This concise and accessible book is the perfect introduction to Badiou’s thought. Responding to Tarby’s questions, Badiou takes us on a journey that interrogates and explores the four conditions of philosophy: politics, love, art and science. In all these domains, events occur that bring to light possibilities that were invisible or even unthinkable; they propose something to us. Everything then depends on how the possibility opened up by the event is grasped, elaborated and embedded in the world – (...) this is what Badiou calls a ‘truth procedure’. The event creates a possibility but there then has to be an effort – a group effort in the case of politics, an individual effort in the case of love or art – for this possibility to become real and inscribed in the world. As he explains his thinking on politics, love, art and science, Badiou takes stock of his major works, reflects on their central themes and arguments and looks forward to the questions he plans to address in his future writings. The book concludes with a short introduction to Badiou’s philosophy by Fabien Tarby. For anyone wishing to understand the work of one of the most widely read and influential philosophers writing today, this small book will be an indispensable guide. (shrink)

An 'Event' can refer to a devastating natural disaster or to the latest celebrity scandal, the triumph of the people or a brutal political change, an intense experience of a work of art or an intimate decision... An event is the effect that seems to exceed its causes--and the space of an event is the distance of an effect from its causes. But, asks Slavoj Žižek, does everything that exists have to be grounded in sufficient reasons? Or are there things (...) that somehow happen out of nowhere? How can philosophy help us to determine what an event is and how it is possible?"--Page [4] of cover. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy, from Kant through Bergson and Husserl to Heidegger, has assumed that time must be conceived as a fundamental determination of the subject: Time is not first in things but arises from actions, attitudes, or comportments through which a subject temporalizes mtime, expecting or remembering, anticipating the future or making a decision. Event and Time traces the genesis of this thesis through detailed, rigorous analyses of the philosophy of time in Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine, ultimately showing that, (...) in the development of metaphysics, the understanding of the temporal phenomenon as an inner-temporal phenomenon has made possible time's subjectivization. The book goes on to argue that time is in fact not thinkable according to metaphysical subjectivity. Instead, the guiding thread for the analysis of time must shift to the eventual hermeneutics of the human being, first developed in Event and World, and now deepened and completed in Event and Time. Romano's diptych makes a compelling, rigorous, and original philosophical contribution to the thinking of the event. (shrink)

Introduction. Activist philosophy and the occurrent arts -- The ether and your anger toward a speculative pragmatism -- The thinking-feeling of what happens putting the radical back in empiricism -- The diagram as technique of existence ovum of the universe segmented -- Arts of experience, politics of expression In four movements. First movement. To dance a storm -- Second movement. Life unlimited -- Third movement. The paradox of content -- Fourth movement. Composing the political.

Our aim in this paper is to give reasons for thinking that Badioursquo;s philosophy is not prepared to follow through all the consequences of the historical retreat of the political event. We want to suggest that it is important to come to terms with the implications of this retreat as no less a revolutionary aspect of the revolution. Whereas fidelity to the event demands that we not be selective in following the consequences of an event, fidelity to the eventrsquo;s (...) retreat points to a more direct relation of philosophy to the event than Badiou allows. In the first section of our paper we outline the philosophical orientation that informs our encounter with Badioursquo;s thought. In the second we examine the relationship between philosophy and the political event in order to set the context for the elaboration of our claim in the third section that fidelity to the event calls for attention not only to the demands of its emergence but also to those associated with the eventrsquo;s retreat. In the final section we indicate how the retreat of the political event might give rise to the philosophical subject and to the requirements of a philosophy of the event. (shrink)

What happens when something happens? In Thinking the Event, senior continental philosophy scholar François Raffoul undertakes a philosophical inquiry into what constitutes an event as event, its very eventfulness: not what happens or why it happens, but that it happens, and what "happening" means. If, as Leibniz posited, it is true that nothing happens without a reason, does this principle of reason have a reason? For Raffoul, the event always breaks the demands of rational thought. Bringing together philosophical insights (...) from Heidegger, Derrida, Nancy, and Marion, Raffoul shows how the event, in its disruptive unpredictability, always exceeds causality, subjectivity, and reason. It is that "pure event," each time happening outside or without reason, which remains to be thought, and which is the focus of this work. In the final movement of the book, Raffoul takes on questions about the inappropriability of the event and the implications this carries for ethical and political considerations when thinking the event. In the wake of the exhaustion of traditional metaphysics, the notion of the event comes to the fore in an unprecedented way, with key implications for philosophy, ontology, ethics, and theories of selfhood. (shrink)

Significant work in the philosophy of history has focused on the writing of historiographical narratives, isolated from the rest of what historians do. Taking my cue from the philosophy of science in practice, I suggest that understanding historical narratives as embedded within historical practice more generally is fruitful. I illustrate this by bringing a particular instance of historical practice, Natalie Lawrence’s explanation of the sad fate of Winston the platypus, into dialogue with some of Louis Mink’s arguments in (...) favour of anti-realism about historical events. Attending to how historians seek out and utilize archival resources puts serious pressure on these arguments, motivates realist positions, and re-focuses the philosophy of history towards making sense of historiography as a part of the diversity of historians’ interests. (shrink)

This book lays out how the event is to be understood and ties it closely to looking, showing, self-manifestation, and the self-unveiling of the gods.

Martin Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy reflects his famous philosophical "turning." In this work, Heidegger returns to the question of being from its inception in Being and Time to a new questioning of being as event.

In recent European philosophy, and especially in Heidegger, Arendt, Derrida, and Badiou, the distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary, or between normality and “event,” has played a very prominent role. In the present paper, I raise a challenge to this distinction, a challenge inspired by Deleuze’s conception of repetition and difference. Is it not the case that every occurrence in some ways reproduces and in some ways deviates from the past, such that nothing is entirely extraordinary and nothing (...) completely normal? The purpose of the paper is to examine whether the ordinary/extraordinary distinction—or the notion of event, respectively—can be defended against this challenge, i.e., whether it can be given a rigorous definition. Drawing on and departing from the named philosophers, I show that there are three alternative responses—the route of subjective experience, of transcendence, and of negation—and assess their respective merits. (shrink)

Claude Romano seeks to change all that, to describe precisely what sort of phenomenon an event is and to establish how it can be grasped via a phenomenology.

We live in a world of breaking news, where at almost any moment our everyday routine can be interrupted by a faraway event. Events are central to the way that individuals and societies experience life. Even life’s inevitable moments—birth, death, love, and war—are almost always a surprise. Inspired by the cataclysmic events of September 11, Robin Wagner-Pacifici presents here a tour de force, an analysis of how events erupt and take off from the ground of ongoing, everyday (...) life, and how they then move across time and landscape. What Is an Event? ranges across several disciplines, systematically analyzing the ways that events emerge, take shape, gain momentum, flow, and even get bogged down. As an exploration of how events are constructed out of ruptures, it provides a mechanism for understanding eventful forms and flows, from the micro-level of individual life events to the macro-level of historical revolutions, contemporary terrorist attacks, and financial crises. Wagner-Pacifici takes a close look at a number of cases, both real and imagined, through the reports, personal narratives, paintings, iconic images, political posters, sculptures, and novels they generate and through which they live on. What is ultimately at stake for individuals and societies in events, Wagner-Pacifici argues, are identities, loyalties, social relationships, and our very experiences of time and space. What Is an Event? provides a way for us all—as social and political beings living through events, and as analysts reflecting upon them—to better understand what is at stake in the formations and flows of the events that mark and shape our lives. (shrink)

The disciplinary enterprises engaged in the study of consciousness now extend beyond their original paradigms providing additional knowledge toward an overall understanding of the fundamental meaning and scope of consciousness. A new transdisciplinary domain has resulted from the syncretism of several approaches bringing about a new paradigm. The background for this overarching enterprise draws from a variety of traditions. In this paper however elaboration is restricted to the quantum-mechanical account in David Bohm’s theoretical work in relation to his ideas about (...) “active information”, “protointelligence”, and “non-locality”. This leads to an adapted version of Bohm’s thesis concerning the implicate order and explicate order of the Universe - the Impression Order and the Expression Order, respectively. On this view, the Universe is formed on an actual-material level, the apparent properties of things, and a potential-material level, a constant process of becoming that exerts an attractive force on the present. The central thesis emerges from a radical reformulation of certain core concepts that transforms many ontological assumptions about the material basis of consciousness. That is, the above platform inclusively connects to a hypothesis that the concepts of ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘event’, and ‘motion’ can be unified to capture the notion of simultaneous activity at reducing levels to the Impression order. This notion coheres with a physical-theoretical model of Signature-Energy-Frequency which has been well demonstrated in the atomic, chemical, and information fields. This study embraces a holistic and creative worldview based on a triadic model wherein consciousness itself is postulated as the most basic, primordial stratum. Importantly, both orders are constantly conjoined since the Impression Order exists as potential energy of the quantum vacuum. The physical realm is formed by the proposed Triangulate-Three conditions as a principle of animation and ‘being’: Consciousness, Body-of-Experience and Intellect-Reflective in the Expression Order, one aspect of which emerge as lifelike properties. This Triangulate-Three principle inheres in every particle and organism to which it guides its development, adaptation, and survival. The conscious being thus possesses all three conditions in Expression Order through STEM-interactions via SEF transmissions, as a self-organising organism. (shrink)

At one point in We will never have been modern Latour notes that his thinking is a “challenge to philosophy”. This article argues that Latour's challenge lies in his repeated claim that his ontology makes us able to think again about the “passing of time”. If this is indeed the case then, this essay looks to Martin Heidegger to think of the question of temporality and ontology. This essay will in effect find that on a deeper level Latour repeats (...) crucial Heideggerian insights with regard to the ontological difference between being and beings. Yet on other points too Heidegger's impact is notable: for Heidegger too, something has gone wary with modernity and our modern constitution. Here too Latour's metaphors point in a rather Heideggerian direction, for the “invisible” modern constitution has become “visible” in certain ontic events—Latour notes the end of communism. This recalls Heidegger's critique of metaphysics. The article will then focus on Latour's distinction between delegation and what is being delegated, a distinction that pervades the conclusion of his 1991 book. Latour thus introduces a difference between delegation and what is being delegated. How not to recognize a duplicate of Heidegger's ontological difference? And, once recognized, what does this mean for our thinking of being and the thinking of the event of world which has been delegated to us? (shrink)

Originally published in 1986. The theory of events presented is one that construes events to be concrete particulars; and it embodies an attempt to take seriously the idea that events are the changes that objects undergo when they change. The theory is about what an event really is, about when events are identical, about what properties events have essentially, and about what relations events bear to entities of other kinds. In addition, this book contains (...) an account of what philosophers are up to when they provide reasons for thinking that objects belonging to metaphysically interesting kinds exist. It also gives an account of the role of criteria of identity in such reasons, and an account of what criteria of identity must be like in order for them to be able to play such a role. (shrink)

Kierkegaard and the Challenges of Infinitude brings together a number of essays culminating the scientific events held during the duration of a project devoted to the translation and study of works by Søren Kierkegaard, which has been sponsored by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (PTDC/FIL/FIL/100.281/2008). The essays reunited here had their first versions delivered at an International Conference held in October 25-26th, 2012, under the auspices of the Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (Philosophy (...) Centre of the University of Lisbon, CFUL) and hosted by the Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa (Faculty of Letters of the University of Lisbon). The conference was commissioned by José Miranda Justo and Eisabete M. de Sousa, who also co-edited the present volume, together with rené Rosfort, who was the recipient of a grant as resident scholar in the Kierkegaard project during the three last months of 2012. (shrink)

Philosophie de la structure, philosophie de l’événement La critique deleuzienne de la phénoménologieDans son essai sur la peinture de Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze affirme résolument que le corps vécu de la phénoménologie est trop faible pour être à la mesure de la puissance presque incroyable du “corps sans organes”. “L’hypothèse phénoménologique est insuffisante” parce qu’elle n’invoque “que le corps vécu”, écrit-il, alors que le corps sans organes, lui, se porte à la limite même du corps vécu. Cette thèse semble nous (...) inviter à choisir entre deux conceptions du corps, celle de la phénoménologie et celle de Deleuze : un corps vécu et un corps presque incroyable. Mais sur quelle base pouvons-nous choisir? L’une de deux thèses est-elle clairement vraie et l’autre fausse? Nous verrons que Merleau-Ponty use d’un modèle fondé sur la mécanique des ondes systémiques, et que le modèle classique ou newtonien de Deleuze construit l’image d’une réalité physique absolue et pose ensuite que les structures perceptives sont simplement des manifestations ou des projections de cette fondation ontologique fondamentale. Mais le concept phénoménologique de “forme” indique que, même si les lois de la réalité physique ne conceptualisent que le monde perçu, la référence à ce monde perçu reste néanmoins essentielle à la connaissance du monde physique.Filosofi a della struttura, fi losofi a dell’evento La critica di Deleuze alla fenomenologiaNella sua analisi della pittura di Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze afferma risolutamente che il corpo vissuto della fenomenologia è insignificante, rispetto al potere quasi invivibile del corpo senz’organi. L’ipotesi fenomenologica è insufficiente perché si limita al corpo vissuto, mentre il corpo senz’organi sorge al confine estremo del corpo vissuto. Questa rivendicazione ci invita apparentemente a scegliere tra le due concezioni del corpo: quello di Deleuze e quello della fenomenologia, un corpo vissuto ed uno pressocché invivibile. Ma su che base possiamo compiere questa scelta? Un corpo è evidentemente vero, e l’altro falso? Vedremo che Merleau-Ponty utilizza un modello derivato dalla fisica quantistica, e che il modello classico, o newtoniano, di Deleuze costruisce invece l’immagine di una realtà fisica assoluta e proporremo poi che le strutture percettive siano semplici manifestazioni o proiezioni di questo fondamento ontologico essenziale. Il concetto fenomenologico di forma indica, al contrario, che per quanto le leggi della realtà fisica concettulizzino il mondo percepito, il riferimento almondo percepito è essenziale e preliminare alla conoscenza del mondo fisico. (shrink)

Philosophie de la structure, philosophie de l’événement La critique deleuzienne de la phénoménologieDans son essai sur la peinture de Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze affirme résolument que le corps vécu de la phénoménologie est trop faible pour être à la mesure de la puissance presque incroyable du “corps sans organes”. “L’hypothèse phénoménologique est insuffisante” parce qu’elle n’invoque “que le corps vécu”, écrit-il, alors que le corps sans organes, lui, se porte à la limite même du corps vécu. Cette thèse semble nous (...) inviter à choisir entre deux conceptions du corps, celle de la phénoménologie et celle de Deleuze : un corps vécu et un corps presque incroyable. Mais sur quelle base pouvons-nous choisir? L’une de deux thèses est-elle clairement vraie et l’autre fausse? Nous verrons que Merleau-Ponty use d’un modèle fondé sur la mécanique des ondes systémiques, et que le modèle classique ou newtonien de Deleuze construit l’image d’une réalité physique absolue et pose ensuite que les structures perceptives sont simplement des manifestations ou des projections de cette fondation ontologique fondamentale. Mais le concept phénoménologique de “forme” indique que, même si les lois de la réalité physique ne conceptualisent que le monde perçu, la référence à ce monde perçu reste néanmoins essentielle à la connaissance du monde physique.Filosofi a della struttura, fi losofi a dell’evento La critica di Deleuze alla fenomenologiaNella sua analisi della pittura di Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze afferma risolutamente che il corpo vissuto della fenomenologia è insignificante, rispetto al potere quasi invivibile del corpo senz’organi. L’ipotesi fenomenologica è insufficiente perché si limita al corpo vissuto, mentre il corpo senz’organi sorge al confine estremo del corpo vissuto. Questa rivendicazione ci invita apparentemente a scegliere tra le due concezioni del corpo: quello di Deleuze e quello della fenomenologia, un corpo vissuto ed uno pressocché invivibile. Ma su che base possiamo compiere questa scelta? Un corpo è evidentemente vero, e l’altro falso? Vedremo che Merleau-Ponty utilizza un modello derivato dalla fisica quantistica, e che il modello classico, o newtoniano, di Deleuze costruisce invece l’immagine di una realtà fisica assoluta e proporremo poi che le strutture percettive siano semplici manifestazioni o proiezioni di questo fondamento ontologico essenziale. Il concetto fenomenologico di forma indica, al contrario, che per quanto le leggi della realtà fisica concettulizzino il mondo percepito, il riferimento almondo percepito è essenziale e preliminare alla conoscenza del mondo fisico. (shrink)

Philosophie de la structure, philosophie de l’événement La critique deleuzienne de la phénoménologieDans son essai sur la peinture de Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze affirme résolument que le corps vécu de la phénoménologie est trop faible pour être à la mesure de la puissance presque incroyable du “corps sans organes”. “L’hypothèse phénoménologique est insuffisante” parce qu’elle n’invoque “que le corps vécu”, écrit-il, alors que le corps sans organes, lui, se porte à la limite même du corps vécu. Cette thèse semble nous (...) inviter à choisir entre deux conceptions du corps, celle de la phénoménologie et celle de Deleuze : un corps vécu et un corps presque incroyable. Mais sur quelle base pouvons-nous choisir? L’une de deux thèses est-elle clairement vraie et l’autre fausse? Nous verrons que Merleau-Ponty use d’un modèle fondé sur la mécanique des ondes systémiques, et que le modèle classique ou newtonien de Deleuze construit l’image d’une réalité physique absolue et pose ensuite que les structures perceptives sont simplement des manifestations ou des projections de cette fondation ontologique fondamentale. Mais le concept phénoménologique de “forme” indique que, même si les lois de la réalité physique ne conceptualisent que le monde perçu, la référence à ce monde perçu reste néanmoins essentielle à la connaissance du monde physique.Filosofi a della struttura, fi losofi a dell’evento La critica di Deleuze alla fenomenologiaNella sua analisi della pittura di Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze afferma risolutamente che il corpo vissuto della fenomenologia è insignificante, rispetto al potere quasi invivibile del corpo senz’organi. L’ipotesi fenomenologica è insufficiente perché si limita al corpo vissuto, mentre il corpo senz’organi sorge al confine estremo del corpo vissuto. Questa rivendicazione ci invita apparentemente a scegliere tra le due concezioni del corpo: quello di Deleuze e quello della fenomenologia, un corpo vissuto ed uno pressocché invivibile. Ma su che base possiamo compiere questa scelta? Un corpo è evidentemente vero, e l’altro falso? Vedremo che Merleau-Ponty utilizza un modello derivato dalla fisica quantistica, e che il modello classico, o newtoniano, di Deleuze costruisce invece l’immagine di una realtà fisica assoluta e proporremo poi che le strutture percettive siano semplici manifestazioni o proiezioni di questo fondamento ontologico essenziale. Il concetto fenomenologico di forma indica, al contrario, che per quanto le leggi della realtà fisica concettulizzino il mondo percepito, il riferimento almondo percepito è essenziale e preliminare alla conoscenza del mondo fisico. (shrink)

The book highlights the newly found evidence which indicates the imposition of boundary conditions on the structure and processing of events and how these are ...

_Law and Evil_ opens, expands and deepens our understanding of the phenomenon of evil by addressing the theoretical relationship between this phenomenon and law. Hannah Arendt said 'the problem of evil will be the fundamental question of post-war intellectual life in Europe'. This statement is, unfortunately, more than valid in the contemporary world: not only in the events of war, crimes against humanity, terror, repression, criminality, violence, torture, human trafficking, and so on; but also as evil is used rhetorically (...) to condemn these acts, to categorise their perpetrators, and to justify forcible measures, both in international and domestic politics and law. But what is evil? Evil as a concept is too often taken as something that is self-evident, something that is always already defined. Taking Kant’s concept of radical evil as a starting point, this volume counters such a tendency. Bringing together philosophical, political, and psychoanalytical perspectives, in analysing both the concept and the phenomenon of evil, the contributors to this volume offer a rich and thoroughgoing analysis of the multifaceted phenomenon of evil and its relationship to law. (shrink)

The aim of the present study was to corroborate or undermine a previously presented conjecture that physicians’ estimations of others’ opinions are influenced by their own opinions. We used questionnaire based cross-sectional design and described a situation where an imminently dying patient was provided with alleviating drugs which also shortened life and, additionally, were intended to do so. We asked what would happen to physicians’ own trust if they took the action described, and also what the physician estimated would happen (...) to the general publics’ trust in health services. Decrease of trust was used as surrogate for an undesirable action. The results are presented as proportions with a 95 % Confidence Interval. Statistical analysis was based on inter-rater agreement -test as well as χ2 test and Odds Ratio with 95 % CI. We found a moderate inter-rater agreement between what would happen with the physicians’ own trust in healthcare and their estimations of what would happen with the general population’s trust. We identified a significant difference between being pro et contra the treatment with double intentions and the estimation of the general population’s trust. Focusing on either decreasing or increasing own trust and being pro or contra the action we identified a strong association [OR 79 ]. Although the inter-rater agreement in the present study was somewhat weaker compared to a study about the explicit use of the term ‘physicians assisted suicide’ we found that our hypothesis—physicians’ estimations of others’ opinions are influenced by their own opinions—was corroborated. This might have implications in research as well as in clinical decision-making. We suggest that Merton’s ideal of disinterestedness should be highlighted. (shrink)

My argument has three parts. In the first, I shall explain some key Thomist distinctions concerning necessity and premotion. In the second, I shall argue that many philosophers who object to the Thomist position misconstrue the relevant understanding of necessity and contingency. In the third, I shall focus directly on their denial that the doctrine of premotion is helpful for discussions of how God moves the human will. The first two sections illustrate that the Thomists think plausibly that our understanding (...) of necessity is connected either with a logical necessity or secondary causality. Consequently, in order to show that the will is free, they argue that human actions are necessitated neither logically nor by secondary causes. In the third section, I argue that Thomists do not simply beg the question by asserting that God’s predetermining decrees are compatible with human freedom. They have an understanding of God’s causation which allows both for God’s infallible motion and the contingency of many created events, among which are free human actions. (shrink)

The article presents the main stages of the N.O. Lossky's work on the book "History of Russian Philosophy", starting with the emergence of his interest in the works of Russian philosophers when writing an article for the journal "The Slavonic Review" about Vladimir Solovyov and his followers; preparing lecture courses on Russian philosophy for reading at foreign universities and ending with the publication of the book in the USA, England and France and his work on the future Russian (...) edition. Particular attention is paid to the debate that arose after the publication of the book in America in the 50s and unfolds on the pages of American journals. The main claims of American critics to the content of the book are the uneven presentation of Russian philosophers teachings, the sketchiness and the absence of representatives of some schools of thought. N.O. Lossky's book also became the subject of discussion in the publications of the Russian migr about Lossky's author's vision statement of the development of Russian philosophy and its specifics. As it follows from the correspondence of N.O. Lossky with D.I. Chizhevsky and with publisher A.S. Kagan, it was also planned to publish the book with additions in Spanish and German publishing houses. Up to and including 1956, N.O. Lossky continued to work on the Russian-language "History of Russian Philosophy", which was given to Russia for publication by his son Boris Nikolaevich Lossky only in the early 90s. New materials found in the Paris archive of N.O. Lossky complement the debate both about N.O. Lossky's "History of Russian Philosophy", and about the nature of Russian philosophy. (shrink)

A new translation of two essential works on Deleuze, written by one of his contemporaries. From the publication of Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event to his untimely death in 2006, Francois Zourabichvili was regarded as one of the most important new voices of contemporary philosophy in France. His work continues to make an essential contribution to Deleuze scholarship today. This edition makes two of Zourabichvili's most important writings on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze available in a (...) single volume. A Philosophy of the Event is an exposition of Deleuze's philosophy as a whole, while the complementary Deleuze's Vocabulary approaches Deleuze's work through an analysis of key concepts in a dictionary form. This new translation is set to become an event within Deleuze Studies for many years to come. Key Features: Distinguishes Deleuze's notion of the event from the phenomenological, ontological and voluntarist conceptions that continue to lay claim to it today; With an introduction by Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith, two of the world's leading commentators on Deleuze, explaining the key themes and arguments of Zourabichvili's work. (shrink)

This extended investigation of the semantics of event (and state) sentences in their various forms is a major contribution to the semantics of natural language, simultaneously encompassing important issues in linguistics, philosophy, and logic. It develops the view that the logical forms of simple English sentences typically contain quantification over events or states and shows how this view can account for a wide variety of semantic phenomena. Focusing on the structure of meaning in English sentences at a &"subatomic&" (...) level&-that is, a level below the one most theories accept as basic or &"atomic&"&-Parsons asserts that the semantics of simple English sentences require logical forms somewhat more complex than is normally assumed in natural language semantics. His articulation of underlying event theory explains a wide variety of apparently diverse semantic characteristics of natural language, and his development of the theory shows the importance of seeing the distinction between events and states. Parsons demonstrates that verbs, also, indicate kinds of actions rather than specific, individual actions. Verb phrases, too, he argues, depend on modifiers to make their function and meaning in a sentence specific. An appendix gives many of the details needed to formalize the theory discussed in the body of the text and provides a series of templates that permit the generation of atomic formulas of English. (shrink)

What constitutes an event? Propelled by this question, Sounding the Event encounters a variety of theories and a host of issues that have implications for not only conceptions of nature and becoming, subject and substance but also practices of time, art and photography. This book explores dialogue in its writing and as it encounters the philosophical utterances of Michel Serres, Isabelle Stengers, Alfred North Whitehead, Jean-Franbliogçois Lyotard, Maurice Blanchot, Gilles Deleuze and Fbliogelix Guattari, and Alain Badiou.

There are two main camps in 20th-century philosophy of time: A-theorists who believe in the dynamic model of reality, and B-theorists who maintain a static model of reality. After the publication of Putnam’s influential article, “time and physical geometry”, the implications of the Special Theory of Relativity became serious in metaphysical discussions about temporal reality. Some philosophers argued that this theory contradicts the dynamic model and implies the ontology of the static model, namely, the objective reality of the present, (...) past and future events. In response, some advocates of the dynamic model argued that there can be dynamic models in relativistic setting, though they are different, radically, from old theories of dynamic reality. In this paper, first, I shall discuss how special relativity contradicts the traditional dynamic model and, then, how new dynamic models imply a relative concept of reality, in contrast to its old absolute concept and, so, why these strategies are very unintuitive. Finally, I shall argue that this radical conceptual shift about reality is, not only unintuitive, but unwarranted and, in some sense, inconsistent as well. (shrink)

In recent years, a disagreement has erupted between two camps of philosophers about the rationality of bias toward the near and bias toward the future. According to the traditional hybrid view, near bias is rationally impermissible, while future bias is either rationally permissible or obligatory. Time neutralists, meanwhile, argue that the hybrid view is untenable. They claim that those who reject near bias should reject both biases and embrace time neutrality. To date, experimental work has focused on future-directed near bias. (...) The primary aim of this paper is to shed light on the debate by investigating past-directed near bias. If people treat the past and future differently with respect to near bias, by being future-directed but not past-directed near biased, then this supports a particular version of the hybrid view: temporal metaphysic hybridism. If people treat the past and future the same with respect to near bias, then this supports a simple version of time neutralism, which explains both future bias and near bias in terms of the functioning of a single mechanism: the anticipatory/retrospectory mechanism. Our results undermine the claim that people are future-directed, but not past-directed, near biased, and hence do not support temporal metaphysic hybridism. They also fail to support simple time-neutralism; instead, they suggest that there are multiple mechanisms that differently shape future- and past-directed preferences. (shrink)

A fascinating exploration into the 125 most important milestones in philosophy, all in one handy book perfect for keeping on your bedside table or carrying wherever you go. Now is the perfect time to expand your knowledge and learn something new or delve deeper into a topic you've always been interested in. With 125 concise, informative, and entertaining entries, The Bedside Book of Philosophy explores the key theories, great insights, thought-provoking questions, influential personalities, and seminal publications in the (...) field over the millennia. Gregory Bassham covers a wide range of topics and cultures--from Confucian ethics and Plato's theory of forms to Occam's Razor, Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, existentialism, feminist philosophy, Social Darwinism, and The Good Place--all in an accessible, conversational voice. Includes 75 black-and-white illustrations throughout. (shrink)

차이의 철학은 차이의 개념을 존재자들 사이의 관계는 물론 존재자의 존재이유로까지 밀고가려는 존재론적 기획이다. 이는 차이만이 아니라 동일성을, 나아가 ‘구조’라는 말로 불리는 동일성의 재생산 또한 차이에 의해 해명해야 한다. 동시에 그로부터 이탈하는 차이의 힘을 그 구조 안에 밀어넣어야 한다. 『차이와 반복』은 이념과 강도라는 개념을 통해 이 문제를 해결하면서, 차이 개념을 존재론적 차이로까지 밀고 간다. 의미의 논리에서는 특이성과 우발성의 개념이 이와 상응하는 기능을 수행하는데, ‘이념적 사건’과 ‘아이온의 시간’은이 두 개념과 대응한다. 그런데 차이의 존재론이 이념에서 강도로 현행화되는 길을 따라 전개되는 것과 반대로, 의미의 (...) 논리는 현행화된 것에서 잠재적인 것으로 거슬러 올라가며 전개된다. 이는 ‘의미’와 ‘사건’이 현행화된 것의 ‘해석’을 기다리는 개념이 아니라, ‘다시 한번!’을 반복하는 주사위 던지기의 실천철학적 개념이란 점에 기인한다. 나는 이러한 점을 강조함으로써, 현행화에 끼어든 우연적 조건으로 오해되는 우발성 개념과, ‘카이로스의 시간’이나 ‘시적 시간’ 같은 특별한 순간으로 오인되는 아이온의 시간 개념을 명확히 하고자 한다. 이로써 들뢰즈가 제안하는 의미의 논리가 단지 의미에 대한 철학일 뿐 아니라 영원회귀의 실천철학임을 드러날 것이다. 이는 ‘지시’, ‘표명’, ‘의미작용’과 구별되는 의미의 4번째 차원으로서의 사건 개념을 정의하는 것을 필두로 이루어질 것이다. (shrink)

The Man in the High Castle is an Amazon TV show, based on the Philip K. Dick novel, about an "alternate present" (beginning in the 1960s) in which Germany and Japan won World War II, with the former Western US occupied by Japan, the former Eastern U.S. occupied by Nazi Germany, and a small "neutral zone" between them. A theme of the story is that in this alternative world there is eager speculation, fueled by the illicit newsreel, The Grasshopper Lies (...) Heavy, about how the world would have been different if America had won the war. -/- In The Man in the High Castle and Philosophy, twenty-two professional thinkers look at philosophical issues raised by this ongoing enterprise in "alternative history." One question is whether it really made a profound difference that the Allies won the war, and exactly what differences in everyday life we may expect to arise from an apparent historical turning point. Could it be that some dramatic historical events have only superficial consequences, while some unnoticed occurrences lead to catastrophic results? (shrink)

Benjamin provides new and important readings of key canonical texts in the history of philosophy in his sustained philosophical reworking of ontology. Amongst texts included are Hegel's _Difference Essay_ and the _Shorter Logic_ and Heidegger's _Time and Being_ and _The Question of Being_. The effective presence of ontology, defined as `an original difference', will be familiar to readers of his earlier writings. This book represents his most thorough and original contribution to contemporary philosophy to date.

When our smartphones distract us, much more is at stake than a momentary lapse of attention. Our use of smartphones can interfere with the building-blocks of meaningfulness and the actions that shape our self-identity. -/- By analyzing social interactions and evolving experiences, Roholt reveals the mechanisms of smartphone-distraction that impact our meaningful projects and activities. Roholt’s conception of meaning in life draws from a disparate group of philosophers—Susan Wolf, John Dewey, Hubert Dreyfus, Martin Heidegger, and Albert Borgmann. Central to Roholt’s (...) argument are what Borgmann calls focal practices: dinners with friends, running, a college seminar, attending sporting events. As a recurring example, Roholt develops the classification of musical instruments as focal things, contending that musical performance can be fruitfully understood as a focal practice. -/- Through this exploration of what generates meaning in life, Roholt makes us rethink the place we allow smartphones to occupy in the everyday. But he remains cautiously optimistic. This thoughtful, needed interrogation of smartphones shows how we can establish a positive role for technologies within our lives. (shrink)

Philosophical questions about events lie at the crossing of several disciplines, from metaphysics and logic to philosophy of language, action theory, the philosophy of space and time.

Events are always passing; to experience an event is to experience the passing. But how do we perceive an experience that encompasses the just-was and the is-about-to-be as much as what is actually present? In _Semblance and Event_, Brian Massumi, drawing on the work of William James, Alfred North Whitehead, Gilles Deleuze, and others, develops the concept of "semblance" as a way to approach this question. It is, he argues, a question of abstraction, not as the opposite of the (...) concrete but as a dimension of it: "lived abstraction." A semblance is a lived abstraction. Massumi uses the category of the semblance to investigate practices of art that are relational and event-oriented -- variously known as interactive art, ephemeral art, performance art, art intervention -- which he refers to collectively as the "occurrent arts." Each art practice invents its own kinds of relational events of lived abstraction, to produce a signature species of semblance. The artwork's relational engagement, Massumi continues, gives it a political valence just as necessary and immediate as the aesthetic dimension. (shrink)

In this autobiographical essay, I will sketch some events which have played a significant role in my intellectual biography. I began my career with a study of Islamic thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries before turning towards a study of Sufism. The exchanges, which took place with colleagues during conferences conducted by the East-West Philosophers’ Conferences, proved to be crucial for my further philosophical development. My current philosophizing is marked by a turn towards intercultural philosophy. In many (...) ways, my own intellectual biography parallels socio-political developments. What began as an intellectual exchange with Soviet fellow philosophers during the heydays of the USSR has matured towards a quest for an intercultural philosophical standpoint. (shrink)