La pretensión de este artículo es captar las visiones que los y las estudiantes de la Universidad de Lleida (Cataluña, España) tienen sobre la universidad y la ciudad donde pasan unos años primordiales en su vida. Tras un prólogo donde evocamos el recientemovimiento estudiantil contra el denominado ..

Analizamos las diferencias entre realizar una docencia tradicional en el que llenamos nuestras horas de clase con sesiones magistrales y entre una docencia innovadora según las normativas e indicaciones del plan Bolonia en la que debemos tener en torno a un 50% de las sesiones como prácticas, que se evaluarán conforme a lo establecido al principio de la asignatura. En este trabajo comparamos dos asignaturas: una con docencia tradicional y una con docencia innovadora y nuestro objetivo es medir (...) si una de las dos genera más adherencia, más presencia en clase y más interactuación con el profesor. Así, establecemos una metodología comparativa entre las dos y examinamos esos indicadores. Con esos resultados, podemos llegar a unas conclusiones y abrir una discusión para futuros pasos y mejoras en la docencia la Universidad presencial. (shrink)

Se analiza el debate actual sobre el concepto de Escuela de Salamanca. Se muestran las nuevas propuestas de los estudiosos: su carácter global (no solo Salamanca); su alcance interdisciplinar (no solo teológico, también jurídico, económico, sociopolítico, etc); la cuestión de los miembros también experimenta una ampliación, aunque siempre se señala un cierto cordón umbilical con los Maestros salmantinos; todo ello dentro de un marco temporal que se extiende durante el siglo XVI y primera mitad del XVII. Estas nuevas perspectivas no (...) excluyen los elementos tradicionales, sino que amplían y desarrollan el concepto primitivo, pero con carácter inclusivo. Por último, se aborda el tema de las condiciones de posibilidad de la Escuela, que se contextualiza en un ámbito histórico que la hace posible. Al término del estudio se ofrece un posible nuevo concepto de la Escuela, todavía _in fieri_. (shrink)

La psiquiatría nace con el siglo XIX, la fenomenología con el XX. Desde el advenimiento de la segunda ha querido la primera ver en ella una vía para la superación del positivismo que la atenazaba desde su mismo origen. Uno de sus intentos más logrados fue el del psiquiatra Ludwig Binswanger a lo largo de los años veinte del pasado siglo. Recorrió en ese tiempo las Investigaciones lógicas de Husserl y ensayó su acercamiento a la psicología estructural. Proponemos que una (...) deficiente lectura de las posibilidades de la fenomenología ―comprensible en su prematuridad, desgraciada en su ímpetu anti-(neo)kantiano― impidió que reconociera su horizonte trascendental y así pudiera entrever caminos de acceso al mundo, a la persona y a su concreto sufrimiento. Para concluir presentamos el intento que supone el proyecto La mirada filosófica como mirada médica por recuperar aquella problematicidad y ahondar en una aproximación respetuosa al padecer, tal como aparece, sin violentarlo por el concepto. (shrink)

Mediante una investigación teórica y de trabajo de campo en relación a la adaptación de la titulación de arquitectura al EEES y con el objetivo de hacer efectivo un despliegue gradual del desarrollo de las competencias del submódulo de dibujo, se exponen los resultados de la coordinación entre asignaturas y una selección crítica y comparativa de actividades de aprendizaje. Se indaga además en la dispar distribución de las materias de dibujo de la adaptación al plan de bolonia, concluyendo (...) con una propuesta de despliegue independiente y mejorada del submódulo desvinculado de las materias que no le son afines. (shrink)

En este artículo queremos ofrecer algunas conclusiones obtenidas de nuestra experiencia en estos primeros años de aplicación del Plan Bolonia y la formación por competencias en la enseñanza de grado en Medicina, desde la privilegiada visión docente en nuestro Centro de Simulación Médica. Seguiremos un método descriptivo y trataremos de exponer cómo el establecimiento de objetivos para el logro de las diversas competencias establecidas en cada curso, se ven potenciados por el método de enseñanza por simulación y el (...) impulso motivador que dicho método ofrece como herramienta educativa. Otorgar el protagonismo del aprendizaje al alumno, exige al docente adquirir nuevas ha-bilidades y modificar viejas costumbres en su estilo educativo. Por otra parte, los medios de que se dispone en un Centro de Simulación obligan al docente a reconfigurar sus objetivos porque, ya desde 1º de Medicina, todas las actividades se enfocan a la mejora de la calidad asistencial y a la promoción de la seguridad en la atención del paciente. Algunas cualidades pedagógicas relevantes del Centro de Simulación son la alta participación del alumno, que propicia la aparición de los errores en las prácticas. También la reflexión continúa y la autoevaluación. Destaca el efecto que produce sobre la motivación del alumno y el ambiente de trabajo en el aula. Los escenarios de aprendizaje con simu-ladores avanzados convierten la simulación en una herramienta muy valiosa y de gran impacto en el proceso formativo del alumno. (shrink)

Our capacity for planning agency is central to our human lives. These essays aim both to deepen our understanding of basic norms that guide our plan-infused thinking and to defend their status as norms of practical rationality. This defense appeals both to forms of pragmatic support and to the ways in which these norms track conditions of a planning agent's self-governance, both at a time and over time.

In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be (...) expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality. (shrink)

We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception (...) of our agency as temporally extended. These are, further, features that have great significance for the kinds of lives we can live. For these two reasons I will say that these are among the core features of human agency. A theory of human action needs to say what these core features consist in and how they are related to each other. And such a theory needs also to clarify the relation between these core features of our agency and the possibility that we are fully embedded in an event causal order. (shrink)

We sometimes strive to achieve difficult goals when our evidence suggests that success is unlikely – not just because it will require strength of will, but because we are targets of prejudice and discrimination or because success will require unusual ability. Optimism about one’s prospects can be useful for persevering in these cases. That said, excessive optimism can be dangerous; when our evidence is unfavourable, we should be at most agnostic about whether we will succeed. This paper explores the nature (...) and rational significance of agnostic practical commitments. Most importantly, the rationality of striving against the odds can depend on investing in a plan for failure: a plan B. I aim to make headway on an account of what backup plans are, how they are related to primary plans, and whether the standard norms of plan rationality apply to our agnostic commitments. (shrink)

This paper raises two problems for plan-expressivism concerning normative judgments about non-corealizable actions: actions which cannot both be performed. First, plan-expressivists associate normative judgment with an attitude which satisfies a corealizability constraint, but this constraint is (in the interpersonal case) unwarranted, and (in the intrapersonal case) warranted only at the price of a contentious normative premise. Ayars (2022) holds that the pair of judgments ‘A should φ’ and ‘B should ψ’ is coherent only if one believes that A (...) can φ while B ψ’s. But this is false. Both Gibbard (2003) and Ayars hold that the pair of judgments ‘A should φ’ and ‘A should ψ’ is coherent only if one believes that A can φ and ψ. But this assumes possibilism. Second, the paper demonstrates, cases involving interpersonal non-corealizability prompt judgments about what multiple agents should do which – contra Gibbard – are not plausibly associated with any planning subject. (shrink)

What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions (...) are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends. (shrink)

We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception (...) of our agency as temporally extended. These are, further, features that have great significance for the kinds of lives we can live. For these two reasons I will say that these are among the core features of human agency. A theory of human action needs to say what these core features consist in and how they are related to each other. And such a theory needs also to clarify the relation between these core features of our agency and the possibility that we are fully embedded in an event causal order. (shrink)

I develop an expressivist account of verbal disagreements as practical disagreements over how to use words rather than factual disagreements over what words actually mean. This account enjoys several advantages over others in the literature: it can be implemented in a neo-Stalnakerian possible worlds framework; it accounts for cases where speakers are undecided on how exactly to interpret an expression; it avoids appeals to fraught notions like subject matter, charitable interpretation, and joint-carving; and it naturally extends to an analysis of (...) metalinguistic negotiations. (shrink)

In this paper, planning models developed in artificial intelligence are applied to the kind of planning that must be carried out by participants in a conversation. A planning mechanism is defined, and a short fragment of a free‐flowing videotaped conversation is described. The bulk of the paper is then devoted to an attempt to understand the conversation in terms of the planning mechanism. This microanalysis suggests ways in which the planning mechanism must be augmented, and reveals several important conversational phenomena (...) that deserve further investigation. (shrink)

The “Freedom Agenda” of President George W. Bush for the Middle East assumed that the liberation of Iraq from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and the start of political change would trigger the process of democratization of the entire region. Encouraged by financial and economic support, Arab countries should have been willing to implement political and educational support, which would lead to the creation of civil society and grassroots political changes initiated by society itself. A number of mistakes made by (...) the Bush administration in Iraq has not only caused the mission of the democratization of Iraq to be a failure, but also influenced the situation that today Iraq is closer to being a failed state than a democracy. (shrink)

This encylopedia entry describes the "Canberra Plan" approach to conceptual analysis, a method closely related to the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis approach to analysing the meaning of theoretical terms.

In this paper, we investigate the use of event models for automated planning. Event models are the action defining structures used to define a semantics for dynamic epistemic logic. Using event models, two issues in planning can be addressed: Partial observability of the environment and knowledge. In planning, partial observability gives rise to an uncertainty about the world. For single-agent domains, this uncertainty can come from incomplete knowledge of the starting situation and from the nondeterminism of actions. In multi-agent domains, (...) an additional uncertainty arises from the fact that other agents can act in the world, causing changes that are not instigated by the agent itself. For an agent to successfully construct and execute plans in an uncertain environment, the most widely used formalism in the literature on automated planning is “belief states”: sets of different alternatives for the current state of the world. Epistemic logic is a significantly more expressive and theoretically better founded method for representing knowledge and ignorance about the world. Further, epistemic logic allows for planning according to the knowledge (and iterated knowledge) of other agents, allowing the specification of a more complex class of planning domains, than those simply concerned with simple facts about the world. We show how to model multi-agent planning problems using Kripke-models for representing world states, and event models for representing actions. Our mechanism makes use of slight modifications to these concepts, in order to model the internal view of agents, rather than that of an external observer. We define a type of planning domain called epistemic planning domains, a generalisation of classical planning domains, and show how epistemic planning can successfully deal with partial observability, nondeterminism, knowledge and multiple agents. Finally, we show epistemic planning to be decidable in the single-agent case, but only semi-decidable in the multi-agent case. (shrink)

We have the capacity to act together in shared intentional and shared cooperative ways. This lecture argues that our capacity for the plan-based, mind-supported cross-temporal organization of our individual activities, together with certain further elements, suffices for our capacity for the mind-supported, small-scale social organization characteristic of acting together. These two fundamental forms of human practical organization––diachronic and small-scale social––are for us grounded in a common core: our capacity for planning agency.

We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception (...) of our agency as temporally extended. These are, further, features that have great significance for the kinds of lives we can live. For these two reasons I will say that these are among the core features of human agency. A theory of human action needs to say what these core features consist in and how they are related to each other. And such a theory needs also to clarify the relation between these core features of our agency and the possibility that we are fully embedded in an event causal order. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify under what conditions a philosophical problem arises. I will describe two ways in which we might perceive a question as a problem. First, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that appear incompatible with each other. Second, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that seem incompatible with our desires. I will discuss both of these cases and articulate a didactic strategy – the Clash Strategy – which can (...) be used in order to plan and facilitate dialogic inquiry in the classroom. This strategy suggests introducing stimuli that will help students appreciate the clash that drives the philosophical question to be explored during the dialogue. In summary, this paper aims to ofer insights to all teachers interested in promoting dialogic inquiry, whether philosophical or otherwise, in education. (shrink)

A new theory of problem solving is presented, which embeds problem solving in the theory of action; in this theory, a problem is just a difficult action. Making this work requires a sophisticated language for‐talking about plans and their execution. This language allows a broad range of types of action, and can also be used to express rules for choosing and scheduling plans. To ensure flexibility, the problem solver consists of an interpreter driven by a theorem prover which actually manipulates (...) formulas of the language. Many examples of the use of the system six given. including an extended treatment of the world of blocks. Limitations and extensions of the system are discussed at length. It is concluded that a rule‐based problem solver is necessary and feasible, but that much more work remains to be done on the underlying theory of planning and acting. (shrink)

Humans routinely make inferences about both the contents and the workings of other minds based on observed actions. People consider what others want or know, but also how intelligent, rational, or attentive they might be. Here, we introduce a new methodology for quantitatively studying the mechanisms people use to attribute intelligence to others based on their behavior. We focus on two key judgments previously proposed in the literature: judgments based on observed outcomes (you're smart if you won the game) and (...) judgments based on evaluating the quality of an agent's planning that led to their outcomes (you're smart if you made the right choice, even if you didn't succeed). We present a novel task, the maze search task (MST), in which participants rate the intelligence of agents searching a maze for a hidden goal. We model outcome‐based attributions based on the observed utility of the agent upon achieving a goal, with higher utilities indicating higher intelligence, and model planning‐based attributions by measuring the proximity of the observed actions to an ideal planner, such that agents who produce closer approximations of optimal plans are seen as more intelligent. We examine human attributions of intelligence in three experiments that use MST and find that participants used both outcome and planning as indicators of intelligence. However, observing the outcome was not necessary, and participants still made planning‐based attributions of intelligence when the outcome was not observed. We also found that the weights individuals placed on plans and on outcome correlated with an individual's ability to engage in cognitive reflection. Our results suggest that people attribute intelligence based on plans given sufficient context and cognitive resources and rely on the outcome when computational resources or context are limited. (shrink)

In practice, mathematical proofs are most often the result of careful planning by the agents who produced them. As a consequence, each mathematical proof inherits a plan in virtue of the way it is produced, a plan which underlies its “architecture” or “unity”. This paper provides an account of plans and planning in the context of mathematical proofs. The approach adopted here consists in looking for these notions not in mathematical proofs themselves, but in the agents who produced (...) them. The starting point is to recognize that to each mathematical proof corresponds a proof activity which consists of a sequence of deductive inferences—i.e., a sequence of epistemic actions—and that any written mathematical proof is only a report of its corresponding proof activity. The main idea to be developed is that the plan of a mathematical proof is to be conceived and analyzed as the plan of the agent(s) who carried out the corresponding proof activity. The core of the paper is thus devoted to the development of an account of plans and planning in the context of proof activities. The account is based on the theory of planning agency developed by Michael Bratman in the philosophy of action. It is fleshed out by providing an analysis of the notions of intention—the elementary components of plans—and practical reasoning—the process by which plans are constructed—in the context of proof activities. These two notions are then used to offer a precise characterization of the desired notion of plan for proof activities. A fruitful connection can then be established between the resulting framework and the recent theme of modularity in mathematics introduced by Jeremy Avigad. This connection is exploited to yield the concept of modular presentations of mathematical proofs which has direct implications for how to write and present mathematical proofs so as to deliver various epistemic benefits. The account is finally compared to the technique of proof planning developed by Alan Bundy and colleagues in the field of automated theorem proving. The paper concludes with some remarks on how the framework can be used to provide an analysis of understanding and explanation in the context of mathematical proofs. (shrink)

Speech planning is a sophisticated process. In dialog, it regularly starts in overlap with an incoming turn by a conversation partner. We show that planning spoken responses in overlap with incoming turns is associated with higher processing load than planning in silence. In a dialogic experiment, participants took turns with a confederate describing lists of objects. The confederate’s utterances (to which participants responded) were pre‐recorded and varied in whether they ended in a verb or an object noun and whether this (...) ending was predictable or not. We found that response planning in overlap with sentence‐final verbs evokes larger task‐evoked pupillary responses, while end predictability had no effect. This finding indicates that planning in overlap leads to higher processing load for next speakers in dialog and that next speakers do not proactively modulate the time course of their response planning based on their predictions of turn endings. The turn‐taking system exerts pressure on the language processing system by pushing speakers to plan in overlap despite the ensuing increase in processing load. (shrink)

In in this paper, I make use of an “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation to argue for a form of epistemic internalism. In doing so, I begin by responding to a recent argument of Schoenfield’s against my previous attempt to develop such an argument. In doing so, I distinguish a variety of ways that argument might be understood, and discuss how both internalists and externalists might make use of the ideas within it. Then I argue that, despite these complexities, (...) the doxastic planning model continues to support a modest form of epistemic internalism. I conclude by showing that, far from conflicting with “anti-luminosity” arguments in epistemology, this form of internalism is best understood as a natural reaction to these arguments. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the skilled performance of rock climbing through the framework of Embodied and Enacted Cognitive Science. It introduces a notion of enactive planning that is part of one mindful activity of ongoing responsiveness to the affordances of the wall. The paper takes two distinct planning activities involved in rock climbing—route-reading and visualizing—and clarifies them through the enactivist and ecological concepts of nested affordances, prospecting, recalibrating, marking, and corporeal imaginings, as well as Rylean concept of heeding. The paper shows (...) that an enactive approach to planning can make sense of both the planning done in preparation of the climb, and re-planning done during the mindful performance, without invoking additional cognitive architectures. (shrink)

Argues from the planning theory of intention – as an account of means-end coherence – to a comprehensive form of ethical rationalism. Having raised objections to this result, the paper ends by sketching a way out.

I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is restricted (...) in ways that aim at blocking an analogue of Smart's concerns about rule-worship. I contrast this with the unrestricted two-tier consequentialism suggested by McClennen. I argue that my restricted approach is superior for a theory of the practical rationality of reflective, planning agents like us. But I also conjecture that an unrestricted two-tier consequentialism may be more appropriate for the AI project of specifying a high level architecture for a resource-bounded planner. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has been analysed and discussed from many disciplinary perspectives. An aspect that still needs critical exploration is the role—that is, the modes and forms—of regulatory interventions during the pan- demic. It is interesting to note in this regard that, in many studies, regulatory measures are labelled “non-pharma- ceutical interventions”, as if they do not have any specificity on their own and only represent a theoretically residual category. The main aim of this article is instead to focus on (...) the distinctive features of normative measures as such. As regards the article’s focus, it centres on the normative interventions in the first period of the pandemic—that is, 2020—with particular reference to Italy. We have chosen to focus on this period because the most extensive and severe restrictions introduced to combat Covid-19 were established at that time. And we have chosen to con- sider Italy because it was the first country, after China, to be hard hit by the virus and to react in a draconian manner. As regards the methodology, the article is based, in general and primarily, on an extensive interdisciplinary literature review. With reference to the Italian case, the study is additionally based on: first-hand data collection and analysis (especially concerning Italian normative measures mainly issued at the national level: their type, frequency, target, hierarchical relationships); second-hand data and analysis (for instance as regards the effectiveness of Italy’s and other countries’ regulatory measures). In discussing the Italian response to the Covid-19 pandemic, certain weaknesses have been identified; and possible lessons have been highlighted, in terms of both “planning” (i.e. the necessity to better pre-define concrete and circumscribed sets of actions) and of “meta-planning” (i.e. the necessity of better planning the way in which public authorities could and should plan and act). Although this article is mainly based on the Italian situation, what we can learn from this case is largely generalizable. (shrink)

Adaptive Planning is an approach to planning in the commonsense domain. An adaptive planner takes advantage of the habitual nature of many of the planning situations for which it plans by bosing its activities on a memory of pre‐stored plans. A critical issue, and the subject of this paper, is the question of flexibility: How does an adaptive planner refit an old plan in order to meet the demands of some new planning situation? An adaptive planner refits prestored plans (...) by constructing an interpretation of the situation in which it is engaged. Key elements in the theory of adaptive planning are its treatment of specific plans and a notion of situation matching. The theory of adaptive planning has been modeled by a computer program called PLEXUS. (shrink)

Knowledge and expertise -- Knowledge and action -- The nature of professional action in urban planning.

Drawing on models of the interaction order, we describe how planning is an inherently social activity. We argue that planning as a practice involves five core elements: mirroring, identifying, coordinating, timing, and surmounting. Specifically, planning depends on (1) a realization of likely responses of others, (2) a recognition of communal understandings, grounded in local cultures, (3) a commitment to collaborative engagements with allies, (4) an adjustment to temporal sequences involving the use of “in time” strategies and tactics, and (5) an (...) ability to overcome or avoid obstacles and blocking moves set by competitors and adversaries. Planning is evident in micro-, meso-, or macro-level domains. To demonstrate how planning is a social accomplishment, we analyze three distinct ethnographic sites: the world of competitive chess, dependent on the micro-interactions of two competitors; the meso-level process of homebuying, requiring the aid of real estate agents as allies; and macro-level structures in directing social movement activism in a contentious action field. Planning extends beyond cognitive achievement and is central to a sociology of the future. (shrink)