This article investigates the doctrine of intellectual memory in Descartes. In his writings, Descartes recognized not only a bodily memory, explainable in purely physiological terms, but also an intellectual or spiritual memory. In this article, I investigate whether Descartes postulated an intellectual memory for theological reasons or for philosophical reasons. From the analysis of certain texts in which Descartes explains what intellectual memory is, the paper will show that Descartes appeals, for strictly philosophical reasons, to intellectual memory to explain some (...) processes of reminiscence that occur in the human being. In contrast to what some contemporary commentators on the Cartesian doctrine of memory have argued, Descartes’s motivations for postulating intellectual memory are not theological. (shrink)

This article investigates the doctrine of intellectual memory in Descartes. In his writings, Descartes recognized not only a bodily memory, explainable in purely physiological terms, but also an intellectual or spiritual memory. In this article, I investigate whether Descartes postulated an intellectual memory for theological reasons or for philosophical reasons. From the analysis of certain texts in which Descartes explains what intellectual memory is, the paper will show that Descartes appeals, for strictly philosophical reasons, to intellectual memory to explain some (...) processes of reminiscence that occur in the human being. In contrast to what some contemporary commentators on the Cartesian doctrine of memory have argued, Descartes’s motivations for postulating intellectual memory are not theological. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the heuristic power of the theoretical distinction between framework and interaction theories applied to the case of General Relativity. According to the distinction, theories and theoretical elements can be classified into two different groups, each with clear ontological, epistemic and functional content. Being so, to identify the group to which a theory belongs would suffice to know a priori its prospects and limitations in these areas without going into a detailed technical analysis. We make the (...) exercise here with General Relativity, anticipate its ontological, epistemic and functional content and show afterwords that such expectations are justified in this case, being consistent with formal issues of General Relativity. With this, we attempt to make a case for the use of the distinction as a powerful tool for scientific and philosophical analysis. (shrink)

BackgroundInformed consent is an important factor in a child’s moral structure from which different types of doctor–patient relationships arise. Children’s autonomy is currently under discussion in terms of their decent treatment, beyond what doctors and researchers perceive. To describe the influential practices that exist among clinicians and researchers toward children with chronic diseases during the process of obtaining informed consent.MethodsThis was a cross-sectional, qualitative study via a subjective and interpretivist approach. The study was performed by conducting semi-structured interviews of 21 (...) clinicians and researchers. Data analysis was performed using the SPSS version 21® and Atlas Ti version 7.0® programs.ResultsThe deliberative and paternalistic models were influential practices in the physician–patient relationship. In the deliberative model, the child is expected to have a moral awareness of their care. The paternalistic model determined that submission was a way of structuring the child because he or she is considered to be a subject of extreme care.ConclusionsThe differentiated objectification [educational] process recognizes the internal and external elements of the child. Informed consent proved to be an appropriate means for strengthening moral and structuring the child. (shrink)

In this paper we continue the study of the variety \ of monadic Gödel algebras. These algebras are the equivalent algebraic semantics of the S5-modal expansion of Gödel logic, which is equivalent to the one-variable monadic fragment of first-order Gödel logic. We show three families of locally finite subvarieties of \ and give their equational bases. We also introduce a topological duality for monadic Gödel algebras and, as an application of this representation theorem, we characterize congruences and give characterizations of (...) the locally finite subvarieties mentioned above by means of their dual spaces. Finally, we study some further properties of the subvariety generated by monadic Gödel chains: we present a characteristic chain for this variety, we prove that a Glivenko-type theorem holds for these algebras and we characterize free algebras over n generators. (shrink)

In this paper we study the subdirectly irreducible algebras in the variety of pseudocomplemented De Morgan algebras by means of their De Morgan p‐spaces. We introduce the notion of the body of an algebra and determine when is subdirectly irreducible. As a consequence of this, in the case of pseudocomplemented Kleene algebras, two special subvarieties arise naturally, for which we give explicit identities that characterise them. We also introduce a subvariety of, namely the variety of bundle pseudocomplemented Kleene algebras, fully (...) describe its subvariety lattice and find explicit equational bases for each subvariety. In addition, we study the subvariety of generated by the simple members of, determine the structure of the free algebra over a finite set in this variety and their finite weakly projective algebras. (shrink)

En este artículo, se aborda, desde una óptica Spinoziana, el problema de la libertad. Spinoza rechaza la libertad como el libre albedrío. Sin embargo, considera que podemos tener agencia (libertad) en tanto, guiados por el conocimiento de las causas de nuestros afectos, actuemos en favor de nuestro conatus. Esta investigación está dividida en tres capítulos: En el primero, se reconstruye, someramente, la posición de Spinoza sobre el libre albedrío; en el segundo, se desarrolla su propuesta de agencia; finalmente, en el (...) tercero, se busca reactualizar las consideraciones de Spinoza en torno a la discusión contemporánea sobre problema de la libertad. (shrink)

Education is a fundamental pillar in human development, and its evolution throughout history has been influenced by a variety of factors, including imaginative culture and human nature. In this study, we explore how educational methods have evolved in response to the interaction between these two aspects. We look at how human creativity, imagination, and adaptation have influenced the way we teach and learn, from early forms of knowledge transmission to more contemporary approaches focused on active student engagement and the development (...) of practical skills. Our research is based on a comprehensive review of the academic literature in the fields of education, evolutionary psychology, cultural anthropology, and imagination studies. We explore how societies have used imagination as a tool to transmit knowledge and values, as well as to foster creativity and individual expression. We also examine how adaptive aspects of human nature, such as the ability to learn collaboratively and adapt to changing environments, have influenced the way educational methods are designed. Our results show a clear evolution in educational methods over time, from approaches focused on the one-way transmission of knowledge to more interactive and participatory models that encourage exploration and discovery. We identify common patterns in the way societies have used imagination and adaptation to promote learning and socialization and discuss the implications of these findings for contemporary education. In conclusion, this study highlights the importance of understanding the relationship between imaginative culture, human nature, and education. It provides a solid foundation for the design of educational methods that harness the innate creativity and adaptability of human beings and offers guidance for educators and policymakers on how to promote meaningful and lasting learning in today's world. (shrink)

In this work we provide a new topological representation for implication algebras in such a way that its one-point compactification is the topological space given in [1]. Some applications are given thereof.

Cybersecurity aggregates are numerical data obtained by aggregation on features along a database of cybersecurity reports. These aggregates are obtained by integration of time-stamped tables using some recent results of non-standard calculus. Time-series of aggregates are shown to contain relevant information about the concrete system dealt with. Trend time series is also forecasted using known data-driven methods. Although absolute forecasting of trend time series is not obtained, a directional forecasting of trend time series is achieved thence validated by means of (...) a rolling cross validation scheme on a public database of Scareware reports. (shrink)

An algebraically expandable (AE) class is a class of algebraic structures axiomatizable by sentences of the form $\forall \exists! \mathop{\boldsymbol {\bigwedge }}\limits p = q$. For a logic L algebraized by a quasivariety $\mathcal {Q}$ we show that the AE-subclasses of $\mathcal {Q}$ correspond to certain natural expansions of L, which we call algebraic expansions. These turn out to be a special case of the expansions by implicit connectives studied by X. Caicedo. We proceed to characterize all the AE-subclasses of (...) abelian $\ell $ -groups and perfect MV-algebras, thus fully describing the algebraic expansions of their associated logics. (shrink)

Parental burnout is a unique and context-specific syndrome resulting from a chronic imbalance of risks over resources in the parenting domain. The current research aims to evaluate the psychometric properties of the Spanish version of the Parental Burnout Assessment across Spanish-speaking countries with two consecutive studies. In Study 1, we analyzed the data through a bifactor model within an Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling on the pooled sample of participants obtaining good fit indices. We then attained measurement invariance across both gender (...) and countries in a set of nested models with gradually increasing parameter constraints. Latent means comparisons across countries showed that among the participants’ countries, Chile had the highest parental burnout score, likewise, comparisons across gender evidenced that mothers displayed higher scores than fathers, as shown in previous studies. Reliability coefficients were high. In Study 2, we tested the relations between parental burnout and three specific consequences, i.e., escape and suicidal ideations, parental neglect, and parental violence toward one’s children. The medium to large associations found provided support for the PBA’s predictive validity. Overall, we concluded that the Spanish version of the PBA has good psychometric properties. The results support its relevance for the assessment of parental burnout among Spanish-speaking parents, offering new opportunities for cross-cultural research in the parenting domain. (shrink)

Este texto recupera dos posiciones en torno al concepto de destino: la de Diego de Saavedra Fajardo y la de Plutarco. Ambos, a diferencia de algunos estoicos, sostienen que, independientemente de aquellas circunstancias que escapan a la voluntad humana, el hombre posee la capacidad para ser libre y tomar decisiones respecto de sus actos, sin que esto signifique dejar atrás el ideal del sabio. Para ellos, enfrentarse con el destino implica conocer las pasiones que se hallan inmersas en la (...) naturaleza humana, así que no las toman en un sentido negativo. Por esta razón, ambos filósofos insisten en reorientar las pasiones a través de la educación, la moral o la religión y, con ello, en dejar atrás la idea de que el hombre está determinado o bien por su propia naturaleza humana o por las circunstancias que se le presentan. De esta manera, brindan un reconocimiento esencial al ejercicio de la libertad humana. (shrink)

En este ensayo, nos proponemos examinar el mito de Narciso en la obra del poeta chileno Humberto Díaz-Casanueva. Nos interesa resaltar la originalidad de su reinterpretación del mito griego. En nuestra opinión, la peculiaridad de este Narciso reside en que él no se enamora de su reflejo en el espejo, sino del espejo mismo. En nuestra lectura, esto último significa que el sujeto, ante el espejo vacío, reconoce su propia muerte. Esta tesis, que podría sonar puramente negativa, debe sin (...) embargo entenderse de una manera positiva: el poeta intenta pensar una subjetividad que no esté regulada por el principio de identidad. (shrink)

En este texto se realizará un análisis filosófico de la poesía de Humberto Díaz- Casanueva. Nuestro propósito general consiste en descubrir sus motivos esenciales, aquellos que la dotan de una forma única dentro del panorama de las letras chilenas. Siguiendo una indicación del propio autor, diremos que su poesía es “órfica”, y esto implica una relación directa con la muerte. Nuestra propuesta consiste en discernir dos momentos en este orfismo: danza y tartamudeo, y en desarrollar la idea de cómo (...) esta poesía alcanza su forma definitiva en el segundo de estos momentos. (shrink)

Este trabajo se centra en la crítica que Martín Diego Farrell, un ilustre filósofo del derecho argentino, dirige al utilitarismo y a su argumento fundamental, la restricción de la libertad en aras de una mayor utilidad. Es una crítica al utilitarismo sobre la que considero que es necesario reflexionar, pues constituye el punto de partida del abandono del utilitarismo por parte de muchos pensadores liberales actuales. Y es también, en mi opinión, el inicio de un peligroso camino hacia un (...) relativismo extremo. He escogido a Martín Diego Farrell como paradigma para plantear algunos problemas actuales de los liberalismos. La autora considera que la filosofía de éste filósofo y jurista argentino es un síntoma claro de la evolución que se produjo dentro del liberalismo, sobre todo desde principios del siglo XX, hacia dos caminos diferenciados, e incluso opuestos, que será necesario subrayar y esclarecer. Desde este análisis podremos comprobar que, cuando hablamos de ciertos neoliberalismos, estamos hablando en realidad de teorías que dejan a un lado las auténticas raíces del liberalismo. (shrink)

Identidad y misión de la Universidad Católica - Constitución Apostólica ex corde eclesial sobre la Universidad Católica (extracto) Juan Pablo II - La Universidad latinoamericana hoy / Ignacio Martín Baró, S.J. / - El rol de las Universidades Católicas en la tarea de evangelizar las culturas en América Latina / César Jerez S.J. / - Generar cultura autónoma / Ignacio Martín Baró, S.J / - La enseñanza de cómo ser crítico / John Passmore / - El capitalismo del saber / (...) Iván Illich / - Ensayo sobre educación en América Latina / Ernesto Sábato / - Los retos de la conciencia moderna - Discurso sobre espíritu positivo / Augusto Comte / - En torno a la crítica de la filosofía del derecho de Hegel / Kart Marx / - Prólogo a la contribución a la crítica de la economía política (1859) / Kart Marx / - El neocapitalismo como caldo de cultivo / Carlos Díaz / - La defensa de la libertad / Josef Pieper / - Moral para intelectuales / Carlos Vaz Ferreira / - Desafíos de la globalización / Luis Ugalde S.J.... (shrink)

What does woman mean? According to two competing views, it can be seen as a sex term or as a gender term. Recently, Jennifer Saul has put forward a contextualist view, according to which woman can have different meanings in different contexts. The main motivation for this view seems to involve moral and political considerations, namely, that this view can do justice to the claims of trans women. Unfortunately, Saul argues, on further reflection the contextualist view fails to do justice (...) to those moral and political claims that motivated the view in the first place. In this article I argue that there is a version of the contextualist view that can indeed capture those moral and political aims, and in addition, I use this case to illustrate an important and more general claim, namely, that moral and political considerations can be relevant to the descriptive project of finding out what certain politically significant terms actually mean. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno inspired much of Germany’s 1960s student movement, but he came increasingly into conflict with this movement about the practical implications of his critical theory. Others – including his friend and colleague Herbert Marcuse – also accused Adorno of a quietism that is politically objectionable and in contradiction with his own theory. In this article, I recon- struct, and partially defend, Adorno’s views on theory and (political) praxis in Germany’s 1960s in 11 theses. His often attacked and maligned (...) stance during the 1960s is based on his analysis of these historical circumstances. Put provocatively, his stance consists in the view that people in the 1960s have tried to change the world, in various ways; the point – at that time – was to interpret it. (shrink)

Explicit and implicit learning have been attributed to different learning processes that create different types of knowledge structures. Consistent with that claim, our study provides evidence that people integrate stimulus events differently when consciously aware versus unaware of the relationship between the events. In a first, acquisition phase participants sorted words into two categories , which were fully predicted by task-irrelevant primes—the labels of two other, semantically unrelated categories . In a second, test phase participants performed a lexical decision task, (...) in which all word stimuli stemmed from the previous prime categories and the primes were the labels of the previous target categories . Reliable priming effects in the second phase demonstrated that bidirectional associations between the respective categories had been formed in the acquisition phase , but these effects were found only in participants that were unaware of the relationship between the categories! We suggest that unconscious, implicit learning of event relationships results in the rather unsophisticated integration of the underlying event representations, whereas explicit learning takes the meaning of the order of the events into account, and thus creates unidirectional associations. (shrink)

The problem of algorithmic fairness is typically framed as the problem of finding a unique formal criterion that guarantees that a given algorithmic decision-making procedure is morally permissible. In this paper, I argue that this is conceptually misguided and that we should replace the problem with two sub-problems. If we examine how most state-of-the-art machine learning systems work, we notice that there are two distinct stages in the decision-making process. First, a prediction of a relevant property is made. Secondly, a (...) decision is taken based (at least partly) on this prediction. These two stages have different aims: the prediction is aimed at accuracy, while the decision is aimed at allocating a given good in a way that maximizes some context-relative utility measure. Correspondingly, two different fairness issues can arise. First, predictions could be biased in discriminatory ways. This means that the predictions contain systematic errors for a specific group of individuals. Secondly, the system’s decisions could result in an allocation of goods that is in tension with the principles of distributive justice. These two fairness issues are distinct problems that require different types of solutions. I here provide a formal framework to address both issues and argue that this way of conceptualizing them resolves some of the paradoxes present in the discussion of algorithmic fairness. (shrink)

In this introductory chapter, I first offer an overview of the two themes addressed in the present collection - namely, disagreement and skepticism - and their connection, then present the purpose and content of the volume.

In this paper, I critically engage with Casey Perin's interpretation of Sextan Pyrrhonism in his book, The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. From an approach that is both exegetical and systematic, I explore a number of issues concerning the Pyrrhonist's inquiry into truth, his alleged commitment to the canons of rationality, and his response to the apraxia objection.

Assessment of decision-making capacity (DMC) can be difficult in acquired brain injury (ABI) particularly with the syndrome of organic personality disorder (OPD) (the “frontal lobe syndrome”). Clinical neuroscience may help but there are challenges translating its constructs to the decision-making abilities considered relevant by law and ethics. An in-depth interview study of DMC in OPD was undertaken. Six patients were purposefully sampled and rich interview data were acquired for scrutiny using interpretative phenomenological analysis. Interview data revealed that awareness of deficit (...) and thinking about psychological states can be present. However, the awareness of deficit may not be “online” and effectively integrated into decision-making. Without this online awareness of deficit the ability to appreciate or use and weigh information in the process of deciding some matters appeared absent. We argue that the decision-making abilities discussed are: (1) necessary for DMC, (2) threatened by ABI, and (3) assessable at interview. Some advice for practically incorporating these abilities within assessments of DMC in patients with OPD is outlined. (shrink)

Ontology development methodologies emphasise knowledge gathering from domain experts and documentary resources, and knowledge representation using an ontology language such as OWL or FOL. However, working ontologists are often surprised by how challenging and slow it can be to develop ontologies. Here, with a particular emphasis on the sorts of ontologies that are content-heavy and intended to be shared across a community of users (reference ontologies), we propose that a significant and heretofore under-emphasised contributor of challenges during ontology development is (...) the need to create, or bring about, consensus in the face of disagreement. For this reason reference ontology development cannot be automated, at least within the limitations of existing AI approaches. Further, for the same reason ontologists are required to have specific social-negotiating skills which are currently lacking in most technical curricula. (shrink)

We investigate a phenomenon which we have experienced as common when dealing with an assortment of Italian public and private institutions: people promise to exchange high-quality goods and services, but then something goes wrong and the quality delivered is lower than had been promised. While this is perceived as ‘cheating’ by outsiders, insiders seem not only to adapt to, but to rely on this outcome. They do not resent low-quality exchanges; in fact, they seem to resent high-quality ones, and are (...) inclined to put pressure on or avoid dealing with agents who deliver high quality. The equilibrium among low-quality producers relies on an unusual preference ranking which differs from that associated with the Prisoners’ Dilemma and similar games, whereby self-interested rational agents prefer to dish out low quality in exchange for high quality. While equally ‘lazy’, agents in our low-quality worlds are oddly ‘pro-social’: for the advantage of maximizing their raw self-interest, they prefer to receive low-quality goods and services, provided that they too can in exchange deliver low quality without embarrassment. They develop a set of oblique social norms to sustain their preferred equilibrium when threatened by the intrusion of high quality. We argue that high-quality collective outcomes are endangered not only by self-interested individual defectors, but by ‘cartels’ of mutually satisfied mediocrities. (shrink)

The question of whether the Pyrrhonist adheres to certain logical principles, criteria of justification, and inference rules is of central importance for the study of Pyrrhonism. Its significance lies in that, whereas the Pyrrhonist describes his philosophical stance and argues against the Dogmatists by means of what may be considered a rational discourse, adherence to any such principles, criteria, and rules does not seem compatible with the radical character of his skepticism. Hence, if the Pyrrhonist does endorse them, one must (...) conclude that he is inconsistent in his outlook. Despite its import, the question under consideration has not received, in the vast literature on Pyrrhonism of the past three decades, all the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I do not propose to provide a full examination of the Pyrrhonist’s attitude towards rationality, but to focus on the question of whether he endorses the law of non-contradiction (LNC). However, I will also briefly tackle the question of the Pyrrhonist’s outlook on both the canons of rational justification at work in the so-called Five Modes of Agrippa and the logical rules of inference. In addition, given that the LNC is deemed a fundamental principle of rationality, determining the Pyrrhonist’s attitude towards it will allow us to understand his general attitude towards rationality. (shrink)

This paper approaches the current epistemological debate on peer disagreement from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, thus adopting a form of skepticism which is more radical than those discussed in the literature. It makes use of argumentative strategies found in ancient Pyrrhonism both to show that such a debate rests on problematic assumptions and to block some maneuvers intended to offer an efficacious way of settling a considerable number of peer disputes. The essay takes issue with three views held in the peer (...) disagreement debate: there is an objective fact of the matter about at least most controversial questions; we possess theory-neutral evidence bearing on those questions which grants us access to the truth of the matter; and many peer controversies are resolved by attending to which disputant has correctly evaluated the objective evidence. With respect to the first two views, it is argued that the belief in both objective facts and theory-neutral evidence is subject to fierce dispute, and should not therefore be taken for granted in the discussion of peer disagreement. As for the third view, it is argued that from either a first- or a third-person perspective, there seems to be epistemic symmetry between the disputants which makes it necessary to suspend judgment. (shrink)

The later Rawls attempts to offer a non-comprehensive, but nonetheless moral justification in political philosophy. Many critics of political liberalism doubt that this is successful, but Rawlsians often complain that such criticisms rely on the unwarranted assumption that one cannot offer a moral justification other than by taking a philosophically comprehensive route. In this article, I internally criticize the justification strategy employed by the later Rawls. I show that he cannot offer us good grounds for the rational hope that citizens (...) will assign political values priority over non-political values in cases of conflict about political matters. I also suggest an alternative approach to justification in political philosophy (that is, a weak realist, Williams-inspired account) that better respects the later Rawls’s concern with non-comprehensiveness and pluralism than either his own view or more comprehensive approaches. Thus, if we take reasonable pluralism seriously, then we should adopt what Shklar aptly called ‘liberalism of fear’. (shrink)

The discussions of these past twenty years have significantly improved our knowledge about the foundation of bioethics and the meaning of the four bioethical principles with concern to at least three different points: that they are organised hierarchically, and therefore not “prima facie” of the same level; that they have exceptions, and consequently lack of absolute character; and that they are neither strictly deontological nor purely teleological. The only absolute principle of moral life can be the abstract and unconcrete respect (...) of human beings. But when determining the material content of this respect, principles become contingent and relative. Therefore, moral reasoning must have necessarily no less than three moments, one absolute but merely formal, namely respect for all human beings, and the other two relative and material. The first material moment is comprised of the four bioethical principles, divided into two levels, one private, including the principles of autonomy and beneficence, and the other one public, including those of nonmaleficence and justice. The second material moment deals with specific cases, and requires analysis of their context, including their circumstances and consequences. Only when following these steps, and therefore balancing principlism and contextualism, can moral reasoning be correct and complete. (shrink)

Externalism about artifactual words requires that (a) members of an artifactual word’s extension share a common nature, i.e. a set of necessary features, and (b) that possession of such features determines the word’s extension independently of whether the linguistic community is aware of them (ignorance) or can accurately describe them (error). However, many common artifactual words appear to be so used that features that are universally shared among members of their extensions are hard to come by, and even fewer can (...) be plausibly regarded as necessary; morevoer, it is highly doubtful that a speaker could manage to refer to kind A while being utterly ignorant of the role the As play in the A-producing community, and it is no less doubtful that an artifactual word that was used to refer to certain objects would keep referring to them (and be regarded as having referred to them) once it has been shown that the associated description is utterly false of such objects, the reason being that we could easily make things that do fit the associated description. Against generalized externalism, it is suggested that artifactual words come in (at least) three different semantic varieties: a few have an externalist semantics, others have an internalist semantics, still others have neither but rather behave as “family names” in Wittgenstein’s sense. (shrink)

Every innovation seeks to become a profitable business, with this considered to be the engine for economic prosperity. When an innovation is revolutionary, its long-term consequences can be revolutionary too. The Haber-Bosh process for ammonia synthesis is arguably the twentieth century’s most significant innovation, and its importance to global food production and its impact on the environment are not expected to diminish over the coming decades. The historical case of the ammonia synthesis process invented by Fritz Haber and the ensuing (...) innovation provides an incomparable opportunity to illustrate the interactions across contemporary needs, prominent scientists, political concerns, moral dilemmas, ethics, governance and environmental implications at a time when the concept of sustainability was still in its infancy. Despite its high economic and environmental costs, no cleaner or more efficient sustainable alternative has so far been found, and so replacing this “old” innovation that still “feeds” a large part of the world’s population does not appear to be on the cards in the near future. (shrink)

Margarita Diaz-Andreu offers an innovative history of archaeology during the nineteenth century, encompassing all its fields from the origins of humanity to the medieval period, and all areas of the world. The development of archaeology is placed within the framework of contemporary political events, with a particular focus upon the ideologies of nationalism and imperialism. Diaz-Andreu examines a wide range of issues, including the creation of institutions, the conversion of the study of antiquities into a profession, public memory, changes in (...) archaeological thought and practice, and the effect on archaeology of racism, religion, the belief in progress, hegemony, and resistance. (shrink)

The relationship between science and philosophy has always been difficult. During thewhole classical and medieval periods, philosophy denied that science was an autonomousactivity, by defining it as epistéme or apodictic and deductive knowledge. Science thus cameto be confused with philosophy. This impeded the development of experimental scienceuntil well into the modern world. When, at the beginning of the 17thcentury, it breaks ontothe stage, a new process begins that will culminate in the 19th century, with philosophyturning into a theory of science. (...) Now it is science that denies a role to the philosophy.Such it was the work of the positivism. Zubiri considers that both science and philosophythey have their own specificity, but that they converge in a fundamental point, viz. beingknowledge about ousía or reality. There are three periods: between 1942 and 1960 he defines reality as “there are”; from 1960 to 1972 it is the “reality thing” as opposed to the“meaning thing”; and between 1973 and 1983 the character of “actuality” stands out. It ismainly in this last stage when Zubiri distinguishes three intellectual modes of actualizingreality: the most basic and immediate, common to science and philosophy, or “primordialapprehension of reality”, that proper to “logos”, merely descriptive, and that specificic to“reason” or what is formally explanatory. It is at this last level where both scientific andmetaphysical investigation unfold. Reason never exhausts reality, and for that reason itsknowledge is always penultimate. Whence the necessity to make explicit its ultimategrounds, which are those characteristic of the two previous strata.Las relaciones entre ciencia y filosofía han sido siempre difíciles. Durante toda la épocaclásica y medieval, la filosofía anuló a la ciencia como actividad autónoma, al definirla comoepistéme o saber apodíctico y deductivo. Ciencia venía a confundirse, de ese modo, confilosofía. Ello impidió el desarrollo de la ciencia experimental hasta bien entrado el mundomoderno. Cuando, a partir del siglo XVII, irrumpe con fuerza la ciencia moderna, se iniciaun nuevo proceso que culminaría en el siglo XIX, al convertirse la filosofía en teoría de laciencia. Ahora es la ciencia la que anula a la filosofía. Tal fue la obra del positivismo. Zubiri considera que ambas, ciencia y filosofía, tienen su propia especificidad, pero que convergen en un punto fundamental, el ser saberes sobre la ousía o realidad. Se diferencian tresperiodos: entre 1942 y 1960 define la realidad como “haber”, de 1960 a 1972 caracteriza la“cosa-realidad” por oposición a la “cosa-sentido”, y entre 1973 y 1983 resalta su carácter de“actualidad”. Es sobre todo en esta última etapa cuando Zubiri distingue tres modos intelectuales de actualización de la realidad, el más básico e inmediato, común a ciencia y filosofía, o “aprehensión primordial de realidad”, el propio del “lógos” o meramente descriptivo,y el específico de la “razón” o formalmente explicativo. Es en este último nivel en el que sedesarrollan tanto la investigación científica como la metafísica. La razón nunca agota larealidad, y por eso su conocimiento es siempre penúltimo. De ahí la necesidad de hacerexplícitos sus fundamentos últimos, que son los propios de los dos estratos previos. (shrink)