified from standard game-theoretic rationality assumptions. A psychological explanation of it is offered in terms of a form of reasoning that we call the Stackelberg heuristic in which players assume that their strategic thinking will be anticipated by their co-player(s). Two-person games are called Stackelberg-soluble if the players' strategies that (...) maximize against their co-players' best replies intersect in a Nash equilibrium. Proofs are given that every game of common interests is Stackelberg-soluble, that a Stackelberg solution is always a payoff-dominant outcome, and that in every game with multiple Nash equilibria a Stackelberg solution is a payoff-dominant equilibrium point. It is argued that the Stackelberg heuristic may be justified by evidentialist reasoning. (shrink)

Cet article vise à interroger l’ambivalence de la notion d’exercice dans le champ artistique, et à en assurer l’intelligibilité par une phénoménologie de la formation de l’habitude. On mettra donc d’abord en lumière le lien essentiel liant l’exercice à l’habitude, et à l’équivoque de cette notion. On cherchera ensuite à interroger la genèse de l’habitude comme structure transcendantale de la visée intentionnelle avant d’entreprendre une phénoménologie de l’acquisition du geste habituel à travers une critique des descriptions du geste chez Henry. (...) On concevra ainsi l’habitude comme la fixation d’un « horizon de potentialité » qui permet la constitution de l’objet et conditionne de cette manière la perception. Cette phénoménologie vise à mettre en évidence le caractère acquis et contingent des habitudes perceptives, afin de concevoir l’exercice en art comme une pratique de renforcement, de subversion et de génération de telles structures habituelles. On exposera enfin la possibilité de cette pratique en montrant que la formation de nouveaux gestes repose ultimement sur un conditionnement affectif. La possibilité de l’art est ainsi conçue, non pas dans un « désintéressement », mais dans un « intérêt flottant » permettant un renouvellement de la perception dans lequel l’habitude joue un rôle clef. (shrink)

The phenomenon known as matching bias consists of a tendency to see cases as relevant in logical reasoning tasks when the lexical content of a case matches that of a propositional rule, normally a conditional, which applies to that case. Matching is demonstrated by use of the negations paradigm that is by using conditionals in which the presence and absence of negative components is systematically varied. The phenomenon was first published in 1972 and the present paper reviews the (...) history of research and theorising on the problem in the subsequent 25 years. Theories of matching bias considered include those based on several broad frameworks including the heuristic-analytic theory, the mental models theory, the theory of optimal data selection, and relevance theory as well as the specific processing-negations account. The ability of these theories to account for a range of phenomena is considered, including the effects of linguistic form, realistic content, and explicit negation on the matching bias effect. Of particular importance are recent findings showing that the bias is observable on a wider range of linguistic forms than has generally been thought, and that it is almost entirely dependent on the use of implicit negation in the logical cases to which rules are applied. The reasons for the general suppression of matching when realistic content is used are, however, unclear and a need for further research is identified here. It is concluded that matching bias is a highly robust effect which is closely connected with the problem of understanding implicit negation. Most of the theories in the literature are unable to account for at least some of the major phenomena discovered in research on the bias. The accounts that fare best are those that posit local effects of negation, including the heuristic-analytic and processing negations theories. (shrink)

Approaching science by considering the epistemological virtues which scientists see as constitutive of good science, and the way these virtues trade-off against one another, makes it possible to capture action that may be lost by approaches which focus on either the theoretical or institutional level. Following Wimsatt (1984) I use the notion of heuristics and biases to help explore a case study from the history of biology. Early in the 20th century, mutation theorists and natural historians fought over the role (...) that isolation plays in evolution. This debate was principally about whether replication was the central scientific virtue (and hence the ultimate goal of science to replace non-experimental evidence with experimental evidence) or whether consilience of inductions was the central virtue (and hence, as many kinds of evidence as possible should be pursued). (shrink)

The functioning of a subject in a changing environment is most effective from the point of view of survival if the subject can form, maintain and use internal representations of the external world for decision-making. These representations are also called reflection in a broad sense. Using it, one can win in reflexive games since an internal representation of the enemy allows predicting their future moves. The goal is to assess the reflexive potential of heuristic model objects – artificial neural (...) networks – in the reflexive games “Even-Odd” (or “Matching pennies”) and “Rock-Paper-Scissors”. We used homogeneous fully connected neural networks of small sizes (from 8 to 45 neurons). Games were played between neural networks with different configurations and parameters (size, step size for modifying weight coefficients). A set of reflexivity criteria is presented, corresponding to different levels of consideration: neuronal, behavioral, formal. The transitivity of formal success in the game is shown. The most successful configurations, however, may not meet other criteria of reflexivity. We hypothesize that the best compliance with the criteria and, as a consequence, universal success in reflection tasks is achievable for heterogeneous configurations with a structure in which the formation of hierarchical systems of attractors is possible. (shrink)

The functioning of a subject in a changing environment is most effective from the point of view of survival if the subject can form, maintain and use internal representations of the external world for decision-making. These representations are also called reflection in a broad sense. Using it, one can win in reflexive games since an internal representation of the enemy allows predicting their future moves. The goal is to assess the reflexive potential of heuristic model objects – artificial neural (...) networks – in the reflexive games “Even-Odd” (or “Matching pennies”) and “Rock-Paper-Scissors”. We used homogeneous fully connected neural networks of small sizes (from 8 to 45 neurons). Games were played between neural networks with different configurations and parameters (size, step size for modifying weight coefficients). A set of reflexivity criteria is presented, corresponding to different levels of consideration: neuronal, behavioral, formal. The transitivity of formal success in the game is shown. The most successful configurations, however, may not meet other criteria of reflexivity. We hypothesize that the best compliance with the criteria and, as a consequence, universal success in reflection tasks is achievable for heterogeneous configurations with a structure in which the formation of hierarchical systems of attractors is possible. (shrink)

Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. (...) I argue that there is substantial evidence for co-opted mechanisms, leading from one individual’s mental state to a matching state in an observer, but there is no evidence that the output of these co-opted mechanisms serve as the basis for mental state attributions. There is also substantial evidence for attribution mechanisms that serve as the basis for mental state attributions, but there is no evidence that these mechanisms receive their input from co-opted mechanisms. (shrink)

This study examines whether private information exchange between institutional investors and public companies in engagement dialogs on sustainability issues improves the publicly disclosed measurements of the target company’s financial and non-financial performance and transparency. It uses a unique dataset containing 326 private reports related to environmental, social, and anti-corruption recommendations to address material incidents among publicly traded MSCI World Index portfolio companies of Nordic institutional investors. The results indicate that target companies appear to have similar values with matched companies on (...) sustainability performance and transparency ratings in the 3 years following the initiation of private reporting. Unexpected sustainability incidents are subsequently reflected in the next year’s fall in the market value of target companies relative to MSCI World Index. This paper provides empirical evidence for the legitimacy-based provision of private sustainability information used in a larger disclosure system of public companies. (shrink)

The functioning of a subject in a changing environment is most effective from the point of view of survival if the subject can form, maintain and use internal representations of the external world for decision-making. These representations are also called reflection in a broad sense. Using it, one can win in reflexive games since an internal representation of the enemy allows predicting their future moves. The goal is to assess the reflexive potential of heuristic model objects – artificial neural (...) networks – in the reflexive games “Even-Odd” (or “Matching pennies”) and “Rock-Paper-Scissors”. We used homogeneous fully connected neural networks of small sizes (from 8 to 45 neurons). Games were played between neural networks with different configurations and parameters (size, step size for modifying weight coefficients). A set of reflexivity criteria is presented, corresponding to different levels of consideration: neuronal, behavioral, formal. The transitivity of formal success in the game is shown. The most successful configurations, however, may not meet other criteria of reflexivity. We hypothesize that the best compliance with the criteria and, as a consequence, universal success in reflection tasks is achievable for heterogeneous configurations with a structure in which the formation of hierarchical systems of attractors is possible. (shrink)

Current psychology of human reasoning is divided into several different approaches. For instance, there is a major dispute over the question whether human beings are able to apply norms of the formal models of rationality such as rules of logic, or probability and decision theory, correctly. While researchers following the “heuristics and biases” approach argue that we deviate systematically from these norms, and so are perhaps deeply irrational, defenders of the “bounded rationality” approach think not only that the evidence (...) for this conclusion is problematic but also that we should not, at least not very often, use formal norms in reasoning. I argue that while the evidence for heuristics and biases is indeed questionable, the bounded rationality approach has its limits too. Most especially, we should not infer that formal norms play no role in a comprehensive theory of rationality. Instead, formal and bounded rules of reasoning might even be connected in a more comprehensive theory of rationality. (shrink)

Considering the properties of mirror neurons (MNs) in terms of development and phylogeny, we offer a novel, unifying, and testable account of their evolution according to the available data and try to unify apparently discordant research, including the plasticity of MNs during development, their adaptive value and their phylogenetic relationships and continuity. We hypothesize that the MN system reflects a set of interrelated traits, each with an independent natural history due to unique selective pressures, and propose that there are at (...) least three evolutionarily significant trends that gave raise to three subtypes: hand visuomotor, mouth visuomotor, and audio–vocal. Specifically, we put forward a mosaic evolution hypothesis, which posits that different types of MNs may have evolved at different rates within and among species. This evolutionary hypothesis represents an alternative to both adaptationist and associative models. Finally, the review offers a strong heuristic potential in predicting the circumstances under which specific variations and properties of MNs are expected. Such predictive value is critical to test new hypotheses about MN activity and its plastic changes, depending on the species, the neuroanatomical substrates, and the ecological niche. (shrink)