Herodotus’Historiesbegin in earnest with Lydia and the infamous tale of the fall of Candaules and the rise of the Mermnad dynasty under Gyges. Yet, for all that Gyges was evidently a transformational figure in Lydian history and, through the story of his usurpation of the throne from Candaules, came to occupy a prominent place in the received memory of the Lydian world, Herodotus tells us very little about Gyges himself or his reign. Chapters 1.13–14 tell us about (...) the role of the Delphic oracle in legitimizing the rule of Gyges in Lydia, as well as his lavish dedications at Delphi, in which he set a precedent followed by Alyattes and Croesus, the more notable among his successors. Yet, the remainder of his reign is summarized in less than one sentence: ‘He sent an army to Miletus and Smyrna as soon as he took power, and seized the citadel of Colophon, but no other great deed was done by him during his thirty-eight year reign … ’. (shrink)

The tale of Gyges' ring narrated by Cicero atDe officiis3.38 is of course originally found, and acknowledged as such by Cicero, in Plato (Resp.359c–360b). I would like in this paper to address two questions about Cicero's handling of the tale – one historical, one philosophical. The purpose of the historical question is to evaluate, with respect to the Gyges narration, Cicero's quality as a reader of Plato. How well does Cicero understand the role of the story in its (...) original Platonic context? The motivation for the question is that, at first blush, Cicero seems to have badly misunderstood it. I shall argue that the appearance is illusory, and that Cicero understands the tale's Platonic provenance perfectly well. Now it should be noted that the question of Cicero's grasp of the tale's purpose in Plato is distinct from the question whether Cicero himself puts the story to the same or a different use than Plato did. I shall suggest that while there are striking points of contact between the two treatments, on one crucial feature – namely the tale's ostentatiously far-fetched nature – Cicero is instructively more explicit than Plato. (shrink)

Glaucon¿s story about the ring of invisibility in Republic 359d-60b is examined in order to assess the wider role of fictional fabrication in Plato¿s philosophical argument. The first part of the article (I) looks at the close connections this tale has to the account of Gyges in Herodotus (1.8-12). It is argued that Plato exhibits a specific dependence on Herodotus, which suggests Glaucon¿s story might be an original invention: the assumption that there must be a lost ¿original¿ to inspire (...) Plato¿s story of the ring has never accommodated the possibility of Plato drawing, perhaps quite directly, from Herodotus. The next section (II) considers the function of that fable within the larger philosophical and aesthetic structure of the Republic. Appreciation of the entire dialogue as an exercise in fiction, as well as philosophy, helps to reveal the ways in which philosophical argument and fictional invention are closely bound up in the formation of Glaucon¿s fabulous anecdote. Finally (III), a reading of Cicero¿s treatment of the story in De Officiis confirms the degree to which philosophical reasoning and fiction can be quite generally interdependent. Although the arguments in Sections II and III are consistent with the opening contention that the ring story was invented by Plato, they do not presuppose it. (shrink)

Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and Christopher Shields (2006) claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic II cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse (...) class='Hi'>Gyges’ behavior, it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain. (shrink)

Plato’s Socrates holds that we always have reason to be just, since being just is essential for living a happy and successful life. In Book II of Plato’s Republic, Socrates’ main interlocutor, Glaucon, raises a vivid and powerful challenge to this claim. He presents the case of Gyges, a Lydian shepherd who possesses a ring that gives him the power of invisibility. Glaucon’s contention is that Gyges does not have reason to be just in this circumstance, since being (...) just will not promote his happiness. Thus, the argument poses the following challenge: what reason do we have to be just, particularly in circumstances where we can get away with injustice? In this essay, we describe Glaucon’s challenge, highlight its similarity to challenges offered by other skeptical figures in the history of philosophy, namely, Hobbes’ Foole and Hume’s sensible knave, and present three broad lines of response. (shrink)

(2001). Hollis, Rousseau and Gyges' ring. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 4, Trusting in Reason: Martin Hollis and the Philosophy of Social Action, pp. 55-68. doi: 10.1080/13698230108403364.

Is a rational morality a necessary evil—a mean between what an individual would judge best—bettering his situation at whatever cost to others, and worst—having one's situation worsened at other's pleasure? It would seem that Glaucon's fable of the ring of Gyges may be applied to our account of morality. And indeed, matters may be worse—a contractarian morality such as we have developed may seem to be a tool for the clever and strong to use in domination, using the language (...) of cooperation to conceal the reality of exploitation. If we understand ourselves on the model of economic man, treating all basic motivation as exemplifying asociality and all human relationships as contractual, we may find these conclusions hard to escape. Even though we could understand the rational arguments in support of morality, our feelings would be engaged only by our own concerns, and we would lack any affective capacity for morality. (shrink)

본 연구의 목적은 인간의 본성에 대한 철학적 탐구의 역사와 인간의 도덕성의 기원에 대한 객관적 검토를 통하여 도덕교육의 필요성과 의의를 확인하는 데 있다. 이러한 작업을 위하여 본 연구에서는 먼저 플라톤과 소피스트의 논쟁을 중심으로 인간의 도덕성의 기원문제에 대한 객관적 검토를 시행할 것이다. 그리고 홉스의 계약론에 대한 분석을 통하여 인간이 비록 이기적 존재이지만 합리적 선택의 능력을 가진 이성적 존재라는 측면에 주목하면서 합리적 합의로부터 도출되는 도덕성을 설명하는 데 필요한 장치와 가정을 검토할 것이다. 그리고 마지막으로 사회가 점점 상호 협력하는 환경, 즉 보다 정의로운 사회 환경이 (...) 조성될수록 개인은 더욱 더 협력하고 정의롭게 행위 한다는 경험적 사실을 바탕으로 개인의 도덕교육의 필요성과 의의를 강조할 것이다. (shrink)

The paper argues that the act of looking, as defined between the story of Gyges, Candaules, and the offended queen and the story of Solon's visit to Lydia, functions in the first book of Herodotus, and perhaps also elsewhere throughout the Inquiry, as a metaphor for the relation of the histôr to the object of his investigation. Further, by a careful comparison of the Gyges story in Herodotus with the queen's own narration in the enigmatic "Gyges Tragedy" (...) , we can define a Herodotean psychology of spectation that bears a striking resemblance to the specifically tragic psychology manifest in the fragment. Herodotus positions his readers, the paper argues, in the place of Gyges, forcing them to look-in their imaginations-on what does not belong to them, just as the theatai in the Theater of Dionysus must look in imagination on the scene described by the queen. While the tragic audience is protected from the fate of Candaules and of Gyges' descendant Croesus by the constitutive blindness of tragedy that prevents the spectators from seeing what happens in the mukhos, Herodotus' audience must seek some other reassurance that they will not face the voyeur's penalty. This paper finally argues that Solon's theôria, with its crucial purpose of establishing the nomoi of Athens and its crucial ethic of looking not at the object of desire but at the end, installs in Herodotus' historiê the psychology of tragedy: to look desiringly is to lose, but to look inquiringly is to learn. (shrink)

Does morality override self-interest? Or does self-interest override morality? These questions become important in situations where there is conflict between the overall verdicts of morality and self-interest, situations where morality on balance requires an action that is contrary to our self-interest, or where considerations of self-interest on balance call for an action that is forbidden by morality. In situations of this kind, we want to know what we ought simpliciter to do. If one of these standpoints over-rides the other, then (...) there is a straightforward answer. We ought simpliciter to act on the verdict of the overriding standpoint. For purposes of this essay, I assume that there are possible cases in which the overall verdicts of morality and self-interest conflict. I will call cases of this kind “conflict cases.” The verdict of morality in a conflict case would be a proposition as to what we ought morally to do, or as to what we have the most moral reason to do; the verdict of self-interest would be a proposition as to what we ought to do in our self-interest, or as to what action is best supported by reasons or considerations of self-interest. These propositions are action-guiding or normative in a familiar sense. The conflict between morality and self-interest in conflict cases is there-fore a normative conflict; it is a conflict between the overall verdicts of different normative standpoints. I take it that the question of whether morality overrides self-interest is the question of whether the verdicts of morality are normatively more important than the verdicts of self-interest. In due course, I will explain the idea of normative importance as well as the ideas of a normative proposition and of a reason. (shrink)

The present work aims at studying the myth of Gyges’ ring from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work The Reveries of a solitary Walker. Gyges’ ring is a magic artefact, allowing its bearer to be visible or invisible according to his will. The ring’s myth is portraited for the first time in the Second Book of Plato’s Republic. Thusly, our article is divided in two parts: the first one presents an analysis of the Republic observing its challenge of justice and the (...) relation it holds with the art of ruling; the second part presents an investigation of Rousseau’s work to show how he had absorbed the ring’s myth. The main objective of our work is the comparison between Plato’s and Rousseau’s view of Gyges’ ring, and the investigation of the concept of nature as one of the pillars of the social contract theory. As results we present the way Rousseau answers to the challenge of justice from the concept of justice within the soul, whereas no harm could be done to others. In his reflexion on the ring, Rousseau seems to point at the existence of an interior justice according to its “natural inclination”, opposite to any obligation of the positive law among men. Therefore, one needs to observe that Rousseau is defending justice according to the natural rights holding that any contract established among men should be according to nature. This agrees with our thesis of a possible political ontology based on firstly, the concept of a universal justice, and secondly, on the art of ruling according to justice. (shrink)

In her already classical criticism of thought-experimenting, Kathy Wilkes points to superficialities in the most famous moral-political thought experiments, taking the Ring of Gyges as her central example. Her critics defend the Ring by discussing possible variations in the scenario(s) imagined. I propose here that the debate points to a significant dual structure of thought experiments. Their initial presentation(s) mobilize the immediate, cognitively not very impressive imaginative and refl ective efforts both of the proponent and the listener of the (...) proposal. The further debate, like the one exemplifi ed by Wilkes’s criticisms and some of the answers, appeals to a deeper, more rational variety of imagination and reasoning. I suggest that this duality is typical for moral and political thought experimenting in general, conjecture that it might be extended to the whole area of thought experimenting. (shrink)

Levinas and the Wisdom of Love: Breaking Gyges' Secret is an essay on the ways in which wisdom can be used to make one invisible to the other. I also show how a wisdom of love, as Levinas describes it, can make one visible to the Other, and thereby more human. ;In analyzing Levinas' wisdom of love and how it is different from other types of wisdom, I focus on Levinas' saying that "philosophy is the wisdom of love at (...) the service of love." This study examines, in turn, Levinas' understanding of love, which I defend as irreducibly distinct from self-love, but compatible with it. Unlike some other compatibilist interpretations of Levinas, I maintain that this view is consistent with a strongly asymmetrical view of neighbor love. This is possible since Levinas' asymmetry is not properly understood as the absence of return, but by the absence of speech which demands reciprocity. ;In asking what sort of priority love is to have over wisdom , I raise the possibilities of 'chronological priority,' 'logical priority,' and 'hierarchical priority,' while dismissing all but the last type. Then I argue that even the altering of hierarchical priority Levinas suggests is not a mere reversal where now the ethical relation---rather than ontology---has a dominating priority. Instead, I suggest a type of hierarchical inversion of priority which I call a 'pacific priority' and show how this priority seems impossible unless one recognizes the distinction between power and authority. ;After analyzing Levinas' understanding of love and priority, I turn to the question of wisdom and ask how Levinas' 'wisdom of love,'---understood as a real possibility and not just an impossible ideal---is any different than the types of wisdom he critiques. The central difference is how one traces the origin of wisdom, and this allows one to give a different answer to Gyges' veiling question of whether it is better to suffer or inflict injustice. I argue that this question lies at the heart of Levinas' project and suggest ways for becoming visible, which is, according to Levinas, to become human. (shrink)

In order to re-examine what role Plato gives to images in the Republic, this chapter argues against modern commentators’ views and demonstrates that for Plato, images represent reality in special ways and that the simile is not simply a didactic method of explaining familiar objects, but is an effective method of inquiry to reveal a reality unknown to us. First it shows that Plato ascribes to images a special role of transforming our souls, by examining the famous story of (...) class='Hi'>Gyges’ ring; second, by analysing the simile of the Sun, it shows that images are real in the sense that they reveal to us the world beyond sensible things. These two examples represent two important aspects, namely, a psychological exercise for changing ourselves and an ontological possibility for such images. In order to rehabilitate our conception of the image, the chapter considers views on images by Japanese philosophers, Megumi Sakabe and Toshihiko Izutsu. (shrink)

THE SECOND BOOK OF PLATO’S REPUBLIC begins with a spirited outburst. Glaucon, not satisfied with Socrates’ arguments proving the goodness of justice in book 1, demands a new proof. At once deeply tempted and deeply repelled by the life of injustice, he wishes to be purged of his longing for tyranny and, accordingly, wants Socrates to show that justice itself, by itself, is good, that is, that justice is not simply a necessary evil, something good by law or nomos but (...) not by nature. To explain what he means, Glaucon tells a story. Perhaps it is worth quoting in full. (shrink)

PurposeThe paper aims to examine the profound transformations engendered by the information revolution in order to determine aspects of what should be visible or invisible in human affairs. It seeks to explore the meaning of invisibility via an interdisciplinary approach, including computer science, law, and ethics.Design/methodology/approachThe method draws on both theoretical and empirical material so as to scrutinise the ways in which today's information revolution is recasting the boundaries between visibility and invisibility.FindingsThe degrees of exposure to public notice can be (...) understood as a matter of balance between access and control over information in a specific context, as well as a function of the ontological friction in a given region of the environment.Originality/valueThe originality of the case study on a new kind of recommender system is enhanced because of the procedural approach which is suggested to further develop the distinction between “good” and “evil” as anything that enriches, or damages, the informational complexity of the environment. (shrink)

This paper illustrates some of the exciting and interesting philosophical discussions we can have with children when we let them develop the thread of the conversation in their own ways. The author discusses the virtue of patience when doing philosophy with children, and the importance of letting the rhythms of the discussion unfold without undue adult interference. Adults (and especially teachers) often attempt to control the ways in which children discuss issues with one another. The author reminds us of how (...) powerful it can be for a philosophical conversation among children to develop organically. and of how allowing silences to occur can inspire further philosophical explorations among the children. (shrink)

This paper illustrates some of the exciting and interesting philosophical discussions we can have with children when we let them develop the thread of the conversation in their own ways. The author discusses the virtue of patience when doing philosophy with children, and the importance of letting the rhythms of the discussion unfold without undue adult interference. Adults (and especially teachers) often attempt to control the ways in which children discuss issues with one another. The author reminds us of how (...) powerful it can be for a philosophical conversation among children to develop organically. and of how allowing silences to occur can inspire further philosophical explorations among the children. (shrink)

Moral philosophy in all its contemporary forms, whether consequentialist, formalist, contractarian, utilitarian, or virtue ethicist, presumes the possibility of formulating principles of conduct that apply universally to all human beings. Standard exceptions are infants and young children, persons who are clinically insane, and persons with reduced mental capacity. These exceptions are recognized by all modern systems of morality and law. The inability to distinguish right from wrong, due to immature age, mental disorganization, or insufficient intelligence is grounds to exempt any (...) given person from moral responsibility and moral agency.Human beings not bound by such conditions are distinguished by their capacity .. (shrink)

Gyges was the first tyrant reigning in Lydia by the Mermenadae's around the seventh century BC. He was also the first great barbarian whom the Greeks made contact to. His complex character has made the development of several stories about him, and the most famous was the one which tells how he came to power. His glory traveled the Greek world and influenced the lyric poetry of his age. Thereafter, history, philosophy and rhetoric were likely influenced, mostly about his (...) power and wealth. In Plato Gyges appear in Glaucon's narrative in Book II of Republic (359b-360b) which tells the deeds of the one to become the sovereign of Lydia. However, one difficulty on the passage 359d which makes the direct identification of Gyges with the narrative has been mistaken. We aim through this work to present some proposals to the passage mentioned using not only Plato's text, but the lyric and historical sources before him. (shrink)

Gyges was the first tyrant reigning in Lydia by the Mermenadae's around the seventh century BC. He was also the first great barbarian whom the Greeks made contact to. His complex character has made the development of several stories about him, and the most famous was the one which tells how he came to power. His glory traveled the Greek world and influenced the lyric poetry of his age. Thereafter, history, philosophy and rhetoric were likely influenced, mostly about his (...) power and wealth. In Plato Gyges appear in Glaucon's narrative in Book II of Republic (359b-360b) which tells the deeds of the one to become the sovereign of Lydia. However, one difficulty on the passage 359d which makes the direct identification of Gyges with the narrative has been mistaken. We aim through this work to present some proposals to the passage mentioned using not only Plato's text, but the lyric and historical sources before him. (shrink)

A specific clinical encounter in which the author was an ethics consultant, after a brief summary, provides the basis for a phenomenological delineation and explication of the key ingredients of such encounters. A brief historical reflection on the myths of Gyges and Aesculapius suggests that several of these ingredients are essential to clinical encounters and help constitute their specific moral aspects and challenges. Understood as an interpersonal relationship framed by critical issues of illness experiences, the clinical encounter makes prominent (...) such constitutive features as dialogue, trust, violence, and especially vulnerability and power. The role of the clinical ethicist is found to be often critical in these encounters, in particular because of the need to help patients and doctors identify, understand, and cope productively with fundamental moral phenomena. (shrink)

Trusting someone in an intuitive, rich sense of the term involves not just relying on that person, but manifesting reliance on them in the expectation that this manifestation of reliance will increase their reason and motive to prove reliable. Can trust between people be formed on the basis of Internet contact alone? Forming the required expectation in regard to another person, and so trusting them on some matter, may be due to believing that they are trustworthy; to believing that they (...) seek es teem and will be rationally responsive to the good opinion communicated or promised by an act of trust; or to both factors at once. Neither mechanism can rationally command confidence, however, in the case where people are related only via the Internet. On the Internet everyone wears the ring of Gyges; everyone is invisible, in their personal identity, to others. (shrink)

Wittgensteinian ethics, it may be thought, is committed to detailed examination of realistically described cases, and hence to eschewing the abstract hypothetical cases, many of them quite bizarre, found in much contemporary moral theorizing. I argue that bizarre cases may be helpful in thinking about ethics, and that there is nothing in Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy that would go against this. I examine the case of the ring of Gyges from the Republic; and I consider also some contemporary arguments (...) about thought-experiments in philosophy. (shrink)

In this essay, part of a cluster of pieces on her concept of “lyric philosophy,” the author explores connections between imagination, understood as the capacity to think in images, and what Wittgenstein called “seeing-as.” In seeing-as, we focus on what Wittgenstein identifies as inner structural relations. This is a term that Max Wertheimer, one of the founders of gestalt philosophical psychology, used independently to describe how seeing-as involves seeing into a thing or situation. The present essay suggests that both seeing-as (...) and seeing-into depend on, and develop, sensitivity to ontological resonance, the attunement of things with one another, the deep analogies that constitute the underlying structure of the world. Imagination is thus fundamental to the good, or ethical, life. For its disciplined exercise relieves us of what Simone Weil calls the “Ring of Gyges”: the refusal to perceive significant analogies between ourselves and other beings, which is the root of injustice. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle offers a solution to the problem of motivating morality based on his distinction between three types of friendship. I consider Aristotle's argument in detail, placing it in a context of similar concerns about the question of why we ought to be moral that ranges from Socrates' discussion of the ring of Gyges in Plato's Republic to Wittgenstein's distinction between internal and external rewards and punishments for action in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Contrary to J.O. Urmson's conclusion that (...) Aristotle's discussion of the highest form of friendship is an editorial insertion in Book VIII of the Ethics, I attempt to show, by filling in the necessary steps in Aristotle's inference, that the treatment of friendship is an integral part of what Aristotle considers a complete moral philosophy. According to the interpretation that I propose, Aristotle's account of being worthy of the highest form of friendship is indispensable to his explanation of an internally rewarding reason for being moral. (shrink)

Trusting someone in an intuitive, rich sense of the term involves not just relying on that person, but manifesting reliance on them in the expectation that this manifestation of reliance will increase their reason and motive to prove reliable. Can trust between people be formed on the basis of Internet contact alone? Forming the required expectation in regard to another person, and so trusting them on some matter, may be due to believing that they are trustworthy; to believing that they (...) seek esteem and will be rationally responsive to the good opinion communicated or promised by an act of trust; or to both factors at once. Neither mechanism can rationally command confidence, however, in the case where people are related only via the Internet. On the Internet everyone wears the ring of Gyges; everyone is invisible, in their personal identity, to others. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Not Kill a Mandarin?:An ExchangeAmihud GileadIn a powerful and well-written thought experiment, Iddo Landau attempts to persuade us that "people cannot be trusted... people... such as ourselves need to be well supervised... there are important advantages in fearing others, in hesitating to be real individuals, and in constantly apprehending what 'they' will say."1Following Balzac, Landau's thought experiment echoes, to some extent, Plato's myth of Gyges's ring in (...) the Republic (359d ff. and 612b). One of the lessons the reader may draw from this myth is that not only fear but shame also plays a crucial role in human morality. With no shame, without the fear of being caught in a shameful act or deed, people would behave much less morally than they actually do. Like Plato's Socrates, mentioning the gods, the supreme judges in Hades,2 Landau relates his idea also to the belief in God (p. 93). Note also that Socrates's view of morality is compatible with the view that each human being is nothing but smikron, a trifle (Symposium 210b8). Plato's Socrates entertains no false ideas about the alleged "human individuality."A similar logic leads Landau to conclude about the moral requirement "in hesitating to be real individuals," or, better, really autonomous individuals. Thus this conclusion also hints critically against Kantian autonomous morality. As if, contrary to Kant, Landau suggests that in order to behave morally, respecting the moral law or value is certainly less than enough. Instead, he argues, we have to fear what others will say about our behavior and preferences and, while behaving immorally, we [End Page 153] should be ashamed of ourselves in the eyes of other people; otherwise we would not be moral beings at all. All other motives, however sublime, are not sufficient to make us moral beings. Landau regards self-deception or simply wistful thinking of any attempt at thinking otherwise (p. 94), namely, that other motives (such as the respect for the moral law) are sufficient to behave morally. Landau's view is prudent, realistic, and powerful, but, nonetheless, annoying. I have a strong feeling that he is wrong, and this feeling of mine, I believe, does not rest upon self-deception or wishful thinking about humanity; it relies instead upon insight that is backed by sound argument.Why a fairly ordinary person, one of us, would not like to kill a Mandarin, who has done no harm to any of us and who is a completely remote stranger, a lonely person whose death would not change any one else's life but instead would benefit that ordinary person a lot? Suppose, like Landau's thought experiment, that no one, absolutely no one, not even omniscient God, if He exists at all, would know even a little bit about the intention, let alone the deed, of any such potential murderer who can be any human being. What could be his or her reason, as sufficient motive, not to kill the Mandarin after all, even if such a murder would change the life of the potential murderer enormously for the better?We have to explicate Balzac-Landau's thought experiment slightly in order to realize its failure. I call this explication "the mutual effect presupposition" (or, if you like, "the reflexive effect presupposition"). Actually, the thought experiment presupposes it for, if the wish or consent of the potential ("wishful") murderer can cause the Mandarin's death which, in turn, benefits the potential murderer immensely, they are both under the mutual effect presupposition. The problem is that Landau and others appear to be unaware of the moral significance or implication of this presupposition. According to it, given that if I can wish for the Mandarin's death and cause it by means of this wish, then someone, sharing the same world with me, may wish for my own death and may bring it about by means of such a wish alone, provided that absolutely no one knew about such a wish. Would I accept that? Would the potential murderer accept a possible situation in which he would be the Mandarin whom somebody else would like to murder for the... (shrink)