The problem of identity is central to epistemic transference. However, relative identity appears to be the only way to work out an epistemic useful notion of identity. Relative identity, on its part, is either parasitic on strict identity or not identity at all. If, on the contrary, we ought for a strict concept of identity capable of satisfying its requirements, we end up with a tautologic and epistemic worthless category. The paper provides an answer to this problem, which, while working (...) with a strict notion, shows how it might still serve epistemic purposes. In doing so, it shows how a formal reconstruction of our objectual world and the identities we refer to poses a workable model upon which our messy epistemic one acquires stability. The paper focuses primarily on the Geach-Quine discussion on identity. (shrink)

En el devenir de las artes visuales en Colombia, la preocupación por los efectos de los fenómenos de la violencia ha sido recurrente. La mirada de los artistas se ha valido de diferentes lenguajes expresivos y formas de traducción, con el interés de construir una estrecha relación entre la naturaleza de las obras y el acontecer de los propios fenómenos sociales.

The paper attempts to conciliate the important distinction between what-is, or exists, and what-is-not, thereby supporting Russell’s existential analysis, with some Meinongian insights. For this purpose, it surveys the varied inhabitants of the realm of ‘non-being’ and tries to clarify their diverse statuses. The position that results makes it possible to rescue them back in surprising but non-threatening form, leaving our ontology safe from contradiction.

Joint activities are ubiquitous in the animal kingdom, but they differ substantially in their underlying psychological states. Humans attribute and share mental states with others in the so‐called shared intentionality. Our hypothesis is that our closest nonhuman living relatives also attribute some psychological mechanisms such as perceptions and goals to others, but, unlike humans, they are not necessarily intrinsically motivated to share those psychological states. Furthermore, it is postulated that shared intentionality is responsible for the appearance of a suite of (...) behaviors, including joint attention, declarative communication, imitative learning, and teaching, that are the basis of cultural learning and the social norms and traditions present in every human culture. (shrink)

In this enlightening exploration of our nearest primate relatives, Michael Tomasello and Josep Call address the current state of our knowledge about the cognitive skills of non-human primates and integrate empirical findings from the beginning of the century to the present.

A previous observational study suggested that when faced with a partner with its back turned, chimpanzees tend to move around to the front of a non-attending partner and then gesture — rather than gesturing once to attract attention and then again to convey a specific intent. We investigated this preference experimentally by presenting six orangutans, five gorillas, nine chimpanzees, and four bonobos with a food begging situation in which we varied the body orientation of an experimenter with respect to the (...) subject and the location of the food. These manipulations allowed us to measure whether subjects preferred to move around to face E or to use signals to attract her attention before they begged for food. Results showed that all species moved around to face E and then produced visual gestures, instead of using tactile/ auditory gestures behind E to call her attention. Species differences were apparent particularly when the food and E were in different locations. Unlike gorillas and orangutans, chimpanzees and bonobos produced their gestures in front of E in all conditions, including that in which subjects had to leave the food behind to communicate with her. Implications of these results are discussed in the context of the evolution of social cognition in great apes. (shrink)

Chimpanzees follow the gaze of conspecifics and humans — follow it past distractors and behind barriers, ‘check back’ with humans when gaze following does not yield interesting sights, use gestures appropriately depending on the visual access of their recipient, and select different pieces of food depending on whether their competitor has visual access to them. Taken together, these findings make a strong case for the hypothesis that chimpanzees have some understanding of what other individuals can and cannot see. However, chimpanzees (...) do not seem nearly so skillful in the Gesture Choice and Object Choice experimental paradigms. Neither behavioral conditioning nor theory of mind explanations can account for these results satisfactorily. Instead this chapter proposes the idea that chimpanzees have the cognitive skills to recall, represent, categorize, and reason about the behavior and perception of others, but not their intentional or mental states, because they do not know that others have such states since they cannot make a link to their own. Human beings began their own evolutionary trajectory with these same skills, but then at some point in their evolution (probably quite recently) they began to understand that their own experience could serve as some kind of model for that of other persons. This allowed for even better prediction and control of the behavior of others and better communication and cooperation with them as well, and so it was an adaptation with immediate adaptive consequences that ensured its survival. (shrink)

El modelo de ser humano: homo oeconomicus, impuesto por la racionalidad económica capitalista, ha tenido en las dos últimas décadas una metamorfosis compleja, a saber, la formación de un tipo de subjetividad representada en la figura del “emprendedor” o “su propio jefe” que, desde una nueva gramática teológica, encarna un proyecto mercantil solapado y subrepticio que condiciona las relaciones entre sujetos. En razón a esto, el propósito de este texto es pensar dicha problemática desde el ejercicio hermenéutico-crítico que lleva a (...) cabo el joven Marx, para someter al análisis las categorías de culpa, deuda, sacrificio y expiación destacadas por Walter Benjamin, a la luz de la categoría esencia subjetiva de la propiedad privada que permita entender cómo el capitalismo se vale hoy de la teología y su lenguaje para continuar responsabilizando al ser humano de su pobreza, de su riqueza o su fracaso económico. (shrink)

Language does not fossilize but this does not mean that the language's evolutionary timeline is lost forever. Great apes provide a window back in time on our last prelinguistic ancestor's communication and cognition. Phylogeny and cladistics implicitly conjure Pan (chimpanzees, bonobos) as a superior (often the only) model for language evolution compared with earlier diverging lineages, Gorilla and Pongo (orangutans). Here, in reviewing the literature, it is shown that Pan do not surpass other great apes along genetic, cognitive, ecologic, or (...) vocal traits that are putatively paramount for language onset and evolution. Instead, revived herein is the idea that only by abandoning single‐species models and learning about the variation among great apes, there might be a chance to retrieve lost fragments of the evolutionary timeline of language. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica - Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies / Revue de l'Association Internationale de Sémiotique Volume: 2014 Issue: 198 Pages: 205-240.

Ape species-specific communication is grounded on the present, possesses some referential qualities and is mostly used to request objects or actions from others. Artificial systems of communication borrowed from humans transform apes' communicative exchanges by freeing them from the present (i.e. displaced reference) although requests still predominate as the main reason for communicating with others. Symbol use appears to enhance apes' relational abilities and their inhibitory control. Despite these substantial changes, it is concluded that even though artificial communication enhances thought (...) and enables its expression more openly, it does not create it or modify the motivation behind communicative exchanges. (shrink)

Las edificaciones con valor patrimonial son un testimonio excepcional del progreso de una comunidad y representan ejemplos innegables de la transferencia de conocimientos a lo largo de las generaciones. Es inevitable caminar por centro consolidado de Pasaje y no reconocer el legado cultural de muchas edificaciones. Sin embargo, también resulta fácil observar las alteraciones erróneas que sea han realizado a estas edificaciones con el objetivo de responder a las “nuevas exigencias” de la actualidad. La conservación de los bienes patrimoniales resulta (...) necesaria para la preservación de la integridad e identidad de la ciudad. La presente investigación posibilita entender el nivel de susceptibilidad que presentan las edificaciones consideradas como bienes patrimoniales, debido a que estás viviendas poseen un valor cultural. El objetivo de la investigación es el de identificar la susceptibilidad sísmica a las que están expuestas, para esto se utilizaron métodos de matrices de evaluación sísmica para medir el nivel de susceptibilidad en las edificaciones patrimoniales. (shrink)

The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege ́s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It then studies an alternative path, that departin1g from Frege’s initial premises, drives to a conception of numbers as synthetic a priori in a more (...) Kantian sense. On this basis, it tentatively explores a possible derivation of basic logical rules on their behalf, suggesting a more rudimentary basis to inferential thinking, which supports reconsidering the difference between logical thinking and AI. Finally, it reflects upon the contributions of this approach to the problem of the a priori. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the relation (...) between the two terms of the entanglement as resulting from the satisfaction of a previously applied moral function. This is what I call a ‘Three-Fold Model’. (shrink)

Talmy divided the world’s languages according to how they express movement. Spanish, a verb-framed language, purportedly constrains the use of motion verbs expressing the manner of movement (such as roll) to contexts in which no spatial boundary is crossed. Previous research suggests that this constraint sometimes does not apply. We report the first large-scale investigation of the constraint and its modulating factors (movement direction, verb type, entering/exiting, Ground size, the preposition used) across different Spanish-speaking communities. A task with open-ended description (...) of animated videos, a sentence interpretation task, and a rating task found that Spanish and Latin American speakers (n = 180 in total) often use manner verbs to describe boundary-crossing situations (especially entering a place), although this is modulated by the preposition following the verb (more with a than en). Better understanding of this constraint in verb-framed languages has applications in, for instance, L2 acquisition research. (shrink)

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and (...) evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention. Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition. Key Words: collaboration; cooperation; cultural learning; culture; evolutionary psychology; intentions; shared intentionality; social cognition; social learning; theory of mind; joint attention. (shrink)

The paper offers an integrative interpretation of the different lines of thought Wittgenstein was inspecting in On Certainty and what he might have been looking for through them. It suggests that we may have been focusing our attention too strongly in the wrong place and comes to a new conclusion about where the real import of these reflections lies. This leads to an answer to the initially posed question of Foundationalism that revises the way in which there can be said (...) to be a grounding intention in On Certainty. (shrink)

Smith et al.'s article provides a convincing argument for devoting increased research attention to comparative metacognition. However, this increased attention should be complemented with establishing links with comparative theory of mind (ToM) research, which are currently missing. I present a task in which pairs of subjects are presented with incomplete information in an object-choice situation that could be used to establish that link.

Primate foraging can be construed as a set of interconnected problems that include finding food, selecting efficient travel routes, anticipating the positions of moving prey, and manipulating, and occasionally, extracting food items using tools. The evidence reviewed in this paper strongly suggests that both monkeys and apes use three types of representation (i.e., static, dynamic, and relational) to solve various problems. Static representations involve recalling certain features of the environment, dynamic representations involve imagining changes in the trajectories of moving objects, (...) and relational representations involve encoding the properties of objects in relation to other objects. Contrary to previous claims, no clear differences were found between the representational skills of monkeys and apes. Current evidence also suggests that primates may be better at representing general compared to specific problem features. Finally, we have characterized the domains of space and objects as complementary and indicated future lines of research in these domains. (shrink)

This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abilities on whose behalf linguistic meaning is introduced from the proper institution of language. I call this capacity “private pattern recognition” (PPR) and argue that it plays an essential part not just in the instauration of linguistic meaning but also in other relevant cognitive phenomena such as artistic creation and understanding. Moreover, it is precisely the failure to separate both aspects that gives rise to important (...) perplexities associated with the underdetermination of meaning. The first part of the article makes a case for this thesis and addresses its compatibility with Wittgenstein's private language argument. It then focuses on the example of art to illustrate the differing roles of private pattern recognition and shared linguistic meaning. The second part of the article focuses on the paradox of resemblance (RP). It (i) considers the difficulties of Williamson's response, (ii) illustrates how they instead support the current thesis, (iii) attempts to delineate how the role of meaning should be understood, and (iv) briefly revisits the rule‐following paradox (RFP). (shrink)

Propone develar cómo influye el narcotráfico, las formas de resistencia y reexistencia en la escuela del Norte del Valle del Cauca (Colombia). Desde un enfoque cualitativo se forman textos de las historias de vida y relatos de experiencias construidos en diálogo sobre los temas generadores Escuela y narcotráfico, analizados por medio de matrices de interpretación y su triangulación; autores, actores y maestro participante en una perspectiva hermenéutica pluritópica. En ella participan estudiantes, padres y madres de familia, docentes y otros miembros (...) de la comunidad escolar. En sus conclusiones se destaca: la marca colonial en la economía nacional (glocal); el imperativo impuesto por las precarias condiciones económicas; los altos niveles de corrupción que crean un caldo de cultivo para el surgimiento de grupos delincuenciales; la escuela como posibilidad de formación humana que resiste y reexiste al narcotráfico; las contradicciones a las que son sometidos los jóvenes en el enfoque de atención al problema del consumo y la capacidad de algunos miembros de la comunidad para construir un proyecto de vida que les permite reexistir por fuera de las lógicas del narcotráfico como sujetos históricos. (shrink)

Animals react and adjust to the behavior of their conspecifics. Much less is known about whether animals also react and adjust to the psychological states of others. Recent evidence suggests that chimpanzees follow the gaze of others around barriers, past distracters, and check back if they find nothing. Chimpanzees can gauge the motives of a human experimenter and distinguish his intentional from accidental actions. These results suggest that chimpanzees interpret the perceptions and actions of others from a psychological perspective -they (...) seem to know what others can and cannot see and what goals others pursue. It is hypothesized that the co-operation of the ability to operate on psychological states and the motivation to share emotions and experiences with others are key ingredients in the making of human minds. (shrink)

Como parte de la investigación doctoral en curso, este escrito presenta una lectura filosófica de las visiones analíticas de la contemporaneidad de José Saramago en su obra La caverna y de Zygmunt Bauman a partir de las obras del denominado “período líquido”, teniendo como orientación metodológica la hermenéutica gadameriana. Se pretende dilucidar el carácter particular de algunos de los fenómenos culturales, sociales, emocionales y comportamentales que constituyen la experiencia contemporánea del mundo (consumismo, debilitamiento de los lazos sociales y afectivos, desregulación (...) de las instituciones que sustentan la sociedad occidental, hedonismo, relativismo moral y religioso, etc). Dichos fenómenos son abordados desde un metáfora óptica –la de Saramago– y una metáfora física –la de Bauman–. Todos ellos constituyen una encrucijada con respecto al sentido atribuible a dichas dinámicas, las múltiples lecturas que se hacen de las mismas y los retos analíticos, comprensivos e intelectuales que implica el debate en torno a la contemporaneidad (¿posmodernidad? ¿tardomodernidad? ¿hipermodernidad?). (shrink)

Flack and de Waal argue that reciprocity, revenge, and moralistic aggression are important components of the social norms that exist in some non-human primates. These and other phenomena are seen as the evolutionary building blocks of human morality. Although focussing on these phenomena is a good starting point for studying the question of morality in non-human animals, they only provide a partial answer. Two other issues deserve careful attention: perception of intentions, and the distinction between using and perceiving social norms. (...) First, perception of intention is particularly important because it modulates whether retribution is justified. There is some preliminary evidence that may indicate that some primates are sensitive to the behavioural intentions of others. Second, the evidence regarding use of social norms does not necessarily imply that individuals also perceive them . This distinction seems particularly important in any comparative analysis of morality that includes humans. Currently, it is unclear whether non- human animals are capable of perceiving social norms. Future studies should devote more attention to these issues and some possible ways to investigate them are indicated. (shrink)

Hare’s analysis of moral language have been either obviated in contemporary meta-ethical debates or straightforwardly sided with dated forms of humean noncognitivism. It is assumed that Hare´s conceptual analysis is subject to the same critique that threatens these last positions and is in the same way inadequate. I believe this misrepresents his position and distracts us from his more important contributions to the understanding of moral language. The present paper attempts to show that, even if some miss-adjustments in Hare’s position (...) favour these assumptions, a reformulation of his account may confront such critics posing a new understanding model of the relation between descriptive and evaluative aspects in the moral case that differs from both realist and humean non-cognitivist accounts. (shrink)