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Douglas C. Long
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  1. Descartes' Argument for Mind-Body Dualism.Douglas C. Long - 1969 - Philosophical Forum 1 (3):259-273.
  2. Avowals and First-Person Privilege.Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-35.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I’m thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
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  3.  76
    Avowals and First-Person Privilege.Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-335.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." If I now said: "I have a headache," or "I'm thinking about Venice," I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
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  4. Particulars and Their Qualities.Douglas C. Long - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 18 (72):193-206.
    Berkeley, Hume, and Russell rejected the traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities which are supported by an "unknowable substratum." To them the proper alternative seemed obvious. Eliminate the substratum in which qualities are alleged to inhere, leaving a bundle of coexisting qualities--a view that we may call the Bundle Theory or BT. But by rejecting only part of the traditional substratum theory instead of replacing it entirely, Bundle Theories perpetuate certain confusions which are found in the Substratum Doctrine. (...)
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  5.  8
    Agents, Mechanisms, and Other Minds.Douglas C. Long - 1979 - In Body, Mind, and Method. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidl. pp. 129-148.
    Hovering in the background of investigations into human physiology is the promise or threat, depending upon how one looks at the matter that human beings are complete physical-chemical systems and that all events taking place within their bodies and all movements of their bodies could be accounted for by physical causes if we but knew enough. In this paper I consider the important question whether our coming to believe that this "mechanistic" hypothesis is true would warrant our relinquishing our conception (...)
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  6. Why Life is Necessary for Mind: The Significance of Animate Behavior.Douglas C. Long - 2010 - In James O'Shea Eric Rubenstein (ed.), Self, Language, and World:Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co. pp. 61-88.
    I defend the thesis that psychological states can be literally ascribed only to living creatures and not to nonliving machines, such as sophisticated robots. Defenders of machine consciousness do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the biological nature of a subject for the psychological significance of its behavior. Simulations of a computer-controlled, nonliving autonomous robot cannot carry the same psychological meaning as animate behavior. Being a living creature is an essential link between genuinely expressive behavior and justified psychological ascriptions.
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  7. The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body.Douglas C. Long - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (July):321-337.
    I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution. The concept of a "body" which may or may not be the (...)
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  8. The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism.Douglas C. Long - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):67-84.
    An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an objective world beyond our subjective experiences. I argue that there is there is a fatal flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "external world." (...)
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  9. Consciousness and Causality. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1987 - Teaching Philosophy 10 (1):83-86.
    A debate between D. M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm on the Mind-Body Problem. Physicalism vs. Wittgenstein.
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  10. The Bodies of Persons.Douglas C. Long - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (10):291-301.
    Much mischief concerning the concept of a human body is generated by the failure of philosophers to distinguish various important senses of the term 'body.' I discuss three of those senses and illustrate the issues they can generate by discussing the concept of a Lockean exchange of bodies as well as the brain-body switch.
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  11. Disembodied Existence, Physicalism and the Mind-Body Problem.Douglas C. Long - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (May):307-316.
    The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. It may seem doubtful that anything new could be added to the debate at (...)
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  12.  5
    Hume. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1982 - Noûs 16 (3):474-477.
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  13.  10
    The Metaphysics of Mind. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):959-961.
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  14. Second Thoughts: A Reply to Mr. Ginnane.Douglas C. Long - 1961 - Mind 70 (279):405-411.
    In his article "Thoughts" (MIND, July 1960) William Ginnane argues that "thought is pure intentionality," and that our thoughts are not embodied essentially in the mental imagery and other elements of phenomenology that cross our minds along with the thoughts. Such images merely illustrate out thoughts. In my discussion I resist this claim pointing out that our thoughts are often embodied in events that can be described in pheno¬menological terms, especially when our reports of our thinking are introduced by the (...)
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  15. Expressing Truths and Knowing Truths.Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
     
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  16.  34
    Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge.Douglas C. Long - 1984 - Noûs 18 (1):132-136.
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  17. Why Machines Can Neither Think nor Feel.Douglas C. Long - 1994 - In Dale W. Jamieson (ed.), Language, Mind and Art. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Over three decades ago, in a brief but provocative essay, Paul Ziff argued for the thesis that robots cannot have feelings because they are "mechanisms, not organisms, not living creatures. There could be a broken-down robot but not a dead one. Only living creatures can literally have feelings."[i] Since machines are not living things they cannot have feelings.
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  18.  35
    Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays.Douglas C. Long - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):99-104.
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  19.  46
    The Character of Mind. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1984 - Teaching Philosophy 7 (4):347-349.
    This is a review of The Character of Mind by Colin McGinn.
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  20.  34
    The Body of a Person. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1992 - International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):113-113.
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  21.  30
    The Metaphysics of Mind, by Michael Tye. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):959-961.
  22.  69
    Other Minds.Douglas C. Long - 1975 - Teaching Philosophy 1 (2):179-181.
    D. C. Long’s review of a monograph Godfrey Vesey prepared on the problem of our knowledge of other minds for the Open University series on problems of philosophy. Vesey discusses philosophers’ disenchantment with the traditional argument from analogy as a solution to the problem. This has been fostered by Wittgensteinian objections to the idea that psychological words get their meaning by reference to our own “private” experiences. Vesey similarly argues for the thesis that a person cannot be said to understand (...)
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  23.  29
    Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction, 3rd Ed. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1983 - Teaching Philosophy 6 (1):82-84.
  24.  8
    The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism.Douglas C. Long - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):67-84.
    The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism [ABSTRACT] Douglas C. Long Philosophical skepticism arises from a Cartesian first-person perspective that initially rejects as unjustified any appeal to sense perception. I argue that, contrary to the cogito argument, when a “purely subjective” epistemology cuts one off from justified beliefs about the world in this way, it undermines justified belief about one’s own existence as an individual in the world as well. Therefore, philosophical doubt expressed in the form: “I know that I exist but (...)
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  25.  89
    Agents, Mechanisms, and Other Minds.Douglas C. Long - 1979 - In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind And Method. Dordrecht: Reidel. pp. 129--148.
    One of the goals of physiologists who study the detailed physical, chemical,and neurological mechanisms operating within the human body is to understand the intricate causal processes which underlie human abilities and activities. It is doubtless premature to predict that they will eventually be able to explain the behaviour of a particular human being as we might now explain the behaviour of a pendulum clock or even the invisible changes occurring within the hardware of a modern electronic computer. Nonetheless, it seems (...)
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  26.  39
    Second Thoughts: A Reply to Mr Ginnane's Thoughts.Douglas C. Long - 1961 - Mind 70 (July):405-411.
    In his article "Thoughts" (MIND, July 1960) William Ginnane argues that "thought is pure intentionality," and that our thoughts are not embodied essentially in the mental imagery and other elements of phenomenology that cross our minds along with the thoughts. Such images merely illustrate out thoughts. In my discussion I resist this claim pointing out that our thoughts are often embodied in events that can be described in phenomenological terms, especially when our reports of our thinking are introduced by the (...)
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  27.  9
    Particulars and Their Qualities.Douglas C. Long - 1979 - In Michael Loux (ed.), Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology. Doubleday. pp. 264-84.
    See Abstract under this title of the journal article below.
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  28.  58
    One More Foiled Defense of Skepticism.Douglas C. Long - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):373-375.
    This paper is a response to Anthony Brueckner's critique of my essay "The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism," which appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 1992. In this reply I contend that the three main avenues by which one might plausibly account for one's self-awareness are unavailable to an individual who is restricted to the skeptic's epistemic ground rules. First, all-encompassing doubt about the world cancels our "external" epistemic access via perception to ourselves as material individuals in the world. Second, (...)
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  29.  35
    Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1996 - Review of Metaphysics 49 (3):641-642.
    The author intends to show how an "interpretationist" conception of mental phenomena, extracted primarily from the writings of Davidson, with supplementation from Dennett and Wittgenstein, is compatible with a causal account of common-sense psychology. "When we interpret someone, we aim to make sense of her by attributing beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions and other propositional attitudes--attitudes in the light of which her behaviour is intelligible as, more or less, rational action. Interpretationists think that we can gain an understanding of the nature (...)
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  30.  15
    Ethics of an Artificial Person: Lost Responsibility in Professions and Organizations.Douglas C. Long & Elizabeth Wolgast - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):385.
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  31.  13
    One More Foiled Defense of Skepticism.Douglas C. Long - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):373-375.
    In my essay I contend that the three main avenues by which one might plausibly account for one's self-awareness are unavailable to an individual who is restricted to the skeptic's epistemic ground rules. First, all-encompassing doubt about the world cancels our "external" epistemic access via perception to ourselves as material individuals in the world. Second, one does not have direct cpistemic access to one's substantial self through introspection, since the self as such is not a proper object of inner awareness. (...)
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  32. Particulars and Their Qualities.Douglas C. Long - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 18 (72).
    The traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities which are supported by a "substratum" was rejected by conscientious empiricists like Berkeley, Hume and Russell on the grounds that only qualities, not the substratum, could be experienced. To these philosophers the proper alternative seemed obvious. One simply eliminates the "unknowable" element in which qualities are alleged to inhere. In Russell's words, "What would commonly be called a 'thing' is nothing but a bundle of coexisting qualities such as redness, hardness, etc."' (...)
     
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  33.  20
    Review of Matter and Mind by I. Dilman. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1977 - International Studies in Philosophy 9:168-170.
    Half of Dilman's book deal with skepticism about the physical world and the other half with skepticism about other minds. His main thesis in each case is that the very general doubts that have traditionally troubled philosophers must not be answered on their own terms but by showing that they are confused. Exposing this confusion helps us to understand better the "logic" of our ordinary talk about things and persons. He draws illuminating parallels between problems about knowledge of the external (...)
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  34.  15
    Review of Virgil Aldrich's The Body of a Person. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1992 - International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):113-113.
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  35.  4
    Other Minds. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1975 - Teaching Philosophy 1 (2):190-192.
  36.  4
    E. Maynard Adams, 1919-2003.Douglas C. Long - 2004 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (5):159 - 160.
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  37.  1
    Matter and Mind: Two Essays in Epistemology. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1977 - International Studies in Philosophy 9:168-170.
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  38. Review of Hume by Barry Stroud. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1982 - Noûs (Sept).