The article will argue that neither what may be called ‘multiple legitimacies’ nor what Leigh Jenco refers to as the hybrid view of legitimacy provides substantial guidance in reconceiving legitima...

One of the most notable features in recent Confucian political theory is the advocacy of political meritocracy. Though Confucian meritocrats’ controversial institutional design has been subject to critical scrutiny, less attention has been paid to their underlying normative claims. This paper aims to investigate the two justificatory conditions of Confucian political meritocracy—the service condition and the reciprocity condition—in light of classical Confucianism and with special attention to moral disagreement. Finding the normative argument for Confucian (...) political meritocracy both incomplete (in light of classical Confucianism) and implausible (under the circumstances of moral disagreement), it proposes Confucian constitutional democracy as an alternative that can meet the three conditions of the good Confucian polity—service, reciprocity, and remedy—by reconceiving the people's well-being in terms of their basic rights, as well as by promoting constitutional dialogue among the three branches of the government. (shrink)

Daniel A. Bell’s searching for the possible alternatives to liberal democracy in light of the political progresses in the Asian countries spans two decades, culminating in his proposal of the so-called Chinese political meritocracy or xianneng zhengzhi. This article indicates the conceptual asymmetry between xianneng zhengzhi and “meritocracy” in three aspects. Firstly, xianeng zhengzhi remains at the brighter end of the spectrum of political ideas while “meritocracy” is bogged down in a highly polarized reception. Secondly, “meritocracy” (...) lacks the quintessence of xianneng zhengzhi, namely, an explicit stress on priority of moral worthiness. Thirdly, “meritocracy” is built upon foundational individualism and focuses on the individual performance and achievement. Although Confucian political tradition and the Western conception of meritocracy share some functional similarities, using the synthesized term “Confucian meritocracy” to introduce the Confucian political tradition may commit a cross-cultural hermeneutic fallacy. (shrink)

Some Confucian scholars have recently claimed that Confucian political meritocracy is superior to Western democracy. I have great reservations about such a view. . . .

"Meritocracy" has historically been understood in two ways. The first is as an approach to governance. On this understanding, we seek to put meritorious (somehow defined) people into public office to the benefit of society. This understanding has its roots in Confucius, its scope is political offices, and its justification is consequentialist. The second understanding of "meritocracy" is as a theory of justice. We distribute in accordance with merit in order to give people the things that they deserve, (...) as justice demands. This understanding has its roots in Aristotle, its scope is social goods broadly, and its justification is deontological. In this article, I discuss the differences--especially the conceptual differences--between these two, prima facie distinct, meritocratic traditions. I also argue that despite their differences Eastern Meritocracy and Western Meritocracy are harmonious. In Section I of the article I introduce the two meritocratic traditions through, in part, a highly abbreviated history of talk about "merit" and "meritocracy" in Chinese and Western philosophy. In Section II, I discuss a number of conceptual issues and partition meritocratic theories in accordance with their scopes and normative justifications. I also discuss two scenarios. In one scenario, Eastern Meritocracy appears to deliver the right result and Western Meritocracy, the wrong result. In the other scenario, vice versa. Finally, in Section III, I argue that Eastern Meritocracy and Western Meritocracy are each special cases of a single, compelling notion of "meritocracy.". (shrink)

In the past two decades, Confucian meritocrats have justified the unequal distribution of political power by appeal to the ideal of Confucian virtue politics. In this article, I demonstrate that at the heart of Confucian virtue politics lies a political leader’s affective accountability and show that non-democratic Confucian meritocracy fails to embody this moral ideal. Then, I argue that the ideal of Confucian virtue politics can be better realized in democratic system. To this end, (...) I first describe how ordinary citizens’ moral demand for a political leader’s affective accountability in a consolidated democratic society can make theoretical space for a Confucian political leader. Next, I articulate the role of a Confucian political leader in contemporary democratic society from a normative standpoint and show that at the core of Confucian democratic meritocracy lies ‘mutual moral transformation’, formed by dialectical interactions between a virtuous Confucian political leader and empowered citizens. (shrink)

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, EarlyView.

The political philosophies of Kongzi, Mengzi, and Xunzi can fruitfully be understood as focusing substantially on politically relevant merit – and as having conceptions of politically relevant merit intertwined with their conceptions of morality and virtue. In short, on their account, politically relevant merit finds its necessary foundation in morally relevant merit. In critiquing this position, Han Fei questions four positions that must be true in order for the early Confucian position to succeed: 1) Politically relevant merit is necessarily (...) tied to moral merit; 2) Virtuous individuals who possess the relevant moral merits can reliably be identified even by those who are not themselves virtuous; 3) Moral cultivation is actually possible; and 4) Those qualities that make someone virtuous can reliably be ascertained. This paper examines the worries that Han Fei has with these positions and offers up an account of Han Fei’s own account of politically relevant merit – a non-moral alternative tied to task specific competencies. (shrink)

Recent debates on Confucian meritocracy largely center around outright normative critiques rather than its textual basis. The unflattering upshot is the lack of attention to a mode of critique that scrutinizes Confucian meritocracy by questioning the way meritocrats invoke Confucian concepts and values. Focusing on three meritocrats—Bai Tongdong 白彤東, Daniel A. Bell, and Kang Xiaoguang 康曉光, this article ventures a text-based normative approach by examining continuities and ruptures between core meritocratic arguments they make, and the (...) messages conveyed by Confucian masters. The core argument that I advance is that the meritocratic thesis about the political division of labor does not mesh with the classic Confucian understandings of voluntariness and political authority, which generates uneasy normative consequences for Confucian meritocracy. Ultimately, classic Confucianism does not provide a conceptually secure platform for the meritocratic part of Confucian meritocracy as its ardent advocates claim. (shrink)

East Asia’s economy is leading the world into the new Asian century. While meritocratic practices in the educational and private sectors are often considered pivotal conditions for East Asia’s economic success, experts have pointed out that the path ahead requires new approaches to ensure social cohesion and stability, which depend on the quality of relations across social divides. These considerations raise multiple questions for philosophers: What forms of social meritocracy are necessary to sustain social cohesion? Moreover, how can the (...) detrimental effects of meritocratic practices be contained? Is it possible to utilise some of the intellectual resources indigenous to East Asia to generate innovative solutions? This paper argues that the answers to these questions lie in the indigenous Confucian conceptual resources. Confucian ideas can inspire a more desirable societal ideal for the future of East Asia. In particular, the Confucian emphasis on cultivating reciprocal harmonious human relationships and others’ morality can guide new approaches to fostering social cohesion. As Confucian personal cultivation through harmonious relations is a process of social cohesion, these ideas inspire a) a multiple approach to policymaking that is not only grounded in economic redistribution, b) a richer understanding of societal progress, and c) a democratic approach to fostering social cohesion. Unlike Confucian meritocrats and scholars who defend the Confucian roots of East Asian forms of political and social meritocracy, this paper proves that Confucian conceptual resources can help formulate a societal vision that strengthens cohesion and mitigates the adverse effects of meritocratic practices. (shrink)

Counter to ‘political meritocracy’, the goal of this article is to present a different approach to incorporating the Confucian political ideal into an ethical modification of liberal democracy, nam...

A crucial tenet of virtue-based or expertise-based theorizing about politics is that there are ways to identify and select morally and epistemically excellent people to hold office. This paper considers historical challenges to this task that come from within Greek and Confucian thought and political practice. Because of how difficult it is to assess character in ordinary settings, we argue that it is even more difficult to design institutions that select for virtue at the much wider political scale. Specifically, (...) we argue that the vast majority of proposals that purport to select for virtue are either (a) unlikely to be effective, (b) not implementable at the scale of most current nations, or (c) have already been incorporated into most democratic states. Thus defenders of meritocratic institutions should take more seriously the practical barriers that will almost certainly arise when trying to implement these proposals at scale. Historical proponents of meritocratic values were well aware of concerns about the feasibility of their political ideals, and we should be too. (shrink)

이 글은 한국의 유교적 근대성이라는 맥락에 초점을 두고 메리토크라시와 민주주의의 관계를 규명해 보려는 한 시도다. 서구에서는 이 메리토크라시 이념이 ‘민주주의의 토대’라고까지 평가되는데, 이 글은 강하게 메리토크라시 이념을 쫓았던 유교적 문화 전통의 영향으로 우리 사회에서도 어느 정도 그런 연관이 확인될 수 있다는 데서 출발한다. 오늘날 한국의 민주주의는 유교 전통의 긍정적 영향사 위에 서 있다. 그러나 메리토크라시는 민주주의에 대해 반드시 긍정적인 함축만을 갖지는 않는다. 이 글은 그것이 심각한 사회경제적 불평등을 생산하고 정당화하면서 민주주의의 토대를 스스로 잠식해가는 ‘배반의 이데올로기’이기도 함을 보여준다. 그렇지만 강한 유교적 (...) 전통을 갖고 있는 동아시아 사회들에서는 메리토크라시 이데올로기를 단순하게 무시하기 쉽지 않은데, 여기서는 유교 전통의 계승이라는 차원에서 ‘정치적 메리토크라시’(현능정치)에 대한 유혹도 결코 가볍지 않다. 이 글은 또한 이 정치적 메리토크라시가 결코 민주주의의 대안이 될 수 없음을 논증하며, 메리토크라시와는 다른 방식으로 오늘날 민주주의의 위기를 극복할 수 있는 길을 모색한다. 마지막으로 이런 식의 인식이 한국 민주주의의 미래에 대해 가질 수 있는 함축에 대해서도 짧게 논의한다. (shrink)

This paper compares criticisms of Singapore’s meritocracy, especially against its impact on income disparities and class divisions, with Michael Sandel’s critique of the meritocratic ethic in the United States. Despite significant differences in their history and politics, meritocracy has similar dysfunctions in both societies, allowing us to draw theoretical conclusions about meritocracy as an ideal of governance. It then contrasts Sandel’s communitarian critique of meritocracy with recent Confucian promotion of political meritocracy and meritocratic justice (...) and argues that the Confucian principle of “promoting the virtuous and talented” is different from the contemporary conception of meritocracy. Textual evidence indicates that a Confucian understanding of “merit” is contrary to the technocratic expertise of contemporary meritocracies. Furthermore, pre-Qin Confucian texts do not support a conception of justice that emphasizes individual desert; they address distributive problems from the perspective of needs and sustaining social relations. The texts also support limiting the reign of merit when it results in inequalities that cause suffering, inhibit personal cultivation of some groups, or undermine social relations. The paper concludes with an assessment of Singapore’s on-going attempts to improve its meritocracy from a Confucian perspective. (shrink)

In lieu of Abstract: With inequality of various sorts ballooning worldwide, a critique of democracy has come of age, and a change of political ethos is underway. Against this background, the critique of democracy becomes not only possible but also popular, and examples in China and many Western democracies abound. It is no exaggeration to say, in this context, that sufficient momentum has gathered to qualify the situation as "democratic recession," despite people may have different understandings as to the exact (...) nature of this recession and how long it will last. Accompanying this recession, Confucian political meritocracy, whose aim is to correct the wrongs of democracy, is constructed as an alternative to liberal democracy. Many argue that the end of history is not nigh but will continue in and by Confucian political meritocracy... (shrink)

Let me first express my gratitude for the three detailed and informative critiques of my book The China Model. These critiques are themselves models of Confucian civility, even as they express sharp areas of disagreement. There does seem to be agreement that the ideal of a Confucian-inspired democratic meritocracy is a worthwhile political project, particularly in the Chinese political context, but Huang, Li, and Wang question my book's arguments in defense of this ideal. There are three kinds (...) of critiques: the need to take Confucianism more seriously, the need to take democracy more seriously, and the need to take political meritocracy more seriously. Let me try to respond to each critique in turn.Yong... (shrink)

In this article, I examine the textual underpinnings of participatory Confucian democracy and Confucian meritocracy and propose realist Confucian democracy as an alternative following a balanced reading of classic Confucianism. I argue that Confucian plebeian values do not square with the political meritocrats’ advocacy for meritocratic rule while Confucian elitist values undermine participatory democrats’ ardor for justifications of active democratic participation. A shared difficulty with both groups is that they tend to overuse one aspect (...) of Confucianism while leaving the status of other elements in limbo. The discussion of participatory democracy and meritocracy is followed by the introduction of an eclectic reading that strikes a dynamic balance between elitist and plebeian values in Confucianism, and which points to the wide gamut of realist democracy that combines democratic election with strong leadership. (shrink)

Several contemporary Confucian philosophers have posited differing hybrid views fusing meritocracy to democracy. There is a good deal of interest in a meritocracy in contemporary Confucian thought, and such a view perhaps should receive more serious consideration in liberal democratic thought since it may make for a stronger form of government when appended to democracy. In this paper, four contemporary hybrid theorists who combine elements of a meritocracy with a democracy are critically analyzed concerning an (...) ability for their views to be instantiated in liberal democracies for the legislative branch only. Finally, I provide a modified hybrid view for the legislature that I believe is the best fit for current liberal democracies. (shrink)

This article aims to critically evaluate the recent proposals of Confucian political meritocracy by focusing on two sets of questions: the first set on the connection between traditional Confuciani...

Daniel Bell's The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy is a significant contribution to contemporary political theory. I am very much in sympathy with his ideal of political meritocracy, although I would disagree with him on the degree to which it is realized or practiced in China today; for me, the reality is as distant from Bell's ideal of political meritocracy, if I understand it correctly, as it is from democracy. However, in the present (...) comment, I will not exploit this disagreement. Instead, I will try to make two friendly amendments to his political meritocracy as an ideal, with which I have a lot of agreements. In the Introduction to the book, Bell discloses that "I developed an... (shrink)

Influenced by the example of China, a literature is emerging that advocates a modernized version of Confucian meritocracy, often as an alternative to liberal democracy and even democracy itself. We...

This study explores the principles of meritocracy and heredity as formulated in the three works of early Daoist philosophy, the Laozi, Zhuangzi and Wenzi. Because Daoist philosophy emerged in critical response to the Confucian worldview, this investigation is placed against the backdrop of pertinent Confucian propositions. To this end, the study begins with a review of Confucian positions on the issue of meritocracy and heredity as expressed in the main transmitted works, as well as newly (...) excavated texts that can be associated with this intellectual tradition. The paper concludes that, while indeed rejecting the Confucian understanding of meritocracy, Daoist texts operated with their own concepts on human excellency. Moreover, the opposition between meritocracy and heredity characteristic of some Confucian works appears less pronounced in early Daoist philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Confucian Liberalism: Mou Zongsan and Hegelian Liberalism by Roy TsengMilan Matthiesen (bio)Confucian Liberalism: Mou Zongsan and Hegelian Liberalism. By Roy Tseng. Albany: SUNY Press, 2023. Pp. 405. Hardcover $95.00, isbn 978-1-4384-9111-0.With Confucian Liberalism, Roy Tseng sets a new landmark in the contemporary discourse on Confucian political theory. His intricate account of the political philosophy of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) and other New Confucian (...) philosophers, in conjunction with his study of T.H. Green's (1836–1882) and other British idealists' liberalism, offer a fresh and novel approach to Confucianism and liberalism alike. Throughout the eight chapters of his book, Tseng develops the concept of "Confucian liberalism." This concept stays faithful to civil liberties, but grounds democracy on an ethics of self-realization and a perfectionist ideal of the state, "where the government helps the people to 'attain accomplishment according to the individual's nature' (jiu geti er shuncheng 就個體而順成)" (p. 125). On the one hand, this framework attempts to circumvent the overbearing tendencies of traditional Confucianism, whose moral imperatives had prohibited the development of an independent sphere of politics. On the other hand, it reintroduces the Confucian concept of humaneness (ren 仁) as an answer to the lack of common meaning in modern societies. On the one hand, Tseng therefore dissociates himself from anti-Confucian liberals such as Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (1919–1969) or Zhang Foquan 張佛泉 (1907–1994), who had proclaimed the incompatibility of Confucianism and liberal values. On the other hand, he also differentiates himself from what he calls "antiliberal Confucians." Especially recently, the latter have attracted much attention by proposing a political vision opposed to the perceived foreign and "Western" concept of liberalism. Under labels such as "political Confucianism" (Jiang Qing 蔣慶), "socialist Confucianism" (Chen Lai 陳來), "politics of benevolence" (Kang Xiaoguang 康曉光), "Confucian meritocracy" (Bai Tongdong 白彤東), or "Confucian political perfectionism" (Joseph Chan 陳祖為), they have had a profound impact on the discourse of Confucian political theory. Turning toward the [End Page 1] political works of Mou Zongsan and the British idealists, Tseng neither advocates for the inherent elitism and anti-Western sentiments of antiliberal Confucianism, nor does he fully subscribe to the radically iconoclast ideals of the anti-Confucian liberals who had denied all value of tradition and saw Confucianism as a mere obstacle toward a modernized China. Another aspect of Tseng's study that stands out from the current field of research on Mou Zongsan is his reading of Mou's conceptual framework through the lens of Hegel. While many prominent researchers, e.g. Li Minghui 李明輝, point toward Mou's reliance on Kantian ideas and concepts, Tseng convincingly argues that Mou's appropriation of the idealist framework, as well as many concepts utilized by Mou, are fundamentally Hegelian, therefore warranting a shift in perspective. Confucian Liberalism is subdivided into three parts and eight chapters. Part I, titled "Confucian Ethics," introduces the reader to Mou Zongsan's moral philosophy by providing a comparative analysis of Mou, Kant, Hegel, and the British idealists, primarily represented by T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley (1846–1924). In part II, "Civil Liberalism," Tseng then moves on to elaborate on the New Confucian view of politics. Here, he pays close attention to Mou's revaluation of Confucian politics through the Hegelian framework, the notion of "civility," and the concept of "humane government." Turning again to Mou and Green, the final part, "Perfectionist Liberalism," presents the political vision of a democratic state underpinned by a strong belief that the primary task of the state is to provide an environment for the individual citizens that allows them to fully realize their moral capabilities. The third part further argues that the values upheld by New Confucianism not only do not contradict the liberal values of human dignity, tolerance, and equal respect, but are in fact able to lay a moral foundation for modern democracies that is able to overcome the weaknesses of mainstream liberalism, manifested in atomism, nihilism, and egoism. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the core principles and concepts of Mou Zongsan's moral metaphysics. Following Mou's own approach, Tseng applies a comparative method in this introductory chapter, meticulously delineating the varying philosophical influences that shaped Mou's... (shrink)

Confucian meritocratic rule has been recently advocated on the basis of the economic performance of Western democracies and the political ignorance of their average voters. These arguments are grou...

I think Tongdong Bai's Confucian Meritocracy requires a lot of idealisation. Feasibility aside, should we realise the conditions for Confucian Meritocracy to work, we would have created the ideal situation for democracy to function properly. This challenges the purported advantages Confucian Meritocracy enjoys over democracy.

The rise of East Asian Confucian heritage societies (China, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam and Singapore) has inspired an enormous amount of new empirical research. At the political level, one...

ntroduction Since China’s gradualist reform started in the early 1980s, its governance record has been relatively successful. Despite a large number of severe challenges, the government in Beijing has managed outstanding economic performance and large-scale social transformation (Naughton 2007). Overall, the regime seems to enjoy relatively high levels of public support (Gilley 2006; Wang 2009), and a reform and state-building process controlled by the ruling Chinese Communist Party looks set to continue for the next ten to 20 years. One key (...) element of the Chinese political or governing system is management of its Party and government officials, or “cadres” in its own terminology. We argue that the Party-state’s personnel management features a meritocratic system that has so far largely evaded scholarly attention. This system retains strong influences from the Confucian scholar-official tradition of China’s imperial past, as well as the Leninist “vanguard party” tradition that was established in the revolutionary and Maoist eras. In recent years, however, this system has paid increasing attention to nurturing managerial competence for the purpose of administering a modern economy and a modern society. How the Party attempts to strike a balance between political loyalty and professional competence is the focus of this study. We will examine several aspects of the Chinese cadre management system. These include the formal rules, institutions, and actual practices regarding (1) recruitment, (2) development, and (3) promotion of officials. From this analysis we will understand how political loyalty and professional competence are defined and measured in the Party’s personnel regime, and how a balance is sought between the two. We will also look at the changes that are taking place in the relative importance, or weights, of these two criteria as the Party-state tries to build a modern governance machine. We find that while political reliability and commitment still feature prominently when the Party staffs the state and party bodies, rapid economic development and social changes have amplified the need for capable and competent managers and administrators, in order to deliver successful governance. Whereas in the past political loyalty played a crucial role for officials’ success within the state ranks, today professional competence has become more central. Whether this trend will continue, to a future state in which political loyalty becomes almost irrelevant, will be discussed toward the end of the chapter. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Confucian Sentimental Representation: A New Approach to Confucian Democracy by Kyung Rok KwonStephen C. AngleKWON, Kyung Rok. Confucian Sentimental Representation: A New Approach to Confucian Democracy. New York: Routledge, 2022. vi + 128 pp. Cloth, $128.00; eBook, $39.16Two facts have driven much of the recent theorizing about Confucian democracy. First, even in robust democracies like South Korea and Taiwan, East Asian citizens hold (...) distinctive views about the relation between leaders and led. Two-thirds of South Korean respondents and a third of those from Taiwan agreed with the statement "If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything." Second, it is uncontroversial to say that traditional Confucianism advocated for rule by the virtuous. Most observers believe these two facts are linked but disagree about their normative upshot. Some regret the lingering authoritarianism polluting East Asian democracies, while others—primarily based in less democratic [End Page 146] countries—call for an embrace of "meritocracy" instead of democracy. A third group, to which Kwon Kyung Rok and I both belong, believe that properly understood "rule by virtue" can be better realized in a democracy. This means that modern Confucians should be democrats, and it suggests a distinctive way of conceptualizing democracy that both may be more apt for East Asia and may even offer lessons applicable worldwide. For Kwon, the key to all this is rethinking how we understand political representation.Kwon argues that we should look to representation rather than directly at democracy because representation is both central to modern conceptions of democracy and yet makes a more constructive dialogue partner for Confucian virtue-based politics. Democracy, says Kwon, is at its core concerned with the equal distribution of political power, whereas representation concerns "a special relationship and psychology" between the representer and the represented that he understands in terms of "authorization," the making of "sound judgments," and "accountability." Chapters 1 and 2 of the book explore the primarily "rationalist" notion of representation found in the Western tradition and the more "sentimentalist" version of representation that can be constructed out of Confucian virtue politics. The latter chapter is the creative core of the book. Kwon argues that for one to count as a representative in a modern Confucian context, one needs to make sound judgments of the true interests of society and share emotions with the people—in the process of transforming them into more morally cultivated people. This sense of "representing" the people builds on what it is to be a virtuous exemplar. Along the way Kwon makes a detailed case that direct caring rather than empathy is core to the idea of humaneness (or benevolence; ren) that is so central to Confucianism; this is a good example of how he engages with interpretive literature to clarify aspects of his picture.The final two chapters engage with alternative accounts of modern Confucian political theory. Chapter 3 provides a negative defense of democratic sentimental representation by demonstrating that various "meritocratic" alternative arguments fail. One of the key points here is that Daniel Bell and Tongdong Bai are overly concerned with the instrumental value of a ruler's competence, missing the intrinsic value of a ruler's virtue and its contribution to the ethically good life of the community; as a result, their views fail to be distinctively Confucian. Chapter 4 takes Sungmoon Kim's influential idea of "public reason Confucianism" as its point of departure. Kwon is quite sympathetic to Kim's framework and defends Kim against certain misunderstandings, but perceptively argues that there is a gap in Kim's account between citizens, understood primarily in affective terms, and the state, which in Kim's account is exemplified by the high court and is understood primarily in rationalist terms. What is missing is the bridging role of leaders. Kwon writes that mediating between formal and informal decision-making processes, leaders should "make ordinary citizens feel respected and make them focus on public issues in appropriate ways." He believes that a caring and competent [End Page 147] leader can "broaden the horizon of mutual understanding by exhorting [citizens] to think of all as belonging to an extended family." In short... (shrink)

In Western political philosophy, democracy is generally the dominant view regarding what the best form of government is, and this holds even in respect to promoting minority rights. However, I argue that there is a better theory for satisfying minority interests and rights. I amass numerous studies from the social sciences demonstrating how democracy does poorly in accounting for minority interests. I then contend that a particular hybrid view that fuses a meritocracy with democracy can do a better job (...) than democracy in accounting for minority interests and in having more equal rights and fair policies coming from the legislative and executive branches. Finally, I defend this thesis from numerous counters. (shrink)

After a decades-long debate on the compatibility between Confucianism and human rights, Confucian political theorists now seem to generally agree that the fallback theory of rights provides an account of human rights acceptable to both sides of the debate. Interestingly, some Confucian political meritocrats make a distinction between non-political human rights and political rights, and argue that while the former are subject to the fallback theory of rights, the latter are subject to the so-called “service conception” of rights, (...) which authorizes political hierarchy among citizens. After identifying the irresolvable tension between the fallback theory of rights and the service conception of political rights as a critical threat to Confucian political meritocracy’s internal stability, this article suggests that Confucian political meritocracy can overcome the instability problem only by taking seriously the political implications of the fallback theory of rights, which entails the endorsement of the right to political participation. (shrink)

Emboldened by the rise of China, a meritocratic trend has surged in recent Confucian political theory. Confucian meritocracy is upheld as an equally viable alternative, if not a superior one, to de...

In this paper, I attempt to revamp Confucian democracy, which is originally presented as the communitarian corrective and cultural alternative to Western liberal democracy, into a robust democratic political theory and practice that is plausible in the societal context of pluralism. In order to do so, I first investigate the core tenets of value pluralism with reference to William Galston’s political theory, which gives full attention to the intrinsic value of diversity and human plurality particularly in the modern democratic (...) context. I then construct a political theory of Confucian pluralist democracy by critically engaging with two dominant versions of Confucian democracy—Confucian communitarian democracy and Confucian meritocratic democracy. My key argument is threefold: (1) the unity in Confucian democracy should be interpreted not as moral unity but as constitutional unity; (2) Confucian virtues should be differentiated (or pluralized) between moral virtues and civic virtues; (3) in Confucian democracy minorities have the constitutional right to contest public norms in civil society. (shrink)

On February 14, 2017, Joseph Chan and Stephen Angle convened a Roundtable on the Future of Confucian Political Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong. Eight invited speakers each offered thoughts on the main topic, followed by discussion among the panelists and responses to questions from the audience. This transcript has been reviewed and edited by the main participants. Much of the discussion revolves around the relations and tensions between Confucian political philosophy as academic theory-construction and the lived (...) realities of citizens in the modern world, especially in East Asia. How is Confucian theorizing connected to Confucian activism? Another central concern is democracy—as value or as institution, as necessary in pluralistic societies or as problematic monopolizer of political discourse. We also discuss translation, republicanism, meritocracy, the proposals of Jiang Qing and Daniel Bell, and the role of Confucianism in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. (shrink)

Past interpretations of the debate between Confucian meritocrats and Confucian democrats tend to center around abstract discussions of meritocratic versus democratic values. Yet, given the difficulties involved in settling on a common definition of “democracy” or “meritocracy,” such abstract discussions often end up talking past each other. In this article, I seek to offer a more precise framing of the debate by surveying the preferred institutional arrangement of one Confucian democrat, Sungmoon Kim, and that of two (...) Confucian meritocrats, Daniel Bell and Tongdong Bai. What I find is that contrary to the claim made by Kim’s theory of pragmatic Confucian democracy, the electoral representative government he favors does not enjoy a legitimacy premium over the kind of hybrid regime envisioned by Bell or Bai under pluralistic societal circumstances. I further demonstrate that it is also difficult for Confucian democrats to justify electoral representative government through either the Confucian ideal of political relationship marked by the public’s willing endorsement of their rulers, or a notion of political equality reconstructed from Mencius’s inclusionary ideal of sagehood. (shrink)

Those who see Confucianism as a premodern imperial ideology or a traditional religion have no problem characterizing its social ideal as inherently hierarchical, as this is fairly typical of such systems of thought. From this perspective, rather than valuing equality Confucianism takes for granted inequalities among people, and justifies social hierarchies and unequal distribution of power, resources, prestige, and other goods as part of its ethics and its ideal of good government by sagely kings, the justification sometimes involving metaphysical claims (...) about cosmic and religious hierar-chies.1 While some reject Confucianism for its supposed opposition to egalitarianism from perspectives that consider equality a.. (shrink)

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 4, Page 793-807, December 2021.

EDITOR’S ABSTRACTThis article presents a counterintuitive view that the rise of Confucianism in the Han dynasty is indebted to the Book of Lord Shang. It analyzes chapter 7, “Opening the blocked,” and shows that the chapter can be read as promoting a combination of force and morality. The sophisticated historical view of this chapter solves apparent contradictions between societies based on family ties, meritocracy, and monarchic power by showing how new levels of social development inevitably open up when old (...) paths are blocked. This dynamic view was abandoned by the followers of Shang Yang but was rediscovered by the Confucian scholar Lu Jia early in the Han dynasty. It is under the impact of this dynamic view that Lu Jia tried to convince the first Han emperor that one can attain the world from horseback but not rule it without an inspiring ideology. The dialectic historical approach presented in “Opening the blocked” chapter remains valid well into our days. (shrink)

In the current crisis of liberal democracy, Confucianism has been cited as offering superior alternative models of government. With the resources from Dewey’s Pragmatism, this paper defends democracy, which should not be equated to de facto liberal democracies, as desirable for Confucian societies. It examines the affinities between Confucian and Dewey’s conception of the person and community and argues for an understanding of democratic values that brings together Dewey’s democratic values and Confucian ideals of personal cultivation and (...) virtuous governance. (shrink)

Bai Tongdong’s Against Political Equality argues for Confucian meritocracy over a pure democracy of equals. His arguments draw on a multiple modernities comparison between the Spring and Autumn Warring States period in China and early modernity in the West, and rest on a Mencian conception of human nature according to which humans are equal in moral potential but not in moral actuality. I argue that there is a crucial disanalogy between this Chinese early modernity and Western early modernity: (...) the role of capitalism. In a similarly comparativist and modernist spirit, drawing on B. R. Ambedkar and M. K. Gandhi, I argue that this disanalogy challenges both Bai’s critique of democracy and his positive account. Bai’s failure to take into account the role of capitalism in Western modernity raises a challenge to the explanatory power of his Mencian conception of human nature with regard to the failings of contemporary democracies, namely that capitalism fosters the relevant features of our moral psychology that cause those failings. Further, without that grounding assumption, Bai’s arguments against democracy cut equally against his Confucian meritocracy. The disanalogy also creates challenges for his positive proposal. Bai, I argue, provides an ideal theory of Confucian meritocracy at the same time as he provides a non-ideal theory of democracy. But, taking into account the non-ideal cultural and moral psychological features of capitalism, Bai’s Confucian meritocracy is likely to fall into an unjust and oligarchic hierarchy. (shrink)

In contrast to the juxtaposition of representative democracy and Confucian meritocracy that is currently being discussed in international political theory, we start from the hypothesis of a historical, intercultural and logical, simultaneous provenance of democracy and meritocracy in the evolution of the modern constitutional state. To this end, we examine the reception of Confucianism in the republican history of ideas of European Enlightenment using selected examples ranging from Leibniz to the classical constitutional and government theory of Sieyès. (...) The widespread ignorance of the Confucian elements in the classical core of modern republicanism that we have evaluated here is attributed to the needs of political legitimacy and the methodical ahistorism and historical amnesia of academic discourse. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, skepticism about political and moral experts has grown into a serious social problem, undermining the functioning of liberal democratic regimes. Indeed, meritocracy-that is, government by hard working, public-spirited people with high levels of relevant expertise-has never looked so promising as an alternative to the dangers of know-nothing populism. One cultural tradition has devoted sustained attention to the idea of meritocracy, as well as to the cultivation of true expertise or mastery: Confucianism. Mastery, Dependence, (...) and the Ethics of Authority presents a compelling analysis of expertise and authority, and examines classical Confucian conceptions of mastery, dependence, and human relationships in order to suggest new approaches to these issues in ethics and political theory. Contemporary Westerners are heirs to multiple traditions that are suspicious of authority, especially coercive political authority. We are also increasingly wary of dependence, which now often seems to signify weakness, neediness, and pathology. Analysts commonly presume that both authority and dependence threaten human autonomy, and are thus intrinsically problematic. But these judgments are mistaken. Our capacity for autonomy needs to be cultivated over time through deliberate practices of training, in which we depend on the guidance of virtuous and skilled teachers. Confucian thought provides a subtle and powerful analysis of one version of this training process, and of the social supports such an education in autonomy requires-as well as the social value of having virtuous and skilled leaders. Early Confucians also argue that human life is marked by numerous interacting forms of dependence, which are not only ineradicable, but in many ways good. On a Confucian view, it is natural, healthy, and good for people to be deeply dependent on others in a variety of ways across the full human lifespan. They teach us that individual autonomy only develops within a social matrix, structured by relationships of mutual dependence that can either help or hinder it, including a variety of authority relations. (shrink)

Building on prior research in Confucianism and business, the current study examines the effects of Confucianism on consumer trust of government involvement with products and company brands. Based on three major ideas of Confucianism – meritocracy, loyalty to superior, and separation of responsibilities – it is expected that consumers under the influence of Confucianism would perceive products from government-involved enterprises to have more desirable attributes and show preference for their company brands. Findings from an empirical study in the Chinese (...) automobile market support the hypotheses. The results suggest that small firms doing business in China would especially benefit from some association with the government. These results also provide managerial implications for enterprises in other countries with a Confucian cultural background. (shrink)

It is often supposed that Confucianism is opposed to the idea of equality insofar as the key ideals to which it is committed, such as meritocracy and li , are incompatible with equality. Sympathetic commentators typically defend Confucianism by saying that (a) the Confucian person is not a free-standing individual but a social being embedded in a social structure with different and unequal roles, and (b) social inequality has to be traded in for other values. This paper argues (...) that in advocating meritocracy, Confucianism does not abandon the idea of equality. Indeed, invoking Aristotle's account of equality in the Nicomachean Ethics , it can be argued that the unequal distribution of rights and benefits reflects one aspect of equality, namely the vertical aspect, or the unequal treatment of unequals. (shrink)