Areas of Artificial Intelligence, Misc

The relations between life and cogntion have been addressed through different perspectives [Stewart 1996, Boden 2001, Bourgine and Stewart 2004, van Duijn & all 2006, Di Paolo 2009]. We would like here to address that subject by relating life to cognition through a process of meaning generation. Life emerged on earth as a far from thermodynamic equilibrium performance that had to maintain herself. Life is charactertized by a ‘stay alive’ constraint that has to be satisfied (such constraint can be included (...) in the constraint of being able to maintain far from equilibrium thermodynamic conditions [Bickhard 2011]). The local ‘stay alive‘ constraint has to be satisfied in an environment containing elements potentially supportive or harmfull. A key activity for the living entity is to characterize these elements in terms of meaningfulness relatively to the ‘stay alive’ constraint. This process can be modeled with an existing tool where a system submitted to an internal constraint generates meaningful information characterizing elements of the environment: the Meaning Generator System (MGS) [Menant, 2003, 2014 a]. In a few words: when a system submitted to an internal constraint receives from the environment an information that has a connection with the constraint it generates a meaning usable for the implementation of an action satisfying the constraint.The generated meaning is the connection existing between the received information and the constraint. The MGS models this process and interfaces to the action implementation for constraint satisfaction The meaning is generated by and for the system. The MGS grounds meaning generation in constraint satisfaction and links the living entity to her environment in a relational process. A simple example is with a paramecium close to a drop of acid. The paramecium which is submitted to a ‘stay alive’ constraint will move away from the acid area. The received information ‘presence of acid’ generates the meaning ‘acid not compatible with the ‘stay alive’ constraint‘ which triggers the moving away action (that example is close to Varela’s bacteria swimming up a sugar gradient. What the MGS brings in addition is a modeling of the significance of the chemical gradient for the organism). The action implemented to satisfy the constraint modifies the environment and the received information, establishing an interactive process linking the living entity to her environment. During its evolution animal life has elaborated new constraints (like ‘live group life’) and new functions enriching meaning generation and action scenarios. As a result the build up of meaningful representations has improved the constraint satisfaction processes of animals, embedding them in their environments in relational and interactive terms [Menant, 2011]. Cognition can be defined by proposing that ‘a system is cognitive if and only if sensory inputs serve to trigger actions in a specific way, so as to satisfy a viability constraint’ [Bourgine, Stewart 2004]. Cognition can also be considered as exemplifying a ‘vital criterion of responsiveness’ [Boden, 2001 ]. Consequently the MGS can be positioned as an elementary and generic version of animal cognition. For animal life, meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction links life and cognition in a relational and interactive process. Cognition for human life is more complex as new performances have to be taken into account like self-consciousness and free-will. Meaning generation at human level is a challenging subject as human constraints are not clearly understood [Menant, 2011]. Many research activities are in process looking for some understanding of human mind [Philpapers]. One area of investigation is an evolutionary approach to self-consciousness using meaning generation where anxiety limitation comes up as a generic human constraint [Menant, 2014 b]. Assuming that we can have clear enough an understanding of some human constraints, we can look at the MGS for partly extending to humans the link between life and cognition that has been established for animals. So overall, we can consider that the MGS approach makes available an evolutionary link between life and cognition for animals, and partly for humans. A characteristic of the proposed system approach to meaning generation is the possibility to use it for any type of agent, be it organic (with intrinsic constraints ) or artificial (with derived constraints). Such characterization of agents through meaning generation can be used to discriminate artificial itelligence from human intelligence (see the MGS usage to support Searle’s chinese room argument [Menant, 2013]). On a more general basis, the proposed system approach can positions the MGS as a simple model for an internal source of normativity. It’s usage as a simple building block allows a bottom-up modeling for normativity in the sensorimotor approach. The ‘stay alive’ constraint could also be taken as a starting point for an evolutionary grounding of sensorimotor norms ‘in the biological normativity of the agent as a whole’ [Di Paolo & all 2014]. The proposed presentation will develop the points summarized here above and position them relatively to the autopoietic and enactive approaches. Several possible continuations will also be highlighted. (shrink)

Modeling social interactions based on individual behavior has always been an area of interest, but prior literature generally presumes rational behavior. Thus, such models may miss out on capturing the effects of biases humans are susceptible to. This work presents a method to model egocentric bias, the real-life tendency to emphasize one's own opinion heavily when presented with multiple opinions. We use a symmetric distribution, centered at an agent's own opinion, as opposed to the Bounded Confidence (BC) model used in (...) prior work. We consider a game of iterated interactions where an agent cooperates based on its opinion about an opponent. Our model also includes the concept of domain-based self-doubt, which varies as the interaction succeeds or not. An increase in doubt makes an agent reduce its egocentricity in subsequent interactions, thus enabling the agent to learn reactively. The agent system is modeled with factions not having a single leader, to overcome some of the issues associated with leader-follower factions. We find that agents belonging to factions perform better than individual agents. We observe that an intermediate level of egocentricity helps the agent perform at its best, which concurs with conventional wisdom that neither overconfidence nor low self-esteem brings benefits. (shrink)

In 2011, Hibbard suggested an intelligence measure for agents who compete in an adversarial sequence prediction game. We argue that Hibbard’s idea should actually be considered as two separate ideas: first, that the intelligence of such agents can be measured based on the growth rates of the runtimes of the competitors that they defeat; and second, one specific (somewhat arbitrary) method for measuring said growth rates. Whereas Hibbard’s intelligence measure is based on the latter growth-rate-measuring method, we survey other methods (...) for measuring function growth rates, and exhibit the resulting Hibbard-like intelligence measures and taxonomies. Of particular interest, we obtain intelligence taxonomies based on Big-O and Big-Theta notation systems, which taxonomies are novel in that they challenge conventional notions of what an intelligence measure should look like. We discuss how intelligence measurement of sequence predictors can indirectly serve as intelligence measurement for agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGIs). (shrink)

In this paper, two central questions will be addressed: ought we to implement medical AI technology in the medical domain? If yes, how ought we to implement this technology? I will critically engage with three options that exist with respect to these central questions: the Neo-Luddite option, the Assistive option, and the Substitutive option. I will first address key objections on behalf of the Neo-Luddite option: the Objection from Bias, the Objection from Artificial Autonomy, the Objection from Status Quo, and (...) the Objection from Inscrutability. I will thereafter present the Demographic Trends Argument and the Human Enhancement Argument in support of alternatives to the Neo-Luddite option. In the second half of the paper, I will argue against the Substitutive option and in favour of the Assistive option, given the existence of two chief formal deficits in medical AI technology: the causality deficit and the care deficit. (shrink)

This article is a knowledge technology case study of DNAOS, a distributed platform for Knowledge Resource Entitlement, Modeling, Management, and Sharing (KREMMS). Some historical aspects of its design, development, and release are briefly discussed, after which the DNAOS technology is commented upon from the specific viewpoint of KREMMS. At the core of this platform is the conception of knowledge as a natural phenomenon, which conception is reflected in the ontology of this technology: Fundamental knowledge structures and structuring principles, believed to (...) be “natural,” including qualification, resources, and relationships, are considered theoretically and modeled computationally. Finally, with the help of images, the reader is briefly introduced to some DNAOS capabilities, touching on transaction, application, data, model, and interface. (shrink)

This presentation discusses a notion encountered across disciplines, and in different facets of human activity: autonomous activity. We engage it in an interdisciplinary way. We start by considering the reactions and behaviors of biological entities to biotechnological intervention. An attempt is made to characterize the degree of freedom of embryos & clones, which show openness to different outcomes when the epigenetic developmental landscape is factored in. We then consider the claim made in programming and artificial intelligence that automata could show (...) self-directed behavior as to the determination of their step-wise decisions on courses of action. This question remains largely open and calls for some important qualifications. We try to make sense of the presence of claims of freedom in agency, first in common sense, then by ascribing developmental plasticity in biology and biotechnology, and in the mapping of programmed systems in the presence of environmental cues and self-referenced circuits as well as environmental coupling. This is the occasion to recall attempts at working out a logical and methodological approach to the openness of concepts that are still to be found, and assess whether they can operate the structuring intelligibility of a yet undeveloped or underdeveloped field of study, where a “bisociation" and a unification of knowledge might be possible. (shrink)

Modelling ethics is critical to understanding and analysing social phenomena. However, prior literature either incorporates ethics into agent strategies or uses it for evaluation of agent behaviour. This work proposes a framework that models both, ethical decision making as well as evaluation using virtue ethics and utilitarianism. In an iteration, agents can use either the classical Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma or a new type of interaction called moral interaction, where agents donate or steal from other agents. We introduce moral interactions to (...) model ethical decision making. We also propose a novel agent type, called virtue agent, parametrised by the agent's level of ethics. Virtue agents' decisions are based on moral evaluations of past interactions. Our simulations show that unethical agents make short term gains but are less prosperous in the long run. We find that in societies with positivity bias, unethical agents have high incentive to become ethical. The opposite is true of societies with negativity bias. We also evaluate the ethicality of existing strategies and compare them to those of virtue agents. (shrink)

Legg and Hutter, as well as subsequent authors, considered intelligent agents through the lens of interaction with reward-giving environments, attempting to assign numeric intelligence measures to such agents, with the guiding principle that a more intelligent agent should gain higher rewards from environments in some aggregate sense. In this paper, we consider a related question: rather than measure numeric intelligence of one Legg- Hutter agent, how can we compare the relative intelligence of two Legg-Hutter agents? We propose an elegant answer (...) based on the following insight: we can view Legg-Hutter agents as candidates in an election, whose voters are environments, letting each environment vote (via its rewards) which agent (if either) is more intelligent. This leads to an abstract family of comparators simple enough that we can prove some structural theorems about them. It is an open question whether these structural theorems apply to more practical intelligence measures. (shrink)

In their thought-provoking paper, Legg and Hutter consider a certain abstrac- tion of an intelligent agent, and define a universal intelligence measure, which assigns every such agent a numerical intelligence rating. We will briefly summarize Legg and Hutter’s paper, and then give a tongue-in-cheek argument that if one’s goal is to become more intelligent by cultivating music appreciation, then it is bet- ter to use classical music (such as Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven) than to use more recent pop music. The (...) same argument could be adapted to other media: books beat films, card games beat first-person shooters, parables beat dissertations, etc. We leave it to the reader to decide whether this argument tells us something about classical music, something about Legg-Hutter intelligence, or something about both. (shrink)

In “Why We Need Friendly AI”, Luke Muehlhauser and Nick Bostrom propose that for our species to survive the impending rise of superintelligent AIs, we need to ensure that they would be human-friendly. This discussion note offers a more natural but bleaker outlook: that in the end, if these AIs do arise, they won’t be that friendly.

In this article, I examine whether the possibility exists that in the foreseeable future, robot technology will permit the development of emotional robots. As the title suggests, the content is of a technological as well as of a philosophical nature. As a matter of fact, my aim in writing this paper was that of bridging two distinctive fields in a world where humanity has become accustomed to technological innovations while overlooking any consequential complications arising from such inventions. To this end, (...) I review and commentate on what Anders Sandberg, Paul Thagard, Nikhil Churamani and other thinkers have contributed on the subject matter. The literature review indicates that in the short to the medium term, scientists will only design and engineers will only build robots that will be able to only learn, be trained, or under the most optimistic conditions only simulate human emotions. However, in the long term the possibility exists for technology to advance to such a state so as to permit an entire human brain to be emulated in a robot via a concept named ‘mind uploading’. If one day that becomes a reality, that will be the point where humanity will possibly come closest to creating robots with emotions. (shrink)

This paper offers a theoretical framework that can be used to derive viable engineering strategies for the design and development of robots that can nudge people towards moral improvement. The framework relies on research in developmental psychology and insights from Stoic ethics. Stoicism recommends contemplative practices that over time help one develop dispositions to behave in ways that improve the functioning of mechanisms that are constitutive of moral cognition. Robots can nudge individuals towards these practices and can therefore help develop (...) the dispositions to, for example, extend concern to others, avoid parochialism, etc. (shrink)

In this paper we present a framework for the dynamic and automatic generation of novel knowledge obtained through a process of commonsense reasoning based on typicality-based concept combination. We exploit a recently introduced extension of a Description Logic of typicality able to combine prototypical descriptions of concepts in order to generate new prototypical concepts and deal with problem like the PET FISH (Osherson and Smith, 1981; Lieto & Pozzato, 2019). Intuitively, in the context of our application of this logic, the (...) overall pipeline of our system works as follows: given a goal expressed as a set of properties, if the knowledge base does not contain a concept able to fulfill all these properties, then our system looks for two concepts to recombine in order to extend the original knowledge based satisfy the goal. (shrink)

We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of the combination of prototypical concepts. The proposed logic relies on the logic of typicality ALC + TR, whose semantics is based on the notion of rational closure, as well as on the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics, and is equipped with a cognitive heuristic used by humans for concept composition. We first extend the logic of typicality ALC + TR by typicality inclusions of the (...) form p :: T(C) v D, whose intuitive meaning is that “we believe with degree p about the fact that typical Cs are Ds”. As in the distributed semantics, we define different scenarios containing only some typicality inclusions, each one having a suitable probability. We then exploit such scenarios in order to ascribe typical properties to a concept C obtained as the combination of two prototypical concepts. We also show that reasoning in the proposed Description Logic is EXPTIME-complete as for the underlying standard Description Logic ALC. (shrink)

In this paper, an artificial neural network (ANN) model was developed and validated to predict whether a couple is going to get divorced or not. Prediction is done based on some questions that the couple answered, answers of those questions were used as the input to the ANN. The model went through multiple learning-validation cycles until it got 100% accuracy.

This text is about the use of an Artificial Intelligence tool within the CESIMA's Digital Library.

Some years ago, I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of a book, or at least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical mistakes will be made and how frequently. In the case of nominally scientific works these may be largely restricted to certain chapters which wax philosophical or try to draw general conclusions about the meaning or long term significance of the work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact are generously interlarded with (...) philosophical gibberish as to what these facts mean. The clear distinctions which Wittgenstein described some 80 years ago between scientific matters and their descriptions by various language games are rarely taken into consideration, and so one is alternately wowed by the science and dismayed by its incoherent analysis. So it is with this volume. -/- If one is to create a mind more or less like ours, one needs to have a logical structure for rationality and an understanding of the two systems of thought (dual process theory). If one is to philosophize about this, one needs to understand the distinction between scientific issues of fact and the philosophical issue of how language works in the context at issue, and of how to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and scientism, but Kurzweil, like most students of behavior, is largely clueless. He is enchanted by models, theories, and concepts, and the urge to explain, while Wittgenstein showed us that we only need to describe, and that theories, concepts etc., are just ways of using language (language games) which have value only insofar as they have a clear test (clear truthmakers, or as John Searle (AI’s most famous critic) likes to say, clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)). I have attempted to provide a start on this in my recent writings. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Being a theist makes a difference, but not so much to what propositions we assent to, nor to an expanded ontology of spiritual entities. Rather, it is concerned with what commitments we enter into, and involves a participatory engagement with a broader reality then we might have supposed was possible. Embodied practices are a crucial part of the contemplative path, which draws on the wisdom of the body. This leads on to a “labor of culture.” Our present culture is not (...) obviously as secular as supposed to be, but what has now become sacred is a strong sense of the individual ego, around which many ethical and political commitments are built, and which sits uneasily with our widely accepted mechanistic view of life. The crucial challenge to artificial intelligence is whether it can find ways of enhancing the mutual recognition that is crucial to the ethical life. (shrink)

This study examined the determinants of trust in artificial intelligence (AI) in the area of asset management. Many studies of risk perception have found that value similarity determines trust in risk managers. Some studies have demonstrated that value similarity also influences trust in AI. AI is currently employed in a diverse range of domains, including asset management. However, little is known about the factors that influence trust in asset management-related AI. We developed an investment game and examined whether shared investing (...) strategy with an AI advisor increased the participants’ trust in the AI. In this study, questionnaire data were analyzed (n=101), and it was revealed that shared investing strategy had no significant effect on the participants’ trust in AI. In addition, it had no effect on behavioral trust. Perceived ability had significantly positive effects on both subjective and behavioral trust. This paper also discusses the empirical implications of the findings. (shrink)

This paper shows the smart walking stick based on ultrasonic sensors and Arduino for outwardly debilitated individuals. There are roughly 37 million individuals over the globe who are visually impaired as indicated by the World Health Organization. Individuals with visual inabilities are regularly subjected to outer help which can be given by people, trained dogs, or electronic gadgets as supportive networks for basic assistance. Thus, this played as the motivation to develop a smart cane white stick to survive these restrictions (...) which includes ultrasonic sensors at particular positions to the stick that gave data about nature to the client by initiating the signal sound and vibrations. We proposed minimal effort and light weight framework structured with micro controller that processes signal and alerts the visually impaired person over any obstacle, water or dark areas through beeping sounds or vibrations. The system comprises of obstacle and moisture detection sensors for process of receiving, processing and sending signals to the alarm system which finally alerts the user for prompt action. The system was designed, programmed using Java language and tried for exactness by the visually impaired. Our gadget can recognize obstacle inside the separation of around 2m from the client. (shrink)

The paper introduces an extension of the proposal according to which conceptual representations in cognitive agents should be intended as heterogeneous proxytypes. The main contribution of this paper is in that it details how to reconcile, under a heterogeneous representational perspective, different theories of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning. In particular, it provides a novel theoretical hypothesis - as well as a novel categorization algorithm called DELTA - showing how to integrate the representational and reasoning assumptions of the theory-theory (...) of concepts with the those ascribed to the prototype and exemplars-based theories. (shrink)

Endowing artificial systems with explanatory capacities about the reasons guiding their decisions, represents a crucial challenge and research objective in the current fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Computational Cognitive Science [Langley et al., 2017]. Current mainstream AI systems, in fact, despite the enormous progresses reached in specific tasks, mostly fail to provide a transparent account of the reasons determining their behavior (both in cases of a successful or unsuccessful output). This is due to the fact that the classical problem (...) of opacity in artificial neural networks (ANNs) explodes with the adoption of current Deep Learning techniques [LeCun, Bengio, Hinton, 2015]. In this paper we argue that the explanatory deficit of such techniques represents an important problem, that limits their adoption in the cognitive modelling and computational cognitive science arena. In particular we will show how the current attempts of providing explanations of the deep nets behaviour (see e.g. [Ritter et al. 2017] are not satisfactory. As a possibile way out to this problem, we present two different research strategies. The first strategy aims at dealing with the opacity problem by providing a more abstract interpretation of neural mechanisms and representations. This approach is adopted, for example, by the biologically inspired SPAUN architecture [Eliasmith et al., 2012] and by other proposals suggesting, for example, the interpretation of neural networks in terms of the Conceptual Spaces framework [Gärdenfors 2000, Lieto, Chella and Frixione, 2017]. All such proposals presuppose that the neural level of representation can be considered somehow irrelevant for attacking the problem of explanation [Lieto, Lebiere and Oltramari, 2017]. In our opinion, pursuing this research direction can still preserve the use of deep learning techniques in artificial cognitive models provided that novel and additional results in terms of “transparency” are obtained. The second strategy is somehow at odds with respect to the previous one and tries to address the explanatory issue by avoiding to directly solve the “opacity” problem. In this case, the idea is that one of resorting to pre-compiled plausible explanatory models of the word used in combination with deep-nets (see e.g. [Augello et al. 2017]). We argue that this research agenda, even if does not directly fits the explanatory needs of Computational Cognitive Science, can still be useful to provide results in the area of applied AI aiming at shedding light on the models of interaction between low level and high level tasks (e.g. between perceptual categorization and explanantion) in artificial systems. (shrink)

We read with interest the Lancet Editorial on artificial intelligence (AI) in health care (Dec 23, 2017, p 2739).1 Deep learning as a form of AI risks being overhyped. Deep neural networks contain multiple layers of nodes connected by adjustable weights. Learning occurs by adjusting these weights until the desired input-to-output function is achieved.2 With many millions of weights, huge amounts of data are required for learning, a process facilitated by recent increases in computational power. However, the learning algorithm, known (...) as the error back-propagation algorithm, was invented in the 1980s and has been used to train neural networks ever since. Two decades ago, our neural network system scored sleep and diagnosed sleep disorders.3 Our machine learning algorithm,4, 5 which now provides early warning of deterioration in many hospitals, was commercialised a decade ago.6 A key change occurred in the early 2000s. Since then, error back-propagation learns features directly from the input data, rather than relying on expert-selected features (eg, microaneurysms for a neural network assessing diabetic retinopathy). The first layers become implicit feature detectors. The success of deep learning has been shown mainly in problems with inputs of image (or image-like) data, as shown in medical image analysis,7, 8 speech recognition, and board game playing. Deep learning also lacks explanatory power; deep neural networks cannot explain how a diagnosis is reached and the features enabling discrimination are not easily identifiable. Clinicians should be aware of the capabilities as well as current limitations of AI. Properly integrated AI will improve patient outcomes and health-care efficiency. Augmented intelligence at the point of care is likely to precede AI without human involvement. LT and PW are supported by the Biomedical Research Centre, Oxford. Both authors have received funding from the National Institute for Health Research. The authors have developed an electronic observations application for which Drayson Health has purchased a sole licence. Drayson Health has a research agreement with the University of Oxford and has paid LT personal fees for consultancy as a member of its Strategic Advisory Board. Drayson Health might pay PW consultancy fees in the future. (shrink)

We present nine facets for the analysis of the past and future evolution of AI. Each facet has also a set of edges that can summarise different trends and contours in AI. With them, we first conduct a quantitative analysis using the information from two decades of AAAI/IJCAI conferences and around 50 years of documents from AI topics, an official database from the AAAI, illustrated by several plots. We then perform a qualitative analysis using the facets and edges, locating AI (...) systems in the intelligence landscape and the discipline as a whole. This analytical framework provides a more structured and systematic way of looking at the shape and boundaries of AI. (shrink)

A model of an intentional self-observing system is proposed based on the structure and functions of astrocyte-synapse interactions in tripartite synapses. Astrocyte-synapse interactions are cyclically organized and operate via feedforward and feedback mechanisms, formally described by proemial counting. Synaptic, extrasynaptic and astrocyte receptors are interpreted as places with the same or different quality of information processing described by the combinatorics of tritograms. It is hypothesized that receptors on the astrocytic membrane may embody intentional programs that select corresponding synaptic and extrasynaptic (...) receptors for the formation of receptor-receptor complexes. Basically, the act of self-observation is generated if the actual environmental information is appropriate to the intended observation processed by receptor-receptor complexes. This mechanism is implemented for a robot brain enabling the robot to experience environmental information as “its own”. It is suggested that this mechanism enables the robot to generate matches and mismatches between intended observations and the observations in the environment, based on the cyclic organization of the mechanism. In exploring an unknown environment the robot may stepwise construct an observation space, stored in memory, commanded and controlled by the intentional self-observing system. Finally, the role of self-observation in machine consciousness is shortly discussed. (shrink)

The essence of the Architectonic Philosophy of Technique is the human self-embodiment in ontogenetic, evolutionary and permanent times (Mitterauer, 1989; 2009). These time conceptions may allow the interpretation of technical processes of self-embodiment and challenge the concept of the soul. The existence of the soul in timeless permanence is my fundamental argument that technical embodiments in robots can only be generated in ontogenetic and evolutionary time periods, but not in permanence. Admittedly, the concept of the soul does not play a (...) significant role in the creation of humanoid robots by engineers, but it is immersed in the subjective experience of each human person. I conceive the soul as an all comprising active principle which guarantees subjective existence and is felt as the destiny for a perfect everlasting life. Since the modeler of the robot is also endowed with this principle, he (she) is intending to implement his (her) reflection processes as programs into a robot brain, but it is not possible to fully implement the principle of human individuality in the sense of the soul. Otherwise, the creator of the humanoid robot would self-destruct his (her) human existence - a contradictio in se. -/- In the perspective of the present article I will discuss the following. First, my brain model is outlined focusing on subjectivity and qualitative mechanisms of brain function. Then, the elementary brain operations in ontogenetic and evolutionary time scales are discussed. Furthermore, the theory of Transphysics of self-embodiment of human subjectivity in human robots is proposed. This process generates a Third Nature of robot societies. In the final section “The soul in self-embodiment” I argue that humanoid robots existentially differ from their human creators, since robots can never be endowed with a soul in its metaphysical characteristics. (shrink)

Educational Data Mining (EDM) is a new paradigm aiming to mine and extract knowledge necessary to optimize the effectiveness of teaching process. With normal educational system work it’s often unlikely to accomplish fine system optimizing due to large amount of data being collected and tangled throughout the system. EDM resolves this problem by its capability to mine and explore these raw data and as a consequence of extracting knowledge. This paper describes several experiments on real educational data wherein the effectiveness (...) of Data Mining is explained in migration the educational data into knowledge. The experiments goal at first to identify important factors of teacher behaviors influencing student satisfaction. In addition to presenting experiences gained through the experiments, the paper aims to provide practical guidance of Data Mining solutions in a real application. (shrink)

This article focuses on a particular issue under machine ethics—that is, the nature of Artificial Moral Agents. Machine ethics is a branch of artificial intelligence that looks into the moral status of artificial agents. Artificial moral agents, on the other hand, are artificial autonomous agents that possess moral value, as well as certain rights and responsibilities. This paper demonstrates that attempts to fully develop a theory that could possibly account for the nature of Artificial Moral Agents may consider certain philosophical (...) ideas, like the standard characterizations of agency, rational agency, moral agency, and artificial agency. At the very least, the said philosophical concepts may be treated as signposts for further research on how to truly account for the nature of Artificial Moral Agents. (shrink)

This paper describes an Intelligent Tutoring System for helping users with ADO.NET called ADO-Tutor. The Intelligent Tutoring System was designed and developed using (ITSB) authoring tool for building intelligent educational systems. The user learns through the intelligent tutoring system ADO.NET, the technology used by Microsoft.NET to connect to databases. The material includes lessons, examples, and questions. Through the feedback provided by the intelligent tutoring system, the user's understanding of the material is assessed, and accordingly can be guided to different difficulty (...) level of exercises and/or the lessons. The Intelligent Tutoring System was evaluated by a group of users and the results were more than satisfactory in terms of the quality of the material and the design of the system. (shrink)

The study outlines the existing and potential philosophical issues of the idea of conscious machines originated from the development of artificial consciousness within the framework of contemporary research of artificial intelligence and cognitive robotics. The outline shows that the idea of conscious machines is concerned with two big philosophical issues. The first philosophical issue is a definition of consciousness, taking into account the selection of a set of objects that can have consciousness, the typology of consciousness, the clarifying of the (...) nature of consciousness' carriers and the relationship between consciousness and its environment and the relationship between consciousness and language, in order to create an artificial consciousness within a machine, making that machine conscious. The second philosophical issue is a clarification whether only artificially created machines can be conscious machines, or cyborgizated human beings also can be considered of conscious machines. These philosophical issues show that there can be two ways to create conscious machines: 1) the creating of artificial consciousness within artificially created machine; and 2) the cyborgization of human being, transforming it into artificially created machine possessed natural consciousness. (shrink)

In the last few years, there has been a growing surge for the interest in the application of artificial intelligence in issues in Software Engineering (SE). Artificial Intelligence has become a much powerful and easy to use as they are increasingly deployed for different key components in the software system [1]. It enables the new functionalities and even allows much better adaptation to different user needs. This also creates additional issues for different software engineers and even exposes different firms to (...) risks. There is a huge number of daunting challenges related to design, building and testing for an engineering system. Software engineers have one advantage over the engineers is that their own material and software can be used for attacking the challenges resulted due to the production of this system [2]. AI algorithm is very much suited for this kind of complex issues in software engineering as they are designed to deal with some of the growing challenges. Software engineers have implemented, exploited most of the practical algorithms, techniques and methods. It has emerged from the community of artificial intelligence [3]. All these activities have a vital and effective application which create an impact on different areas of software engineering. (shrink)

This article presents modal versions of resource-conscious logics. We concentrate on extensions of variants of linear logic with one minimal non-normal modality. In earlier work, where we investigated agency in multi-agent systems, we have shown that the results scale up to logics with multiple non-minimal modalities. Here, we start with the language of propositional intuitionistic linear logic without the additive disjunction, to which we add a modality. We provide an interpretation of this language on a class of Kripke resource models (...) extended with a neighbourhood function: modal Kripke resource models. We propose a Hilbert-style axiomatisation and a Gentzen-style sequent calculus. We show that the proof theories are sound and complete with respect to the class of modal Kripke resource models. We show that the sequent calculus admits cut elimination and that proof-search is in PSPACE. We then show how to extend the results when non-commutative connectives are added to the language. Finally, we put the l.. (shrink)

The orbital debris problem presents an opportunity for inter-agency and international cooperation toward the mutually beneficial goals of debris prevention, mitigation, remediation, and improved space situational awareness (SSA). Achieving these goals requires sharing orbital debris and other SSA data. Toward this, I present an ontological architecture for the orbital debris and broader SSA domain, taking steps in the creation of an orbital debris ontology (ODO). The purpose of this ontological system is to (I) represent general orbital debris and SSA domain (...) knowledge, (II) structure, and standardize where needed, orbital data and terminology, and (III) foster semantic interoperability and data-sharing. In doing so I hope to (IV) contribute to solving the orbital debris problem, improving peaceful global SSA, and ensuring safe space travel for future generations. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is two-fold: first, to emphasize causality in disease ontology and knowledge representation, presenting a general and cursory discussion of causality and causal chains; and second, to clarify and develop the River Flow Model of Diseases (RFM). The RFM is an ontological account of disease, representing the causal structure of pathology. It applies general knowledge of causality using the concept of causal chains. The river analogy of disease is explained, formal descriptions are offered, and the RFM (...) disease definition is refined by describing causal chains in terms of causal relations. The definition is updated to coincide with the actual RFM classes found in its upper-level ontology, YAMATO, which brings to light some challenges in developing both YAMATO and the RFM. The RFM is also discussed in relation to another ontological account of disease. Strategies are offered toward interoperability between these theories. (shrink)

Over the last decade, multi-agent systems have come to form one of the key tech- nologies for software development. The Formal Approaches to Multi-Agent Systems (FAMAS) workshop series brings together researchers from the fields of logic, theoreti- cal computer science and multi-agent systems in order to discuss formal techniques for specifying and verifying multi-agent systems. FAMAS addresses the issues of logics for multi-agent systems, formal methods for verification, for example model check- ing, and formal approaches to cooperation, multi-agent planning, communication, (...) coordination, negotiation, games, and reasoning under uncertainty in a distributed environment. In 2007, the third FAMAS workshop, FAMAS'007, was one of the agent workshops gathered together under the umbrella of Multi-Agent Logics, Languages, and Organ- isations - Federated Workshops, MALLOW'007, taking place from 3 to 7 September 2007 in Durham. This current special issue of the Logic Journal of the IGPL gathers together the revised and updated versions of the five best FAMAS'007 contributions. (shrink)

Modern semiotics is a branch of logics that formally defines symbol-based communication. In recent years, the semiotic classification of signs has been invoked to support the notion that symbols are uniquely human. Here we show that alarm-calls such as those used by African vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops), logically satisfy the semiotic definition of symbol. We also show that the acquisition of vocal symbols in vervet monkeys can be successfully simulated by a computer program based on minimal semiotic and neurobiological constraints. (...) The simulations indicate that learning depends on the tutor-predator ratio, and that apprentice-generated auditory mistakes in vocal symbol interpretation have little effect on the learning rates of apprentices (up to 80% of mistakes are tolerated). In contrast, just 10% of apprentice-generated visual mistakes in predator identification will prevent any vocal symbol to be correctly associated with a predator call in a stable manner. Tutor unreliability was also deleterious to vocal symbol learning: a mere 5% of “lying” tutors were able to completely disrupt symbol learning, invariably leading to the acquisition of incorrect associations by apprentices. Our investigation corroborates the existence of vocal symbols in a non-human species, and indicates that symbolic competence emerges spontaneously from classical associative learning mechanisms when the conditioned stimuli are self-generated, arbitrary and socially efficacious. We propose that more exclusive properties of human language, such as syntax, may derive from the evolution of higher-order domains for neural association, more removed from both the sensory input and the motor output, able to support the gradual complexification of grammatical categories into syntax. (shrink)

Donald Gillies is one of the pioneers in the philosophical analysis of artificial intelligence. In his recent book, Gillies not only makes a new and rapidly developing field of science accessible to philosophers; he also introduces philosophical topics relevant to researchers in AI and thereby helps establish a dialogue between the two disciplines. His book clearly and convincingly demonstrates the fruitful interplay between AI and philosophy of science.

The process of cooperative problem solving can be divided into four stages. First, finding potential team members, then forming a team followed by constructing a plan for that team. Finally, the plan is executed by the team. Traditionally, very simple protocols like the Contract Net protocol are used for performing the first two stages of the process. In an open environment however, there can be discussion among the agents in order to form a team that can achieve the collective intention (...) of solving the problem. For these cases fixed protocols like contract net do not suffice. In this paper we present an alternative solution, using structured dialogues, with an emphasis on persuasion, that can be shown to lead to the required team formation. The dialogues are described formally using modal logics and speech acts. (shrink)