Background Moral distress is a serious problem for health care personnel. Surveys, individual interviews, and focus groups may not capture all of the effects of, and responses to, moral distress. Therefore, we used a new participatory action research approach—moral conflict assessment (MCA)—to characterize moral distress and to facilitate the development of interventions for this problem. Aim To characterize moral distress by analyzing responses of intensive care unit (ICU) personnel who participated in the MCA process. Research Design In this qualitative study, (...) we invited all ICU personnel at 3 urban hospitals to participate in individual or group sessions using the 8-step MCA tool. These sessions were facilitated by either a clinical ethicist or a counseling psychologist who was trained in this process. During each session, one of the researchers took notes and prepared a report for each MCA which were analyzed using qualitative content analysis. Participants and Research Context A total of 24 participants took part in 15 sessions, individually or in groups; 14 were nurses and nurse leaders, 2 were physicians, and 8 were other health professionals. Ethical Considerations This study was approved by the Providence Health Care/University of British Columbia Behavioural Research Ethics Board. Each participant provided written informed consent. Results The main causes of moral distress related to goals of care, communication, teamwork, respect for patient’s preferences, and the managerial system. Suggested solutions included communication strategies and educational activities for health care providers, patients, family members, and others about teamwork, advance directives, and end-of-life care. Participants acknowledged that using the MCA process helped them to reflect on their own thoughts and use their moral agency to turn a distressing situation into a learning and improvement opportunity. Conclusions Using the MCA tool helped participants to characterize their moral distress in a systematic way, and to arrive at new potential solutions. (shrink)

The purpose of the following article is to juxtapose and compare the concept of shame as seen by two contemporary French philosophers, Jean Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas. The fundamental problem that is posed in this article concerns the role and significance of the impact of shame on the formation of human subjectivity. For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, the subject attempts to bear the burden of being in a heroic way and the experience of shame proves to (...) be an important experience in this process. Is it an ontological or ethical experience? Or perhaps metaphysical? For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, shame is a relational experience, i.e., it occurs in relation to You. But does this Other have to come to me from outside? In Sartre’s case, shame appears in the experience of the gaze of the Other, and it is a traumatic experience. The Other interferes with my freedom and challenges me as a subject. The experience of shame makes me aware of my subjugation by the Other. In Levinas, the experience of shame comes originally from within myself. The shame of my own existence demands justification. I can be ashamed in relation to myself. I can be a menace of myself. I don’t need the presence of another human being for this. What unites and what separates the two philosophers in interpreting the experience of shame for human subjectivity? (shrink)

The purpose of the following article is to juxtapose and compare the concept of shame as seen by two contemporary French philosophers, Jean Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas. The fundamental problem that is posed in this article concerns the role and significance of the impact of shame on the formation of human subjectivity. For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, the subject attempts to bear the burden of being in a heroic way and the experience of shame proves to (...) be an important experience in this process. Is it an ontological or ethical experience? Or perhaps metaphysical? For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, shame is a relational experience, i.e., it occurs in relation to You. But does this Other have to come to me from outside? In Sartre’s case, shame appears in the experience of the gaze of the Other, and it is a traumatic experience. The Other interferes with my freedom and challenges me as a subject. The experience of shame makes me aware of my subjugation by the Other. In Levinas, the experience of shame comes originally from within myself. The shame of my own existence demands justification. I can be ashamed in relation to myself. I can be a menace of myself. I don’t need the presence of another human being for this. What unites and what separates the two philosophers in interpreting the experience of shame for human subjectivity? (shrink)

The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent to a dominance condition; (...) that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe- Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance. (shrink)

This book explains, in simple terms, with a minimum of mathematics, why things can appear to be in two places at the same time, why correlations between simultaneous events occurring far apart cannot be explained by local mechanisms, and why, nevertheless, the quantum theory can be understood in terms of matter in motion. No need to worry, as some people do, whether a cat can be both dead and alive, whether the moon is there when nobody looks at it, or (...) whether quantum systems need an observer to acquire definite properties. The author's inimitable and even humorous style makes the book a pleasure to read while bringing a new clarity to many of the longstanding puzzles of quantum physics. (shrink)

The Dominican theologian Durand of Saint-Pourçain (ca. 1275–1334), breaking from the wide consensus, made a two-pronged attack on concurrentism (i.e., the theory according to which God does more than conserving creatures in existence and co-causes all their actions). On the one hand, he shows that the concurrentist position leads to the unacceptable consequence that God is the direct cause of man’s evil actions. On the other hand, he attacks the metaphysical foundations of concurrentism, first in the version offered by Thomas (...) Aquinas and Giles of Rome, and then in a more general way. Against Thomas and Giles, he challenges Neoplatonic assumptions about causality and being. More generally, he establishes that God’s action and a creature’s action can be neither identical nor different, and thus cannot both be direct causes of the same effect. Without claiming that Durand’s series of objections are definitely unanswerable, we may at least observe that they have generally been underestimated (which earned him the lowly role of the mere foil of the concurrentist view in the history of philosophy) and are able to do considerable damage to concurrentism. (shrink)

It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary relations are entirely arbitrary from an ordinal point of view. These properties would be, in a nutshell, the hallmark of (...) cardinal utility. While much is obviously true in these two tenets, this note explains why, as stated, they should be abandoned. Any ordinal utility function induces a rich quaternary relation. There is such a thing as ordinal utility differences. Furthermore, this induced quaternary relation respects, apart from completeness, the most standard structural properties of quaternary relations. These properties are, from an ordinal point of view, anything but arbitrary; from a quaternary perspective only completeness should be considered the hallmark—if any—of cardinal utility. These facts are explained to be especially relevant to the critical appreciation of the ordinalist methodology. (shrink)

Contrary to what many interpretations claim, according to Bayle faith does not completely eliminate reason. It intervenes to reveal factual truths that can only be known through revelation (for example, that God allowed Adam and Eve to sin). To these factual truths can be applied a rational principle (an axiomatic and evident one, according to Bayle, which he calls a "common notion"), namely, that "what God does is well done." God allowed sin, so we must think it was justified, even (...) if we don't understand why. This approach is what I call, cum grano salis, Pierre Bayle's theodicy. (shrink)

Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right represents a turning point in the philosophy of law and the state. In 14 original essays, this volume compiles a collaborative commentary that offers a differentiated interpretation of this controversial classic in legal philosophy. Ideally suited for seminar courses.

Pref. and introd. in English; text in Latin.

Schelling est le moins connu des " grands " philosophes : c'est que, sans doute, dans l'œuvre qu'il nous propose, il n'y a rien justement à connaître, aucun sens ultime et autonome qui puisse désormais se représenter, se résumer pour lui-même, se diffuser dans une quelconque postérité - rien d'autre que l'œuvre elle-même et le travail toujours recommencé de son impossible perfection. Pendant soixante années, de 1794 à 1854, qui sont les plus riches peut-être (parce que les dernières) de l'histoire (...) de la philosophie, une pensée a cherché à se clore, à se comprendre, à s'arrêter, sans cesser de se voir rouverte par l'effondrement (le retournement) des structures où elle avait cru s'équilibrer. Il a semblé à l'auteur de cette étude que ces ruines successives finissaient par présenter un tracé signifiant, comme si le véritable " système " de Schelling s'écrivait peu à peu, hors de la vue du philosophe, dans un autre espace qui est celui de l'histoire même de son œuvre, jusqu'au moment où, dans sa " dernière philosophie ", tout le passé contradictoire se récapitule et redevient contemporain au sein d'une construction qui se présente elle-même comme dédoublée et interminable. On trouvera ici l'histoire de cette formation, de ce destin que Schelling a patiemment enduré sans jamais chercher à l'interrompre de manière prématurée, et qui fait de lui une figure proprement exemplaire. Grâce à cette œuvre en effet, où la pensée apparaît perpétuellement replongée dans la profondeur parfois désespérante de son travail, il devient possible d'approcher d'un peu plus près " l'acte et le lieu " de la philosophie, partout ailleurs masqués par la perfection superficielle de son résultat ; par là même, au-delà de l'individu Schelling, c'est une question plus vaste qui se trouve posée - la question : Qu'est-ce qu'une œuvre philosophique? (shrink)

"Vous êtes perdus si vous oubliez que les fruits sont à tous et que la terre n'est à personne." Le Discours est une critique virulente et toujours actuelle d'une société où l'homme est dépossédé dès sa naissance de sa qualité d'homme. Il faut relire J.-J. Rousseau. Ses attaques contre le travail, la propriété et, en général, la vie sociale telle que nous la trouvons constituée dans un monde où nous sommes jetés sans l'avoir voulu ont, pour nos oreilles, des échos (...) à la fois très modernes et inattendus. La Reine fantasque est un conte "gai et fou". (shrink)

It is widely assumed that emotions are evaluative. Moreover, many authors suppose that emotions are important or valuable as evaluations. According to the currently dominant version of cognitivism, emotions are evaluative insofar as they make us aware of value properties of their intentional objects. In attributing to emotions an epistemic role, this view conceives of them as epistemically valuable. In this paper, I argue that proponents of this account mischaracterize the evaluative character of emotions and, a fortiori, their value. Moreover, (...) I propose an alternative view of emotional evaluation, according to which emotions are practically rather than epistemically important. As I argue, emotions are ways of acknowledging their intentional objects as (dis)valuable. As such, they do not apprehend values but make them count. I elaborate this idea by drawing an analogy with legal and political sanctions. The resulting view has it that emotions are practically important in that they affirm the cares and concerns which serve as standards of emotional evaluation. (shrink)

According to a well-known view in the philosophy of mind, intentional attitudes by their very nature satisfy requirements of rationality (e.g. Davidson 1980; Dennett 1987; Millar 2004). This view (which I shall call Constitutivism) features prominently as the ‘principle of minimal rationality’ in de Sousa’s monograph The Rationality of Emotion (1987). By explicating this principle in terms of the notion of the formal object of an attitude, de Sousa articulates an interesting and original version of Constitutivism, which differs in important (...) respects from other extant versions. In this paper, I explore this version of Constitutivism against the background of recent developments in the theory of rationality and make explicit its ramifications for the long-standing dispute over whether the mind is essentially normative. My focus will be on how to conceive of the form of the rationality requirements that attitudes as such must satisfy according to this principle. I argue that, although de Sousa seems officially to endorse a structuralist conception of rationality, according to which these requirements are requirements of coherence, his considerations on formal objects suggest that they are more aptly conceived in terms of a reasons-responsive conception of rationality. I further argue that which of these two readings we choose makes a significant difference to the prospect of vindicating the essential normativity of mind by invoking the principle of minimal rationality. (shrink)

Dans cette longue lettre à Benoît Peeters, Jean-Pierre Faye revient sur les péripéties de la fondation du Collège international de philosophie, sous l’égide de Jean-Pierre Chevènement alors ministre de la recherche, dans les années 1981-1982. Il laisse entendre quel rôle ambigu – et relativement peu élégant - a joué Derrida dans cette affaire de fondation. Mais la lettre pousse plus loin. Ces circonstances relatives à la création du Collège international de philosophie ne sont qu’un cadre narratif. Il s’agit (...) en fait de questionner l’origine des fameux concepts derridiens de « déconstruction » et de « logocentrisme ». En ce qui concerne « déconstruction », qui traduit l’usage du mot « Abbau » chez Heidegger, Jean-Pierre Faye en montre le contexte inquiétant : la pensée féroce de la « race » sous le Reich nazi. Quant au « logocentrisme », le nom et l’idée d’un combat à mener contre les prétentions de la raison (« logos ») naissent dans les feuilles d’un certain Ludwig Klages, psychiatre désigné par Goering lui-même comme « Reichsführer der Psychotherapie ». Führer de la psychothérapie... (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Quelle place accorder aujourd'hui aux religions dans les démocraties? Que peut-on espérer du dialogue entre croyants et non-croyants dans une société devenue plurielle et sécularisée? Quel rôle peut jouer la religion dans la modernité du XXIe siècle? Le philosophe français Jean-Marc Ferry prend à bras-le-corps ces questions difficiles, laissées en déshérence ou livrées aux excès de tous bords. Refusant les pièges d'un laïcisme souvent ignorant, tout comme les hégémonies religieuses, il reprend le fil (...) d'une longue tradition philosophique qui a toujours pris au sérieux la question religieuse, même quand elle s'y opposait. Dans ce livre qui fera date, le philosophe rassemble pour la première fois sous la forme d'une conversation l'ensemble de sa réflexion sur la religion dans la modernité. Au cours de sa réflexion, Jean-Marc Ferry invite à considérer les "Lumières de la religion", une expression malicieuse par laquelle il entend signifier que les religions ne sont pas en opposition avec la modernité. A la condition de devenir réflexives et critiques, et d'accepter les règles du jeu démocratique, elles peuvent apporter une précieuse participation à la vie commune, au bénéfice de tous.". (shrink)

Transhuman, or trans-human, is the concept of an intermediary form between human and posthuman. In other words, a transhuman is a being that resembles a human in most respects but who has powers and abilities beyond those of standard humans. These abilities might include improved intelligence, awareness, strength, or durability. Transhumans sometimes appear in science-fiction as cyborgs or genetically-enhanced humans. This book will look into the question "Can machines think?" followed by "Can humans extend their lifespan and keep up with (...) machines?" In other words, do we (humans) have to modify ourselves to be bionic humans, to co-exist and make the most of machines in future? (shrink)

L’usage de corpus n’est pas réservé aux linguistes. Néanmoins ceux-ci en sont des utilisateurs patentés, du fait, entre autres, que leurs analyses portent sur des productions linguistiques ou langagières non finies dont l’étude ne peut s’opérer que sur un échantillon. Mais pour que l’analyse prétende à quelque validité, cet échantillon doit être représentatif. Représentatif de quoi? D’une réalité qui à la fois préexiste à l’analyse et qu’il contribue à cerner et à établir. D’où toute une palette de corpus dont les (...) principaux types en usage dans la discipline, selon les matériaux utilisés, selon la clôture imaginée, selon la fonction assignée…, sont brièvement rappelés. La réflexion est ensuite centrée sur la délimitation de la place et de la fonction du corpus entre faits, analyses et théories ; il est montré, quelques exemples à l’appui, empruntés à la démarche du dialectologue et du lexicologue, que le corpus ne saurait être qu’un construit et que sa construction fait partie intégrante du prisme théorique à travers lequel le linguiste entend appréhender le réel. (shrink)

The implementation of a diplomacy that could put more emphasis on democracy and human rights was not an easy process in Belgium. Treatment of these matters have taken a different perspective in Zaïre, Rwanda and Burundi, Belgium 's three most important African partners. Reasons for that are twofold. Fore one thing, the Belgian foreign affairs service has always been overloaded by mercantile preoccupations. Secondly, knowledge on Africa has been limited to short circle diplomatic contacts while no instruments were ever implemented (...) that could have ensured some following up of the African civil society at large.In the future, the continuation for a slow process of disengagement might be foreseable. New "partners" might come to the forefront such as South Africa while the U.S. and international financial organisations will definitely try to impose "good governance" together with a reasonable dose of human rights. (shrink)

In reviewing the Belgian policy towards Zaïre for the last two decades, one is struck by a certain politica! as well as economic withdrawal which has become more obvious since the end of the sixties. In the context of the «Mobutu Plan», the Marshall Plan for Zaïre, or in that of the two Shaba upheavals, Belgium, unlike France with respect to its former colonies, has choosen to align itself with big powers policies and international organizations, and to avoid taking too (...) strong stands in the rather confuse situation which prevails in Zaïre today. Although unanimity does no langer exist among the various Belgian pressures groups about what is tobe done in Zaïre, the official policy of the government is entrenched in a «wait and see» attitude which points to the deepening contradictions within Western states towards Africa in general and Zaïre in particular. (shrink)

Que vaut le connaître humain? Telle est la question que ce présent texte essaie de traiter, en évitant à la fois les écueils du scepticisme et du dogmatisme, et en s'appuyant sur l'histoire et la sociologie des méthodes de recherche qu'utilisent les chercheurs et les scientifiques. Grâce à la notion de réalisme critique, l'auteur soutient une position dynamique sur l'exploration du vrai. En affirmant ainsi qu'il n'y a que du "provisoirement vrai", c'est un optimisme prudent et circonspect de la rationalité (...) humaine que ce texte nous invite à développer. (shrink)

Bringing together two aspects of Thomas Aquinas's thought that have been studied separately: his theory of God's concurrence and his theory of instrumental causality, I show how he uses the latter (which I discuss first) to clarify the Proclusian principle that the first cause has a greater influence on an effect than the proximate causes. Thanks to this theory, Aquinas accounts for the fact that it is God who confers existence to every new being that is produced by natural processes, (...) without however negating the agency of secondary, created causes. (shrink)

This entirely new English translation of Buridan's classic treatment of logical consequence aims to make accessible to the modern reader the foremost treatment of the subject in the middle ages. The translation is accompanied by an introduction in which Buridan's ideas are set in their historical context and clearly explained.

Abstract: In this article we introduce an input-oriented democratic innovation – that we term ‘TaxTrack’ – which offers individual taxpayers the means to engage with their political economies in three ways. After joining the TaxTrack program, an individual can: (1) see and understand how much, and what types, of taxes they have contributed, (2) see and understand how their tax contributions are, or have been, used, and (3) control what their tax contributions can, or cannot, be spent on. We explain (...) this democratic innovation in two ways. The first is through evocation to prefigure what the innovation could look like in future practise which raises the prospects for both good and problematic outcomes. The second is through formal theory to produce a detailed model of the innovation to assist theory building. We conclude by discussing three interactive outcomes of ‘TaxTrack’ through the democratic innovations literature to establish the beginnings of a theory for the model. This theory tells us that ‘TaxTrack’ can return benefits to its users and the democratic regimes in which they are located but it may also place restrictions on output-oriented innovations like Participatory Budgeting. (shrink)

Im Folgenden stellen wir drei aktuelle Forschungsbereiche zur formalen Logik bei Kant allgemeinverständlich dar und greifen dabei auf die trans zendentale Logik nur dann zurück, wenn sie ein besseres Verständnis der formalen Logik ermöglicht: Zunächst wird Kants Beitrag zur Rezeption und Weiterentwicklung von Euler-artigen Diagrammen dargestellt. Diese Diagramme wurden in den 1990er Jahren wiederentdeckt, als formales System interpretiert und werden heute insbes. in der Didaktik, in den Kognitionswissenschaften, in der Linguistik, in KI-Bereichen wie der (Logik-basierten) Wissensrepräsentation eingesetzt, und auch in (...) der Philosophie verwendet (Kapitel 2). Mehrere Studien haben in den letzten Jahren gezeigt, dass Kant in weiten Teilen seines Systems Oppositionsverhältnisse verwendet, die der Struktur des logischen Quadrats entsprechen. Das logische Quadrat ist heute Gegenstand intensiver Forschung, da es neben der klassischen, auch die paravollständige und parakonsistente Negation abbildet (Kap. 3). Jüngst wurde zudem die Implementierbarkeit der kantischen Logik in ein formalisiertes deduktives System bewiesen. Die Bedeutung dieses Ergebnisses wird insbesondere im Hinblick auf die formalisierte Umsetzung der Sätze vom Widerspruch, vom zureichenden Grund und der Ausschließung des Mittleren erläutert (Kap. 4). Abschließend möchten wir ein paar Perspektiven für die Forschung zur formalen Logik bei Kant nennen (Kap. 5). -- -/- Note: No financial support acknowledged by the second autor (S. Kovač). (shrink)

Consider a subjective expected utility preference relation. It is usually held that the representations which this relation admits differ only in one respect, namely, the possible scales for the measurement of utility. In this paper, I discuss the fact that there are, metaphorically speaking, two additional dimensions along which infinitely many more admissible representations can be found. The first additional dimension is that of state-dependence. The second—and, in this context, much lesser-known—additional dimension is that of act-dependence. The simplest implication of (...) their usually neglected existence is that the standard axiomatizations of subjective expected utility fail to provide the measurement of subjective probability with satisfactory behavioral foundations. (shrink)

L’anthropologie ne cesse aujourd’hui de déconstruire les processus d’essentialisation de divers groupes sociaux dans une visée critique et politique. À la suite du tournant ontologique, certains travaux entendent désormais dépasser, dans une visée inclusive, les distinctions d’essences et les typologies d’espèces pour décrire le continuum des agency entre des existants que la modernité aurait séparés. Mais ces approches d’inspiration animiste, et que je nomme la nouvelle métaphysique en anthropologie, n’exploitent qu’une modalité possible de la relation homme-animal. À l’aune de certaines (...) pratiques Mursi, une population agro-pastorale du sud-ouest éthiopien, je présente donc une autre modalité de la relation homme-animal, agençant de manière originale les espèces humaines et bovines : bien que partageant une essence commune, il n’y a pas d’extension anthropomorphe de la subjectivité, et les bovins ne sont pas des sujets équivalents en morale ou en droit. (shrink)

Préface à l’édition des notes préparatoires de Michel Henry pour son dernier ouvrage Paroles du Christ.

La maturation temporelle se poursuit jusqu'au moment où l'esprit se dégage du corps vivant et du corps social, double matière à travers laquelle il a pris conscience de soi dans le cosmos. Alors, il laisse pour ainsi dire procéder hors de lui le corps vivant et le personnage, ces deux enveloppes sur lesquelles il avait pu marquer son caractère, mais qu'il n'était pas : c'est ce que nous nommons la mort. Ce passage à quelque autre mode d'existence, qui n'est pas (...) concevable pour nous, doit correspondre dans la conscience à un sentiment de présence absolue à soi-même. Lorsque dans le même moment l'être biologique et l'être social échappent à la personne spirituelle, celle-ci s'éternise. A l'inverse de ce qui se passait dans la contamination, le courant d'éternité qui était impuissant dans la vie temporelle doit absorber la succession. Enfin, la dissociation s'opère. C'est alors que le temps disparaît ou plutôt qu'il s'accomplit. (shrink)

Cet article, introductif à la publication de textes inédits de Michel Henry sur l’expérience d’autrui, souhaite présenter le « modèle » d’intersubjectivité proposé par ce dernier. L’objectif est d’en indiquer les grandes lignes, non seulement pour montrer que la philosophie henryenne du christianisme répond à certaines difficultés encore prégnantes dans ses écrits de jeunesse, mais aussi et surtout pour souligner combien, à cinquante années de distance, elle résonne avec eux, tant dans la manière dont s’y trouvait posé le problème d’autrui (...) que dans les solutions qui y étaient déjà préesquissées. Aussi leur publication permet-elle d’attester au moins une chose : la continuité, la profonde unité de l’œuvre de Michel Henry. (shrink)