Open peer commentary on the article ““Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: My aim is to show that “truthful” acting that emerges through improvisation is equivalent to the development of mutual forward models in the actors. If these models match those of the audience members, this is perceived as “truthful.”.

In the wake of several highly publicized lawsuits over drugs recalled for safety – most notably, Vioxx and Paxil – the Food and Drug Administration and the pharmaceutical industry have faced increasingly intense public scrutiny over the drug testing and approval process. Critics blame the FDA's shorter pre-market approval process that has resulted from the enactment of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, which effected, among other changes, an increased number of reviewers, a higher review load for each reviewer, and (...) the implementation of “user fees” from companies submitting drugs for review. While many have posited that the lack of safety in some FDA-approved drugs was caused by the enactment of PDUFA, the results of a recent study from the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development have indicated that there is no statistically significant correlation between the number of drugs recalled for safety and the enactment of PDUFA. (shrink)

The pandemic and subsequent wave of lockdowns in many countries led to a massive increase in TikTok users globally, boosting the platform’s public significance. Even if TikTok’s political potential is already established, the platform still lacks a theoretical underpinning as a space for action. Using both a political-philosophical as well as a techno-philosophical perspective, I seek to discuss and substantiate TikTok’s potential as a public realm that enables political action. Due to the unique algorithmic logic of this app, I argue (...) that users are acting-with the algorithm when engaging in political action from home: be it in the form of national political protest or international acts of care and empowerment. I base my analysis on philosophical theory, cross-disciplinary TikTok research, and my own experiences on TikTok during the pandemic years. (shrink)

The U.S. Supreme Court held 7-2 that an individual harmed by an overt act that is not tortious under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not have a civil cause of action under RICO. Therefore, an individual terminated from his job in furtherance of a racketeering conspiracy does not have a civil cause of action, since such termination is not an “independently wrongful” act under RICO.The plaintiff, Robert Beck, was the president, CEO, director, and shareholder of Southeastern Insurance (...) Group. The defendants, including Ronald Prupis, were senior officers and directors of SIG. In 1998, the plaintiff discovered that the defendants were engaged in racketeering. The racketeering activities included refusing to qualify contractors for SIG surety bonds unless they paid fees to SIG; diverting corporate funds for their personal use; and providing regulators, shareholders, and creditors with false financial statements. (shrink)

Although living conditions have improved throughout history, protest, at least in the last few decades, seems to have increased to the point of becoming a normal phenomenon in modern societies. Contributors to this volume examine how and why this is the case and argue that although problems such as poverty, hunger, and violations of democratic rights may have been reduced in advanced Western societies, a variety of other problems and opportunities have emerged and multiplied the reasons and possibilities for protest.

This paper aims to determine whether extended human-machine cognitive systems and group systems can be regarded as autonomous agents. For this purpose, I compare two notions of agency: one developed within analytical philosophy of action and based on the concept of intention, and the other introduced by enactivists via the concepts of autopoiesis and sensorimotor autonomy. I argue that only the latter approach can be used to demonstrate autonomous agency in respect of systems that are not humans as such, though (...) they contain humans as their elements. After introducing Maturana and Varela’s conception of minimal autonomy as a kind of generalization of autopoiesis, I present the three conditions of agency put forward by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde, noting that they do not invoke the property of being alive as necessary in that respect. I argue that both extended and group systems can satisfy these conditions of agency, even though they are not alive as such. The fulfillment of these conditions, however, is ensured by the autopoietic nature of the living components of these systems. That being said, an autonomous system itself does not need to be alive in the biological sense. Sensorimotor, adaptive agency could emerge out of other processes than those responsible for biological life. The article concludes with a suggestion that this is exactly what will happen if an autonomous system is ever artificially created. It would be functionally indistinguishable from a living organism, though not alive in a biological sense. (shrink)

This article sets out a scenario highlighting some of the issues to be faced by NHS hospitals when dealing with patients who may require treatment under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The article sets out matters to consider when dealing with patients in A&E, assessments of best interests, emergency treatment, lasting powers of attorney and transferring patients to nursing homes. All of these matters come under the remit of the Act.

Speech act theory seems to provide a promising avenue for the analysis of the functional organization of argument. The theory, however, might be taken to suggest that arguments are a homogenous class of speech act with a specifiable illocutionary force and a single set of felicity conditions. This suggestion confuses the analysis of the meaning of speech act verbs with the analysis of the pragmatic structure of actual language use. Suggesting that arguments are conveyed through a homogeneous class of linguistic (...) action overlooks the way in which the context of activity and the form of expression organize the argumentative functions performed in using language. An alternative speech act analysis would treat folk terminology as a heuristic entry point into the development of a technical analysis of the myriad argumentative functions and structures to be found in natural language use. This would lead to a thorough-going pragmatic analysis of the rational and functional design of speech acts in argumentation. (shrink)

This article argues that studies of late-development should be altered in two respects: the unit of analysis should increasingly be the subnational economy, and an understanding of economic outcomes should be sector specific. Variation in the developmental outcomes of particular sectors can be best understood by analyzing the fit between local institutions and firms within a particular sector. The specific development needs of firms vary across sectors, and the institutional structures required to meet firm-level needs are local more (...) often than national. The importance of regional and sectoral variation is demonstrated by comparing Beijing and Shanghai in two sectors. (shrink)

This work provides, for the first time, a unified account of the theory of action presupposed by both British and American criminal law and its underlying morality. It defends the view that human actions are volitionally caused body movements. This theory illuminates three major problems in drafting and implementing criminal law--what the voluntary act requirement does and should require, what complex descriptions of actions prohibited by criminal codes both do and should require, and when the two actions are the "same" (...) for purposes of assessing whether multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments are warranted. The book contributes to the development of a coherent theory of action in philosophy. It provides a grounding in three of the most basic elements of criminal liability for legislators, judges, and the lawyers who argue to them. (shrink)

Using speech act theory from the Philosophy of Language, this paper attempts to develop an ethical framework for the phenomenon of speech processing. We use the concepts of the illocutionary force and the illocutionary content of a speech act to explain the ethics of speech processing. By emphasizing the different stages involved in speech processing, we explore the distinct ethical issues that arise in relation to each stage. Input, processing, and output are the different ethically relevant stages under which a (...) spoken item or a speech navigates within the range of speech-processing modules. Employing the illocutionary force-content distinction, we specify and characterize the input-related ethical issues, the output-related ethical issues, and the processing-related ethical issues involved in speech processing. Together with illocutionary force-content distinction, we employ the data-information distinction to characterize the stage-wise ethical issues in the phenomenon of speech processing as the ethics of collecting (speech) data, the ethics of contextualizing (speech) data/information, and the ethics of releasing the con-textualized information (processed speech). Immediate ethical issues that arise from the range of speech processing modules are distinguished from distant ethical issues. We also indicate the nature of ethical issues that arise from Speaker Independent speech technologies. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of consciousness in action. Both consciousness and action are related to knowledge. A voluntary action is defined as a volition, or something intentionally effected by means of such volitions. Volitions are conscious mental acts whose proper function is to make their content true. A mental act is the exercise of a power of mind and a conscious mental act is identical with knowledge of its own phenomenal character. This set of definitions elucidates the relations between (...) consciousness, action and knowledge. (shrink)

Speech acts and the autonomy of linguistic pragmatics This paper comments on selected problems of the definition of linguistic pragmatics with a focus on notions associated with speech act theory in the tradition of John Langshaw Austin. In more detail it concentrates on the relevance of the use of the Austinian categorisation into locution, illocution, and perlocution in locating a divide in between pragmatics and semantics, and especially the distinction between the locutionary act and the illocutionary act and its implications (...) for the definition of pragmatics and its separation from the semantic theory.The relation between form and meaning is further briefly reviewed against dichotomies including the Gricean and neo-Gricean ‘what is said’ versus ‘what is implicated’ or meant, between what can be ‘locuted’, but not said, and what can be said, but not asserted. These dichotomies are related to the theoretical commitments as to the accepted operative forces in speech acts, primarily convention and intention. It is suggested that, roughly, the development of the speech act theory can be viewed as a process by which the theory moves away from its originally sociolinguistic orientation towards a more psychologistic account, which in turn leads towards diminishing the role of semantics and the subsequent juxtaposition of pragmatics and syntax rather than pragmatics and semantics. (shrink)

What is it for a sentence to have a certain meaning? This is the question that the distinguished analytic philosopher William P. Alston addresses in this major contribution to the philosophy of language. His answer focuses on the given sentence's potential to play the role that its speaker had in mind, what he terms the usability of the sentence to perform the illocutionary act intended by its speaker. Alston defines an illocutionary act as an act of saying something with a (...) certain "content." He develops his account of what it is to perform such acts in terms of taking responsibility, in uttering a sentence, for the existence of certain conditions. In requesting someone to open a window, for example, the speaker takes responsibility for its being the case that the window is closed and that the speaker has an interest in its being opened. In Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning, Alston expands upon this concept, creating a framework of five categories of illocutionary act and going on to argue that sentence meaning is fundamentally a matter of illocutionary act potential; that is, for a sentence to have a particular meaning is for it to be usable to perform illocutionary acts of a certain type. In providing detailed and explicit patterns of analysis for the whole range of illocutionary acts, Alston makes a unique contribution to the field of philosophy of language—one that is likely to generate debate for years to come. (shrink)

This book develops an alternative approach to sentence- and word-meaning, which I dub the speech-act theoretic approach, or STA. Instead of employing the syntactic and semantic forms of modern logic–principally, quantification theory–to construct semantic theories, STA employs speech-act structures. The structures it employs are those postulated by a novel theory of speech-acts. STA develops a compositional semantics in which surface grammar is integrated with semantic interpretation in a way not allowed by standard quantification-based theories. It provides a pragmatic theory of (...) truth, a treatment of logically complex discourse as expressive cognitive states, and a background metaphysics in which the world is a totality of logically simple states of affairs. The book also puts forward an account of how intentional states provide the simple, representational foundation for a superstructure of speech-act structures–a system of thoughts–that far outruns the expressive power of the intentional foundation. In short, it provides an account of cognitive foundations of a language and a naturalistic reduction of semantics through an expressive theory of semantic norms. (shrink)

This article analyses the challenges for the strategies and practices of transformational development in a changing context. This reflection is based on contributions received during the process of dialogues and regional consultations, realised from August 2012 until March 2014, of the ACT Alliance, an international coalition of churches and faith-based organisations (FBOs) working in the areas of humanitarian response, development and advocacy. The main processes that affect the changing development context are addressed, such as the ongoing globalisation (...) as well as the consequences, mainly regarding the shrinking space for civil society. It discusses the concepts of human development and of transformational development, based on a people-centred development vision, a human rights-based approach and advocacy, which addresses the root causes and effects of poverty, inequality and injustice. Transformational development practices, from Latin America, are presented and analysed. The article concludes that the changing development context also offers opportunities, especially regarding regional and global alliances of FBOs, civil society organisations and of social movements. (shrink)

In bilateral systems for classical logic, assertion and denial occur as primitive signs on formulas. Such systems lend themselves to an inferentialist story about how truth-conditional content of connectives can be determined by inference rules. In particular, for classical logic there is a bilateral proof system which has a property that Carnap in 1943 called categoricity. We show that categorical systems can be given for any finite many-valued logic using $n$-sided sequent calculus. These systems are understood as a further (...) class='Hi'>development of bilateralism—call it multilateralism. The overarching idea is that multilateral proof systems can incorporate the logic of a variety of denial speech acts. So against Frege we say that denial is not the negation of assertion and, with Mark Twain, that denial is more than a river in Egypt. (shrink)

In this paper a dialogue game for critical discussion is developed. The dialogue game is a formalisation of the ideal discussion model that is central to the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. The formalisation is intended as a preparatory step to facilitate the development of computational tools to support the pragma-dialectical study of argumentation. An important dimension of the pragma-dialectical discussion model is the role played by speech acts. The central issue addressed in this paper is how the speech act (...) perspective can be accommodated in the formalisation as a dialogue game. The starting point is an existing ‘basic’ dialogue game for critical discussion, in which speech acts are not addressed. The speech act perspective is introduced into the dialogue game by changing the rules that govern the moves that can be made and the commitments that these result in, while the rules for the beginning, for the end, and for the structure of the dialogue game remain unchanged. The revision of the move rules is based on the distribution of speech acts in the pragma-dialectical discussion model. The revision of the commitment rules is based on the felicity conditions that are associated with those speech acts. (shrink)

Logic and psychology overlap in judgment, inference and proof. The problems raised by this commonality are notoriously difficult, both from a historical and from a philosophical point of view. Sundholm has for a long time addressed these issues. His beautiful piece of work [A Century of Inference: 1837-1936] begins by summarizing the main difficulty in the usual provocative manner of the author: one can start, he says, by the act of knowledge to go to the object, as the Idealist does; (...) one can also start by the object to go to the act, in the Realist mood; never the two shall meet. He is himself inclined to accept the first perspective as the right one and he has eventually developed an original version of antirealism which starts, not from considerations about the publicity of meaning, in the manner of Dummett, but from an epistemic standpoint, trying to search in a non-Fregean tradition of analysis of judgement and cognate notions a way of founding constructivist semantics. The present paper ploughes the same field. We concentrate on the significance, for Sundholm’s program, of the perspective that has been opened by Twardowski in his important essay on acts and products (1912. (shrink)

This article presents the author’s main assumptions of two professors’ ethical theories – Vasil Gluchman and Grzegorz Grzybek, that is: “ethics of social consequences” and “ethics of development”. It presents the similarity of “ethics of social consequences” to “ethics of reverence for life”. It shows the definition of the act, the nature, types and its special place in the two theories. It highlights three major historical perspectives on the standard of morality: eudaimonism, deontonomism, personalism. It relates these considerations to (...) the analyzed theories. At the end, a new dimension of the act in the context of the present day is indicated. It is, of course, to help people in need, the poor and the hungry. There is a reference to Peter Singer, whose philosophy was the inspiration for V. Gluchman and G. Grzybek. The summary can be a significant remark that the pursuit of high moral standards leads one on the right track of procedure. Thinking about morality in terms of “black – white” is a mistake. Life has more shades. Therefore, we should praise people for much better deeds than these, which most people can afford, and rebuke – for a lot worse. If someone does more than he should, it is hard to scold him that he does not do much more. (shrink)

I offer an account of the experience of acting that demonstrates how agentive aspects of experience associated with the execution of intentions are richly integrated with perceptual aspects associated with parts of action taking place in the publicly observable world. On the view I elucidate, the experience of acting is often both an engagement with the world and a type of intimate acquaintance with it. In conscious action the agent consciously intervenes in the world and consciously experiences the world she (...) is changing. In section one, I discuss extant accounts of the experience of acting, noting deficiencies. In sections two and three, I develop my own account, drawing on Casey O’Callaghan’s work on multi-modal perception. In the conclusion, I discuss ramifications for psychology and philosophy. (shrink)

In print for the first time in over ten years, Act and Crime provides a unified account of the theory of action presupposed by both Anglo-American criminal law and the morality that underlies it. The book defends the view that human actions are always volitionally caused bodily movements and nothing else. The theory is used to illuminate three major problems in the drafting and the interpretation of criminal codes: 1) what the voluntary act requirement both does and should require; 2) (...) what complex descriptions of actions prohibited by criminal codes both do and should require ; and 3) when two actions are 'the same' for purposes of assessing whether multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments are warranted. The book both contributes to the development of a coherent theory of action in philosophy, and it provides both legislators and judges a grounding in three of the most basic elements of criminal liability. (shrink)

Choice is one of the central elements in the experience of free will, but it has not received a good account from either compatibilists or libertarians. This paper develops an account of choice based around three features: (i) choice is an action; (ii) choice is not determined by one's prior beliefs and desires; (iii) once the question of what to do has arisen, choice is typically both necessary and sufficient for moving to action. These features might appear to support a (...) libertarian account, but they do not. Instead it is argued that all three features can be accommodated within a compatibilist account, where choice is needed because of agents' inabilities to arrive at judgements about what is best. Choice differs though from random picking: in choosing, agents frequently (though not always) deploy abilities that enable them to make good choices. In such cases, judgements about what is best will frequently follow the choice. Finally choice is distinguished from agency, and, on the basis of the distinction, the claim that choice is an action is made good. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe in things, propositions, which are the things that we believe, assert etc., and which are the contents of sentences. The act-type theory of propositions is an attempt to say what propositions are, to explain how we stand in relations to them, and to explain why they are true or false. The core idea of the act-type theory is that propositions are types of acts of predication. The theory is developed in various ways to offer explanations of the (...) important properties of propositions. I present the core idea of the theory, and some developments of it. I discuss the relationship between the theory and the content–force distinction. I also present an important type of objection that has been raised to the explanations offered by the act-type theory. (shrink)

The central goal of this essay is to develop a theory of justified paternalism that will be useful in evaluating and designing paternalistic public policies. The theory is designed for a society that promotes the development of characteristics of autonomy in its members. In the opening chapter I analyze widely-held legal, familial and philosophic conceptions of paternalism, discuss the inadequacies of each of those conceptions and develop a "unified" conception of paternalism. In Chapter II I analyze what it means (...) to be "morally responsible" and base this analysis on the legal, psychological and psychiatric accounts of responsibility that inform an autonomist society. From these analyses I develop two principles which inform an autonomist society: Respect for Others and Non-Interference and discuss the restraints on justifiable paternalism entailed by them. In Chapter III I discuss the roles of voluntariness and consent in the legal, phychiatric and philosophic concepts of moral responsibility and turn to an analysis of the disappointing treatments of these concepts in traditional philosophic justifications for paternalism. I argue that "unencumbered consent" is an appropriate concept of consent to utilize in any philosophic justification for paternalism that would be consistent with the concepts of moral responsibility and autonomy and the principles of respect for others and of non-interference. Chapter IV offers a decision-theoretic model justifying acting paternalistically for others. Each of the necessary conditions for justified paternalism is drawn from the aforementioned concepts and principles. In Chapter V, I show that if Rawls is to be consistent, he must adopt a theory of paternalism similar to mine, and I argue that my theory of paternalism overcomes libertarian, utilitarian and statistical arguments against it. I then apply the theory to specific forms of paternalism including involuntary commitment and guardianship, mandatory blood transfusions, flouridation of public water supplies, mandatory motorcycle helmets and seatbelts, social security taxation, mandatory education of children and suicide intervention. A 267-entry bibliography is appended. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the concept of collective improvisation and draws out its potentials for social and political theory. Translating the ideas of collective improvisation from their original context in the theatre into the field of political thought, I argue that they offer a new understanding of political action by reevaluating the concepts of dissensus and community, as well as the ways in which politics as a system needs to produce collectively binding decisions. I conclude that the ideas inherent in the (...) practice of collective improvisation, as it has been developed within the tradition of modern theatre improvisation, subvert our intuitive ways of thinking about politics and thereby offer an alternative model of being and acting together. nema. (shrink)

Cognitive architectures have often been applied to data from individual experiments. In this paper, I develop an ACT-R reader that can model a much larger set of data, eye-tracking corpus data. It is shown that the resulting model has a good fit to the data for the considered low-level processes. Unlike previous related works, the model achieves the fit by estimating free parameters of ACT-R using Bayesian estimation and Markov-Chain Monte Carlo techniques, rather than by relying on the mix of (...) manual selection + default values. The method used in the paper is generalizable beyond this particular model and data set and could be used on other ACT-R models. (shrink)

Catholic act analysis cannot reckon effectively or coherently with long-term, worldwide threats to human well-being that are caused by the corporate, cumulative side effects of everyday human activity. Indeed, Catholic act analysis leads moral agents to consider these side effects as morally trivial, when in fact they are not. This article develops the many problems associated with Catholic act analysis and proposes a different method and evaluative criteria to assess our daily patterns of behaviour and the side effects they produce.

The primary units of meaning in the use and comprehension of language are speech acts of the type called illocutionary acts. In Foundations of Illocutionary Logic John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken presented the first formalized logic of a general theory of speech acts. In Meaning and Speech Acts Daniel Vanderveken further develops the logic of speech acts and the logic of propositions to construct a general semantic theory of natural languages. Volume I, Principles of Language Use, explains the general principles (...) that connect meaning, reason, thought and speech acts in the semantic structure of language. It presupposes no detailed knowledge of logical formalism, and will be accessible to a large readership of students and scholars from philosophy, lingustics, cognitive psychology and computer science. Volume II, Formal Semantics of Success and Satisfaction uses the resources of philosophical and mathematical logics to develop a formalization of the laws of the semantic theory advanced in Volume I. It will be of interest to theoretical linguists and those involved in mathematical logic and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

“What characterizes the act of justice is not resort to a court and to judges; it is not the intervention of magistrates (even if they had to be simple mediators or arbitrators). What characterizes the juridical act, the process or the procedure in the broad sense, is the regulated development of a dispute. And the intervention of judges, their opinion or decision, is only ever an episode in this development. What defines the juridical order is the way in (...) which one confronts one another, the way in which one struggles. The rule and the struggle, the rule in the struggle, this is the juridical.” - Michel Foucault Penal Theories and Institutions is the title Michel Foucault gave to the lectures he delivered at the Collège de France from November 1971 to March 1972. In these lectures Michel Foucault presents for the first time his approach to the question of power that will be the focus of his research up to the writing of Discipline and Punish (1975) and beyond. His analysis starts with a detailed account of Richelieu’s repression of the Nu-pieds revolt (1639-1640) and then goes on to show how the apparatus of power developed by the monarchy on this occasion breaks with the system of juridical and judicial institutions of the Middle Ages and opens out onto a “judicial State apparatus”, a “repressive system”, whose function is focused on the confinement of those who challenge its order. Michel Foucault systemizes the approach of a history of truth on the basis of the study of “juridico-political matrices” that he had begun in the previous year’s lectures (Lectures on the Will to Know) and which is at the heart of the notion of “knowledge-power”. In these lectures Foucault develops his theory of justice and penal law. The appearance of this volume marks the end of the publication of the series Foucault’s courses at the Collège de France (the first volume of which was published in 1997). (shrink)

The paper provides a taxonomy of group speech acts whose main division is that between collective speech acts (singing Happy Birthday, agreeing to meet) and group proxy speech acts in which a group, such as a corporation, employs a proxy, such as a spokesperson, to convey its official position. The paper provides an analysis of group proxy speech acts using tools developed more generally for analyzing institutional agency, particularly the concepts of shared intention, proxy agent, status role, status function, convention (...) and constitutive rule. (shrink)

The article presents a case study of ethno-linguistic policy in the ethnic Republics of Central Russia (the Chuvash Republic and the Republic of Tatarstan), with special emphasis on the analysis of language acts and correlated legislation. It raises an important problem concerning the efficacy of the Language Laws and their conceptual foundations. One of the main assets in facing this problem is adequate reflection on the actual ethno-linguistic situation by the legislature, ensuring peaceful and productive social development. Analysis of (...) the conceptual fundamentals and the concrete language laws in action as well as instrumental interaction shows a wide range of factors influencing the efficacy of policies. Acknowledgement of the bilingual situation by the legislatures of the Republics manifests a valuable perspective on productive development, provided the language laws are implemented intelligently and supported in the educational and cultural spheres. Multilingualism as a universal form of socialization should be recognized as a valuable opportunity and receive the necessary legislative support. (shrink)

The article presents a case study of ethno-linguistic policy in the ethnic Republics of Central Russia (the Chuvash Republic and the Republic of Tatarstan), with special emphasis on the analysis of language acts and correlated legislation. It raises an important problem concerning the efficacy of the Language Laws and their conceptual foundations. One of the main assets in facing this problem is adequate reflection on the actual ethno-linguistic situation by the legislature, ensuring peaceful and productive social development. Analysis of (...) the conceptual fundamentals and the concrete language laws in action as well as instrumental interaction shows a wide range of factors influencing the efficacy of policies. Acknowledgement of the bilingual situation by the legislatures of the Republics manifests a valuable perspective on productive development, provided the language laws are implemented intelligently and supported in the educational and cultural spheres. Multilingualism as a universal form of socialization should be recognized as a valuable opportunity and receive the necessary legislative support. (shrink)

Over the past five decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will according to which it requires that agents be to some degree ultimately responsible for the formation of their own wills. To act ‘of one's own free will’ in this sense is to act ‘from a will’ that is to some extent ‘of one's own free making’. A free will of this ultimate kind has been under attack in the modern era as obscure and unintelligible. In (...) this paper, I discuss the arguments for such a view and compare it to other contemporary views of free will and action. I then address criticisms that such a non‐determinist free will cannot be made intelligible or reconciled with modern science, does not allow sufficient agent control, reduces to mere chance or luck or randomness, leads to various regresses, or fails to account for moral responsibility, among other criticisms. (shrink)

The theme of _Signifying Acts _is that social acts are created by human agents engaging in signifying gestures and elic­iting determined responses—from which flow a number of consequences. This theme is developed by a critical synthesis of various strands of early and contemporary thought in symbolism, meaning, language, and grammar. These strands have been classified as pragma­tism and interactionism, structuralism and grammatical theory Perinbanayagam brings together for the first time the writings of G. H. Mead and his followers, who label (...) their efforts “symbolic interactionism,” and the re­cent developments in the philosophi­cal and anthropological studies of mind and meaning. Through his wide-ranging analysis, he demonstrates the sociologi­cal relevance of Chomsky, Derrida, and Searle and particularizes their contribu­tions to a more comprehensive theoreti­cal framework. The interdisciplinary scope of his thesis recalls Ernest Becker’s _Birth and Death of Meaning, _and his sty­listic flair will stimulate readers at all levels of sophistication. (shrink)

In both their external and internal communications, organizations tend to present diversity management approaches and corporate social responsibility initiatives as a kind of morally ‘good’ organizational practice. With regard to the treatment of employees, both concepts largely assume equality to be an indicator of organizational ‘goodness’, e.g. in terms of equal treatment, or affording equal opportunities. Additionally, research on this issue predominantly refers to prescriptive and imperative moralities that address the initiatives themselves, and values them morally. Schopenhauer opposes these moralities (...) by conceptualizing morality as exclusively being based on the incentives of acting instead of the actions themselves. He identifies egoism, compassion, and malice as the sole incentives for every human action, whereby only those actions solely motivated by compassion can be ascribed genuine moral worth. In this context, this article shows that from a Schopenhauerian perspective, CSR and DM initiatives only have a genuine moral worth in so far as the individuals who have initiated or supported their implementation were exclusively motivated by compassion. Stressing the narrative of a business case, if utilized as a façade for true compassion that attaches economic legitimacy to these initiatives, does not necessarily harm their moral worth. The approach and the findings developed in this paper contribute to the discourse on the ethical behavior of organizations, as well as to the discourse on CSR and DM. (shrink)

This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have pre-specified goal contents. For example, one cannot prespecify the content of a judgment or of a deliberation. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental actions. Given these three constraints, mental and bodily actions appear (...) to have a significantly different structure. A careful analysis of the role of normative requirements, distinguishing them from instrumental reasons, allows the distinction between mental and bodily forms of action to be clarified. Two kinds of motives must be present for a mental act to develop. The first kind is instrumental: a mental act is performed because of some basic informational need, such as the need to "remember the name of that play". The second kind is normative: given the specific type of mental action performed, there is a specific epistemic norm relevant to that act. These two motives actually correspond to different phases of a single mental act. The first motivates the mental act, i.e. makes salient the corresponding goal. The second offers an evaluation of the feasibility of the act, on the basis of its constitutive normative requirement. Conceived in this way, a characterization of mental acts avoids the three difficulties mentioned above. The possibility of pre-specifying the outcome of epistemic mental acts is blocked by the fact that such acts are constituted by strict normative requirements. That mental acts include receptive features is shown to be a necessary architectural constraint for mental agents to be sensitive to epistemic requirements. Finally, the phenomenology of intending is shown to be absent in most mental acts; the motivational structure of mental acts is, rather, associated with error- signals and self-directed doubtings. Mental acts need to be recognized as a natural kind of action meant to normatively control and enhance cognitive efficiency according to current processing needs. (shrink)